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REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?
Aviva Abramovsky*
***

This article suggests that a discussion on insurance regulation
should include a consideration of the effect that reinsurance may
have on the behavior of insurers. The traditional types of
reinsurance are reviewed, and the ability of private reinsurance
contracts to produce insurer action is considered. If reinsurance is
not included in a holistic examination of the field, its realities have
the capacity to misdirect insurance regulatory assumptions.
Moreover, reinsurance works as a source of independent and often
unexamined contractual influence on insurer activity, and as a
potential source of interference with regulatory proposals. Even
though reinsurance is initiated by private contract, those contracts
have the potential for regulatory effect sufficient to provide a positive
answer to this Essay’s main query: may reinsurance correctly be
termed a “silent regulator”?
***
“The first principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write
rules; and markets develop ways to circumvent these rules without
violating them.”1

*

Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The author would
like to thank the Searle Center for its generous support of this research and for the
author’s inclusion in its symposium. The author would like to recognize the staff
of the H. Douglas Barclay Law Library at the Syracuse University College of Law
for their invaluable help in producing this work.
1

Allan H. Meltzer, Regulatory Overkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008 at A14.
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INTRODUCTION

When evaluating the efficacy of insurance regulation, the nature
and availability of reinsurance is not often considered.2 Yet, as “the
insurance of insurance companies”3, reinsurance should not be so quickly
dismissed as irrelevant in the regulatory discussion.4 Just as insurance is
often viewed as having a regulatory effect on insured industries, so too
should reinsurance be considered as having a regulatory effect on its
reinsureds.
Initially, a brief discussion of the concept of regulation is
necessary.
The term “regulation” commonly evokes thoughts of
governmental action and visions of the regulatory state. For good or ill,
thoughts of regulation are usually linked with thoughts of state power. Yet
such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and ignores the capacity
of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths of social
actors. This ability has led to the development of a fascinating body of
literature which examines the myriad ways private or quasi-private
insurance can regulate private behavior. With the concept of power not
limited to overt government action alone, insurance takes its place among
regulators of social behaviors with surprising force and scope. Indeed, it
has been stated that “looking at twentieth century governance, it is
tempting to see insurance as the sleeping giant of power.” 5
Identifying insurance as a private regulator stems from the idea that
insurance works as a mechanism to set social standards. Insurance is an
2

This is not overly surprising since, as one commentator noted, “development
of reinsurance in the United States has, for much of its history, gone largely
unrecorded.” See William Hoffman, Facultative Reinsurance Contract Formation,
Documentation, and Integration, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 763, 777 (20022003).
3

See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996).

4

See Gary Marchitello, Ignore Reinsurance at Your Peril, RISK MGMT. MAG.,
Dec. 2007, at 46 (“Discounting the importance of the vital role of reinsurance in
risk spreading and how the pricing, stability and capacity of reinsurance can
influence the viability of one’s own direct insurance purchases can be a critical and
potentially costly mismanagement.”).
5

See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 12 (2002).
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acknowledged gatekeeper of many economic activities, from buying a
home to driving a car to executing a complex financial transaction. Some
of this regulatory effect results from a direct delegation of state power by
mandating the purchase of insurance as a prerequisite to such things as
operating a car or entering a certain business, much, however, does not.
When insurance is purchased without governmental compulsion, the nature
of the obligations acquired alongside the indemnity function of insurance
can be viewed as a form of “private legislation” within the regime of
traditional notions of liberal governance.6
The corollary of the idea of insurance as private regulator of
policyholders is to consider the concept of reinsurance as a source of
private regulation of reinsured insurance companies. In effect, if insurance
is a “sleeping giant of power”, how much more so is the power of
reinsurers to affect the behavior and choices of insurers themselves?
Through this vantage point, the reinsurance relationship begins to emerge
as a subject requiring careful review and analysis in the regulatory context.
Though purely private in origin7 and function,8 reinsurance of insurance

6

Id. at 13.

7

See 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: SEPARATE LINES
OF INSURANCE, § 40.01, at 6 (2007) (“The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by
a written contract reflecting the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts
between different cedents and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes,
the wording of particular provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties’
specific needs, customs and practices.”).
8

See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 142(d), at
1021 (4th ed. 2007) (“In many respects, the relationship between primary insurer
and reinsurer tracks that of the original insured and the primary insurer. The
primary insurer and reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and
the reinsurer will have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, fraud, or concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer’s acts
or neglect giv e rise to the defense.”). See also STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., 1A COUCH
ON INSURANCE § 9:17 (3d ed. 2008) (“Duties of good faith and fair dealing run
between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial insured
and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer’s need to rely upon
and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling
claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Accordingly,
this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which
may affect the subject risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related
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policies is common practice of the domestic insurance industry.9 For
reasons described below, the benefits of reinsurance to an insurer are
manifold10 and the likelihood that an insurer will seek reinsurance at some
point great.11 Hence the function of this Essay: to determine whether
concept that reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith decision
to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’ doctrine.”).
9

Though reinsurance agreements may use any language the parties may
choose to effectuate their agreements, commonly found reinsurance clauses
abound. See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 15.03(b), at 997 (12th ed. 2003) (“Reinsurance treaties
may contain ‘follow the fortunes,’ ‘errors and omissions,’ ‘notice,’ ‘arbitration,’
‘claims cooperation,’ ‘salvage and subrogation,’ ‘allocation of expenses,’ ‘extra
contractual obligations,’ ‘punitive damages’ and/or ‘cut through clauses.’ The
wording of these clauses in different reinsurance certificates and treaties can also
vary substantially.”).
10

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Fundamentals of Property
and Casualty Reinsurance 4 (2009) http://www.reinsurance.org/files/
public/07FundamentalsandGlossary1.pdf
(“Reinsurance provides protection
against catastrophic loss in much the same way it helps stabilize an insurer’s loss
experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect against catastrophes in two ways.
First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic financial loss resulting from a single
event, such as the total fire loss of a large manufacturing plant. Second,
reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of many smaller claims resulting
from a single event, such as an earthquake or major hurricane, that affects many
policyholders simultaneously.
While the insurer is able to cover losses
individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer wishes to retain.”).
11

See Anna Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance Models for
FDIC Insurance Pricing, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 742-43 (1994-1995)
(“Reinsurance is sought by primary insurers for various reasons. From an
economic standpoint, reinsurance permits an efficient specialization of skills. In a
simplified world, primary insurers are small, local, and specialized; reinsurers, on
the other hand, are well capitalized international corporations with highly
diversified risk portfolios. Primary insurers, because of their proximity to and
knowledge of the insured, have an advantage over reinsurers in soliciting
customers, pricing policies, and monitoring insureds for moral hazard. Reinsurers,
on the other hand, have advantages in raising capital and diversifying and
managing risk, particularly the risk of a catastrophe which might bankrupt a small
private insurer. Insurers, therefore, can trade their advantages in pricing and moral
hazard monitoring for the greater risk-bearing capacity of the reinsurer. Primary
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reinsurance can properly be understood as a little acknowledged and “silent
regulator” of the insurance industry.
To that end, Section II of this article will describe what reinsurance
is and why insurers seek it. Section III will explore the main purposes of
reinsurance. Section IV will review various ways reinsurance has the
capacity to influence certain insurance industry behaviors. This will
include a review of reinsurance’s effects on reinsured’s underwriting and
claims handling practices, along with a discussion of general consumer
protection issues. Section V will offer a conclusion.
Before beginning that discussion, it is important to note that
insurance is not, of course, an unregulated industry, though it is the only
major financial industry regulated primarily at the state level. State
regulators coordinate their efforts through the highly competent National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).12 Moreover, these state
regulators share identifiable and reasonably identical goals in the
performance of their duties. Among these are the promotion of competitive
and sound insurance markets and the enforcement of insurance laws to
assure consumers of fair treatment and protection from unfair trade
practices13 Throughout the course of this Essay, therefore, mention will be

insurers also may find reinsurance necemeeting regulatory restrictions that limit
exposure to any individual risk. By retaining only a portion of each insured risk,
the insurer is able to insure a greater variety of risks with the same amount of
capital, assuming that state regulators permit it to subtract reinsured risk from its
reserve requirements.”).
12

See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
13

Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest,
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of
Insurance describes its mission as follows:
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient manner which
promotes a competitive and financially sound insurance market for
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made of reinsurance’s potential as a source of support or hindrance to
insurance regulatory interests. Such review gains added importance with
the recognition that, other than as regards some issues of solvency, the
reinsurance industry is generally unregulated at all. 14
II.

REINSURANCE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY HAVE IT?

At its most reductive, reinsurance is a relatively straightforward
financial transaction by which an insurance company is indemnified for all
or a portion of some risk by another insurer.15 This risk transfer, just as
with common consumer or commercial insurance policies, is effectuated by
contract, with the reinsurance agreement mainly subject to ordinary
contract rules and doctrine. Some practices of reinsurance contract
interpretation are distinct from the practices used in interpreting a more
common insurance policy, but at this juncture it is sufficient to recognize
that reinsurance is a creature of contract.16

consumers, and by enforcing the insurance laws to ensure that
consumers are treated fairly and are protected from unfair practices.
Connecticut Department of Insurance: Our Mission Statement (Aug. 25,
2008), http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.
14

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (“Since
reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency, it safeguards the validity of
reinsurance policies and, at the same time, maintains flexibility in the business of
reinsurance. By focusing on the reinsurer, rather than on the reinsurance contract,
primary insurance companies are allowed to purchase reinsurance to suit their
particular business needs. Of course, reinsurance contracts are entered into by two
or more insurance companies – the reinsurer(s) and the insurer(s). Recognizing
that there are always some exceptions to the rule, the two companies are generally
expected to be knowledgeable about the insurance business. Therefore, the
oversight necessary in primary insurance to protect consumer interests is not
essential in the reinsurance business.”) (emphasis added).
15

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 (“Reinsurance is essentially a
form of insurance for insurance companies.”).
16

PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:6. (“Although some rules of construction do not
apply to contracts in the reinsurance context, the general rules of contract do apply
to reinsurance contracts.”).

2009]

REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?

351

A. WHAT IS REINSURANCE?
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the study of reinsurance stems
from the particularly opaque and obscure language endemic to the
industry.17 Some discussion of terms is necessary. As reinsurance involves
a minimum of two insurance companies, different terms have developed to
identify the various parties.18 The original insurer who acquired the risk or
liability is referred to by a variety of designations, including that of direct
or initial insurer and sometimes, though less commonly, as the primitive
insurer.19 However designated, once it has entered into an agreement with
a new insurer for the purpose of reinsurance, the original insurer is
thereafter most commonly referred to as the reinsured.20 Though that
seems clear enough, the original insurer is frequently referred to by another
more exotic definition, that of cedent.21 This designation stems from the
idea that the function of reinsurance is for the original insurer to “cede” a
certain amount of its business to the reinsurer, hence the term cedent.22
17

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140(a), at 1015 (“The business of reinsurance
has developed some special terminology.”). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01, at § 40.05 (2007) (“Reinsurance, like
many areas of business law, has a language of its own.”).
18

See PLITT, supra note 8, § 9:2 (“There are two parties to a reinsurance
agreement, but these parties have been bestowed with multiple names which are
used interchangeably and are all accurate.”).
19

See GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE § 1:1, at 3 (Supp.
2008) (“The original insurer, sometimes called the direct, or initial, insurer, and
occasionally the primitive insurer, is commonly called the reinsured or, especially
in England, the reassured.”).
20

See OSTRAGER, supra note 10, § 15.01(c), at 992 (noting a ceding insurer or
reinsured is “the insurer that transfers all or a portion of the risk it underwrites to a
reinsurer.”).
21

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 3 (“The reinsured is said to cede
business to the reinsurer, or reassurer, and is therefore also referred to as the ceding
company or the cedent (or cedant).”). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.01 (“The insurance company purchasing
reinsurance is called the ‘ceding company’ (or the ‘cedent’ (or ‘cedant’),
‘reinsured’ or ‘ceding insurer’) because it ‘cedes’ or transfers part of the risk.”).
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Likewise, a reinsurer may itself seek reinsurance, called retrocessions, in
the same forms and for the same purposes as any other insurers.23 Hence,
the reinsurer of a reinsurer is often called a retrocessionaire.24
As a descriptive matter, reinsurance is inherently a contract of
insurance, albeit a secondary one.25 Reinsurance is commonly defined as a
contract “by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against
loss or liability by reason of such original insurance.”26 More generally,
22

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1054 (“The act of transferring the risk
is called ‘ceding,’ and the portion of the risk passed to the reinsurer is called the
‘cession.’”).
23

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:3 (The retrocessional agreement, like any other
reinsurance agreement, is a contract and will be effective according to its terms.
These terms need not mirror the specific risks of the reinsurance agreement which
it is reinsuring. As can quickly be deduced, with the expansion of the insuring
scenario from one to three or more separate agreements, all of which may cover
different risks and have different exclusions, the resolution of indemnity
responsibility can easily become complex).
24

The preponderance of French terminology likely arises from the early
statutory action by the French Courts in the reinsurance business. For instance,
notice of the 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV provided that:
The insurers may reinsure with others the effects they may have insured, and
the insured may likewise cause to be insured the premium of insurance, and the
solvency of the insurers.
STARING, supra note 20,§ 1:4, at 6 (providing translation of Article XX, Title
Sixth of the 1681 Ordonnance).
25

PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer
transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a
separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the
premium . . . While reinsurance technically qualifies as insurance, it is a contract
for indemnity rather than liability.”).
26

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:1, at 2 (This definition allows for the
inclusion of both an existing policy or contract of reinsurance and assumes that the
requirements of the contract are met. A “reinsurance policy” can therefore simply
be understood as a “contract for indemnity one insurer makes with another to
protect the insurer from risks already assumed.” Likewise a treaty looking forward
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reinsurance includes all contractual arrangements where one insurance
company transfers to another all or some portion of the risk it underwrites
to another insurer.27 Thus, the common refrain that reinsurance is
insurance for insurance companies.28
One of the hardships in understanding reinsurance is that the term
is sometimes used over-broadly and applied to relationships which are best
understood as something other than a commonly accepted definition of
reinsurance.29 Reinsurance is best understood as distinct from coto reinsure would constitute reinsurance, though such agreement may be better
understood as a contract for reinsurance, rather than a contract of reinsurance. In
either case, reinsurance policies, reinsurance treaties on specific classes of risk and
reinsurance treaties entered into for future acquired risk would all come within the
heading of reinsurance); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01, at 990.
27

See Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); OSTRAGER
& NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[a], at 990.
28

See Cont’l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd., et al., 77 F.3d 16, 17, 20 (2d
Cir. 1996). In that case, the Second Circuit offered an additional colorful and
intuitive explanation of reinsurance adopted in a New York Court of Appeals
decision of the late 1930’s. See id. at 17. (discussing People ex. rel. Sea Ins. Co. v.
Graves, 274 N.Y. 312, 15 (1937)) (The concept of reinsurance “dates back to the
time the first bookie, fearful that he could not cover all his bets in the event he
were to lose, decided to spread his risk ‘laying-off’ the risk by getting other
bookies to share his exposure.”). Though colorful, that assessment is not entirely
accurate. The earliest recordings of the use of reinsurance likely predated the
iteration of the modern bookie and has been historically identified as predating the
17th century. See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4, at 5-6 (“The earliest recorded
instance is said to have been a policy written on a voyage from Genoa to Sluys and
reinsured for the more hazardous portion, from Cardiz to Sluys, the insurer
retaining the Mediterranean portion of the risk.”). The New York courts were not
altogether mistaken as England likely recognized the relationship between
insurance and speculation in the 18th Century and prohibited marine reinsurance by
the Marine Act of 1745. Addressing that Parliamentary Act, Lord Mansfield noted
that, “The statute doubtless was intended to prevent gambling. I suppose that the
mischief was that policies were underwritten at one premium and reassurance
affected at another.” In Re Norwich Equitable Fire Assurance Soc’y 57 LT REP.
241, 243 (1887).
29

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1053 (“Reinsurance should not be
confused with the situation where one insured takes out two or more policies
covering the same risk with two or more insurers. Also, reinsurance should not be
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insurance, the proper term for the relationship which forms when separate
insurers, either jointly or severally, assume direct shares of a given risk; in
such cases where all the insurers have a direct relationship with the insured,
the relationship is not within the traditional understanding of reinsurance.30
Likewise, reinsurance should be distinguished from banking even though it
may assist in the reinsured’s financing and allow for insurance loss
amortization.31
In a true reinsurance contract, the risk indemnified is the risk that
the insurer will have to pay on the underlying insured risk.32 Reinsurance
is an aspect of insurance and, to the extent that it is regulated at all, is
regulated under the rubric of insurance.
By entering into a contract to
reinsure, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for any
liability incurred by the insurer that is covered by the reinsurance
confused with the situation where the insured cancels one policy and substitutes
another for it . . . Reinsurance only exists where a primary insurer becomes a
‘reinsured’ by entering into a contract with another insurer, the ‘reinsurer.’”).
30

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:5, at 9-10 (“Reinsurance is not
coinsurance, which is the relationship that results when separate insurers, either
severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a given risk; in that case, all the
insurers have a direct contract with the insured. It also is not a partnership, coventure, or syndication, even though the contract may contain clauses creating or
permitting joint responsibilities or control, as well as joint loss, since true
reinsurance lacks essential characteristics of those relationships.”).
31

Id. at 10 (“Neither is reinsurance banking, although it performs a function of
banking by providing the amortization of insurance losses and may, in effect,
finance the growth of the reinsured.”).
32

Risk is transferred by a variety of financial transactions, not all, or even
most of which, constitute insurance. Though insurance itself remains a somewhat
elusive definitional concept, the indemnity function, particularly when combined
with some aspect of fortuity is often seen as core insurance principles. See PLITT,
supra note 9, § 9:24. (“Because the reinsurance agreement is a contract of
indemnity, the liability of the reinsurer is inextricably tied to the loss of the
reinsured.”); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[a], at 990; Travelers
Idem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1995) (Reinsurance is
generally understood as a contract for indemnity not one of liability); Transcont’l
Underwriters Agency v. Am. Agency Underwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.2 (3d Cir.
1982).
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agreement.33 Importantly for our later discussions, the liabilities covered
under a reinsuring agreement can extend beyond the cost of direct losses
accrued by the cedent insurer’s policyholder under the original policy to
include such things as the cedent’s costs of investigation and settlement of
claims.34 Examples of other potentially indemnified insurer losses can
even include losses arising from the reinsured’s own bad faith – such as
“judgments in excess of loss” costs and extracontractual, tortious bad faith
liability.35
B. A BRIEF TAXONOMY OF REINSURANCE
As reinsurance is a contractual arrangement, the nature, complexity
and terms of many contracts stray from the standardization common among
primary insurance policies.36 In fact, because of reinsurance’s remarkable
flexibility and its capacity to take on a large variety of risk types and risk
levels, the policies vary in their purposes and specifics.37 The terms of the
reinsurance contract and the terms of the policies reinsured determines the
scope of the indemnity offered by the reinsurer.38 The contracts reflect the
business needs of sophisticated commercial entities and, as such, the terms,
33

PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:24 (“It is the language of the reinsurance contract
that will ultimately determine the extent of the reinsurer’s liability to the reinsured.
In other words, the sustaining of a loss by the original insured cannot create
liability for the reinsurer extending beyond the terms of its contract”). See also
STARING, supra note 20, § 15:1, at 1 (“It does not necessarily follow that, where
the first insurer is liable, the reinsurer is also liable. Whether or not the reinsurer is
liable depends upon the terms of the contract of reinsurance.”).
34

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:30.

35

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 16.06[a], at 1045-1048.

36

See id. § 15.03[b], at 997 (“Reinsurance treaties and certificates vary
considerably in their language and terms of coverage”).
37

Id. (“Reinsurance treaties may contain ‘follow the fortunes,’ ‘errors and
omissions,’ ‘notice,’ ‘arbitration,’ ‘claims cooperation,’ ‘salvage and subrogation,’
‘allocation of expenses,’ ‘extra contractual obligations,’ ‘punitive damages’ and/or
‘cut through clauses.’ The wording of these clauses in different reinsurance
certificates and treaties can also vary substantially.”).
38
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).
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conditions and costs of a reinsurance contract are all negotiable.39 Various
clauses such as “follow the forms” and “follow the settlements”40 or
clauses for “extracontractual damages”41, all discussed later in further
detail, are common to many reinsurance contracts. The interaction of
various clauses and the reciprocal obligations of good faith will be
discussed in Section IV as we review the performance standards required
by the reinsurance agreement. First, in order to understand the purposes of
reinsurance, we review a few of the common types of arrangements
common to those agreements. 42

39

See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at
40.01 (“The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by a written contract reflecting
the negotiated terms. Although reinsurance contracts between different cedents
and reinsurers can include clauses with similar purposes, the wording of particular
provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties’ specific needs, customs
and practices.”).
40

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 31 (noting
“‘follow the settlements’ generally provides that a reinsurer must cover settlements
made by the reinsured in a business like manner, provided the settlement is
arguably within the terms of the reinsured’s policy and the reinsurance agreement
and the settlement is not affected by fraud, collusion or bad faith. It is an
expectation that the reinsurer will abide by the reinsured’s good faith determination
to settle, rather than litigate, claims under a reinsured policy and not relitigate a
reinsured’s settlements ceded to the reinsurance agreement. The term is often used
interchangeably with follow the fortunes, and there may be overlap between the
affect of follow the settlements and follow the fortunes when the ‘risk’ is what
generated the loss. Follow the settlements is focused on ‘loss settlement’, not
necessarily tied to a ‘risk determination’ arising out of follow the fortunes.”).
41

Id. at 29 (noting the definition of the term extra-contractual obligations as
“in reinsurance, monetary awards or settlements against an insurer for its alleged
wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments required of an insurer to its
insured are extra-contractual in that they are not covered in the underlying
contract.”).
42

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:3 (“There are two broad categories of
reinsurance agreements: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance.”).
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i. Facultative Reinsurance
Facultative reinsurance is the most discrete form of reinsurance,
and generally accepted as the likely original form of reinsurance.43
Facultative reinsurance policies take their name because the contracts allow
the reinsurance company to use its “faculties” or reason to choose to
reinsure a specific risk, a specific policy, or a specific group of policies.44
The ceding insurer and reinsurer agree to the terms and conditions of each
individual contract.45 In these contracts, the reinsurer often conducts its
own underwriting to determine the appropriate premium level.46
Facultative reinsurance contracts provide reinsurance for the unusual; they
also have the greatest specific effect on the cost of covering unusual or

43

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 (“Facultative reinsurance of a single risk,
which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the last half of
the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract covering more
than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties became common
around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the excess of loss
treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San Francisco
earthquake and fire of 1906”).
44

See JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054 (“Facultative reinsurance
involves the primary insurer entering into an agreement for the reinsurance of a
particular risk. The reinsurance can be written on a pro rata or an excess basis; the
root word “faculty” denotes that the reinsurer has a choice of accepting or rejecting
any risk proposed and of demanding whatever premium it thinks appropriate.”).
45

See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at §
40.04[1] (“The reinsurer and cedent negotiate the terms for each facultative
certificate.”). See also STARING, supra note 20, at §2:2 (“The prospective
reinsured, either directly or through a broker, presents the direct policy terms, or a
summary of them, and the proposal for reinsurance. If it is accepted at a
satisfactory premium, a contract is made. Other terms are negotiated to the
satisfaction of both parties.”).
46

See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6 (“The reinsurer will always have at least
a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s underwriting
and claims practices.”). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE, supra note 8, § 40.04[1] (“Facultative reinsurance is commonly purchased
for large, unusual or catastrophic risks. Reinsurers thus must have the necessary
resources to underwrite individual risks carefully.”).
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low-incidence risks.47 Likewise, with its ability to allow reinsurers to
engage in significant underwriting operations prior to placing the policy,
facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic or other low
incidence – high loss risks.48 Individual risk facultative reinsurance may be
used in tandem with the second variety of reinsuring agreements, the
treaty.49
ii. Treaty Reinsurance
Treaties are broad agreements that reinsure multiple contracts,
often contracts that have yet to be written by the direct insurer.50 Usually,
treaties cover some portion or class of business of the direct insurer and
historically may cover a long period of time, usually renewable on a fairly
automatic basis unless one of the parties seeks a new term.51 Treaties are
47

See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:3, at 4 (“Once, no doubt, all reinsurance
was facultative. With the rise of treaties, they account for great amounts of
reinsurance but facultative reinsurance, which requires individual attention to
underwriting, remains very important for businesses that fall outside the bounds of
a treaty reinsurance program. The reinsured may want to meet competition and
enter into new lines in which it has no expertise but can gain it through initially
taking risks and obtaining facultative reinsurance from those who have experience.
The reinsured may need facultative reinsurance where the risk falls under an
exclusion in its treaties, either as to type or amount, or because the risk, although
routine in nature, present a very high loss exposure. In the end, all these uses serve
the general purpose of reinsurance to provide stability and promote growth.”).
48

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.01[b] (“The availability of
reinsurance enables an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its
underwriting capacity by allowing the ceding insurer to ‘lay-off’ on reinsurers a
portion of the risk of loss. Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of
catastrophic losses among a larger pool of insurers.”).
49

See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, supra note 8, at §
40.04[1].
50
51

JERRY supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054.

Id. (“Most reinsurance is treaty reinsurance. The treaty arrangement,
sometimes called “automatic reinsurance,” involves a commitment of a reinsurer to
assume part of the risk of the primary insurer, either on a pro rata or an excess
basis, for a stated period.”).
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particularly useful reinsuring mechanisms since they can be structured to
reinsure losses on direct insurance which either were written during the
term of the treaty but occur later, or they can be structured to reinsure
losses that occur during the term of treaty but were written earlier.52
Likewise, the premiums may be calculated in a variety of ways including
structuring the reinsurance premium in some way directly related to the
premiums on the underlying policies or assigning a single sum or some
other variable amount as the parties wish and which reflect their business
purposes.53 Generally speaking, the treaty reinsurance contract forms when
the original insurer cedes part of the premiums for its policies and the risk
of losses on those policies to the reinsurer.54 Treaty reinsurance usually
involves multiple reinsurers taking part of a book of the business’ risks,
with each agreeing to assume a portion of the risk in some pre-determined
manner.55
Importantly, reinsurance treaties cover all risks written by the
reinsured that fall within their terms unless specifically excluded.56 For this
reason, treaty reinsurers generally do not review the individual risks
underlying the treaty and do not conduct their own underwriting of the
52

See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:4, at 4-5.

53

Id. at 5 (“Depending again on its structure and purpose, the premiums may
be directly related to the premiums on the underlying insurance or may be lump
sums, or variable amounts, not based on direct participation in the underlying
premiums.”).
54

OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.03[a], at 996. (“The reinsurer,
under a single contract, agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer with respect to an
entire ‘book’ of the ceding insurer’s underwriting activities for designated lines of
insurance. A treaty reinsurance contract is formed when the primary insurer cedes
part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on those policies to a
reinsurer.”).
55

Id. (“Arrangements typically involve the participation of numerous
reinsurers, each agreeing to assume a percentage of the total liability under a single
treaty.”).
56

See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, §
40.04, at 17. (“Reinsurance treaties cover all of the risks written by the ceding
insurer that fall within their terms unless exposures are specifically excluded.
Thus, in most cases, neither the cedent nor the reinsurer has the ‘faculty’ to
exclude from a treaty a risk that fits within the treaty terms.”).
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risks.57 Rather, they rely on the underwriting experience of the original
insurer, with a prudent reinsurer investigating the underwriting philosophy,
loss experience, attitude towards claims management and other business
Facultative reinsurance can be combined with treaty
practices.58
reinsurance to cover exclusions in the treaty or for other business purposes,
some of which we explore later.59
iii. The Verticals and Horizontals of Reinsurance: Prorata and Excess of Loss
Again, we recognize along with the United States Supreme Court
that:
In indemnity reinsurance . . . [the reinsurer] agrees to
indemnify, or reimburse, the ceding company for a
specified percentage of the claims and expenses
attributable to claims that have been reinsured.60

57

Id. (“Treaty reinsurers rely heavily on the cedent’s underwriting.”).

58

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 7. (“While
treaty reinsurance does not require review of individual risks by the reinsurer, it
demands a careful review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and historical
experience of the ceding insurer, including a thoughtful evaluation of the
company’s attitude toward claims management, engineering control, as well as the
management’s general background, expertise and planned objectives.”).
59

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29, 54.
(Noting the definition of treaty reinsurance is “is a reinsurance contract under
which the reinsured company agrees to cede and the reinsurer agrees to assume
risks of a particular class or classes of businesses” and the definition of facultative
reinsurance is “reinsurance of individual risks by offer and acceptance wherein the
reinsurer retains the ability to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding
company.”).
60

Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 491 U.S. 244, 247 (1989). See
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).
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The insured’s indemnification by the reinsured need not be total or
complete.61 In fact, the ability of reinsurers to take only a portion of a risk
or book of risks is one of the particularly useful risk spreading-elements of
reinsurance.62 There is nothing to prevent a single reinsurer from taking all
indemnity responsibility for a policy or group of policies, but most
reinsuring agreements take responsibility for only a portion of those
losses.63 Traditionally, the responsibilities divide into two basic divisional
structures most easily visualized as either a vertical or horizontal slicing up

61

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1
(“Reinsurance is a transaction in which one insurance company indemnifies, for a
premium, another insurance company against all or part of the loss that it may
sustain under its policy or policies of insurance”).
62

Id. (“The fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk so that no
single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its ability to pay, is
enhanced by reinsurance.”). See also NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE, supra note 8 (“Reinsurance relationships can be simple or complex. A
cedent can cede certain loss exposures under one contract or purchase several
contracts covering different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve the
desired degree of coverage. A layering process involving two or more reinsurance
agreements is commonly employed to obtain sufficient monetary limits of
reinsurance protection. When a claim is presented, the reinsurers respond in a
predetermined order to cover the loss.”).
63

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:1, at 3-4 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby
one insurer transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has
assumed under a separate or distinct policy or group of policies in exchange for a
portion of the premium.”).
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of the losses from particular risks assumed.64 Both facultative and treaty
reinsurance can be written in either a pro-rata or excess of loss basis.65
C. PRO-RATA AND EXCESS OF LOSS
If a reinsurer does not want indemnification responsibility for an
entire risk classification or group of policies, it can structure the treaty to
take on only a specific portion of each risk to which it applies.66 Using a
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding
insurer for a percentage of original risk losses in exchange for a
corresponding portion of the premium.67 Generally, pro-rata agreements
64

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1
(“Reinsurance may be written on either a proportional basis or excess of loss basis.
A reinsurance contract written on a proportional basis simply prorates all
premiums, losses and expenses between the insurer and the reinsurer on a prearranged basis. The proportional approach is used extensively in property
reinsurance. Excess of loss contracts, on the other hand, require the primary
insurer to keep all losses up to a predetermined level of retention, and the reinsurer
to reimburse the company for any losses above that level of retention, up to the
limits of the reinsurance contract. In simplest terms, a retention is analogous to the
deductible a policyholder may have on a personal insurance policy, such as an
automobile or homeowner’s policy.”).
65

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, §15.03[a], at 996 (“Both treaty
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance can be written on either a pro-rata or
excess-of-loss basis. Treaty reinsurance involves an ongoing agreement between
two insurers, binding in advance one to cede and the other to accept specified
business that is the subject of the treaty. Facultative reinsurance is negotiated with
respect to a specific risk insured by a particular policy or policies.”). See also
REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 7..
66

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 10 (“Under
proportional reinsurance, the ceding insurer and the reinsurer automatically share
all premiums and losses covered by the contract on a pre-agreed basis, thus there
are no characteristics uniquely attributable to the risk associated with proportional
reinsurance.”).
67

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pursuant to
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding
portion of the premium for the original risk.”).
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obligate the reinsurer to indemnify an insurer without requiring any
retention by the reinsured.68 Commonly, this type of pro-rata arrangement
is called Quota Share Reinsurance, where the ceding company indemnifies
the cedent insurer for a fixed percentage of loss on all policies of a defined
risk type.69 This easily visualized apportionment can become somewhat
more complex in that a “pro-rata” treaty can also be horizontally segmented
within each “slice” by requiring the ceding insurer to retain some portion of
the loss with the reinsurer only responsible for the surplus.70 This type of
pro-rata reinsuring up to the amount of insurance originally written, minus
the ceding insurer’s retention is commonly called Surplus Share
Reinsurance.71 With the entrance of additional retrocessionaires there can
be quite a bit of segmentation in this surplus line.
68

See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 299 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Wis. 1981); Central
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage Corp., 426 F. Supp. 7, 11 n. 5, 21 (D. Neb.
1976), aff’d in part and remanded, 565 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1977). See also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pro-rata reinsurance
arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that
occur with no retention by the reinsured.”).
69

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b], at 1054-1055 (“Pro rata reinsurance,
sometimes called ‘quota share’ reinsurance, means that losses, premiums, and
expenses are divided pro rata by the primary insurer and the reinsurer. For
example, the primary insurer may retain sixty percent of the risk and transfer forty
percent. If any loss occurs, whether large or small, the primary insurer is liable for
sixty percent of the loss and the reinsurer is liable for forty percent.”). See also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting quota share
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all
policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.”).
70

JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b] at 1055. (“A special kind of pro rata
reinsurance is ‘surplus reinsurance.’ Under surplus reinsurance, the reinsurer
agrees to cover a share of the risk that varies with the size of the exposure. For
example, the treaty might specify that losses under $50,000 are covered in full by
the primary insurer, that the first $50,000 of losses between $50,000 and $250,000
is paid by the direct insurer and the rest by the reinsurer, and that losses exceeding
$250,000 are paid 20 percent by the direct insurer and 80 percent by the
reinsurer.”).
71

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (noting
surplus share reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of
loss for all policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.”).
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Another interesting aspect of pro-rata treaties is the reinsured’s
obligation to automatically accept its portion of the risks insured.72 Prorata treaties come in a variety of broad types, knowledge of each of which
is useful for our later discussion. For instance, the treaty can be pro-rata
and obligatory.73 Through this structure, all risks in a specified category
are shared automatically by some proportion agreed to.74 Pro-rata treaties
often allocate a portion of the original premium to the reinsurer.75
In the excess of loss reinsurance scenario, the reinsurer’s obligation
is defined in relation to the reinsured’s retention.76 In this structure the
reinsurer, subject to specific stated limits of coverage, indemnifies the
reinsured for all or a stated portion of losses in excess of the agreed upon
retention. 77 The agreements can be structured so that the reinsurance can

72

See NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, §
40.04[2], at 16 (“Proportional or pro-rata reinsurance is characterized by a
proportional division of liability and premium between the ceding company and
the reinsurer.”).
73

Id. (“The cedent pays the reinsurer a predetermined share of the premium,
and the reinsurer indemnifies the cedent for a like share of the loss and the expense
incurred by the cedent in its defense and settlement of claims (the ‘allocated loss
adjustment expense’ or ‘LAE’”).
74

Id. (“According to the percentage agreed, the cedent and reinsurer share the
premium and losses from the business reinsured.”).
75

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, § 15.02[a], at 993 (“Pursuant to
a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer
for a percentage of any losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding
portion of the premium for the original risk. Pro-rata reinsurance arrangements
generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur with no
retention by the reinsured.”).
76

See STARING, supra note 20, at 4 (“Whether the contract is pro rata or
excess, the reinsured will…be expected ordinarily to retain a sufficient amount of
the risk to give the reinsurer confidence that the policy will be well
administered.”).
77

See Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New England
Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 998 n.17 (D. Mass. 1996).
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be excess to the specific risk, specific occurrence, an aggregate dollar
amount or specified loss ratio.78
III.

PURPOSES OF REINSURANCE

A comprehensive review of all the reasons an insurer may seek to
reinsure is not possible or necessary for the purposes of this Essay. Suffice
it to say that as reinsurance is a flexible medium and supports a variety of
functions, the purpose of acquiring it will differ in accordance with the
business interests of the insurer seeking it.79 Likewise, as reinsurance
serves a variety of purely financial and accounting purposes, reinsurance
may be employed for purposes slightly beyond the scope of this Essay’s
interest in its potential regulatory effects on insurance companies as
insuring companies, rather than as financial institutions. Regardless, in
accordance with our focus on the potential effects of reinsurance on
primary insurers, it is useful to review the four main purposes for which
reinsurance is generally sought in relation to the primary insurer’s
insurance function.80

78

OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, § 15.02[b], at 994 (noting per risk or specific excess
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the
amount of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each risk covered
by a reinsurance arrangement”; per occurrence reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding
insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount of loss in excess of a
specified retention with respect to each occurrence”; aggregate excess of loss
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for the amount by which the ceding
insurer’s loss during a specified period exceeds either (a) a specific dollar amount
or (b) a percentage of the company’s subject premium”; and stop loss reinsurance
“indemnifies the ceding insurer for losses in excess of a specified loss ratio up to a
predetermined loss ratio limit.”).
79

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3
(“Depending on the ceding company’s goals, different types of reinsurance
contracts are available to bring about the desired result.”).
80

Id. (Insurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit
liability on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity.”).
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A. RISK ALLOCATION
For some purposes, reinsurance serves the almost identical purpose
for the reinsured insurance company as that of many other common
commercial insurances. Thus, reinsurance’s initial purpose may be viewed
as a basic reallocation of risk and as an additional way to spread risk.81 Just
as any commercial entity might enter the insurance market seeking
indemnity for specific types of loss, so too does the insurer seek a
mechanism to transfer the risk it chose to underwrite to another party.82 In
a reinsurance situation, the risk acquired by the ceding insurer transfers to
the reinsurer to the extent and within the limits of the negotiated contract;
to the extent that those risks are allocated among numerous reinsurers, the
risk is spread even further. 83
This risk transfer benefits the insurer by allowing the reinsured to
take action that might otherwise be prohibited or disallowed sans
reinsurance.84 For instance, through the medium of reinsurance, the ceding
81

Id. (“By providing a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss
exposure to levels commensurate with their net assets, reinsurance enables
insurance companies to offer coverage limits considerably higher than they could
otherwise provide.”).
82

Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcora (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 590 N.E.2d 1186,
1188 (1992).
83

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 6. Importantly,
it must be remembered that reinsurance does not actually lessen total risk
exposure:
In any discussion of reinsurance, the limitations must be
considered along with its advantages. Reinsurance does not
change the inherent nature of a risk being insured. It cannot make
a bad risk insurable or an exposure more predictable or desirable.
And while reinsurance may limit an insurance company’s exposure
to a risk, the total risk exposure is not altered through the use of
reinsurance.
Id.
84

JERRY, supra note 9, § 141, at 1056 (“[R]einsurance permits an insurer to
transfer large risks that it is unable to manage or that are simply too risky to
another insurer.”).
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insurer can underwrite business that it might otherwise not have been able
to undertake.85 Either the risk itself may simply be too large or the risk of
loss might be unusual in some other way.86 By limiting their loss exposure
through reinsurance, the reinsured can offer higher coverage limits than
they could otherwise afford.87 Through this mechanism, smaller insurers
have the capacity to compete with larger companies and offer their
policyholders a broader array of coverage options.88
Likewise, the insurer may want to enter business lines that present
the possibility of some future unexpected losses the insurer is unwilling to
retain beyond a specific retention.89 Either the possibility of a very great a
85

Id. (“For example, an insurer that has a portfolio of coverage faces the risk
that a large number of small losses of an unexpected, unexceptional nature may
occur, thereby exceeding the insurer’s capacity to pay for them without suffering a
loss.”).
86

Id. (“[T]he insurer faces the risk that a single catastrophic event, the precise
timing of which is uncertain (e.g., an earthquake) may occur with devastating
consequences to the insurer’s balance sheet.”).
87

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (“In
calculating an appropriate level of reinsurance, a company takes into account the
amounts of its own available surplus, and determines its level of retention based on
the amount of loss it can absorb financially. Surplus, sometimes referred to as
policyholders’ surplus, is the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its
liabilities. A company’s retention may range anywhere from a few thousand
dollars to one million dollars or more. The loss exposure above the retention, up to
the policy limits of the reinsurance contract, is indemnified by the reinsurer. In
this manner, reinsurance helps to stabilize loss experience on individual risks, as
well as on accumulated losses under many policies occurring during a specified
period.”).
88

Id. (noting reinsurance’s goal of limiting liability “is crucial because it
allows all companies, large and small, to offer coverage limits to meet their
policyholders’ needs. In this manner, reinsurance provides an avenue for small-tomedium size companies to compete with industry giants.”).
89

JERRY, supra note 9, at § 141, at 1056-57 (“Just as reinsurance enables an
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.”).
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number of small, unexpected losses or the possibility of a single,
catastrophic loss which could overwhelm the insurer’s balance sheet might
cause a prudent insurer to acquire reinsurance to offset the risk of loss.90
This prudential risk-transferring purpose of reinsurance appropriately
supports a decision to reinsure, even though the insurer believes (as it must)
that its underwriting decisions are prudent and the premium appropriate.
After all, sufficiently imprudent underwriting could well be a defense to
reinsurance coverage.91 Still, even the most perspicacious of underwriters
cannot foresee the unexpected; thus the prudential purpose of reinsurance.

90

Id. at 1056 (“When the primary insurer purchases reinsurance, it reduces the
size of its potential losses, which reduces the size of the reserves it must maintain.
Insurers, however, are not as interested in reducing reserves as they are in
increasing their business. An insurer with the minimum allowable level of reserves
and surplus (the amount an insurer is required to maintain in excess of reserves to
meet unexpected losses) could not take on new business or enter new fields.
However, reinsurance provides a solution: the insurer could write the coverage,
transfer the risk to a reinsurer, and receive a commission from the reinsurer. The
primary insurer adds no new liabilities, but its surplus increases by the amount of
the commission. This increased surplus enables the primary insurer to write and
retain additional coverage. Another way to view this transaction is that some of
the excess capacity of the reinsurer is utilized by the business-garnering efforts of
the primary insurer; in essence some excess capacity is transferred from the
reinsurer to the primary insurer. For the small insurer who wants to grow,
reinsurance is an important way to take on new business beyond its means and
simultaneously increase its capacity.”).
91

PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:31, 80-1 (“The duty of good faith that runs
between the parties to a reinsurance contract is essential to the reinsurance
relationship. Stemming from the reinsurer’s need to rely upon and not duplicate the
reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks and handling claims, and reducing
costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract. Due to these specific needs of the
industry, the duty of utmost good faith in this context connotes a higher duty than
the ordinary duty of good faith that is inherent in general contract law.
Accordingly, it requires that the reinsured must disclose to the reinsurer all
material facts which may affect the subject risk. The failure of a reinsured to
disclose material facts to the reinsurer will warrant the rescission of a reinsurance
contract.”).

2009]

REINSURANCE: THE SILENT REGULATOR?

369

B. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
A second purpose for reinsurance, one particularly importantly in
the insurance regulatory context, is using reinsurance to reduce the amount
of reserves an insurer must maintain, thus freeing the insurer up to write
more policies.92 In purchasing reinsurance, the primary insurer reduces the
size of its potential losses, which allows it to reduce its statutorily
mandated reserves.93 Hence, if a primary insurer hits the threshold for the
minimum allowable level of reserves plus surplus that it is statutorily
required to maintain, the amount of new business open to it would be
restricted. But, if the primary insurer purchased reinsurance, the primary
would still be able to write new policies so long as it could transfer the risk
to the reinsurer.94 In fact, since the reinsurer swaps the new risk in
exchange for a commission, the primary insurer is frequently seen as
acquiring no new liabilities, while its surplus is viewed as increasing by the
amount of the reinsurer’s commission.95 The majority of public regulation
governing reinsurers concerns itself with this aspect of the reinsuring
relationship.96
92

See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d
255, 258 (1992) (noting reinsurance allows “a primary insurer to reduce the
amount of legally required reserves held for the protection of policyholders, and to
increase the company’s ability to underwrite other policies or make other
investments”).
93

See STARING, supra note 20 (“For the individual insurer, the purchase of
reinsurance has any or all of a number of objectives. It will desire to limit the
reserves it must maintain for losses on its ordinary business.”).
94

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4-5 (“When an
insurance company issues a policy, the expenses associated with issuing that
policy, such as taxes, agent commissions, and administrative expenses, are charged
immediately against the company’s income, resulting in a decrease in surplus.
Meanwhile, the premium collected must be set aside in an unearned premium
reserve to be recognized as income over a period of time. This accounting
procedure allows for strong solvency regulation; however, it ultimately leads to
decreased capacity. As an insurance company sells more policies, it must pay
more expenses from its surplus. Therefore, the company’s ability to write
additional business is reduced.”).
95

Id. (“Insurers purchase reinsurance…to increase capacity.”).
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i. Regulation of Reinsurance for Purposes of Solvency
Though by no means its sole purpose, much insurance regulation
exists simply to decrease the likelihood of unexpected insurance company
failure. Regulators typically identify the fiscal ramifications of wide-scale
insurance failure as their justification for proper insurance regulation.
Therefore, though permitting reinsurers to go unregulated in other aspects,
regulators recognized that the potential insolvency of a reinsurer could
affect the solvency of its reinsureds, and have therefore taken legislative
action to minimize that risk.
This is no idle matter. Both the Transit Casualty Company and
Mission Insurance Company failed due to insurance insolvency in the
1980’s.97 The failure occurred in part because they could not collect from
their reinsurers. To address this risk, the states all have various techniques
in place to assure reinsurer solvency. If admitted or licensed in the state,
the reinsurer must comport with certain reserve requirements of its own or,
if foreign or unadmitted, states require the reinsurer to offer a bond
sufficient to allay fears of not collecting on reinsurance agreements.98 If
the company does not post a bond, the insurer cannot take advantage of
reinsurance’s ability to grant credit and expand reserves.
96

Since reserves are the primary way public regulators attempt to reduce the
risk of insurer insolvency and default, a great amount of activity has occurred
amongst and between regulators to devise statutory schemes that allow for
protection of the reserves. See, e.g., INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL ACT § 22
(NAIC 2007). There has been some very interesting work on reinsurer chartering
and on bonding requirements for foreign insurers reinsuring domestic primaries.
97

U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: State Reinsurance
Oversight Increased, but Problems Remain 8 (1990). [Hereinafter 1990 GAO
Report].
98

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (“When
overriding public policy concerns require regulatory involvement, however, nearly
all states have adopted regulations affecting reinsurance contracts. An example of
this type of regulatory involvement is the requirement of a standard insolvency
clause, which allows the receiver of an insolvent insurer to collect on reinsurance
contracts. While few states require the filing or approval of reinsurance contracts,
indirect regulation of reinsurance contracts and rates does exist. For example,
restrictions on insurance rates affect reinsurance rates. Generally, if the amount
paid in the premium to the insurer is limited, the amount of premium paid under a
quota share reinsurance contract may also be limited.”).
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Still, the multi-state system leads to some fears of inadequacy and
redundancy. To address these issues, along with the perennial problem of
construing the appropriate way for the states to share in the taxation of
these transactions, the House of Representatives in June 2007 passed HR
1065, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act.99 The Senate
companion bill, S 929, awaits consideration in the Senate.100 That
legislation would create a single state authority to determine the
appropriateness of reinsurance credit and reinsurer solvency assessment.101
The solvency assessment would be conducted by the reinsurer’s home state
and the credit determination would be made solely by the ceding insurer’s
domiciliary state.102 It is unclear how this alters the current regulatory
system other than to encourage reinsurers or insurers to change their
domiciles in search of a state whose regulation best comports with their
needs, though it likely will assist in clarifying taxation. In any event, these
Congressional efforts reflect an understanding of reinsurance’s direct effect
on insurer’s solvency.
By this legislative activity, it is apparent the regulators are not
entirely unaware of the financial effects a reinsurer default could have on
reinsureds. Yet, this type of legislation is still limited to regulation of
reinsurance only as a source of funds for the domestic insurer. Basically, it
reflects a conceptualization of reinsurance as a mere contractually acquired
source of capital. There is no attempt in the regulatory legislation to move
beyond solvency and to address the effects the terms a reinsurance
agreement may have on their reinsured’s performance as regards their
underlying policyholders. So far as regulators appear concerned, their
responsibility to regulate reinsurance ends with regulating solvency.

99

National Association of Insurance Commisioners, Current Issues:
Nonadmitted Insurance and Reinsurance, http://www.naic.org/topics/topic_
surplus_lines.html (last visited February 19, 2009).
100

Id. (That legislation would grant exclusive regulatory authority for multistate surplus lines and to the insured’s home state so as to restrict each transaction
to a single set of regulatory oversight, rules and taxation).
101

Id.

102

Id.

372

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

C. RISK EXITS AND FRONTING
A third commonly accepted purpose of reinsurance allows the
primary insurer to cease writing some policies.103 An insurer that seeks to
exit a certain risk stream can be relieved of the risks of loss from those
policies and exit that insurance market via appropriate reinsurance.104 This
allows a certain amount of flexibility to insurers by allowing them to shift
direction in their future business choices.105
A few caveats are necessary here. By reinsuring the entire loss, the
primary insurer generally has not freed itself from its direct responsibilities
to its policyholders, despite even a 100% risk transfer to the reinsuring
companies. In other words, though it may have successfully transferred the
risks of loss, it did not transfer its servicing responsibilities to the reinsurer.
Again, reinsurance is generally defined as a secondary indemnity
agreement and the reinsurer does not usually assume a direct claims
handling relationship with the policyholders of the reinsured.106 Reinsuring
agreements can, however, include “cut-out” provisions, which allow a
direct action by the policyholders against the reinsurer; provisions like
these change the reinsuring relationship.107
103

JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1056-57 (“Just as reinsurance enables an
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer
to leave a particular kind of business quickly. An insurer that wants to rid itself of
a particular kind of coverage can solicit reinsurance for all of the insurance the
carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the business and
makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.”).
104
Id.
105

Id.

106

NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at §
40.01 (“In essence, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. It is a
contractual arrangement under which an insurer secures coverage from a reinsurer
for a potential loss to which it is exposed under insurance policies issued to
original insureds. The risk indemnified against is the risk that the insurer will have
to pay on the underlying insured risk. Because reinsurance is a contract of
indemnity, absent specific cash-call provisions, the reinsurer is not required to pay
under the contract until after the original insurer has paid a loss to its original
insured.”).
107

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 27 (noting
the definition of the term ‘cut-through endorsement’ as “an endorsement to an
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One benefit of the reinsurer’s role instead of the primary insurer
role is that the reinsurer is generally free from direct original policyholder
action. For this reason, the standards of contract performance and the
mutual obligations of the reinsured and reinsurer differ in type and
structure from that of policyholder and insurer. Some of these relationships
and the differences of obligations are described in Section IV of this Essay.
Too much direct interaction by the reinsurer and the original policyholder
will force the reinsurer to be treated simply as an insurer of the
policyholder, obviating some of the benefits and performance obligations
associated with the reinsuring agreement, usually to the reinsurer’s
detriment. Likewise, though there is nothing to prevent the kind of direct
assumption of the primary insurer’s role, such a situation really is better
understood as a novation of the original primary insurance policies, rather
than the type of reinsurance agreement for business agility that is the more
common purpose of seeking reinsurance for indemnity purposes.
Another brief caveat is also useful here. Placing reinsurance for
100% of a certain type of underwriting business for the purpose of exiting
the business is likewise different from another type of 100% reinsuring
agreement that displays certain similar characteristics. In “fronting
agreements”, an insurer will enter into a policy with the understanding that
another party, a reinsurer, will be responsible for the entire amount that it is
required to pay under the policy.108 One New York court described a
fronting agreement or “fronting cessation” as an arrangement where an
insurer issues a policy on a risk “with an understanding that another party
will insure it”.109 The purpose of these “fronting agreements” is to allow a
reinsurer not qualified or licensed to do business in the state, the

insurance policy or reinsurance contract which provides that, in the event of the
insolvency of the insurance company, the amount of any loss which would have
been recovered from the reinsurer by the insurance company (or its statutory
receiver) will be paid instead directly to the policyholder, claimant, or other payee,
as specified by the endorsement, by the reinsurer.”).
108

See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing a fronting agreement as a “well established ad perfectly legal scheme”
where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance companies and then
immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value).
109

Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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opportunity to profit from the sale of insurance transactions in that state.110
Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the “front”.111
Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is
nothing illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unauthorized
insurer. In fact, so long as all other regulatory goals are met, these
relationships can allow for a significant increase in insurance capacity.112
D. LOSS STABILITY
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reinsurance is a mechanism
for insurers to stabilize their profits and expected losses.113 Insurance does
and always has concerned risk.114 Using reinsurance, the primary insurer
can set a limit on its exposure by facultative insurance for any given risk,
use a surplus treaty to create a ceiling on aggregate loss or determine its
percentage of risk retained through a pro-rata arrangement.115 In this way,
110

See Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F.
Supp. 481, 484 (S. D. Miss. 1993).
111

See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1336 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
112

NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 8, at §
40.04[5] (“A licensed reinsurer can front for an unauthorized reinsurer or a
reinsurance syndicate, to permit the ceding insurer to take credit for the reinsurance
without need for security.”).
113

JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 (“A fourth purpose of reinsurance is
to stabilize insurers’ profits and losses.”).
114

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 49 (noting
the definition of the term ‘risk’ as “a term which defines uncertainty of loss,
chance of loss, or the variance of actual from expected results as it relates to
coverage provided under an insurance or reinsurance contract. Also the term is
used to identify the object of insurance protection, e.g., a building, an automobile,
a human life, or exposure to liability. In reinsurance, each ceding company
customarily makes its own rules for defining a risk.”).
115

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (“Insurers
often seeks to reduce the wide swings in profits and loss margins inherent to the
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
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even cumulative losses can be restricted to designated limits.116 The
insurer uses reinsurance as a form of stability control, enabling them to
fulfill their obligations to policyholders in a continuous manner117 and
potentially stabilize their profits.118
IV.

REINSURANCE AS PRIVATE REGULATOR

As we have seen, reinsurance is a flexible and multifunctional
arrangement. If the benefits of reinsurance to insurers were not so
attractive, this multinational, trillion dollar industry would not be nearly
such a popular choice of insurers. Yet, the potential for reinsurance to
affect the business conduct of insurers has not been among insurance
regulatory concerns. This is likely because reinsurance is considered to
consist of agreements between sufficiently sophisticated parties so as to
require little formal regulatory oversight of the relationship. That
conclusion, however, precludes the understanding that through the medium
of contracting for reinsurance, the insurer subjects itself to limitations – a
kind of private legislation- similar to that of a consumer policyholder with
its insurer. Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a reinsurance
agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit from
the reinsuring agreement.
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall operating
results.”).
116

JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[a], at 1057 (“Through reinsurance, the
maximum losses on policies can be kept to manageable levels, and cumulative
losses over a period of time can be kept within a designated limit.”).
117

Corcoran v. Universal Reins. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 77, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“Insurance companies depend upon reinsurance contracts for financial stability
and hence their ability to fulfill their obligations under their policies.”).
118

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (“Insurers
often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent to the
insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature of
insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall results.”).
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This is so because the reinsurance agreement is not one without
conditions. Those conditions include everything from offering the
reinsurer access to its underwriting philosophy119 and underwriting success
rates, to providing defenses to reinsurance performance based on
inadequate claims handling. Moreover, the sheer breadth of the advantages
available to an insurer from reinsurance make it likely that a prudent
insurer will keep in mind the requirements and interests of the reinsurance
industry while setting its underwriting and claims handling mechanisms in
place.120 Just like a consumer policyholder will seek to keep his losses
down to attract lower cost insurance, so will an insurer strive to make itself
attractive to reinsurers.
Importantly, it must be recognized that reinsurance is generally not
a one-off deal. Rather, reinsurance agreements are entered into for a
specific time and are often then renegotiated.121 When a party is aware that
its conduct under one agreement will affect the terms of its next agreement,
it can only be assumed that the party will seek to mitigate activities which
could have a future negative financial effect. If one can agree on nothing
else as regards the insurance industry, the capacity for these companies to
consider their long term financial interests should be somewhat obvious.
Another aspect of this discussion is not just that insurers seek to
make themselves fiscally attractive risks to their reinsurers, an activity that
119

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting
the definition of underwriting capacity as “[t]he maximum amount of money an
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be
imposed by law or regulatory authority.”).
120

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 3 (noting
“[i]nsurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability
on specific risks; (2) to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against
catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity. Depending on the ceding company’s
goals, different types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the
desired result.”).
121

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (noting
“reinsurance contracts must be shaped to the ceding insurer’s unique requirements.
No two contracts are alike – all have marked variations in retention levels,
coverages and exclusions. An insurance company’s needs for reinsurance depend
on its book of business and financial and underwriting strategies. The reinsurance
contract, and hence reinsurance premiums, must be individually tailored and
determined by the parties.”).
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any party seeking capital would undertake. Rather it is the identification
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the
potential to affect insurance company action as regards their primary
policyholder in areas that come within the bounds of current insurance
regulatory interests. Specifically, insurer practices in underwriting and
claims handling.
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT INSURANCE REGULATORY GOALS: THE
IDEA OF “AEQUUM ET BONUM”.122
Insurance regulation seeks to achieve a complex set of goals
through the regulation of insurance. Regulation, as discussed earlier,
frequently concerns itself with issues of insurer solvency.123 This interest is
not conceived of solely as an attempt to keep a lucrative industry
functioning. Rather, insurer solvency regulation exists in large part to
obviate the harm to insured policyholders who would be hurt as a result the
insurer’s insolvency.124 Unlike many other types of transactions, insurance
does not lend itself to being the type of product that can be replaced if, just
as a policyholder should come to need the insurer to perform, the
policyholder were to learn that its company has defaulted as a result of
insolvency. Put even more plainly, if insufficient reserves cause an insurer
to default as a result of too many claims being made, in a catastrophe
scenario for example, the negative externalities of that default are
potentially extreme.125
122

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (8th ed. 2004) (noting the term
secundum aequum et bonum means “[a]ccording to what is just and good.”).
123

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13 (noting
“reinsurance regulation focuses on solvency.”).
124

See STARING, supra note 20, § 19, at 19-1(noting “[r]einsurance has certain
advantages which accrue to the insured public as well…reinsurance coverage
represents an added shield protecting a policyholder against uncompensated loss.
This advantage to the insureds is realized most obviously in the event of the
primary insurer’s insolvency. “Thus, from the perspective of an insured or
policyholder, the insolvency of the primary insurer may make any reinsurance the
only or de facto source of at least partial compensation for losses incurred.”).
125

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting
“[r]einsurance provides protection against catastrophic loss in much the same way
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Solvency, however, is not the only goal of insurance regulation.
Rather the mission of insurance regulators is also to assure consumers of
fair treatment and protection from unfair trade practices.126 Fairness can be
seen to include appropriate access to insurance and the prevention of
impermissible discriminatory practices and other notions of consumer
protection. Taken as a whole, this amorphous “public policy” regulatory
interest has perhaps been best characterized by some academics as the
insurance regulatory principle of “Aequum et Bonum”.127
Used to encompass a spectrum of “public good” regulatory
objectives, the identification of this principle is a useful shorthand. These
“public good” regulatory goals are translated into regulatory policy in a
it helps stabilize an insurer’s loss experience. Insurers use reinsurance to protect
against catastrophes in two ways. First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic
financial loss resulting from a single event, such as the total fire loss of a large
manufacturing plant. Second, reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of
many smaller claims resulting from a single event, such as an earthquake or major
hurricane, that affects many policyholders simultaneously. While the insurer is
able to cover losses individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer
wishes to retain.”).
126

Insurance regulatory interests include the perennial issues of risk
containment and default. However, risk of default is not the sole purview of
insurance regulation. Included in regulatory efforts are issues of political interest,
such as guaranteeing equitable access to insurance, and other redistributive and
equitable normative policies. For example, the Connection Department of
Insurance describes its mission as follows:
The mission of the Connecticut Insurance Department is to serve
consumers in a professional and timely manner by providing
assistance and information to the public and to policy makers, by
regulating the insurance industry in a fair and efficient
manner which promotes a competitive and financially sound
insurance market for consumers, and by enforcing the insurance
laws to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and are protected
from unfair practices.
Connecticut
Insurance
Department:
Our
http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?q=254396.
127

Mission

Statement,

See Howell E. Jackson & Edward L. Symons Jr., Regulation of Financial
Institutions 452 (1998).
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variety of ways and it has not escaped notice that “the objective of aequum
et bonum is present in some degree to most systems of insurance law and
regulation. It has many facets: It is equality. It is morality. It is fairness,
equality, reasonableness.
It may even be efficiency, economy,
parsimony.”128
Generally this principle is reflected in the tripartite goals that rates
not be “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory”, the standard
language in nearly every state’s regulatory legislation.129 Likewise
regulations prohibiting unfair trade practices in the handling of a claim are
created in the interest of consumer protection and fairness.130 This can be
seen to reflect a somewhat disjointed effort to stay true to the “public
interest” as best as it can be defined by regulators and courts while at the
same time offering a private industry an opportunity for profit in an
industry demanding regulated solvency. For this reason, underwriting
practices, the assignment of rates to the sale of insurance, and its corollary
– claims handling – are within the purview of insurance regulatory
interest.131
In their regulatory efforts Insurance Commissioners have not
apparently considered the potential effect reinsurance agreements could
have on insurers performance of their obligations to their policyholders, nor
does there appear to have been any systemic review of the public policy
128

Id.

129

This authorization for regulatory efforts in these identifiably somewhat
conflicting and unclear goals is supported by the long standing identification of
insurance as something other than a purely private contractual affair. As courts
have long noted, “It is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is
affected with a public interest . . . Neither the company nor a policyholder has the
inviolate rights that characterize private contracts.” Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 74 P.2d 761, 774 (Cal. 1937). Thus, “[t]he contract of the policyholder is
subject to the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.” Id. at 774-75.
130

See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 13
(noting the NAIC works in conjunction with state insurance regulators in serving
the public interest and facilitating “the fair and equitable treatment of insurance
consumers.”).
131

See id. (noting fundamental insurance regulatory goals include protecting
the public interest, promoting competitive markets, promoting the reliability,
solvency, and financial solidity of insurance institutions, and supporting and
improving state regulation of insurance.”).
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concerns implicated by the availability of reinsurance for coverage of badfaith extracontractual damages132 as a matter of consumer protection. In
the next sections, we will identify how the core principle of reinsurance
agreements- the reciprocal duty of good faith- when taken in concert with
other common reinsurance doctrines and practices, have the capability of
influencing insurer behavior on an industry wide scale. Likewise, we will
review how the court’s interpretation of these obligations have the potential
to affect insurance claims handling decisions and practices. Finally, we
will review a series of available reinsurance clauses that seem to be
antithetical to consumer protection goals and reduction of coverage
litigation.
B. GOOD FAITH AS A REGULATOR OF UNDERWRITING AND
CLAIMS HANDLING PRACTICES
Reinsurance obligates the parties to act in good faith.133 In fact, in
can be said that this duty of good faith – enforced by the courts- is the core
principle by which reinsurance operates in its myriad forms. 134
132

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 29 (noting
the definition of extra-contractual obligations as “monetary awards or settlements
against an insurer for its alleged wrongful conduct to its insured. Such payments
required of an insurer to its insured are extra-contractual in that they are not
covered in the underlying contract.”).
133

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 (noting “[d]uties of good faith and
fair dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between
the initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer’s
need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating
risks and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance
contract. Accordingly, this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer
all material facts which may affect the subject risk.”).
134

See STARING, supra note 20, § 12:1, at 1-2 (“The long and well established
tradition that reinsurance transactions are a matter of ‘utmost good faith’ between
the parties has had a predictable effect on the preparation of reinsurance
contracts…The typical reinsurance contract is a relatively short, concise document,
noticeably lacking in the legalisms so characteristic of other types of contracts.
This underlying assumption of utmost good faith allows the companies to draft a
document that assumes both parties are so knowledgeable on the subject matter to
be dealt with and possess such a degree of sophistication as to preclude the
necessity got long, expository declarations of intent and implementation.”).
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Importantly, courts reviewing this doctrine have often interpreted it to
require specific insurance company behavior as a condition precedent to
requiring reinsurer performance of its indemnity obligation.135 Hence,
failure to act in good faith affords the reinsurer a defense to its reinsurance
obligation.136 Since reinsurance is frequently only triggered by extremely
large dollar value claims, preventing the release of its reinsurer for a lack of
good faith behavior will undoubtedly be of paramount concern to a prudent
insurance company.
i. The Duty of Good Faith in Underwriting
One of the strangest aspects of reinsurance is the often overlooked
question of how reinsurance could ever exist without becoming cost
prohibitive. If one were to simply think about reinsurance in terms of risk
assessment, there seems little way that the addition of multiple new players
in the insuring process would not add and continue adding to the cost of
insurance. After all, due diligence is an expensive proposition. How could
all these different reinsurance institutions capably evaluate the true risks of
all the policies which they agree to reinsure, particularly in the treaty
context, without accruing costs as large as, if not larger than, the original
insurer?137 The answer is simply that in the reinsurance treaty context they
simply do not engage in that kind of investigation, instead they rely on the
underwriting skills of their reinsureds.138 Investigation costs are limited to

135

See e.g. Liquidation of Union Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co.,
674 N.E.2d 313, 319-20 (N.Y. 1996).
136

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1059 (“The primary insurer and
reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and the reinsurer will
have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of warranty, fraud, or
concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer’s acts or neglect give rise
to the defense.”).
137

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 56-57 (“Duties of good faith and fair
dealing run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the
initial insured and his or her insurer. This duty originates from the reinsurer’s need
to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks
and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.”).
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delving into the potential reinsured’s loss experiences, underwriting skills
and claims handling competence.139
How is action like that considered prudent? As we have seen to
our great dismay in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the consequences of
opaque risk acquisition can be remarkably severe. In reinsurance, the
reciprocal obligations of good faith obviates this problem in the reinsurance
context.140 In reinsurance, this duty often requires, “the most abundant
good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty;
[including] the absence of any concealment or deception, however
slight”.141 Viewing utmost good faith as appropriately sufficient to govern
trillions of dollars of transactions is interesting in and of itself, yet, as the
138

See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7 (“The reinsurer will always have at
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s
underwriting and claims practices.”).
139

Id.

140

See PLITT, supra note 9, at 57-58 (“[The duty of good faith] requires the
reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect the subject
risk. The extension of this duty of good faith is the related concept that reinsurers
are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith decision to pay a claim,
commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’ doctrine. The purpose for this
rule is to prevent situations in which reinsurers, in attempt to deny coverage, use
against the reinsured the same coverage arguments made by the reinsured against
the original insured, essentially eroding the good faith relationship needed in the
reinsurance context. The limiting factor, preventing the abuse of this doctrine, is
the determination of whether the reinsured’s payment was made in good faith.”).
141

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. (noting that good faith “is the
position of reinsurers that their contracts are those of ‘utmost good faith.’ Utmost
good faith contracts of any kind are so delicate in character and so susceptible of
abuse that unusual precautions must be observed by both parties in their
implementation. The business of reinsurance often involves considerable oral
exchange of information between primary insurer and reinsurer, and the reliability
of this information is very important. The resemblance of the customary practices
to how business used to be conducted at the Lloyd’s Coffee House of old is
unmistakable. The strict law of warranty which applied to the old transactions at
Lloyd’s probably has something in common with the duty of ‘utmost good faith’
which applies in reinsurance. Both doctrines have the effect of ratcheting up the
expectations contracting parties can reasonably possess with regard to the accuracy
of information shared by the other party.”).
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Second Circuit has noted, it is the core relationship that allows for
reinsuring to profitably occur. As they explained:
Historically, the reinsurance market has relied on a
practice of the exercise of good faith to decrease
monitoring costs and ex ante contracting costs.
Reinsurance works only if the sums of reinsurance
premiums are less than the original insurance premium.
Otherwise, the ceding insurer will not reinsure. For the
reinsurance premiums to be less reinsurers cannot
duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary
insurer in evaluating risks and handling claims. . . .
Reinsurers are protected, however, by a large area of
common interest with ceding insurers and by the
tradition of utmost good faith, particularly in the sharing
of information.142
In other words, in exchange for placing the reinsurance at a price
less than the original premiums, the reinsurer is allowed to rely on the good
faith of the reinsured.143 In order for treaty reinsurance to function
economically, the reinsurer cannot duplicate the underwriting functions
engaged in by insurers at the time they placed the original coverage.144
142

Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d
Cir. 1993).
143

See JERRY, supra note 9, § 142[c], at 1060. (“Not all insurance law
doctrines are ratcheted up when it comes to reinsurance arrangements, however.
As one court explained, ‘[r]einsurance contracts, unlike primary insurance
contracts, are not contracts of adhesion. Rather, reinsurance involves two
sophisticated business entities familiar with the business of reinsurance who
bargain at arms-length for the terms in their contract.’ Thus, a rule like the noticeprejudice rule, which is designed to equalize the relationship between insured and
primary insurer, may be deemed irrelevant to the reinsurance setting, and an
insurer that fails to give timely notice to a reinsurer may find itself unable to defeat
the reinsurer’s late notice defense on the ground that the reinsure failed to show
prejudice.”).
144

See ERIC M. HOLMES & L. ANTHONY SUTIN, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 102.4(a) (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE] (noting “[u]nderwriting is largely retrospective, focusing on the
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However, that does not mean the reinsurer does not take an interest
in the underwriting activities of its reinsureds. As explained by the
Reinsurance Association of America:
While treaty reinsurance does not require review of
individual risks by the reinsurer, it demands careful
review of the underwriting philosophy, practice and
historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a
thoughtful evaluation of the company’s attitude toward
claims management, engineering control, as well as the
management’s general background, expertise and
planned objectives.145
Keeping these criteria in mind, it is difficult to imagine insurance
companies would not create and institutionalize underwriting practices that
are most likely to attract reinsurers if they want to benefit from
reinsurance.146 Moreover, the reinsured company would want to ensure
that it kept particularly good records of its underwriting efforts, as they are
required by their good faith obligation to “disclose to the reinsurer all
material facts which may affect the subject risk”.147
So great is the reinsurer recognition of their risk in relying on the
underwriting decisions of their reinsured’s that reinsurance contracts
frequently include a clause which allows the reinsurer access to their
reinsured’s “books and claims and underwriting files”,148 if it finds such an
financial condition and expertise of the ceding insurer. A reinsurer would be welladvised, however, to undertake a careful review of the practices and standards of a
prospective reinsured under a treaty.
Many reinsurance treaties embody
longstanding relationships between the parties and have been renewed many times
over the decades.”).
145

See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7.

146

See STARING, supra note 20, § 2:6, at 7. (“The reinsurer will always have at
least a general, if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s
underwriting and claims practices.”).
147

See PLITT, supra note 9, § 9:17, at 57.

148

See STARING, supra note 20, §15:8.
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audit necessary. Known as “audit and inspection clauses”, these clauses
require “the reinsured’s records relative to the contract sessions to be
always open to the reinsurer at reasonable times.”149 These clauses offer an
opportunity for the reinsurer to review their reinsured’s underwriting and
claims handling practices to assure itself that the reinsured company is
acting in conformance with its expectations and that the claims made on it
come within scope of its reinsurance contract.150 By this method,
reinsurer’s have the capacity to keep themselves abreast of their reinsured’s
underwriting and claims handling practices in an ongoing manner, when
such inquiry is reasonable. And, in the event of a dispute it allows them the
opportunity for a direct audit.
ii. The Capacity of Reinsurance to Stifle Underwriting
Innovation
The search for information implies the capacity for reaction. The
interplay of the duty of good faith and audit clauses offer the reinsurer the
opportunity to monitor their reinsured’s practices. Such monitoring has the
capacity to influence the way in which reinsured’s create and apply their
underwriting discretion. Particularly for smaller insurance companies,
dependant on reinsurance to take on the larger risks, it would not be
beneficial to adopt underwriting practices which stray too far from the
Should such a company attempt it,
industry’s accepted norm.151
undoubtedly the company would have to charge higher premiums in order

149

Id. (noting that this right is not without limits and does not permit access to
all the reinsured’s books generally, rather the audit is limited to the scope of the
relationship between the parties).
150

Id. (noting that audit and inspection clauses are found in both treaty and
facultative agreements so that treaty reinsured must make available their relevant
books and facultative reinsured’s must keep the reinsurer “advised at various levels
of detail with respect to claims under the policy”).
151

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 5-6 (noting
“reinsurers often provide insurers with a variety of other services. Some reinsurers
provide guidance to insurers in underwriting, claims reserving and handling,
investments, and even general management. These services are particularly
important to smaller companies interested in entering new lines of insurance.”).
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to entice reinsurers to take on their risks.152 Likewise, those companies
which require greater amounts of reinsurance to comply with their reserve
requirements could also be discouraged from adopting broader or unusual
underwriting procedures.153
The inclusion of the reinsurer’s interest of “underwriting
philosophy”, “historical experience of the ceding insurer” and “attention to
the attitude of claims management” suggest that to the extent the industry
profits from and seeks reinsurance for its business interests, those interests
will militate in favor of choices which may not be completely congruent
with all aspects of the regulators objectives; particularly those objectives
which come within the broad understating of aequum et bonum. It is not
beyond the realm of possibility that access to insurance could be restricted
for less profitable groups or only offered at a higher cost, implicating
notions of fairness.
Though reinsurance monitoring may have the capacity to
somewhat stifle or raise the cost of innovation, perhaps even to the point of
raising issues of unfairness, there may well be some positive public good
from the effect of reinsurance monitoring of underwriting practices.
Reinsurers’ interest in the underwriting and claim handling processes of its
reinsureds might well suffice as a strong financial incentive towards
maintaining professional and non-biased underwriting practices – a
regulatory goal. The reinsurer’s sole interest is its own financial one. To
that end, the industry will seek out and reward those insurers who most
accurately measure and rate risks. Though the reinsurance industry may
not have an active incentive to broaden access to insurance for public
policy reasons, it also has no active disincentive to restrict the sale of
properly underwritten policies. As a whole, reinsurers profit from having
insurance policies available to reinsure. Given the capacity for reinsurance
to assist small insurers to compete on an asset basis with larger companies,
152

New insurance lines are often covered facultatively until a sufficient loss
history is developed to attract treaty reinsurance. See Hoffman, supra note 3, at
771. (“Demand for facultative reinsurance also exists for new insurance lines,
specialty lines, or insurance products that are developed to cover traditionally
uninsured risks. Such risks and exposures, if accepted by a reinsurer, are likely to
be accepted only on a facultative basis because they transcend existing actuarial
and ratemaking techniques.”).
153

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 48 (noting
the term ‘reserve’ means “[a]n amount which is established to provide for payment
of a future obligation.”).
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reinsurance’s availability can act to support companies writing policies for
previously underserviced policyholders. In any event, reinsurers’ interest
in the underwriting procedures of those they reinsure undoubtedly serves
the pseudo-regulatory function of encouraging actuarially sound
underwriting practices by rewarding those companies with greater access to
reinsurance.
For this reason alone, reinsurance can be perceived as
effecting industry practice beyond questions of solvency.
iii. Reinsurer Monitoring of Underwriting History and the
Potential
For Market Response, the risk of reinsurance rate consequences
does appear to effect insurance industry practice. A look to the facultative
reinsurance market suggests that insurers are very concerned in maintaining
attractive loss histories and are sensitive to reinsurance costs when making
underwriting decisions. Remember, facultative reinsurance is used to
mitigate the effect of the phenomena of the unusual risk costing more than
the easily forecastable risk and is usually placed when the risk would not be
accepted under a treaty.154 Again, it is through facultative reinsurance that
an insurer could acquire reinsurance for a specific risk, a specific policy or
a specific group of policies.155 It is for this reason that facultative

154

See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 770-771 (“By definition facultative
placements involve risks that fall outside the general parameters of a treaty
reinsurance program. Facultative reinsurance is purchased by primary insurance
companies, captives, or reinsurers to cover assumed business that, for one reason
or another, will not be ceded to a treaty.”).
155

See STARING, supra note 20, § 1:4 at 7-8. (“Facultative reinsurance of a
single risk, which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the
last half of the Nineteenth Century. A treaty, which is a long term contract
covering more than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 1821. Treaties
became common around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the
excess of loss treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906.”). See also JERRY, supra note 9, § 140[b],
at 1054 (“Facultative reinsurance involves the primary insurer entering into an
agreement for the reinsurance of a particular risk. The reinsurance can be written
on a pro rata or an excess basis; the root word ‘faculty’ denotes that the reinsurer
has a choice of accepting or rejecting any risk proposed and of demanding
whatever premium it thinks appropriate.”).
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reinsurance “usually covers catastrophic or unusual risks”.156 Facultative
reinsurance, however, will likely be more expensive per risk than broader
treaty reinsurance because with facultative reinsurance the reinsurer often
employs “substantial personnel and technical resources” to underwrite
those risks.157 Treaty reinsurance avoids this kind of cost
Yet, it is common practice to combine treaty and facultative
reinsurance to protect an insurer’s loss history with its treaty reinsurer.
Companies often use facultative insurance to protect loss histories even
though reinsurance coverage for the facultative risk already existed under
treaty reinsurance agreements. The insurer’s strategic decision to enter the
additional facultative agreement as a hedge against unexpected losses on a
risk is done with an eye out to protect against losses which would otherwise
have the capacity to trigger a renegotiation of the insurer’s entire treaty or
cause future treaties to be reinsured at a higher cost.
As an example, the Reinsurance Association of America158
describes a situation where in order to accommodate a policyholder, an
insurer may agree to provide commercial automobile insurance coverage –
a higher risk activity. The RAA argues that additional facultative
reinsurance159 would be appropriate in this situation even if the treaty
reinsurance160 the insurer had already placed did not exclude commercial
156

See Reinsurance Association of America, supra note 11, at 7.

157

Id. at 8.

158

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Who We Are,
http://reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3615. (The RAA describes
themselves as “…a national trade association, headquartered in Washington,
D.C., that is committed to an activist agenda to represent the interests of the
property and casualty reinsurance industry in Congress, state legislatures, and
international forums.”).
159

See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at §102.4(b)
(noting “[a] facultative reinsurance contract is written to cove a specifically
identified risk. Both the ceding insurer and the reinsurer have the option (or
‘faculty,’ from the Latin for ability) to affect reinsurance on a risk-by-risk basis.
Neither is obligated to cede or assume any given risk.”).
160

Id. (noting “reinsurance treaties are blanket agreements negotiated between
an reinsured and a reinsurer under which reinsurance is automatically provided for
all policies issued by the reinsured that meet the criteria of the treaty. Treaty
reinsurance is sometimes (but rarely) called automatic reinsurance. When a treaty
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automobile coverage to “protect its losses under applicable treaty
agreements”. As the RAA points out, the facultative “rider” need not even
be purchased from the treaty reinsurers, allowing those potential
commercial automobile losses to be handled under a completely separate
relationship. This suggests the overall cost of ongoing higher treaty
premiums is sufficiently grave to encourage the additional cost of “double
reinsuring” certain risks, even at the relatively higher specific cost of the
facultative agreement.
In any event, this common choice to pair facultative with treaty
reinsurance to protect loss histories161 supports the conclusion that
reinsurance monitoring of loss histories does effect reinsurance choices.
This monitoring of underwriting practices162 has the capacity to effect
underwriting decisions holistically and possibly industry-wide as insurers
choose to implement practices that conform to the reinsurance market’s
interests and prevent them from making underwriting risks which may
negatively affect their reinsurance opportunities. To an extent, this natural
interplay of loss history with reinsurance costs can create a self-regulating
and self-limiting tendency among certain insurers to produce loss histories
lower than similarly situated insurers.
Whether this activity is congruent with all articulated insurance
regulatory interests is open to question, but there certainly exists the
potential for segmentation of the market and increased costs for some
policyholders. The simplest way for insurers to decrease loss histories is to
restrict their business to lower risk policyholders or limit their dollar
exposure to those risks. A “cherry picked” book of business, for example

is in force, the ceding insurer is obligated to cede and the reinsurer is obligated to
accept all of the risks within the scope of the treaty.”).
161

See id. (noting “a reinsured can structure an elaborate program of
reinsurance using a combination of treaties and facultative contracts, using one or
multiple reinsurers.”).
162

Not only are underwriting practices monitored on a general basis, but in
conformity with the reinsurer’s need to rely on their reinsured’s underwriting
expertise, the duty of good faith requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer
all material facts which may affect the insured risk. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN,
supra note 10, at § 16:03[a], at 1036-37 (“It is a basic obligation of a reinsured to
disclose to potential reinsurers all material facts regarding the original risk of loss,
and failure to do so renders a reinsurance agreement voidable or rescindable.”).
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could attract more reinsurance interest; as a result, the cherry-picking
insurer can charge lower premiums to gain an even bigger bowl of cherries.
To the extent that this segmentation would not have occurred but
for the reinsurance interests, reinsurance can be seen as having an effect on
underwriting. There would still be an interest in insuring and reinsuring
lemons, of course, so long as they can and will pay higher premiums which
could be shared with the reinsurer, but the potential for reinsurance pricing
to encourage cherry-picking can be somewhat troubling. The competitive
advantage an insurer can obtain through reduced reinsurance premiums
may militate against the traditional benefits afforded by the law of large
numbers. The insurer could determine their best option for profit lay in the
reinsurance cost saving produced by the lower risks.
An insurer with a sufficiently broad market share and multi-line
business, of course, could get what would amount to a “bulk discount” for
placing most of its reinsurance business with one company. But, if smaller
insurers took the “cherry” approach and were rewarded with sufficiently
lower premiums to compete against even the “bulk” advantage, the move
towards segmentation would start when the big insurer slowly (or even
quickly) began to loose enough of its cherries to affect its loss history in a
way significant enough to offset its “bulk” appeal to its reinsurers.
Remember, the reinsurance market is extremely broad, with at least 50% of
domestic insurers reinsured by foreign companies.163 There is likely
always some reinsurer around with a taste for cherries.
Importantly, reinsurance’s effect on cherry-picked risk premiums
does not always result in the company actually restricting their business to
those “better” risks alone. There is no reason why reinsurance treaties must
be structured so as to take the entire book of business for a certain type of
risk, though they often are structured that way.164 An insurer could reinsure
with one company for their “better” risks at the lower prices, seek a
competitive advantage on the market, and move the worse risks into a
163

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1
(“Reinsurance can be purchased from three distinct sources: reinsurance companies
located in the United States, reinsurance departments of U.S. primary insurance
companies, and alien reinsurers that are located outside the U.S. and not licensed
here. The ceding insurer may purchase reinsurance directly from a reinsurer or
through a broker or reinsurance intermediary.”).
164

See HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 152, at § 102.4A, at
32 (noting “[a] treaty may be written to cover some or all of an insurer’s line of
business”).
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different book charged higher premiums; premiums sufficient to entice a
different reinsurer. A different insurer could acquire better overall pricing
by averaging the two pools, but it could face difficulty getting those
cherries away from the segmented insurer, moving the whole market
towards segmentation.
There is also the possibility that certain types of policyholders –
likely corporate ones- which could be sufficiently attractive to an insurer so
as to make the relative reinsurance benefits irrelevant. If, for example, the
worse risks in one line were restricted to those who proved more profitable
for the company on some other business basis, like companies interested in
multi-line policies or companies which in some sense represent loss
leaders, the higher reinsurance premiums could be offset for even those
“worse” risks. This offset provides the book of business with a competitive
advantage. Yet, even that potential benefit would have to be consistently
reevaluated in relation to current market rates and costs of reinsurance. If
the advantage of getting the big book of business did not offset the higher
reinsurance rates, it would no longer be profitable, forcing the insurer to
raise its rates across the board. And, just as with the possible loss of
cherries scenarios described above, if another insurance company could
convince the multi-line user it was better served by spinning off the
insurance of its cherry risks for a significantly lower premium; such
competition could again support a move toward segmentation.
Unfortunately, in all these scenarios, there exists the risk of
identification of a certain class of generally unattractive risks with fewer
insuring options other than higher premiums. Hence, restrictive
underwriting in the search for lower reinsurance costs can be seen as
having the capacity to self-support segmentation through beneficial
reinsurance rates. To the extent that reinsurance was the “but for” cause of
this segmentation and increased costs for certain classes of risks,
reinsurance is acting as a regulator of insurance rates and should certainly
come within governmental regulatory review.
It would be extremely interesting to identify empirically whether
certain state actions, such as prohibiting coverage refusals to certain classes
of policyholders in their state results in an initial spike in the cost of
reinsurance for the reinsureds who must extend their underwriting in
conformity with those new mandates. Likewise, it would be very
interesting to determine how long, if at all, such a spike continued to exist
and whether a new underwriting requirement became sufficiently common
that the effect disappeared.
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iv. Reinsurance Clauses, Doctrines and Their Effect on
Claims Handling
As with underwriting165, reinsurance has the capacity to influence
the activities of reinsureds, or those seeking to become reinsureds, attitudes
and actions in the claims handling process. Because of the manner in
which the reinsured’s good faith obligation166 has been interpreted by
courts so as to offer the reinsurer a defense to its indemnity obligations, the
proper handling of a potentially reinsurable claim is likely paramount to
any prudent reinsured. Even though, as described below, the claims
handling would have to be so poor to constitute some form of “negligence”
to succeed as a defense, the risk of lost reinsurance funds is no small
matter. Further, given the fact that claims handling processes and
“philosophy” are reviewed as part of reinsurers decision to reinsure (just
as with underwriting), adoption of formalized claims handling processes
which would assure compliance with the reinsurance “non-negligent”
claims handling standard is not unlikely. As we will see, the actions which
a court might construe as “negligent” handling and investigation of a claim
are neither necessarily intuitive nor without cost.
v. Duty of Good Faith in Claims Handling and Court
Interpretation
In order to understand how the courts became arbiters of insurance
claims handling sufficiency requires some explanation of a few new
reinsurance doctrines and clauses – particularly the loss settlements or
follow the fortunes doctrine.167 Again, a key point to remember is that the
165

See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 57 (noting
the term ‘underwriting capacity’ means “[t]he maximum amount of money an
insurer or reinsurer is willing to risk in a single loss event on a single risk or in a
given period. The limit of capacity for an insurer or reinsurer that may also be
imposed by law or regulatory authority.”).
166

See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., Ltd., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d, 217 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000);
Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de Fr., et al., v. New England Reins. Corp., et
al., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
167

See William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer’s
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duty of good faith is mutual and has been interpreted to create a powerful
judicially-supported standard of care when examining the insurer’s
performance of its claims handling function.168
Most reinsurance agreements requires the reinsurer to “follow the
fortunes” or “follow the settlements” of its reinsureds. These obligations
are somewhat intuitively understandably necessary so as to allow the
proper functioning of reinsurance.169 In short, the “follow the fortunes”
doctrine170 obligates a reinsurer to follow the underwriting fortunes of its
Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 TORT &
INS. L. J. 659, 659-60 (1992) (offering an expansive analysis of the reinsurance
loss settlement clause and the application of the duty of utmost good faith).
168

See PLITT, supra note 9, at § 9:17 (“Duties of good faith and fair dealing
run between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial
insured and his or her insurer.”).
169

These doctrines are often conjoined in court decisions leading to certain
amount of confusion in their analysis. See e.g., Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac Employers
Ins. Co., v. Home Ins. Co., 991 P.2d 638, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). This
problem has been noted by both courts and commentators. See Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
“[t]he term ‘follow the fortunes” has been used imprecisely to describe the
reinsurer’s duty to follow the claims adjustment decisions of the ceding company,
thereby giving rise to some ambiguity as to its meaning. ‘Follow the fortunes’
more accurately describes the obligation to follow the reinsured’s underwriting
fortunes, whereas ‘follow the settlements’ refers to the duty to follow the actions of
the cedent in adjusting and settling claims.”).
170

There is considerable debate as to whether there truly exists a “follow-thefortunes” or “follow the settlements” doctrine in the absence of a “follow-the
fortunes” clause. Some treatises and courts identify a “doctrine”. See PLITT, supra
note 9, at § 9:17 (“reinsurers are generally bound by the reinsured’s good faith
decision to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the ‘follow the settlements’
doctrine”) (discussing ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878
(8th Cir. 2002) (the follow the fortunes “doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted
in good faith in handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the
claims, the reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent”).
Other commentators are explicit that in the absence of a general loss settlement or
other “follow-the fortunes clause” the nature of reinsurance as an indemnity
contract prohibits an implied-in-law obligation to reinsure a loss settlement unless
the reinsured can prove actual –as opposed to a good faith belief of – liability. See
Hoffman, supra note 174, at 679. The courts are aware of the split authority on the
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reinsured and pay its share of a loss sustained by its reinsured,171 according
to the terms of the reinsurance contract.172 This clause obligates a reinsurer
to indemnify its reinsured for its good faith payment of all claims that
arguably fall within the scope of the agreement – no “second guessing”
Likewise, a “follow the settlements” clause requires
allowed.173
matter. For example, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp.
1328, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court, when finding in favor of the reinsured
Aetna, stated:
Under Aetna's theory, it is the settled custom and practice in the
reinsurance industry that reinsurers follow settlements entered into
between a ceding company and its insured, as long as the settlements are
made in good faith after a reasonable investigation and do not involve ex
gratia payments. Essentially, Aetna maintains that a reinsurer's
undertaking to follow the ceding company's settlements is implicit in any
contract of reinsurance, and enforceable even in the absence of an
explicit loss settlements clause. Home responds that in the absence of a
loss settlements clause, a reinsurer is not bound by a ceding company's
settlement of a coverage dispute without the consent of the reinsurer. The
court agrees with Aetna (emphasis added).
The weight of authority appears to favor Aetna's position, although
the authorities admittedly do not speak with one voice. For example,
Gerathewohl opines that the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principle"
generally applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the contract of
reinsurance, i.e., in a loss settlement clause.
171

A reinsurer is not, however, required to pay losses “squarely outside” the
scope of the ceding insurers coverage. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10
at § 16.01[a], at 1013.
172

See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 413 F.3d 12,
1231 (1st Cir. 2005). The reinsurer cannot, however, be found liable for an
amount in excess of the reinsurance limit of liability stated in the agreement. See
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1070-71 (2d Cir.
1993). This includes the reinsurer’s liability for “expenses” as well as for the
amount of the actual loss. See Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 882
N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (N.Y. 2004) (finding that a reinsurers obligation for expenses
incurred while handling a loss is capped by the limit of liability in a facultative
agreement regardless of the presence of a “follow the fortunes” clause).
173

See N. River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“‘Follow the fortunes’ clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing good-faith
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indemnification of the reinsured for good faith settlement decisions.174
Such broad grants of power by the reinsurer to the discretion of its
reinsured is seen by the courts to require the insurer to comport with a
standard of care appropriate to that level of reliance and in accordance with
its good faith obligation. In its application, a reinsurer will only be bound
by a reinsured’s claims decision if the reinsured’s decision was made in
conformance with judicially created criteria for identifying insurer good
faith .175 Specifically, the claims decision must have been made after a
“reasonable, businesslike investigation” into the propriety of the claim
settlements and obtaining de novo review of judgments of the reinsured’s liability
to its insured.”). This standard, however, is not always completely clear in its
application. See JERRY, supra note 9, at § 142[e], at 1061-62 (“The usual role of
the reinsurer is to ‘follow the fortunes’ of the primary insurer as if the reinsurer
were a party to the original insurance. Some courts insist that the reinsurance
agreement have appropriate language placing this obligation on the reinsurer, while
others presume that the reinsurer’s obligations follow the form (although in most
certificates ‘follow the form’ language will be found). As the phrase suggests, the
idea is that the reinsurer is to accept whatever settlements the primary insurer
makes and participate and pay according to the reinsurance agreement the
appropriate share of whatever judgments are entered that trigger the primary
insurer’s liability. Difficulties can arise in determining exactly what ‘fortunes’ the
reinsurer agreed to ‘follow,’ in that the reinsurer’s obligation to participate in
whatever payments the primary insurer makes is not unlimited.”).
174

In general, “[w]hen the reinsurance agreement contains a ‘follow the
settlements’ provision, the reinsurer will be bound by the settlement or
compromise agreed by the cedent unless it can meet its burden of proving either
that settlement was dishonestly arrived at, or that the reassured has failed to take all
proper and business-like steps to have the amount of loss fairly and carefully
ascertained.” OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at § 16.01[b], at 1020.
Unsurprisingly, there is some muddling of terms as regards the use of the word
“settlement” in various clause formulae. See e.g. Mentor Ins. Co. (UK), Ltd., v.
Norges Brannkasse, et al., 996 F.2d 506, 508, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1993) (construing a
reinsurance policy which provided that it was “subject to all terms, clauses,
conditions and settlements as original to require reinsurance “payment where
cedent’s good faith payment is at least arguably within the scope of the insurance
coverage that was reinsured” using a “follow-the-fortunes” analysis.).
175

See Hoffman, supra note 174, at 692-93 (noting “[d]ishonesty, including
fraud, bad faith, and collusion, is a universally recognized defense to a loss
settlement clause”).
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prior to granting it,176 and where there was a “reasonable basis” to
conclude the underlying claim was covered by the reinsured’s ’s policy as a
matter of law.177
Since the obligation of good faith is mutual, the courts allow that
certain circumstances, indicative of a lack of good faith, are sufficient for
the reinsurer to be released from its obligation to reinsure. In other words,
the court seeks a way to make sure the reinsurer is not taken advantage of
by its reinsured. Particularly in the investigation and handling of the claim,
in the absence of a reasonable standard, the reinsured could foreseeably
choose not to investigate the claim properly to the financial detriment of its
reinsurer. For this reason, the courts require the positive duty of reasonable
and businesslike investigation of the claim by the cedent company. In
theory, this likely only further strengthens the already extant interest of the
reinsured company to be sure it is actually liable for coverage prior to
payment – another instance where reinsurance supports a public interest by
incentivizing prudence. In practice however, the availability of a defense
on these grounds may lead to a reinsured cedent being overcautious in its
claims review and handling at considerable expense.
vi. The Case of Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.
One “follow the settlements” case is particularly illuminating of the
capacity of “poor” claims handling to release the reinsurer from its
indemnity obligation. In Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co.,178 the court
focused on claims handling improprieties in its decision to release the
176

See Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
93 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 1996).
177

See Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Colum. Cas. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d, 251,
258 (D. Conn. 2000).
178

Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209
(D.N.J. July 14, 2006), vacated by, Goldman v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70406. Though this decision was vacated as a result of
agreement by the parties prior to hearing by the Third Circuit, for purposes of a
recent court’s analysis of the requirement of reasonable “businesslike” claim
handling and investigation it is helpful. Instances where a court determines that
the claims investigation was insufficient are rare, making this case of particular
value for its findings of fact and reasoning.
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reinsurer of its obligation arising from the reinsured’s settlement.179 The
underling case and settlements involved product liability tort claims
asserted against Pfizer, as the manufacturer of allegedly defective heartvalves, by patients who had received the potentially defective valves.180
The manufacturer was the original insured which settled claims with the
consent of Integrity Insurance Company, the original excess insurer which
sought indemnity from General Accident Insurance Company of America,
its reinsurer.181
Interestingly, the “claims handling” improprieties identified in this
decision were all actually related to the reinsured excess insurer’s legal
acumen and choices made in evaluating and settling the claim.182 They
primarily were issues involving the proper acquisition of independent
coverage counsel and expert medical advice.183 The court determined that
failure to seek certain types of legal counsel and take certain investigatory
steps, given the complexity of the case, constituted “gross negligence”.184

179

See id., at *77–85 (reviewing the actions of Mr. Reive, the Senior Claims
Examiner for Integrity Insurance Company, excess insurance company whose
reinsurance agreement with General Accident Insurance Company was the subject
of the case).
180

Id. at *13-34.

181

Id. at *8-13 (Pfizer had a classic array of multi-tiered insurance policies in
place, with the company self-insuring for the first $10 million of liability, followed
by two primary policies issued by INA, the Insurance Company of North America,
above which it had umbrella issued by Transit Casualty Company, along with
excess policies issued by Integrity, the reinsured in this case. Id. The Integrity
Policies “followed the form” of the Transit umbrella policies, making the policy
language of the Transit policies the subject of interpretation to determine the scope
of Integrity’s liability. Id. at *10).
182
183

Id. at *34-66

Id. at *81-85. (“for a case of this legal and medical complexity industry
standards required Integrity to first obtain expert medical advice as to when bodily
injury actually occurred and to retain its own coverage counsel for an opinion as to
the appropriate trigger of coverage. The failure to do so . . . breached Integrity’s
duty to Generall Accident to make a reasonable, businesslike determination as to
whether the Shiley Heart valve claims should have been allowed.”).
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The court cited the insurer’s reliance on another insurer’s counsel for its
appraisal of potential liability as inappropriate.185 Likewise, it cited failure
of the insurer to hire its own medical expert (again it had relied on another
insurer’s expert) to advise on the heart-valves potential for bodily injury
and a failure of the insurer to keep up to date on the laws of trigger of
coverage as determinative factors.186 Relying on these claims settlement
investigation failures, the court further determined that the insurer had
failed “breached its duty to General accident [the reinsurer] to make a
reasonable, businesslike determination as to whether the [heart valve]
claims should have been allowed.”187 The court also found the Pfizer
claims beyond the scope of Integrity’s policies and Integrity’s settlement of
the Pfizer claims to have been so grossly negligent so as to constitute badfaith.188 As such, the reinsurer was freed from its presumptively applicable
duty to follow the insurer’s settlement. 189
To those familiar with the tort litigation process, this demonstrates
a privately assumed obligation’s effect on the legal process and litigation
costs. By focusing on the insurer’s choice not to hire independent counsel
or rely on other medical experts as grounds for release from reinsurance
obligations, even in a case like Suter where such reliance was self184

Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at
*84 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006). The court’s analysis of the “follow the settlements
doctrine” requirement that the reinsured’s duty to make a reasonable, businesslike
investigation noted:
What is a reasonable, businesslike investigation of course must depend on the
facts of each case. The factual findings support the conclusion that Mr. Reive's
investigation was anything but reasonable and businesslike. Mr. Reive's
investigation of the Pfizer claim was superficial, relying as it did on Pfizer's
position and opinions of Transit's counsel, which were even at times inaccurate.
The defendant has demonstrated that Mr. Reive did not make the kind of
reasonable and businesslike investigation that the circumstances required. Id.
185

Id. at *84-5.

186

Id. at *81-85.

187

Id. at *85.

188

Id. at *85-86.

189

Id.
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evidently imprudent, the court explicitly allows the reinsurance contract
obligation of reasonable investigation to affect the insurer’s business
judgment to save the cost of its own counsel or experts.190 In effect, this
type of decision will require the use of coverage counsel by each insurer
implicated on a sufficiently “complex” claim that may implicate its
reinsurance. It also has the potential to institutionalize the added cost of
duplicative legal analysis and investigation of claims where reinsurance is
implicated. 191
To be sure, the Suter case, involved a significantly complex area of
bodily injury law where the opinions of qualified legal and medical experts
would likely have been sensible. Likewise, the Integrity claims handler
probably should have kept abreast of legal changes implicating its
obligations, given that directly relevant decisions had been made.
However, there is no evidence that Integrity’s claims handler had been
acting collusively with any party, was attempting to perpetrate a fraud, or
was not subjectively acting in good faith. The importance of the decision is
in its recognition that the standard of competent and businesslike
investigation will be one of industry standards, as discerned by the courts.
It identifies how a generally common business practice can transform into a
legal obligation. Though the court was not incorrect in identifying that the
claims handlers ignorance may have been tantamount to malpractice in this
instance, the decision has the capacity to effect business practices beyond
the narrow fact situation of the ruling.
Though the application of the determined standard of care will
always be fact specific to the situation reviewed for reasonableness, the
capacity for a standard practice of requiring independent legal experts in
“complex” cases could easily trickle down to “moderate” cases and then,
perhaps, to “easy” coverage decisions. Even in cases where there would
probably be little disagreement as to the likely value of the claims or
medical evidence of causation, how could an insurer not be expected to
cover its risk with duplicative legal opinions when the claim implicates its
190

Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48209, at
*85-6 (D.N.J. July 14, 2006).
191

Good faith is a perquisite for application of a reinsurer’s indemnity
obligations. See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 878 (8th
Cir. 2002) (finding that “doctrine posits that if the cedent has acted in good faith in
handling the claims presented to it and in providing coverage of the claims ‘the
reinsurer may not second guess the coverage decisions of the cedent’”).
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reinsurance? Regardless where the line is eventually drawn as a matter of
industry practice, one way or another, the litigation costs will eventually be
internalized by the obligated insurers and passed to policyholders in the
form of higher premiums.
Moreover, as the decision in Suter stems from the universally
applicable good faith obligation of the insurer to reasonably investigate as a
predicate to the reinsurer’s performance under the reinsuring agreement,
this duplicative effort could become simple industry practice for most
claims in an overabundance of caution.192 Even if there is no reinsurer
obligated on the particular claim, as discussed above, reinsurers investigate
and monitor claims handling philosophy. It is possible that an insurer
thinking about their future interest in reinsurance will take steps to ensure
their claims handling demonstrates their history of operating in a nongrossly negligent manner and, if that requires a showing of the consistent
use of its own independent medical experts and coverage counsel, such
would likely be undertaken.
One caveat: it is of course possible that this added duplicative cost
could be so cost prohibitive the insurer would prefer to simply avoid
reinsurers and internalize the litigation savings. As described above, the
benefits of reinsurance, particularly the ability to stabilize profits and
leverage reserves makes such a choice unlikely.193 For various reasons, an
insurer remains aware of the chance it will in future need reinsurance. If
anything, knowingly producing largely duplicative legal work would
simply lead insurers to pressure their attorneys to reduce the cost of
redundant legal services, if it cannot reduce the need to complete the work
in the first place. Perhaps this accounts for some of the insurance
industry’s interest in creating legal services compensation structures which
offer opportunities for “bulk rate” services and long-term billing
agreements.
192

Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co., 424 F. Supp 2d 781, 784, 788, 792
(D.N.J. 2006).
193

REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (noting
“[i]nsurers often seek to reduce the wide swings in profit and loss margins inherent
to the insurance business. These fluctuations result, in part, from the unique nature
of insurance, which involves pricing a product whose actual cost will not be known
until sometime in the future. Through reinsurance, insurers can reduce these
fluctuations in loss experience, and stabilize the company’s overall operating
results.”).
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C. CONSUMER PROTECTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, BAD
FAITH AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE
Since reinsurance is considered a business to business transaction,
it is subject to significantly less regulatory oversight beyond issues of
solvency. As described above, however, reinsurance’s ability to indirectly
affect the policyholder though inculcating and rewarding reinsurer-focused
underwriting decisions and claims handling processes exist and current
regulatory schemes do not address them. Yet they implicate issues of grave
public policy. As described below, reinsurance clauses have been held
valid so as to provide reinsurance for the bringing of a declaratory
judgment action against the original insured to obviate coverage. Other
approved clauses even allow for the reinsurance of judgments in excess of
loss resulting from insurer bad faith and clauses which offer reinsurance for
extracontractual damages arising from a bad faith tort suits. Each of these
has the capacity to support rather than prohibit unfair insurance practices.
If for no other reason than the moral hazard of reinsuring tortious conduct.
As regards declaratory judgments, many reinsurance agreements
include a clause which states that the agreement covers “all expenses
incurred in the investigation and settlements of claims or suits”.194 Such a
clause makes sense in relation to the reinsurer’s interest in not
indemnifying claims beyond the scope of the policy they are reinsuring.
These clauses have been construed to reinsure the cost of declaratory
judgments brought against the primary insured policyholder to obviate
coverage. To an extent, it makes sense for the reinsured to seek to lay-off
these declaratory judgment costs to the reinsurer where much of the benefit
of the coverage determination would accrue to the reinsurer on the risk.
However, the availability of such coverage can only incentivize an
increased use of the declaratory judgment mechanism. In fact, given the
broad reaching good faith obligation of the reinsured, failure to bring the
declaratory judgment action could potentially be seen as negligent.
These clauses are very common and often interpreted broadly.195
Moreover, in the absence of an exclusion, the “standard practice” of the
industry to allow for such costs can create a sufficient question of fact to
194
195

See PLITT, supra note 9, at §9:29.

See Employers Ins. Co. v. American Reins. Co., 256 F. Supp.2d 923, 92526 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
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support an implied modification of the contract sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.196 Likewise, despite the absence of a
clause, declaratory judgment costs have been upheld as part of the contract
as a result of the parties “custom and practice”.197
Other particularly worrisome reinsurance clauses implicate insurer
bad faith. For example, one available clause makes reinsurance coverage
available for judgments in excess of policy limits arising out of the
reinsured’s bad faith failure to settle or defend a claim and another allows
for reinsurance of bad faith judgments and other extracontractual damages.
Called “judgment in excess of policy limits” and “extracontractual
obligations” clauses, these provisions allow insurers to be indemnified for
their own bad faith actions against their policy holders.
As reported in Ostrager & Newman’s Handbook on Insurance
Coverage Disputes, a judgment in excess of policy limits clause generally
provides “in word or substance”198:
It is agreed that should the ceding insurer become legally obligated
to pay a loss in excess of policy limits by reason of alleged or actual
negligence, fraud or bad faith in rejecting an offer of settlement or in the
defense or trial of any action against an insured, the Reinsurer agrees to
assume ____% of said loss [in excess of the ceding insurer’s] $ _____
retention.199
These clauses are “relatively widely used and provide[] the
reinsurer will participate in such excess verdicts but not to exceed the
reinsurance contract limits”.200 Moreover, there are iterations of this clause
which explicitly provide for coverage of “punitive damages”.201 Other
courts have found reinsurer’s liable for extracontractual damages even in

196

See Premier Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d
348, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
197

See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Constitution Reins. Corp., 416 Mass. *839,
*846 (1994).
198

See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 10, at § 16.06[a].
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Id.
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the absence of such a clause, but where the reinsurance agreement does
contain the common “follow the fortunes” language.202
The second bad faith related clause covering extracontractual
obligations or ECO’s differs from that of the “excess judgments clause” in
that it directly allows for reinsurance indemnification for tortious insurer
bad faith awards. 203 Its purpose has been described thusly:
When an insurance company finds itself on the wrong side of a bad
faith case, a judgment awarding punitive damages often results and
theinsurance company must pay the judgment out of its own funds unless it
has insured itself, through reinsurance programs or other means, against
punitive damages awards. Many reinsurance agreements have a special
provision called an extracontractual obligations clause, which typically
provides that the reinsurer will pay some percentage of the reinsured's
liability for claims brought against it outside of the terms of underlying
insurance contracts. It is well understood in the industry that the ECO
clause is designed to respond to bad faith punitive damages awards against
the reinsured.204
Prior to the creation of ECO clauses, the ability of insurers to layoff the costs of their own bad faith actions had been limited to the
availability of reinsurance for only judgments in excess of policy limits.
The ECO clause sought to broaden this limitation by extending reinsurance
for tortious bad faith judgments as well as judgments in excess of policy
limits.205 ECO clauses offer reinsurance coverage for an insurer’s bad faith
202

Id. (citing Peerless Ins. Co. v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 696, 697 (4th
Cir. 1958)).
204

See Larry P. Schiffer & William Bodkin, Caveat Reinsurer: Reinsuring
Punitive Damages Under ECO Clauses, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2001).
205

Id. at 159. ECO clauses made their first appearance in 1978 in response to
the desire of primary insurers to secure coverage for the various tort claims that
had evolved into extracontractual, i.e., bad faith liability. Bad faith liability arises
separately from the coverage provisions of any underlying insurance policy or
reinsurance agreement, and results solely from the tortious conduct of an insurer in
the course of policyholder service or claims handling under the policy. Tortious
conduct may include: (1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2)
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations against the
insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5) unfair marketing
practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the policy limits; and (7)
agent misrepresentation or fraud. An extracontractual obligation also may be a
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liability sounding in tort law, rather than arising from breach of the
insurance contact. Hence, the reinsurance clause which provides coverage
for those tortious damages refers to such finding of liability as an
“extracontractual obligation”. Such clauses first began to appear in 1978 as
actions for tortious bad faith liability –and judgments- began to become
more commonly accepted.
It appears obvious that the availability of reinsurance for bad faith
tortious liability has the capacity to influence reinsured companies claims
behavior. In fact, it appears to be an obvious moral hazard. A bad faith
action can be grounded in a whole host of improper insurer activity when
servicing a policyholder’s claim. As one commentator noted, examples of
bad faith tortious conduct could well include:
(1) denial of a claim based on inadequate investigation; (2)
intentional misrepresentation of a claim or policy; (3) false accusations
against the insured; (4) failure to disclose the rights of the insured; (5)
unfair marketing practices; (6) unreasonable rejection of an offer within the
policy limits; and (7) agent misrepresentation or fraud.206
It seems apparent that so far as there is a regulatory interest in
preventing bad faith insurer behavior – an interest reflected in both
statutory and common law – the capacity to reinsure bad faith judgments
has the capacity to subvert that interest.
Considering that reinsurance agreements are supported by the
premiums charged to policyholders, it seems somewhat incongruous to
allow the cost of insurer’s own bad faith judgments to be charged directly
back to policyholders in their premiums. In fact, it seems to severely
undermine the integral purpose of bad faith legal actions beyond the
reinsured’s own retention, to allow for them to be reinsurable.
Clearly, this type of indemnification reduces the deterrent value of
these actions. There can be little deterrence through litigation and the
award of damages, tortious or otherwise, if those judgments are
indemnified by reinsurer’s as a matter of course. Granted, reinsurers are
sensitive to loss histories so too frequent a number of bad faith judgments
could increase the insurer’s costs to reinsure. Still, that market based result
seems somewhat less than the affect contemplated by legislators who enact
bad faith statutes and somewhat disjointed from traditional understanding
of the purpose of the tort system. In any event, these clauses identify yet
judgment in excess of the limits of an insurance policy, with the insured being
liable for the excess due to the mishandling of the claim.
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another possible contractual source of influence on reinsured’s claims
handling behavior.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reinsurance agreements certainly have the capacity to influence
insurer behavior. The effect of these agreements and the manner in which
courts enforce their performance likely leads to the institutionalization of
systems beyond and not necessarily congruent with many of the
expectations and avowed purposes of some regulatory activity.
Insurance is often dubbed an industry affecting the public interest;
if that is so, then reinsurance should acquire that denomination as well.
Though silent, operating through private contract alone, it has the capacity
certainly to influence, if not directly regulate, insuring behavior. To be
effective, this Essay suggests that regulatory discussions of the insurance
industry be expanded to recognize the influential capacity of the reinsuring
industry. To fail to do so is to ignore a fundamental financial influence on
the entire insurance industry with the likely result that the silent regulator
will continue to operate below the notice of our sometimes raucous public
ones.
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“FAIR IS FOUL AND FOUL IS FAIR:”
HAVE INSURERS LOOSENED THE
CHOKEPOINT OF COPYRIGHT AND
PERMITTED FAIR USE’S BREATHING
SPACE IN DOCUMENTARY FILMS?
Thomas Plotkin*
Tarae Howell**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, documentary films have served a public purpose, in
that unlike standard Hollywood fare, they educate and convey news,
criticism and commentary. The films shed light on lives that might
otherwise remain obscure, or on corners of social and political interest that
are unexamined by the mainstream media. Because of their capacity to
convey a sense of unmediated reality, they exert enormous power over
audiences. Documentarians routinely rely on copyrighted material in
telling their stories. This appropriation can take the form of cultural
artifacts captured incidentally while filming a subject, music or images
included in the film to establish context, or other material used for critical
or editorial purposes.
Copyrighted material is, by definition, protected by copyright. The
Copyright Act, which has existed in one form or another since 1790 and
has its own purpose adumbrated in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution,
grants authors exclusive rights for a limited duration.1 Copyright
protection serves to incentivize the creation of knowledge-producing
works, a public good. Infringement, the violation of those rights, is subject

*
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litigation associate at Rome, McGuigan, P.C., in Hartford, Connectiuct.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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to substantial penalties, including statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and a
permanent injunction upon the work that was copied.
The Copyright Act of 1976 contains a counterweight to authors’
rights: fair use.2 Recognizing that new works come from old, and that the
limited term of copyright protection signifies that the public benefit of
knowledge-producing works may outweigh an author’s exclusive rights,
fair use permits the reasonable taking of copyrighted material for the
purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or
research.
In recent years, documentarians have found that the cost of licenses
for copyrighted material has ballooned astronomically, far beyond the
reach of their meager budgets. This is in large part because the large media
entities that hold copyrights have awakened to the value of their backcatalogs as cash cows: since Hollywood and the music industry itself pays
top dollar for licenses, documentarians are expected to as well. In addition,
the ideological slant of many documentaries (historically oppositional), or
the desire for brand-management on the part of the owner, often results in
the denial of a license. Rights-holders have also been abetted by Congress’
extraordinary expansion of the Copyright term, which in 1790 was fourteen
years, but now effectively keeps anything created since the 1920's out of
the public domain for generations.
Recognizing they sit on a goldmine, the media accordingly polices
its copyrights aggressively, threatening documentarians who might take
material with infringement suits. Even if a documentarian wins, these suits
produce litigation expenses beyond most independent film-makers’ means.
Fair use provides little relief. The doctrine is an affirmative defense, only
coming into play once a documentarian has been sued, leaving little room
for informed decision-making at the time of the taking. Ex ante planning
is also problematic because the Supreme Court has stated that fair use
decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, without regard to brightline rules. The ensuing chaos in the lower courts renders the doctrine
unpredictable and unstable.
Finally, documentarians require E & O insurance for their film to
be distributed, screened or broadcast. Until early 2007, insurers either
denied coverage for un-cleared material outright, or submitted the film to
an unwieldy, ad hoc underwriting process when the film-maker sought
distribution, when timeliness was most crucial. This underwriting process,

2

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2009).

2009]

FAIR IS FOUL

409

which already followed time-consuming failed attempts to clear the
material, made documentarians reluctant to assert fair use.
The Copyright regime, considering the scale of its subject matter
and the length and complexity of the Act, is largely a matter of private
ordering. Enforcement lies with the courts, which may refine fair use
ambiguities, but only when owners bring infringement suits and defendants
assert fair use. Into this regulatory vacuum steps the insurer, who may
acquire a regulatory role by virtue of its capacity to modify its insured’s
conduct. By exercising its gate keeping function to deter filmmakers from
using un-cleared material or exercising fair use, insurers act as policeman
for an owner-friendly copyright regime, abetting the monopolies in
violating the spirit of the Copyright Clause, whose stated purpose is “the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts;” that is, the public good.
Since February 2007, the insurer’s regulatory role with respect to
documentaries and fair use appears to have changed. The four major E &
O insurers who serve documentarians have publicly embraced fair use, two
of them offering affirmative endorsements. How this sea change came
about, and what its effects may be, are the subject of this paper. Part II
discusses copyright itself, from the dual incentivizing/knowledge-creating
purpose in the Constitution, to its legislative expansion favoring owners at
the public’s expense. Part III discusses film-makers travails obtaining
licenses, and the growth of the “content industry,” the media monopolies
who use their copyright protection to either extract exorbitant licensing
fees, or withhold the material altogether. Part IV discusses the fair use
doctrine, its common-law roots, statutory enactment, interpretation by the
Supreme Court, and the nine fair use cases involving nonfiction film, which
demonstrate the inconsistency and instability of the doctrine. Part V
discusses the role of the E & O insurer in handling documentarians’ fair use
assertions prior to 2007. Part VI is a narrative of the events surrounding
four insurers’ public embrace of fair use for documentaries, assessing the
differences in their underwriting approaches, and concluding with
predictions for the future.
II.

COPYRIGHT
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT AS A SOCIAL BARGAIN - THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OR THE PROGRESS CLAUSE?

The power to create intellectual property rights is granted to
Congress in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution: “Congress has
the power to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive rights to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Copyright Clause is the
only enumerated Congressional power in Article I, Section 8 that has a
stated purpose.3 Whereas the other enumerated powers flatly permit
Congress to do some something (regulate commerce among the several
states, declare war), here Congress is charged with advancing the
production of knowledge.4
That purpose can be re-stated as the Congressional furtherance of
three policies, whose priority may be divined from their ordering within the
clause.5 First, the term “Science” in Enlightenment parlance was
synonymous with “learning,” so, like copyright law’s English prototype the
Statute of Anne, copyright exists to encourage learning.6 Second, the
“limited times” allotted to copyright protection denotes the existence of a
public domain, a future point when rights will no longer accrue to the
author, and the public may exploit freely that for which it once needed
permission.7 Third, within that limited term, the author will be vested with
exclusive rights in her work, thus providing the incentive for the creation of
new works.8

3

Lydia P. Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an
Era of Copyright Permissions Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP L. 1, 3 (1997).
4

LAURENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 215 (2004).
5

Stacy McDonald, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of
Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause,
50 HOW. L.J. 541, 546 (2007).
6

The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, was the first codification of copyright.
It was subtitled “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies . . . for the
Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write Useful Books.” Quoted in
Anne E. Forkner et. al., Pretty Woman Meets the Man Who Wears the Star: Fair
Use After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music and American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 719, 720 (2007).
7

McDonald, supra note 5, at 546.

8

Id. at 542, 546.
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Prioritized in this manner, the third policy, the author’s monopoly
of exclusive rights in the work, is the means for achieving the first two, in
that the monopoly temporarily rewards authors for their creations, then
surrenders to the public access to, and use of, copyrighted works.9 Any
private benefit an author gains through copyright protection is merely the
vehicle by which a broader public interest is promoted.10
Laurence Lessig argues that in view of its singular Constitutional
purpose, the Copyright Clause should instead be known as “the Progress
Clause.”11 Some indication of the Framers’ intent to avoid benefitting
authors at the public’s expense can be seen in the words of James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson. Madison believed that copyright had the potential to
thwart creativity while Jefferson believed that copyright protection is for
the benefit of society overall, and not individual creators. 12
Overall, it is clear from the congressional policies regarding the
“copyright clause” that, at least initially, copyright protection was regarded
as a protection for both authors and the general public.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT: FROM SOCIAL
BARGAIN TO COMMODIFICATION
Congressional enactments from the 18th century down to the present
day have shifted the Constitutional social bargain of copyright into the
realm of a property regime.13 Propertization came to envelope copyrighted
works within ownership terms of effectively unlimited duration which
more closely resembled the exclusive rights granted to an owner of real
property than the finite zone of protection envisaged by the Framers.14
9

Id. at 546.

10

Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a
Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 31,38
(2007).
11

LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 131-32.

12

JAMES MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 427
(1884) (Philip R. Fendall ed., R. Worthington 1884).
13

McDonald, supra note 5, at 552.

14

Id. (quoting Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
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The first Copyright Act appeared in 1790. Brief and straightforward, its
scope was limited to maps, charts, and books, and granted authors
exclusive rights to print, reprint, publish and sell them for a term of 14
Registration was required, and
years, renewable for 14 more.15
infringement triggered statutory penalties.16 In the next 119 years, the Act
was amended to expand the subject matter of copyright (encompassing
musical
compositions,
photographs,
paintings,
drawings,
chromolithographs, statues, and works of fine art), as well as the initial
term, which in 1831 was raised from 14 to 28 years.17
The Copyright Act of 1909 substantially revised the original statute,
increasing its length from 7 to 64 sections.18 Copyright’s subject matter
was expanded to encompass public performance and derivative works (the
latter defined non-exhaustively as compilations, abridgements,
arrangements, dramatizations, and translations of copyrighted works).19 In
addition, the renewal term was extended to 28 years, bringing the total term
of copyright to 56 years.20 More significantly, corporate copyright was
created, vesting authorship in an owner who contracted a creator to produce
a work for hire.21
Congress next re-visited the Copyright Act in 1976; in the
intervening seven decades, motion pictures, radio, recorded music, and
television and the nascent computer software industry had matured into the
mass media environment we live in today.”22 The new Act now spanned
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004)).
15

Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L REV 87, 94 (2004).

16

Id.

17

Id. at 95.

18

Id. at 94-96.

19

Id. at 96.

20

Id.

21

SIVA VAIDHYNATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, 102, 214, n. 33
(2003) (quoting Copyright Act of 1909, § 23).
22

Amendments to the 1909 Act in the 1920's included recorded music and
motion pictures as protected under copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6)-(7) (2006).
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several hundred pages, dwarfing its predecessors in complexity.23 It should
come as no surprise that the Act was the product of over twenty years of
negotiations with representatives of a burgeoning culture industry, and that
the Act substantially expanded the scope and terms of copyright
protection.24
The exclusive rights of the author now protected “all original
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium expression” from
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public
display.25 The term of copyright was extended yet again, this time for the
life of the author, plus fifty years.26 Corporate copyrights were extended to
seventy five years.27 The civil penalties for copyright violation were set at
between $750,000 and $30,000 per infringement, with courts given
discretionary authority to raise that to $150,000 per infringement, if
willfulness was found.28 Additionally, default copyright was adopted, as
all renewal formality requirements were dropped for works created before
1978.29 The necessity that copyrighted works be registered and renewed
prior to 1976 as a de facto matter placed the vast majority of works into the
public domain after the initial term had lapsed.30 Now, no action beyond
23

Liu, supra note 15, at 99.

24

See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 48-58 (2001).

25

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 254445 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(2000)).
26

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2572
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)); McDonald, supra note 5, at
548.
27

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, § 302(c), 90 Stat. 2572
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000)); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra
note 4, at 135.
28

Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2004)).
29
30

LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 135.

John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548 (2007).

414

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

the mere creation of the work was needed to trigger infringement
enforcement.31
The relatively brief term of copyright protection allotted by earlier
iterations of the Act was consistent with the fact that most creative works
have a brief commercial existence.32 The combination of limited terms of
protection with formalities requiring registration and renewal ensured that
works no longer being exploited passed into the public domain.33 Under
the extended terms and relaxed registration and renewal formalities of the
Copyright Act of 1976,, works that hitherto might have been made freely
available sooner became profitable to corporate owners via the threat of an
infringement suit, both by reason of “the long tail” of copyright protection
and the slide from a default regime of non-protection to one of per se
protection.34
Congress was still not through with tinkering with copyright, and
further changes nakedly reflected the influence of industry lobbying. In
1998, with the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), the
copyright term was extended an additional twenty years. This brought the
term for new and subsisting works up to the life of the author plus seventy
years, and in the case of a work made for hire, ninety-five years from the
year of first publication or 120 years from the year of creation, whichever
expires first.35
CTEA was nominally passed to harmonize United States copyright
law with its European Union counterpart, which established a term of life
plus seventy years and denied this longer term to works of non-E.U. origin
31

Id.

32

LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 134.

33

Id. at 135. Lessig states that in 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright
owners failed to renew their copyrights, which means the average term of
copyright in that year was 32.2 years; with the elimination of the renewal
requirement, the average term becomes the maximum term, which, in 2003 had
tripled from 32.2 years to 95 years. Id.
34
35

Tehranian, supra note 30, at 548.

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)); McDonald, supra note 5, at
556.
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unless the foreign law provided the same protection.36 However,
harmonization could have been accomplished by reciprocal extension of
E.U works copyright terms within the U.S.37 The bill’s legislative history
manifested Congressional concern that the term extension was necessary to
preserve the dominance of the U.S. culture industry, with scant mention of
the preservation of the social bargain of copyright envisioned by the
Framers.38 In fact, it has been widely reported that the bill was a direct
response to intense lobbying by Walt Disney Studios, who were faced with
loss to the public domain of Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and their kin in
2003 unless Congress extended the term.39 For this reason, CTEA has been
called “a classic instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation.”40
Justice Stephen Breyer has noted that as a practical matter, CTEA’s
long tail of copyright protection imposes a “permissions requirement . .
.[upon those] who want to make the past accessible for their own use or for
that of others, ” because with the lengthened term comes the lengthened life
of the licenses attached to that term.41 Breyer argued that the prohibitive
cost that those licenses imposed on users would affect “historians, scholars,
writers, artists ... and researchers of all kinds” for decades to come;

36

McDonald, supra note 5, at 556.

37

See id. at 556-57.

38

Id. at 557. The most notorious expression of these sentiments came from
Mary Bono, widow of Representative Sonny Bono and successor to his seat in the
house upon his death. She stated that “Sonny wanted the term of copyright
protection to last forever. I am informed [...] that such a change would violate the
Constitution… As you know, there’s Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last
forever less one day.” Id. (Valenti was the first president of the Motion Picture
Association of America, the movie industry’s lobbying group).
39

Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the
Copyright Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft (Mar. 5, 2002),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html.
40

Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000).
41

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Eldred was a failed constitutional challenge to the CTEA. Id. at 771-72.
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additionally, he predicted that this would hinder or prevent the use of old
works as the costs of obtaining permission has risen drastically. 42
The negative effects of a restrictive owner-friendly copyright
system and its corollary, the all-encompassing permissions system which
Breyer warned of, is best seen than in its effects on documentary filmmakers.
II.

THE DOCUMENATARIAN’S DILLEMA: CREATIVE
ENDEAVOR STIFLED BY CLEARANCE CULTURE
A. “HAPPY BIRTHDAY,” THE TEXTURE OF THE REAL, AND THE
HIGH COST OF CLEARANCE

The song “Happy Birthday to You” was copyrighted by
schoolteachers Mildred and Patty Smith Hill in the mid-1930's.43 Under the
Copyright Act of 1909, controlling at the time the Hill sisters registered
their work, the song would have fallen into the public domain after one 28
year term, unless it was renewed for an additional 28 year term.44 But the
Copyright Act of 1976 granted the owners an additional 19 years of
protection.45 Then CTEA added 20 more years of exploitation to the life of
“Happy Birthday.” Music publishing giant Warner Chappell bought the
rights in 1989.46 The song nets around $2 million annually in royalties.47
At the time of the acquisition, rumored to have cost $25 million, a Warner
Chappell executive admitted that motion picture and television licensing
42

Id. at 250-52

43

K. Matthew Dames, Copyright Conundrum: Documentaries and Rights
Clearance, INFO. TODAY, June 2006, at 26.
44

Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909) (repealed

1976).
45

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976) (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000)).
46

Assoc. Press, “Happy Birthday” and the Money it Makes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 1989, at C26.
47

Id.
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was the motive, saying “Obviously whenever there’s a birthday scene,
they’re going to use that song.”48 Warner Chappell Music and the Hill
estate stand to collect royalties from “Happy Birthday” until 2030, barring
an additional expansion of the copyright term by Congress.
“Happy Birthday”is the bete noir of documentarians: wedded to the
texture of our everyday lives, it is predictable that a director following live
subjects may stumble upon a birthday party, and the moment when “Happy
Birthday” is sung could constitute a privileged event in the film. One such
scene occurs in Hoop Dreams, when one of the film’s subjects, a teenager
from Chicago’s housing projects chasing the dream of college basketball as
a way out of the mean streets, is thrown a birthday party; the song is sung,
and his mother says offhandedly, “Isn’t it wonderful that he made it to
18?”49 Director Peter Gilbert called this a “pivotal scene” in the Oscarwinning documentary.50 He also described the owners as “brutal” in
exacting clearance, demanding $15,000-$20,000 for one verse.51
Even a historical documentary can fall into the “Happy Birthday”
money pit. In Eyes on the Prize, there is an excerpt of home-movie footage
of a birthday party thrown for Dr. Martin Luther King by his staff, where
“Happy Birthday” is sung.52 The films’ clearance budget was so tight that
the producers had to weigh paying a substantial amount of money for the
song against dropping a valuable glimpse into King’s private life, as the
scene would lose meaning if the song were cut.53
Examples abound of filmmakers capturing copyrighted material
felicitously, seeing that its presence adds something aesthetically to the
scene, and then being faced with the choice of paying an exorbitant
48

Id.

49

PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS
11
(2001),
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Dames, supra note 43, at 24.

53

Id at 27.
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licensing fee or leaving it on the cutting-room floor.
In Mad Hot
Ballroom, a film about urban public school fourth graders who enter a
ballroom dancing competition, the camera caught a boy going home from
school with his mother.54 She had just asked how his day had gone, when
her cell phone rang, and she answered before he could respond.55 The
producer said the moment “was such an indicator of today’s culture ...The
look on his face says ‘I don’t get to tell my mom about my day.’”56 Adding
an additional layer of irony, the ring-tone on the mother’s phone was the
theme song from Rocky; this, in a true-life Rocky about underdog Brooklyn
kids competing in a city-wide ballroom dancing competition.57 EMI Music
Publishing, the rights-holder to the Rocky theme, demanded $10,000 for the
documentarian’s use of six seconds of music.58 However, after months of
begging, the producer got them down to $2,500; this on a film whose total
music clearance costs were $170,000 of a $500,000 budget.59 In Sing
Faster, in a backstage view of a production of Wagner’s Ring of the
Niebelung the camera caught stage-hands playing checkers while watching
The Simpsons on television., oblivious to the opera performance occurring
in the background.60 The Simpsons clip was onscreen for four-and-a-half
seconds.61 The image was a perfect collision of high and low culture, and it
did not make it into the finished film. Matt Groening, the Simpsons creator
granted Else permission to use the clip, but advised to him to call the Fox
network, which airs the show.62 Else was surprised to discover that
54

Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2005, at A13.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 95-96 (2004).

61

Id. at 96.

62

Id.
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Groening didn’t actually own the rights to the show, and that his
permission was no good.63 Fox demanded a $10,000 licensing fee for the
4.5 seconds.64 Convinced there was a mistake, Else asked if he could get
the educational rate, and was informed $10,000 was the educational rate.65
Else digitally replaced The Simpsons footage with a shot from one of his
own documentaries.66
Historical and political documentaries, where copyrighted material
is edited into a mosaic rather than caught on the fly, are also vulnerable to
the vagaries of copyright.67 A documentarian making a film about
Hollywood representations of the Holocaust required an hour of clips from
movies.68 The rights costs wound up tripling the entire production budget,
even after he received discounts from sympathetic studio executives.69 The
producer’s argument that long-forgotten films languishing in the licensors’
libraries might enjoy a renewal of interest by being featured in the
documentary left the licensors unmoved.70
Antipathy to the historical documentarian’s message can be a dealbreaker for owners. For his documentary Uncovered: The Whole Truth
About the Iraq War, partisan political filmmaker Robert Greenwald wanted
to use a clip of President George W. Bush doing a poor job of defending
his decision to invade Iraq in an appearance on Meet the Press.71 NBC
denied permission to use the clip, even when full compensation was
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 97.

67

See generally AUFDERHEIDI & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49.

68

Id. at 14.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting the President, WIRED MAG., Aug. 2004,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired.archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5.
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offered, on the grounds that the clip was unflattering to the President.72
The film Smoke and Mirrors illustrated collusion between the tobacco
industry and Hollywood by showing clips from old movies glamorizing
smoking by depicting the biggest stars puffing away on cigarettes in scene
after scene.73 The standard form licensing agreements issued by all the
studios forbid any use criticizing the studio, its producers, employees, or
the motion picture industry itself, rendering the clips off-limits.74 As this
article goes to press, Yoko Ono is seeking an injunction to prevent a
documentary that touts “intelligent design” and disparages the teaching of
evolution from critically deploying John Lennon’s song “Imagine” in the
film and using it without permission (“Imagine no religion....”).75
Finally, at least one film of vast significance was nearly lost
completely due to restrictive clearance procedures. Eyes on the Prize is an
epic multi-part historical documentary chronicling the Civil Rights
Movement. Produced independently, it aired in eight parts on PBS in 1987,
followed by six additional segments in 1990, to high ratings and massive
acclaim.76 Eyes was an extremely important documentary, important for
both its scope and its content.
The film was partially composed of interviews with participants in
the Civil Rights Movement, and partially compiled from archival and news
footage, containing 492 minutes culled from 80 archives and 272 still
photographs.77 For the soundtrack, 120 songs were licensed.78 Each
72

Id.

73

Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, Donaldson and Callif (Sept.
12, 2007).
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Henry Louis Gates, chairman of the department of African American
Studies at Harvard University called Eyes “the most sophisticated and poignant
documentary of African-American history ever made.” Nancy Ramsey, The Secret
Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A13. Jon Else, who edited
the series, called it “virtually the only audio-visual purveyor of the history or the
civil rights movement in America.” AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES,
supra note 49, at 19.
77

Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
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episode was about 50% archival, and derived from commercial sources.79
Due to budget constraints, the clips were licensed for differing terms, some
in perpetuity, some for terms of three, seven, and ten years.80 When the
terms began to expire, the film had to be pulled from circulation.81 The last
broadcast before it disappeared from view was in 1993.82 Video tapes were
available, sold largely to libraries and schools shortly after the initial
broadcasts.83 Since that final broadcast, video tape was the only way to see
the film, yet video tapes break easily, degrade rapidly with use and age, and
are subject to loss and theft.84
By 2006, Eyes on the Prize had become a lost film, unavailable on
DVD, the VHS tapes crumbling and disappearing, commercial sale of the
tapes ceased long ago due to the lapse of licenses, and exhibition or
broadcast in any venue legally impossible.85 An entire generation of
2005, at 2.13.
78

Dames, supra note 43, at 27.

79

AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19.

80

Ramsey, supra note 77. The cost of archive footage at $3,500-$4,500 a
minute has been described by one filmmaker as “extortionate.” AUFDERHEIDE &
JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 9.
81

Ramsey, supra note 77.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Dames, supra note 43, at 24.

85

AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19. In 2005,
following substantial outcry in the media and bootleg copies surfacing both in
theaters and the internet, the Ford Foundation kicked in $600,000 to pay new
licensing fees. Katie Dean, Cash Rescues Eyes on the Prize, WIRED MAG., Aug.
30,
2005,
available
at
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/
music/news/2005/08/68664. In October 2006 the series was broadcast on PBS for
the first time in 15 years, and soon after the series became available on DVD for
educational markets only at a cost of $375. PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex
/eyesontheprize/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); Hamil R. Harris, Activists Mark
Rerelease of ‘Eyes on the Prize’, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006, available at
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students had been deprived of the chance to see this landmark film, and it
appeared that Eyes on the Prize would go missing for ever.
All of these examples of clearance issues not only speak to the
hazards of filmmakers’ use of copyrighted material, they also illustrate how
integral such material can be for the purposes of creating the documentary.
Copyrighted material can find its way into a documentary incidentally,
when the recording apparatus captures a work of art hanging on a wall, or
something playing on a TV or radio, or a boombox blaring near a subject,
or a subject performing a song. Such uses are part and parcel of the reality
being captured, and as such can convey the dense texture of that reality by
placing the subjects amidst the cultural artifacts they live amongst, or,
when the filmmaker gets truly lucky, adding a felicitous counterpoint and
commentary to a scene.
Copyrighted materials may be collaged into a work deliberately as
well as merely captured. A film describing an historical event or a matter
of current public import gains power and resonance when archival or news
footage is employed, rather than just giving a dry oral recitation of the
facts. Cultural artifacts culled from mass media, such as advertisements
and scenes from movies and television programs, can provide necessary
context to back up a critique of the norms which produced the artifacts.
Music, which arguably elicits even more powerful audience associations
and emotions than images, can provide a similar function; songs can situate
an audience in the historical or cultural moment it evokes, tell us something
about the environment the subject lives in, or lend commentary or an ironic
counterpoint to the visuals. In any of these instances, a picture, or a piece
of music, can be worth a thousand words.
But as we have seen from the examples above, documentarians’
use of other authors’ copyrighted material can be so costly as to be
prohibitive, and in some instances may be rendered impossible by the
owner’s refusal to license the work at any price. It must be borne in mind
that most documentary films budgets are low, and often rely on public and
non-profit funding until they are acquired post-production: their very
cheapness is one source of their attractiveness to the broadcasters and

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/15/
AR2006111500588.html. Presumably, widespread commercial sale at a cheaper
price through standard retail outlets may still be restricted by unresolved clearance
issues.

2009]

FAIR IS FOUL

423

theatrical distributors who have embraced them so zealously in the last
decade.86
A documentarian’s use of copyrighted material breeds delays and
expense from pre-production until years after the film’s completion, indeed
for as long as the material remains under copyright. Licensing fees are
often inflated by standard “most favored nation” clauses in licensing
agreements, mandating that all rights holders get the highest price
negotiated by any other; thus the fees for copyrighted music and images
used in a documentary may be determined by a single exorbitant quote, and
often the film-maker’s budget is uncertain until the time that high quote
comes in.87 The result can either be an untenable budget, or dropping the
most expensive element, no matter how important it may be to the film.88
In addition, rights must be cleared anew for each distribution
A
channel – telecast, cable, theatrical, DVD, internationally.89
documentary producer who made a film about Los Angeles’ specialty
cinephile cable station Z Channel, the precursor to HBO,90 relied heavily
on clips from 53 movies; initially intended solely for broadcast on the
Independent Film Channel, increasing interest in the film necessitated
repeat negotiations with the studios as its exhibition prospects broadened.91
86

Gretchen Stoeltje, Light in Custody: Documentary Films, the TEACH Act
and the DMCA, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1075, 1079-80
(2004). And as documentarian Frederick Wiseman said of Hollywood budgets,
“You [a documentarian] could make five films for the lunch money.” Janet
Maslin, Summer Films: Indies; Visionaries With Their Eyes on the Truth, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1999, at A2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9506E2DD153DF931A35756C0A96F958260.
87

AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 12-13.

88

Kimberly Brown, Copyright vs. Creativity, Realscreen, June 1, 2005,
available
at
http://www.realscreen.com/articles/magazine/20050601/
copyright.html?word=Copyright&word=vs.&word=Creativity.
89

See Paul Cullum, Freedom of Information: Copyright and its Discontents,
L.A. WEEKLY, Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.laweekly.com/2006-0817/film-tv/freedom-of-information.
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Internet Movie Database, Z Channel: A Magnificent Obsession (2004),
available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0405496/.
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Cullum, supra note 89.
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First the clips had to be cleared for North American cablecast; then, when
the film was entered into the Cannes Film Festival in competition, the
filmmaker needed “festival rights;” next, to qualify for an Academy Award
nomination, the film had to have a limited theatrical release, requiring a
new round of clearances; and finally, international television and
worldwide DVD rights had to be cleared.92 Of course, the same steps had
to be repeated for any soundtrack music from the clips, with separate
negotiations for the actual recording and the publishing rights.93 Following
these travails, producer Evan Shapiro vowed never again to make a clipheavy documentary.94 Overall, the combined television and DVD rights
came to the nominal fee of $375,000. 95 (This was with substantial
assistance from two sympathetic studios which cut favorable deals).
However, it should be noted that even three years later the producer was
still paying for and clearing film clips; 96 this is evidence of the complexity
of attaining adequate licensing rights for a production.
Inability to pay for licenses results in the loss of crucial material
within a film, or even the disappearance of an existing film, such as Eyes
on the Prize. There are less readily quantifiable losses to the culture as
well; for example, the phenomenon of “untold stories,” films that go
unmade because the film-maker has realized that her concept will likely be
impossible to finance due to a dependence on copyrighted material.97
Because of rising clearance costs, producers and copyright lawyers alike
have stated that archive-dependent historical films like Eyes on the Prize
and PBS’s similarly exhaustive 1983 series Vietnam: A Television History

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Elaine Dutka, No Free Samples for Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips
With the Fair-Use Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/movies/28dutk.html.
95

A single clip from a Hollywood studio film can cost $7000 for broadcast
clearance alone. AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 19.
96

Cullum, supra note 89.

97

AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 11, 13, and 23.
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could not be made today,98 and that documentaries that use Hollywood film
clips have “become almost impossible.”99
B. THE CONTENT INDUSTRY AND THE RISE OF CLEARANCE
CULTURE
Film-makers interviewed by the Center for Social Media in 2005
asserted that rights costs accounted for more of their budgets than a decade
earlier, and that the process had become both more time-consuming and
more costly in legal fees than hitherto.100 The reasons for this increase are
multiple, and interlinked.
Cultural activists have labeled the combined forces of the movie
studios, TV networks, recording and publishing fields as “the content
industry.”101 These businesses are thought of as simply content-producers,
delivering to the marketplace a steady stream of new TV shows, movies,
CD’s and books. However, they have gradually metamorphosed in the last
two decades into something not quite so simple.
Authors of original works of the type that documentarians
appropriate – films, music, television shows, journalism – typically do not
control the copyrights of their work.102 Most of these works were made for
hire, and the corporate media entities that commissioned the work holds the
copyright and control every subsequent use of the work.103 The content
industry is a high-volume business, but there are a few players controlling
the vast majority of copyrighted sounds and images.104 This is the result of
several decades of increased concentration of media ownership, as these
corporations have consolidated into an ever-shrinking number of large
98

See Ramsey, supra note 54; Brown, supra note 88.

99

Brown, supra note 88.

100

AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 85, at 7-8.

101

McDonald, supra note 5, at 543 n. 15.

102

Id. at 554.
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conglomerates controlling an ever-growing volume of copyrighted
material.105
The growth of the content industry has coincided with the
appreciation in value of the deep catalog of already-distributed copyrighted
works whose shelf-life has theoretically passed.106 Content producers that
once made money by creating new programming, films and music
discovered that their back catalogs as a significant revenue stream, and
have become content-recyclers.107 As copyright attorney/law professor
Peter Jaszi has said, what was once seen as “marginal, unimportant, and
secondary has suddenly become a big focus of private and public
attention.”108 One media liability insurance broker has likened the response
of the content industry to the value of long-dormant libraries as realization
that it was “sitting on a gold mine.”109
As a consequence, copyright ownership and enforcement is now
policed more aggressively then twenty years ago; this policing, as the
examples of film-makers’ struggles above indicates, extends to
documentarians.110 Nonfiction filmmakers have in part been a victim of
105

Id. Senator John McCain, summarizing the FCC’s data compiled in its
review of media ownership, stated “Five companies control 85 percent of our
media resources.” Quoted in LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 162. Lessig
further provides concrete examples: five recording labels control 84.8 percent of
the U.S. market. Id. Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. is a fully integrated vertical
monopoly, in that its supplies content via the Fox movie studio and Fox broadcast
and cable network, controls sports broadcasts and newspaper and book publishing,
sells its content to the public and advertisers in print, broadcast and cable media,
and operates the distribution channels through which the content is disseminated
via movie theaters and television venues, as well as through satellite systems it
owns in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Id. at 163.
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See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Will
Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 5- 6 (2005),
available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
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See id.
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Brown, supra note 88.
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their own success and heightened visibility; the high grosses of films like
An Inconvenient Truth ($24,540,079 domestic box office), the works of
Michael Moore ($265,310,868 combined for Sicko, Farenheit 911, and
Bowling for Columbine), and Supersize Me ($11,536,423) have not only
permitted audiences, theater chains and distributors to view documentaries
as entertainment, but copyright holders have made the leap as well.111 So, a
connection can be drawn between the music publisher’s $10,000 demand
for the use of a few seconds worth of the Rocky theme incidentally captured
in a low-budget documentary, the success of documentaries at the box
office, and the content producers new-found role as licensors of
accumulated copyrights. As Professor Jaszi has said, “Would music
copyright owners 10 years ago have predicted they’d be making a
substantial part of their money over ringtones on cellphones?”112
Movie studios, TV networks, and the music industry are only the
most conspicuous forces driving up clearance costs. Archive houses
preserve and store old newsreel and other functional nonfictional footage,
and their product can be essential to historical documentaries. They have
also been the locus of an inflationary spiral in recent years. Archive houses
were once small, independent operations that negotiated with impecunious
documentarians on a hand-shake basis.113 Today, the small houses have
been gobbled up by larger ones, mirroring larger trends in media
consolidation, and the licensing fees they charge, which can run as high as
Amendment (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 950, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4599&context=expresso.
111

Ramsey, supra note 54. Top Documentary Box Office Grosses, available
at http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=documentary.htm (last visited
3/23/09). Documentary box office grosses should be scrutinized relative to what
top-grossing studio fare takes in. The highest-grossing documentary, Fahrenheit
911, made $119,194,771 on its theatrical release. Id. The highest grossing
Hollywood feature, Titanic, took in almost $601 million. Id. Fahrenheit 911 ranks
at number 295 on the all-time domestic box office scale, and it must be born in
mind that no other documentary even comes close to that figure. Id.
112

Ramsey, supra note 54. Sasha Frere-Jones, Ring My Bell: the Expensive
Pleasures of the Ring Tone, NEW YORKER, March 7, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/07/050307crmu_music.
113

AUFERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 8-9.
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$3,500-$4,500 a minute, have been called by one documentarian
“extortionate.”114 Moreover, the explosion of specialty cable channels,
owned by major media conglomerates (and hence well-funded, unlike
typical documentaries) produces a never-ending stream of sports, nature,
and historical shows that have so increased the demand for archival footage
that licensing costs have risen accordingly. The “gold mine” effect of the
value of the back catalog, familiar from film clips and popular music, has
occurred in the less overtly-commercial context of archive footage.115
Licensing practices between the big media entities also drive up the
costs of clearance.116 The same media corporations who demand exorbitant
fees from documentarians also pay high fees themselves for any uses of
copyrighted materials in their own original work.117 Movie studios and
networks are naturally conservative when it comes to courting infringement
suits, as they are large institutions with deep pockets, and their lawyers are
well aware that such entities are attractive lawsuit targets.118 Studio legal
departments often impose in-house guidelines on their producers,
mandating that the producers clear everything; adherence to these
guidelines is a defensive litigation-avoidance strategy.119 Accordingly,
studios mechanically pay high licensing fees, and bequeath an industry
custom and fee structure to impecunious documentarians, who do not have
comparable resources for clearance costs.120
It is this asymmetry between the big media players who can afford
to clear everything, and do clear everything, and the documentarian who
would clear everything but will never have the budgetary means to do so,
114

Id. at 14 (quoting Jeffrey Tuchman).

115

Brown, supra note 88.
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See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 901 (2006).
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See id. at 901-902.
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that renders industry practices problematic. The better-financed private
interests, such as movie studios, will have the copyrighted material of
others available when needed to further its creative work, but a less
powerful actor, such as a documentary filmmaker, will not.121
And yet, ironically, documentarians who seek clearance for their
use of copyrighted material may often not even have to seek such
clearance. Section 107 of the same Copyright Act of 1976 that reaffirms
exclusive rights to the content industry also provides the nonfiction
filmmaker with a fair use defense. 122
III.

FAIR USE
A. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS ENACTMENT

Fair use is a limitation on copyright protection that acknowledges
that not every secondary use is an infringement upon an owner’s exclusive
statutory rights.123 Consistent with the idea of copyright’s social bargain,
the doctrine permits a user to appropriate elements of a copyrighted work
without express permission, in recognition that new works necessarily draw
on old works.124 Fair use enables the creation of new works that surpass
the original work, augmenting our culture and our knowledge in a manner
that the original does not.125 By refusing to label a transformative126
121

In addition, documentarians themselves benefit from the same copyright
protection that creates their own clearance headaches. In recognition of this, they
tend to acquiesce in the face of a rightholder’s demands, as they recognize the
possibility of a situation where the shoe could be on the other foot. See
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 22-23.
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Id. at 332.
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appropriation an infringement, fair use furthers Lessig’s “Progress Clause”
by placing the economic benefits copyright confers upon creators beneath
the primary Constitutional goal of maximizing dissemination of new
works for the greater benefit of the general public.127
Fair use is part of a web of doctrines which restrains copyright’s
monopolistic tendencies: the limited term of exclusive rights encoded in the
first Copyright Act; the idea-expression distinction, which denies
protection to an idea, and only confers copyright on the expression of that
idea;128 the refusal to recognize facts as falling under the subject matter of
copyright;129 and the “first sale” doctrine, which “exhausts” an owner’s
right of distribution by permitting the sale of used books or the rental of
DVDs after the initial lawful purchase.130 The Supreme Court has stated
that these limiting doctrines, some of which have their origins at common
law, are not “unforeseen byproduct[s] of a statutory scheme,” but instead
balances authors’ “right to their original expression, but encourages others
to build free[ly] upon ... [their earlier] work.”131
Though the doctrine of fair use appeared in English law before our
own copyright regime was in place,132 it was not integrated into U.S.
alter an original work “with new expression, meaning or message.” As shall be
seen, it has often been viewed as dispositive in fair use cases.
127

See Forkner, supra note 6, at 720-21 and LESSIG, supra note 3, at 130-31.

128

Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a
Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 31, 3637 (2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
129

Id. at 36 (citing Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344
(1991)).
130

WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 842-43 (1994).

131

See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
(quoted in Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Peter Jaszi, Professor,
American University Washington College of Law).
132

Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in
an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 15 (1997).
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common law until Justice Story’s 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh133. In
Folsom, Justice Story outlined several factors courts should weigh in
deciding whether or not a use was fair: “look to the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.”134
Justice Story’s common law enunciation of fair use was followed
for 135 years before the factors were finally codified in the Copyright Act
of 1976:
[The] fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include –
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market or value
of the copyrighted work.135
Fair use may be seen as a “enforced consent” imposed upon the
original author, who, in return for statutory protection of her exclusive
rights, is deemed to assent to reasonable uses of her work. Thus, fair use
and consequently “enforced consent” satisfy the Constitutional aim of
promoting expansion of the public fund of knowledge; if second uses also
further the promotion of the public good.136
133

9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).

134

Id. at 348.

135

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).

136

See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 715, 719 (2007) (citing ALAN LATMAN, STUDY NO. 14, FAIR USE OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781, 785
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Between 1909 and 1976, legislative extensions of a copyright’s
scope, subject matter, and corresponding penalties were paralleled by an
increase in the number of infringement actions.137 This was due in part, to
the growth of both reproductive technology (the capacity to copy) and the
power of mass media. These changes threatened to stifle new works by
shrinking the public domain.138 Courts in turn responded by embracing fair
use.139 It is possible that Congress decided to codify fair use in order to
counteract the effects of its own expansion of copyright protection for the
benefit of a burgeoning content industry.140 The doctrine’s codification in
the 1976 Copyright Act kept copyright constitutional by limiting authors’
exclusive rights. Unchecked, these exclusive rights would thwart the very
progress in arts, sciences, and knowledge that copyright was created to
promote.141
Congress acknowledged the role courts played in shaping the
boundaries of copyright by incorporating the four factors originally
outlined in Folsom, while allowing for continued refinement of the doctrine
on a case-by-case basis.142 The House Report stated that the purpose of
section 107 was to “restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way143. . . [S]ince the doctrine is an
(Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963)).
137

See generally Loren, supra note 132, at 18-21.

138

Id. at 718.

139

Pat Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame Their Fear of
Quoting and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, 1
INT’L J. OF COMM. 26, 27 (2007); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World,
50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A 133, 136 (2003).
140

See generally Loren, supra note 132, at 19.

141

Id. at 21.

142

Liu, supra note 15, at 99-100.

143

While Congress stated that it intended no alteration in the common-law
doctrine, the language dictating consideration of whether a use was for a
commercial or non-profit educational purpose appeared very late in the drafting as
a result of lobbying by educators, and did in fact constitute a contraction of the fair
use doctrine which has since proven vexatious for documentary film-makers,
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equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and
each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”144
As a practical matter, fair use is an affirmative defense to
infringement, and not a right, “a shield and not a sword.”145 From a
documentary film-makers standpoint, this poses a problem; the doctrine
may only be utilized after one is sued for infringement.146 Therefore, a
film-maker has to endure the risk, having appropriated elements of a
copyrighted work, either because the licensing fee was beyond her means,
or else because the owner denied the license outright for brand-control or
ideological reasons, of being subsequently sued rather than receiving a
preemptive determination.147 Even assuming the cost of litigation presents
no obstacle to a film-maker (a considerable leap of faith, since the cost of
defending an infringement action can range from $290,000 to $1 million, a
cost far in excess of the unaffordable license148), applying the mandatory
four factors as an ex ante predictive exercise does not provide much
guidance in determining whether the defense will be successful.149
Most documentaries qualify as “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research.” 150 While, by this
among other potential users. See Lockridge, supra note 128, at 72-75; see also
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 68-69 (2001).
144

Maxton-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253,1260 (2d Cir. 1986).

145

MICHAEL C. DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 280. “‘Fair use’ is not
infringement of a copyright.” Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1552 (2003). The most plausible
reading of 17 U.S.C. § 107 would place the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but
courts have put the burden on the defendant. Id. There is debate as well as to
whether fair use constitutes a right or merely a privilege. Id.
146

DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 280.

147

See generally Madison, supra note 145, at 1569.

148

Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909 n.23 (2007) (citing American Intellectual
Property Law Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2007, at 25 (2007)).
149

Id. at 1910-11.

150

Id. at 1910 n.27.
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definition, fair use should be applicable to documentary films, they may
also be considered commercial.151
Under the ____, whether the
documentary is of a “commercial nature” impacts fair use analysis and may
result in the first factor being found in favor of the owner. Many,
documentaries have distribution deals with Hollywood studios, cable
networks, and DVD producers. These deals create an aura of commercial
exploitation that hovers over even the most high-minded nonfiction film.152
Also, the amount of material utilized from the copyrighted work impacts
analysis under the third factor of the fair use test. Factor three asks “how
much is too much,” and raises dual questions of “how much and how
crucial was what was taken relative to the original work,” and “how much
of the second work did it comprise.”153 Even if the first three factors of the
test can be satsfied, the fourth factor pre-supposes a licensing market for
the copyrighted work which may render any abrogation of permission
harmful, and thus not a fair use.
Since the four factor test offers little in the way of a determinative
outcome one may want to consider fair use case-law. The case-law,
however, also is indeterminative. Fair use is an equitable doctrine and as
such cases were decided on a fact-intensive inquiry. Courts, following the
express dictate of the Supreme Court, have refused to offer bright-line rules
when interpreting Section 107. This has resulted not in doctrinal coherence
but fragmentation.154 This patchwork judicial application of the fair use
test has led one of the foremost copyright scholars to label fair use “a fairy
tale,” and to conclude, after surveying nearly a decades worth of fair use
decisions, that “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than [the factors
in Section 107] . . . the upshot would be the same.”155

151

This reflects an opinion by the author.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Madison, supra note 145, at 1570.

155

David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 263, 280 (2003).
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B. THE FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court, echoing the legislative history of Section 107,
has stated that courts, faced with weighing the four fair use factors, are to
avoid bright-line rule-making and tailor their analysis to each specific factpattern. In addition, no one factor of the four is determinative, and all are
to be explored individually and weighed together.156 As a consequence of
this avowedly ad hoc nature of fair use decision-making, the doctrinal
jurisprudence has been entirely judge-made, and is thus unpredictable.157
As an example, two of the three Supreme Court fair use rulings were
closely decided, and all three involved reversals first in the federal
appellate courts and then again at the Supreme Court.158
These three Supreme Court fair use decisions staked out certain
doctrinal refinements subsequently employed by lower courts. These
refinements, however, are not firm guidelines for documentary filmmakers. Rather, they are more like variables in an ex ante calculus
regarding whether to gamble on incurring an infringement suit resulting
from a fair use.159
Universal City Studios v. Sony was a challenge by the motion
picture industry’s to the video cassette recorder, then in its infancy. The
studios claimed private home-taping of copyrighted television
programming for later viewing constituted infringement.160 The court
found that such private non-commercial use was fair, but noted that under
the statutory fair use factor, “purpose and character of the use,” a
commercial or profit-making private use would be presumptively unfair.161
Consideration of the commercial purpose of the use does comport with the
language of the statute, but risks tilting every decision towards the
copyright holder and away from fair use, especially when weighed in light
156

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).

157

Madison, supra note 145, at 1666.

158

Id. at 1666.

159

See Madison, supra note 145, at 1666.

160

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

161

Id. at 451.
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of the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the marketplace for the
copyrighted work.162
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, a
progressive news magazine “scooped” the forthcoming publication of
Gerald Ford’s memoirs and an authorized excerpt due to run in Time
magazine, when it received a pilfered manuscript and published the most
sensational portion, Ford’s account of his pardon of President Nixon.163
The Court reaffirmed that commercial use is presumptively unfair,
stating that the user’s profit motive alone was not at issue, but whether “the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.”164 In addressing the third factor, “the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole,” where The Nation had only copied a very small part of Ford’s
book and had surrounded it with a substantial amount of original reportage,
the Court applied a qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis, and found
the use unfair because “the heart of the work” had been copied.165
Most significantly, the Court termed the fourth factor “undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use.”166 Due to the fact that Time
cancelled serialization subsequent to The Nation’s scoop, and the book
publisher’s consequent monetary loss was found to be conclusive proof of
actual market harm, the Court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant
for rebuttal. The Nation failed to do so, and the Court found no fair use.167
The most recent case in the Supreme Court’s fair use trilogy,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc,. has proven to be the most significant
in terms of providing a fair use guideline to the lower courts.168 Here, rap
group 2 Live Crew, had copied Roy Orbison’s wholesome early ‘60's
162

Id. at 450-51.

163

471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).

164

Id. at 562.

165

Id. at 564-66.

166

Id. at 566.

167

Id. at 567.

168

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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country-rock classic “Oh, Pretty Woman” for their gamier parody song
“Pretty Woman.”169
In contrast to Sony Pictures and Harper and Row, the Court held
that the commercial nature of the use was not dispositive, but merely one
factor to be weighed among the four.170 The Court recognized that the
enumerated fair uses in the statute – news reporting, criticism, commentary,
etc. – are invariably paid for by someone, quoting Dr. Johnson’s “No man
but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”171 In shifting its attention
away from whether the use was a commercial exploitation of a copyrighted
work, the Court introduced a new criteria for the first factor’s “purpose and
character of the use” which seemed to take fair use back to its origins in the
social bargain of the Copyright Clause: was the secondary work
“transformative?”172 That is, did the new work, in copying an older work,
supersede or supplant the older work in the marketplace, or did it :
add something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message . . . .such works . . . lie at the heart of the fair
use doctrine’s breathing space within the confines of
copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of the other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against finding fair use.173
169

Id. at 572. In addition, the Court carved out a parody exception to an
author’s exclusive rights, holding that since a parody is by nature a derivative
work, remand was necessary for further inquiry under the fourth fair use factor as
to whether the rap song had incurred any harm to the owner’s potential market for
its own derivative rap-parody work. Id. at 592-93.
170

Id. at 584-85.

171

Id. at 584.

172

Id. at 578-79.

173

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court
found that the raunchy rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was a parody, and
hence transformative. The Court reasoned that for a parody to succeed, it must, by
definition, take enough from the original to elicit the minimum degree of
recognition for the joke to properly effect the audience. Moreover, the Court found
that the subjects of parody will often be unlikely to want to see themselves
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Since Campbell, the transformative inquiry has been central to fair
use decision-making, despite the fact that the phrase appears nowhere in
the statute.174 In every case in the appellate courts since then, if the court
found the use to be transformative, it was fair use; if the use was found not
to be transformative, it was infringing.175 The relevance of the inquiry to
the documentary context is self-evident, in that a court could arguably find
that with any given use, a documentarian, by arranging the copyrighted
materials used within a novel context, had transformed it. However, a
finding of transformativeness is necessarily going to be a result-oriented
inquiry; just about any use that is not mere plagiaristic replication
transforms the original in some way, and defining the point where copying
as pure commercial exploitation ends and transformation begins is so
dependent upon judicial discretion that a potential defendant is in no
position to guess before she copies.176
Copyright scholar David Nimmer views the malleability of the four
fair use factors as enabling results-oriented, and hence subjective and
imprecise, fair-use decision-making: “At best the four factors fail to drive
the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang
antecedent conclusions.”177
The tension between two of the factors, which can subsume the
others, is the reason. On the one hand, the purpose and character of the use
leads the court to examine whether the use of an older work has
transformed that material into a novel one. The fourth factor, inquiring as
to how the use has affected a potential market for the original work leads
courts to examine whether even the very existence of an actual or potential
licensing market has been harmed by the use. But by using harm to a
potential market as a bar to fair use, courts invite circular reasoning; in this
era of rapid technological change in media dissemination, cross-licensing
arrangements, and lengthened copyright terms, it is a simple matter for a
parodied, and may deny a license for that reason alone, making fair use an
appropriate defense to infringement when a parody is at issue.
174

DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 288.

175

Forkner, supra note 6, at 745.

176

Madison, supra note 12, at 1558-59.

177

Nimmer, supra note 155, at 281.
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copyright owner to define its own potential market and thus claim injury,
and sweep away the transformative inquiry altogether.178
This tension has played itself out in a circuit split. Federal courts
in New York, taking their cue from Campbell, have held that the first
factor, under the transformative inquiry, is the most important.179 But most
federal courts in California have followed Harper & Row in taking the
position that the fourth factor, harm to the licensing market, is the most
important factor.180 As a consequence of this uncertainty, one prominent
copyright attorney advising film-makers considering using copyrighted
material, has stated “you should always err in favor of asking and
Thus, to avoid the appearance of market harm, one
paying.”181
documentarian feels compelled to pay thousands of dollars to use a ringtone despite undoubted aesthetic transformation when the sound inhibits a
little boy from telling his mom about his school day in Mad Hot Ballroom;
while the makers of Hoop Dreams similarly feels obliged to pay the owners
of “Happy Birthday” when the song occurs in the transformative context of
an 18th birthday party in the Chicago housing projects, and elicits the
mother’s poignant comment that her son is lucky to have reached 18.182
C. FAIR USE AND NON-FICTION FILMS IN THE COURTS
Since the Supreme Court birthed the transformative criteria in
Campbell, there have been eight significant fair use decisions relevant to
non-fiction film and its close cousin, television news reporting.183 All were
178

See generally Marques, supra note 124, at 340-41.

179

See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2nd Cir. 2006); NXIVM Corp. v.
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2nd Cir. 2004); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152
(2nd Cir. 2001); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132
(2nd Cir. 1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2nd Cir.
1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997).
180

DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 282.

181

Id.

182

Forkner, supra note 6, at 744.

183

See Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.
2003); Los Angeles News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002);
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decided in either New York or Los Angeles, which is not surprising, as the
Second and Ninths Circuits are the twin domiciles to the U.S. media
industries. Two salient points emerged from the cases: on the one hand,
they express the tension between the application of the first, transformative
factor, favoring users, and the fourth “effect on the potential market”
factor, favoring copyright owners. Second, the cases relating to nonfiction
film at least superficially demonstrates the ad hoc uncertainty which is the
consequence of the kind of case-by-case analysis called for by Congress
and the Court.
i. The California Cases: The King and Chopper Bob
In Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video,184 the defendant,
producers of a 16 hour video biography of the King of Rock and Roll
created for retail sale, sought to lift an injunction against their documentary
won in the District Court by the plaintiffs, amongst whom were the rightsholders of Elvis Presley’s television Performances.185 The advertising copy
on the box touted the fact that the film included footage from every film
and television appearance of Elvis.186 The copyrighted materials provoking
the infringement action constituted five to ten percent of its sixteen hour
length;187 the materials include all of his appearances on the Steven Allen
show, 35% of Elvis’ career-making Ed Sullivan appearances, and three
minutes of his epochal 1968 comeback TV special.188 The film-makers
Hofheinz v. AMC Prod.’s, Inc., 147 F. Supp.2d 127 (S.D. N.Y. 2001);

Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F.Supp.2d 442 (S.D. N.Y. 2001);
Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 3802 (HB), 2001 WL
1111970 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters
Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Los Angeles News Serv. v.
KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Monster Commc’ns Inc., v.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
184

349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003).

185

Id. at 626.

186

Id. at 625.

187

Id.

188

Id.
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asserted fair use, and the Ninth Circuit,189 after weighing the four factors,
affirmed the injunction sought by the plaintiffs.190
The court performed the four-factor analysis and found no fair
use.191 First, looking to the purpose and character of the use, the court cited
Harper & Row’s proposition that a commercial use disfavors a defendant to
the degree to which the user exploits the copyrighted material for
commercial gain.192 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the use
was “not consistently transformative,” and that the presence of the voiceover commentary was insufficient for any mitigation;193 the court indicated
the long length of some clips amounted to essentially a re-broadcast of the
copyrighted materials rather than use as reference to Presley’s career.194
Moreover, the court believed that the commercial nature and purpose
outweighed any transformation because the advertising touting the fact the
video includes every television appearance indicates their inherent desire to
profit from the copyrighted materials.195
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, was found
to be neutral, as the clips were both newsworthy, hence less protected and
creative expression, which enjoys more protection.196 For the third factor,
amount and substantiality of the use, the court found that the film-makers
189

Id. at 626.

190

Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 631 (The court noted in reviewing an injunction,
an abuse of discretion standard controlled, and that it believed the case was closer
than the district court had held; had these facts come before the appellate court
under de novo review, the court acknowledged the outcome may have been
different). Id.
191

Id. at 627-31.

192

Id. at 627.

193

Id. at 628-29 (citing Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc,
935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Hofheinz v. A&E Television, Inc., 146 F.
Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
194

Id.

195

Id.

196

Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 629-30.
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had taken the heart of the work197 by copying the material that would likely
be licensed, the most memorable parts of Elvis’ hits.198 Finally, the court
indentified the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market, as “the
single most important of all the factors.”199 The court found no fair use,
stating that if others similarly used the plaintiff’s footage without paying
for it, the plaintiff’s market for licensing works would be undermined.
Effectively, the clips would be used for the same purpose as the plaintiff’s
original work.200
Overall, in Presley the Ninth’s Circuits Section 107 analysis
focused on the harm to the plaintiff’s potential market. The court
seemingly dismissed any transformation of the clips when viewed in light
of the film’s biographical re-contextualization under the vague standard of
“inconsistency.”201 The result was a documentarian’s fair use worst-case
scenario: the death of a film, which had cost $2 million and years to
produce, by means of a permanent injunction.202

197

Id. at 630-31.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 630-31.

200

Id. at 631.

201

Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 628-29.

202

Paige Gold, Fair Use and the First Amendment: Corporate Control of
Copyright is Stiflying Documentary-Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First
Amendment, 15 U. BALT. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 28, 29 (2006). Judge Noonan, the
dissenting judge in Presley, was so disturbed by what he termed the court’s
embrace of the trial court’s factual and legal errors, particularly with respect to the
transformative fair use analysis and the protection of the public’s interest in
copyright’s social bargain, that three months later he amended his dissent to
broaden his argument to incorporate constitutional questions. See Elvis Presley,
349 F.3d at 631-34 ((Noonan, J., dissenting), amended by 357 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2004)). The decision is indicative of the instability of judicial analysis of the four
factors, because if the district court had weighed them as Judge Noonan suggested,
and as courts in New York did in A&E and Monster Communications, a fair use
finding may have resulted. See generally Krissi Geary, Video Biography Gets All
Shook Up: Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151,
161-64 (2004).
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The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent fair use decisions clouded rather
than clarified doctrinal boundaries. There were three cases involving the
same plaintiff, the Los Angeles News Service (“LANS”) suing for the use
of the same film footage.203 While in all three cases the court gave
substantial weight to the fourth “market effect factor” unlike in Presley,
transformative fair use was found in one.204
Robert Tur, owner of LANS and free-lance helicopter news
cameraman,205 flew his helicopter to the flashpoint of a riot that occurred
after the 1992 verdict acquitting the police officers who had beaten Rodney
King.206 Tur managed to film nine minutes of footage of Reginald Denny
being pulled from his car and beaten nearly to death by gang members. Tur
scooped all of the local national news outlets and insisted that they do not
use the footage without a license.207
LANS had two victories in fair use defense cases against the Los
Angeles News station K-CAL and international news service Reuters.208
Both defending parties did not manage to obtain a license and thus tried to

203

L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2002);
L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir.
1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir.
1997).
204

L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d at 940.

205

Matthew Belloni, The Man Who Could Kill YouTube, ESQUIRE, July
2007, at 71.
206

Id.

207

Id. at 71-72. 17 years later, Tur is still litigating unauthorized use of the
footage, this time against YouTube, whom he vows to shut down. Id. He has since
moved to join his action with numerous corporate media plaintiff’s pursuing
similar claims. See Tur. v. YouTube, No. CV-4436, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96517,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007).
208

L.A. News Serv., v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News
Serv. v. K-CAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.
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justify their use of LANS footage through the doctrine of fair use.209 The
Ninth Circuit found that in both cases, the defendant’s use was not fair.210
With respect to the first factor, the commercial nature and purpose
of the use, the court found no fair use because LANS and the defendants
were competitors; this negated the fact that the clips were used for news,
one of the factors enumerated in Section 107.211 Furthermore, the court
concluded that transformativeness of the material was absent because the
voice-over failed to fundamentally change the nature of the video
recording.212
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the court favored both defendants because the copyrighted work was
factual rather than expressive.213 Next, the court found that in both cases
the amount and substantiality of the use amounted to the heart of the work
because the images of the beating was exactly what legitimate licensees
would want the clip for.214 Finally, the court looked at the effect on the
plaintiff’s market and concluded both that the commercial use was
presumptively unfair, and using clips that would normally be licensed
would destroy the plaintiff’s market.215
209

L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.
210

L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.
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LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.
212

L.A. News Serv. v. KCA_-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122-23. In Reuters,
the court also found with respect to the first factor that the defendant could not
claim a fair use exemption for news, since a new service does not report news but
merely collects and transmits it for others to broadcast. 149 F.3d at 994.
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L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News
Serv. v. K-CAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122.
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LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1122.
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LA. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d at 994; L.A. News
Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123.
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The Ninth Circuit took a different position in the Los Angeles New
Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., concluding that the there was
transformativeness of the material and thus the defendant could assert the
fair use defense.216 In this case, the cable network Court TV used brief
images of the Denny beating in advertising “teasers” to promote its
coverage of the trial of Denny’s assailants and in the opening title montage
for the show “Prime Time Justice.”217
Regarding the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the
court found that both instances were commercial in nature because of its
promotion of the network’s trial coverage.218 The Ninth circuit reasoned
that though an advertising “teaser” was not transformative per se, this was
mitigated by the fact that, as opposed to Reuters and K-CAL, Court TV
was not a direct competitor of LANS.219 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the use of footage in the title montage was sufficiently transformative
because of the creative use of graphics beyond a mere copying of the
clip.220 On balance, the court found the first factor “weakly” favored fair
use.221
The nature of the copyrighted work, here as in the other two LANS
cases, tilted towards fair use since there were factual materials at issue.222
Regarding the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the use, LANS’
prior fair uses cases came back to haunt the court.223 The court explained
that unlike in Reuters, where it was argued that the 45 second clip
constituted the heart of the work, only a few seconds were used by Court

216

L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d at 942.
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Id. at 929.
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Id. at 939-40.
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Id. at 940.
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Id. at 939.
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Id. at 940.
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L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d at 940.
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TV and thus did not qualify as the “heart” of the work.224 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant did not adversely affect LANS
potential market for two reasons.225 First, they explained that the clip
montage was unlikely to affect the plaintiff’s market because it was
transformative,226 and the lack of competition between LANS and Court
TV mitigated the concern of the teaser footage not being transformative.227
The Tur trio reveals the importance of the transformative test,
especially with regard to an owner-friendly court like the Ninth Circuit. In
K-CAL and Reuters, where the character and purpose of the use was news
reporting, an enumerated fair use exception in Section 107, fair use was
denied; yet in CBS, where the use was purely commercial, the court found
transformative fair use.228
ii. The New York Cases:
Shlockmeister’s Widow

The Greatest and The

While the Ninth Circuit advanced Harper & Row’s presumption
that commercial uses are unfair, and advanced the fourth “market harm”
factor as determinative, the district courts in New York City emphasized
the transformative test from Campbell in their fair use decision making.229
224

Id. at 940-41.

225

Id. at 941-42.

226

Id. at 941.

227

Id. at 942.
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L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d at 942); L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d at 997; L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV
Channel 9, 108 F.3d at 1123).
229

Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’n, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3802, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14752, at, *10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). This judicial favoring of the
transformative test was ultimately embraced by the Second Circuit in two decisions
handed down in 2006. Bill Graham Archives., 448 F.3d at 608; Blanch v. Koons,
467 F.3d at 250. While neither of these decisions occurred within the non-fiction
film context, commentators and copyright attorneys have recognized their potential
positive significance for documentarians asserting a fair use defense. In Graham
and Blanch, the court allowed the transformative inquiry to dominate all other
considerations. In both cases, minimal aesthetic changes to the copyrighted work
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In Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting System,
the plaintiffs were the producers of the documentary “When We Were
Kings” which told the story of Muhammad Ali’s 1974 fight in Zaire.230 The
defendants, producers of a cable documentary “Ali-The Whole Story” used
between 41 seconds and 2 minutes of the plaintiff’s footage without
permission.231 The plaintiff filed suit and the court found in favor of the
defendant on the basis of fair use.232
The court concluded that the first factor, nature and character of the
use, favored fair use because a biography fulfills many of the enumerated
purposes set forth in Section 107.233 Specifically, the biography could
qualify as a comment, criticism, or scholarship and research, and thus could
be considered fair use regardless of the commercial nature of the film.234
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court
explained that despite the creativity present in the original work, “Kings,” a
denial of fair use to a film depicting history would deprive the public of
information.235 The court, however, determined that the second factor did
not favor the defendant because the story could have been told without
using the plaintiff’s clips.236
and the work’s contextualization within the expressive totality of the second work
were sufficient for findings of transformativeness. And once transformativeness
was found, market considerations were largely mooted. Perhaps more importantly
for documentarians, the court expanded the statutory enumerated fair use purposes
to include creative works, mandating looking to the expressive purpose of the use,
and not merely the functional purpose. In the future, this may open the door for
courts to make a prima facie finding for documentaries as legitimate fair users. See
Marques, supra note 124, at 347-52.
230

Monster Communications, 935 F. Supp. at 491.

231

Id.
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Id. at 496.
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Id. at 494.
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Id. at 493-94.
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Monster Communications, 935 F. Supp. at 493-94.
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Id. at 495.
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With respect to the third factor, the amount and substantiality of
the use, the court found in favor of fair use. The court reasoned that
quantitatively the use was too small such that it was barely noticeable when
viewing the two films in a back-to-back screening.237 Moreover, the portion
of the defendant’s film dealing with the 1974 Zaire fight occupied only
nine minutes of the infringing work.238 On the fourth factor, the court
concluded that the there was too little use of the plaintiff’s work to have
any potentially adverse effect its licensing market.239
The New York decisions, like the Ninth Circuit, also involve a
trilogy of cases brought by a single litigious copyright-holder.240 The cases
involved documentarian and TV networks use of clips from films produced
by American International Pictures (“AIP”). From the 1950s to the early
1970s, AIP was famous for creating science fiction and drive-in features.
Susan Hofheinz, widow of AIP founder-principal James H. Nicholson,
sued three separate film makers for using clips from AIP’s films. The
Southern District of New York found fair use in all three cases.
In Hofheinz v. AMC Productions, Inc.,241 American Movie Classics
was producing a documentary history of AIP with the cooperation of Ms.
Hofheinz.242 Hofheinz licensed six 59-second clips,243 but shortly before
the film’s theatrical screening, she withdrew her involvement and voided
all licenses. Further, she warned AMC that any exhibition of the film
segments would constitute infringement.244 AMC screened the film
237

Id. at 495.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

See Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14752 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
241

147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

242

Id. at 130-31.

243

Id.

244

Id. at 133.
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anyway and Hofheinz sued. In Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, a 20
second-clip from the AIP film “It Conquered the World”245 was used,
without permission, in an episode of the cable series “Biography,” profiling
actor Peter Graves.246 The clip illustrated Grave’s pre-stardom work in
low-budget films.247 In the final AIP case, Hofheinz v. Discovery
Communications, Inc., the defendant cable network used the plaintiff’s
clips in a multi-episode documentary of the history of the horror movie
One segment examined Hollywood’s representation of
genre.248
extraterrestrial visitations; three clips totaling 48 seconds in length, with
voice –over on the soundtrack, were taken from AIP’s “Invasion of the
Saucermen” without permission from Hofheinz’.249
In examining the first factor, the purpose and character of the use,
the district court found fair use in the Hofheinz trilogy.250 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently transformed the clips, and
there was a lower presumption against AMC’s commercial purpose
because the copyrighted materials were not superseded by their
incorporation in a wholly new work.251 In AMC and A & E, the court
explained that the use of the clips were per se transformative because as a
biographical documentary it satisfied many of the enumerated purposes of
245

The clip was taken not from the AMC Documentary discussed above, but
from the alien-invasion film from which it took its title. IT CONQUERED THE
WORLD (American International Pictures 1956).
246

146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

247

Id. at 444.

248

Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
249

Id. at *5-7.

250

A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47; AMC Prods., 147
F. Supp. 2d 127, 137-38; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14752, at *17-*18.
251

A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47; AMC Prods., 147
F. Supp. 2d at 137-38; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752,
at *17-18.
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Section 107; namely being a criticism, comment, or research.252 The
Discovery case extended the transformative analysis beyond the parameters
of biography. The court held that transformativeness “forms the basis for
the entire fair use analysis” and not merely for the first factor inquiry.253 In
Discovery, Hofheinz’s clips were used to establish that “Saucermen” was
the first film to depict government efforts to cover up the existence of
UFO’s. The clips fit into the film’s overall examination of common themes
and political context of science fiction films. Thus the work was
transformed.254
Finally, as in the Ninth Circuit’s Presley decision, Hofheinz argued
that the clips taken by all three defendants were used solely for
entertainment value, thus acting as competitors with each other and hurting
the marketplace for AIP films.255 The district court explained that while the
defendant’s films had entertainment value, they were also intended to
educate the audience.256 Thus, since Section 107’s enumerated list of fair
use purposes was non-exhaustive, entertainment value did not preclude a
second user.257
In analyzing the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the district court was definitive. In AMC, the court found this factor in
favor of the plaintiff because the AIP films were creative works. In A & E
and Discovery, however, the court did not find in favor of either party.
252

A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446; AMC Prods., 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 138.
253

Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *10.
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Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
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Id. at *13; A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 447; AMC
Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
256

Discovery Commc’ns, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *13; A & E
Television Networks 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47; AMC Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d at
137.
257
Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14752, at *13, 17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., 146
F. Supp. 2d 442, 446-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. A & E Television
Networks, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
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This was based on the fact that Hofheinz had managed to keep the films out
of circulation. Thus, the unavailability of the films, according to the court,
justified the defendant’s appropriation.258 Regarding the third factor, the
amount and substantiality of the use, the court, in all three cases, found that
the use of the clips were either brief or fragmentary in nature. The
defendants had taken on only what was necessary for their purpose and had
not appropriated the heart of the work.259
With respect to the fourth factor, the court, in all three cases, found
the use too diminutive in when compared to the whole work. This
proportion was too insubstantial to cause any adverse effect on the
plaintiff’s potential licensing market.260 The court opined, in all three
cases, that the defendants’ use of the clips from AIP movies might actually
stimulate audience interest in these long-dormant films.261 In contrast to the
Ninth Circuit’s Presley holding, the court in the Hofheinz trilogy dismissed
the plaintiff’s argument that a finding of fair use would diminish the value
of her ability to license AIP clips in the future.262 The court in AMC
believed that this argument would eviscerate fair use because the whole
point of fair use is to recognize circumstances where a third party is not
required to obtain a license.263
258

Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *18-20; A &
E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45,447-48.
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A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 448; AMC Prods., 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 139; Discovery Commc’ns, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752 at *20-21.
260

A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 449; AMC Prods., 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 140; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at *2123.
261

A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 449; AMC Prods., 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 140; Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at
*23.
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AMC Prods., 146 F. Supp. 2d at 449; A & E Television Networks, 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 140-41. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14752, at
*23.
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Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
This language was echoed in Discovery Communications. See 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14752 at *23.
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iii. Lessons for Film-makers From the Fair Use Cases
The fair use decisions expressly dealing with nonfiction films and
television news illustrate the unpredictability inherent in fair use law.
Further, the decisions highlight courts’ insufficient guidance regarding the
applicability of fair use law to documentary films.264 When viewed at a
high level of generality, similar fact patterns produce opposing or
counterintuitive results. Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Passport Video found
the use of clips within a biographical documentary not to be fair use,265
while Hofheinz v. A&E Network and Monster Communications v. Turner
Broadcasting System strongly suggested, and Hofheinz v. Discovery
Communications expressly stated, a presumption of transformativeness in
the biographical film context.266
All of the courts, however, stated that nonfictional copyrighted
material utilized in a documentary, is accorded less protection than
expressive, creative works. This is contrasted with Los Angeles News
Service v. Reuters and Los Angeles News Service v. K-CAL, where the use
of hot news footage of extraordinary public interest was not found to be fair
use,267 while use of the fanciful and creative films of AIP was found to be
fair in the Hofheinz trilogy.268
In Elvis Presley the court found that the documentary’s use of the
copyrighted material, with respect to entertainment value, was a mere
264

See generally Donaldson, supra note 118 at 291.
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Elvis Presley Enter. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628-31 (9th Cir.

2003).
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See Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 446;
Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 493-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14752, at *11.
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See Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d
987, 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1998); Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d
1119, 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d. 442, 447-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d. 127, 141 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, No. 00 civ. 3802 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14752, at *17-19, *21, *24.
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substitute for the owners purpose, but I the Hofheinz cases, the court
dismissed the entertainment value inherent in the use as a consideration
altogether.269 The ad copy touting the inclusion of copyrighted material in
Elvis Presley tainted the use of that material as unfair, but the same court
accorded the use of the Denny footage in Court TV’s ads as fair – after the
aforementioned LANS decisions where it had held use of the same footage
as news was unfair!270
Lawrence Lessig has suggested that the fair use defense, despite its
codification in the Copyright Act, effectively does not exist for
documentarians, because the inconsistent outcomes from litigation has
rendered the defense too uncertain to rely upon:
The rules of “fair use” are self-consciously not selfauthenticating. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted
that lower courts not develop simple, automatic rules. The
effect is that fair use in practice becomes the right to hire a
lawyer, in contexts in which the defense of fair use rights is
effectively impossible . . .If a documentary filmmaker
wants to include a clip from [the news] in her film, the
standard procedure is to ask permission, regardless of the
length, and regardless of [its] transformative nature . . . . [If
permission is denied] the film maker must therefore decide
whether . . . the use of the clip is . . . “fair.” That inquiry is
fundamentally uncertain . . . [and] the expense of error is . .
. extraordinarily high. The reality for most [documentary]
filmmakers is thus not a public domain . . . . The reality is
that while the law effectively secures to writers a broad and
unquestioned freedom to quote without permission, it
grants no such freedom to filmmakers.271

269

Compare Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 628-29; with Hofheinz, 147 F. Supp.2d

at 127.
270

Id.; Los Angeles News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939-40
(9 Cir. 2002).
th
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Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN
(SPECIAL ISSUE). 56, 60-61(2006).
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Further, as motion picture copyright attorney Michael Donaldson writes,
“court cases are supposed to give us some guidance about how to behave.
About all you can draw from these cases is that courts want you to
behave.”272
And yet behavior may be precisely the element that harmonizes
these documentary fair use decisions. It is possible that the documentary
fair use case-law is but a palimpset beneath which an older and a far more
useful inquiry lies hidden. An English copyright infringement case from
1802, pre-dating the seminal U.S. fair use case Folsom v. Marsh, may
provide a clue.273 In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough framed the fair
use inquiry in this fashion: “Was the matter so taken used fairly with that
view [for the promotion of science and the benefit of the public], and
without what I may term the animus furandi [in effect, an intent to
pirate]?”274
The documentary cases, while purporting to weigh the four factors,
may instead indicate a judicial inquiry into whether a second user’s work
fits within a privileged category which benefits the public, or whether a fair
use defense is merely a mask for piracy.275 Thus K-CAL and Reuters
denied fair use because the defendant were free-riding on the plaintiff’s
footage, rather than reporting news; and the video biographers in Elvis
Presley made the key error of boasting in their ad copy of the copyrighted
film and television appearances within.276 In all the other cases, graphics,
voice-overs, context all worked not merely to indicate transformativeness,
but also an intent on the defendant’s part to add to the domain of public
knowledge.277 The courts deployed the four factor analysis to reassure

272

DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 291.
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9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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1802, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.).
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See supra n. 264-68 and accompanying text.

276

Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d at 1120, 1123; Los Angeles
News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F. 3d 987, 990, 997 (9th Cir.
1998); Elvis Presley, 349 F.3d at 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2003).
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themselves that they were in fact viewing a documentary and not a mere
copy sold for the same purpose as the copyrighted work.278
Even a film-maker who comports herself with the same probity as
the defendants whose fair use defense carried the day chooses to roll the
dice, and assert fair use when sued. Though the film-maker may be
confident in her case because she has competent copyright counsel, she still
has to reckon with what one film-maker has called the ultimate “chokepoint
of rights”:279 the Errors and Omissions (E & O) insurer.
V.

E & O INSURERS AND FAIR USE
A. THE GATEKEEPER

Errors & Omission (E&O) insurance, known as a type of media
liability coverage, is akin to malpractice insurance. It compensates third
parties for the negligent mistakes of the insured.280 No film can be
exhibited and distributed in any venue, be it theatrical, cable or network
broadcast, or DVD, unless the film-maker has an E & O policy.281 The
president of one media liability insurer has said, “An uninsured film is an
un-releasable film.”282 E & O insurance is the most important gatekeeper
for a documentarian’s fair use assertion.283
The policy indemnifies and pledges to defend any claims arising
from infringement suits. The insurance protects investors, exhibitors, and
278

Id.

279

AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES, supra note 49, at 9 (quoting
filmmaker Jon Else).
280

DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 198.

281

Copyright attorney David Rieff, quoted in HEINS & BECKLES, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF
COPYRIGHT CONTROL 6 (2005); Gibson, supra note 116 at 890; DONALDSON,
supra note 118, at 198.
282

Interview with Leib Dodell, Media Professional Insurance (Sept. 7, 2007).

283

Interview with Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law at Washington College of Law
at American University (Sept. 21, 2007); see also Gibson supra, note 116, at 890.
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distributors from either secondary liability, the loss of up-front investment
and potential profits should the film be subject to money damages, or if an
injunction is successful established against the film.284 E & O insurance
thus protects not only the film-maker, but mitigates the risk aversion of
other parties downstream on the distribution chain.285 Because copyright
owners have been increasingly aggressive in policing uses of their work in
the past two decades, the need for media liability insurance on the part of
content-producers has increased accordingly, and documentarians have not
been exempt.286
Documentarians typically defer purchasing E & O insurance until
the last possible minute, because independent films are often shot without
distribution in place; typically the distributor is the first interested party in
the film’s existence who will mandate coverage.287 Film-makers seeking E
& O insurance do not deal directly with the insurer, but instead fill out an
application with a broker.288 The application itself begins with the
presumption that any copyrighted material within a documentary has been
cleared with formal permission from the owner.289 The form asks if
copyrighted materials are included within the film. If so, it then asks if
permission to use it has been obtained from the owner. If permission has
been denied, the film-maker must explain the refusal.290 In addition, the
film-maker must provide a full clearance history of any copyrighted
284

Gibson, supra note 116, at 890-91.

285

Gibson, supra note 116, at 890-91.
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Copyright attorney David Rieff attributes the demand for E&O in the media
context to high-profile defamation suits by General William Westmoreland against
CBS, and by Israeli leader Ariel Sharon against Time Magazine in the 1980's;
media companies scrambled for insurance protection from defamation actions, but
copyright-related matters came as part of the package; when corporate media
entities decided to require the policies for distribution and exhibition, copyright
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material included in the film, again explaining any failure to secure
permissions.291 Finally, the applicant is asked if she has been party to an
infringement claims, whether brought to fruition in proceedings, pending,
or threatened; this demand extends to claims the film-maker may
reasonably believe to potentially exist, within the last five years.292
The broker then takes the application to insurance company
underwriters, who assess the risks, and decide whether to issue the policy,
and for how much.293 Often with the help of counsel, though sometimes
drawing on experience, the underwriter, on seeing the absence of
permission will analyze two things. First, the broker will determine the
likelihood an infringement suit will be filed. Second, if the underwriter
even entertains the possibility of accepting fair use, the likelihood the
defense will defeat summary judgment is entertained.294 An underwriter
facing a potential fair use assertion must weigh the fact that only areas of
settled law can be considered by a court deciding a motion for summary
judgment.295 As has been shown, the fair use case-law is both scanty with
respect to documentaries, and is anything but settled; this is palpably the
underwriter’s perspective.296 As one broker for documentarians has said,
“we never say fair use to an underwriter. Ever. Fair use is a defense, and
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underwriters don’t want to get to the point where they’re defending a
claim.”297
Prior to 2007, of the four major media liability insurers in the
documentary field, one, AIG, flatly refused to cover un-cleared material.298
The other three, Media Professional, First Media, and Chubb, would, on a
case-by-case basis, accept an opinion letter from the film-maker’s
copyright counsel for review in the underwriting process.299 Responses to
the letters varied. Chubb’s underwriters weighed the opinion against their
own analysis of the four factors (sometimes turning to clearance counsel),
and if there was agreement, Chubb assumed the risk and write coverage
confident that their analysis comported with the law.300 In some instances,
the policy was priced upwards.301 If there was no agreement, coverage was
denied.
First Media stressed that it would always urge the filmmaker to
work closely with an attorney for clearance issues at the outset of the
relationship.302 Unlike Chubb, it looked to the quality and strength of the
opinion letter, rather than weighing the opinion against their own fourfactor analysis.303 Media’s attitude was that if the film-maker (and her
counsel) showed they had conducted due diligence, they would provide
coverage.304 Media’s underwriters have even, in the absence of an opinion
letter, watched the film themselves to determine fair use, and if a problem
297

Debra Kozee, President of C&S Int’l Ins. Brokers in New York, quoted in
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was evident, would steer the film-maker to counsel for advice that would
bring the use in line with fair use.305
Media Professional also looked to a persuasive opinion letter from
competent copyright counsel in covering un-cleared material.306 The letter
was important, because MediaPro’s president acknowledged “underwriters
are not lawyers, they do not view things through the legal lens, are not
capable of legal judgment.”307 Even if an opinion favored the user, the cost
of litigation that the use might incur was still the bottom line.308
Film-makers aver that insurers, even those who will accept an
opinion letter, will typically not accept uncleared material.309 On the other
hand, Debra Kozee of C & S Insurance Brokers, who served as an
intermediary for insurers and documentarians for twenty years, describes it
as a fallacy to say coverage was not available where fair use was asserted;
documentarians as a breed are just too poor to pay much beyond the $3500
E & O policy, particularly when the film had yet to recoup its investment;
and that as far as underwriters were concerned, $3500 did not cover
exhaustive legal vetting and subsequent litigation expenses. Such litigation
can cost between $290,000 and $1million.310 The consequences of a
plaintiff’s verdict can run from statutory damages of $30,000 per infringing
use, up to $150,000 if the infringement is found to be willful, as well as
actual damages and attorney’s fees.311
The insurer’s reluctance to endorse a film-maker’s fair use, no
matter how strong a copyright counsel may believe the defense to be, is
305
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inextricably bound up with the uncertainty of a litigation outcome.312 The
level of uncertainty tolerated by attorneys is not acceptable to insurers.313
As copyright lawyer Michael Donaldson puts it, “Insurers would rather
avoid litigation than win litigation.”314
Documentarians’ fair use assertions were just not worth the money
from an insurer’s litigation standpoint.315 This may also be true from the
film-makers standpoint. Even if she can find an attorney to furnish a
persuasive opinion letter to a sympathetic underwriter, the additional
expense of getting “lawyered up” stretches a documentary’s slender budget
to the breaking point.316 Moreover, film-maker’s may have pragmatic
reasons to avoid pressing fair use assertions on their insurers.317 One
documentarian has said, “if you ever have a claim on E & O insurance, you

312
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formally, when asked whether the fair use case law was settled with respect to
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might as well go into another line of work. You can never file a claim or
you get blacklisted – and never insured again.”318
B. THE E & O INSURER AS COPYRIGHTR
E & O insurers shape documentary practice via the power to deny
coverage to un-cleared material that satisfies the statutory fair use factors;
what insurers do can determine what winds up on screen, and thus they can
affect film-makers, either for timidity or boldness.319 Representatives of all
four major insures who provide E & O coverage to documentarians
concurred with the characterization that, with respect to fair use, the insurer
is a policeman for the copyright regime, making certain that the film-maker
walks the line between fair use and infringement. Because insurers so often
deny coverage where permission was not granted, their gate-keeping role
favors copyright holders rather than film-maker.320 This makes them the de
facto regulator in a copyright system that is, at least with respect to
infringement actions, an unregulated matter of private ordering.321
The unregulated nature of copyright may seem surprising, given
that it is the creation of a long and complicated Congressional statute, and
governs a global media industry, whose contribution to the nation’s net
wealth is vast. Congress defines copyright’s entitlement, subject matter,
requirements for protection, exclusive rights due to the creator, and
penalties for violating those rights.322 The role of the Federal Copyright
Office is ministerial and non-regulatory, and is largely concerned with
registering and tracking copyrighted works.323 Enforcement then occurs in
318
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322

Id. at 100.

323

Id. at 102.

462

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

the courts, where judges refine any complexities in the application of the
statute on a case-by-case basis.324
While infringement enforcement is thus judicially administered, it
comes about as a matter of private lawsuits.325 The allocation of rights and
responsibilities in the market, such as licensing, is not regulated, as it is not
defined in the Copyright Act. Between Congress’ definitions of the
copyright entitlement and judicial enforcement (with the attendant
refinements of doctrines like fair use), the copyright regime relies upon
private parties to create the structure of the market for expressive creative
works.326
Fair use is a captive of this private ordering. Due to risk-averse
behavior, notably on the part of insurers, but also on the part of filmmakers and their financiers, it is not a subject of much litigation.327
Licensing markets tend to dictate the scope of copyright entitlements
because of the absence of coherent fair use case-law precedent that lend
authority to owners or users, and because film makers, guided in part by
insurance considerations, are gun-shy abut asserting fair use. 328 Fair use in
practice is dictated less by the Copyright Act of 1976 and decisional law,
and more by marketplace actors’ day-to-day behavior.329 An independent
licensing culture, where documentarians must seek permission for
copyrighted materials when they may have a legitimate fair use, supersedes
positive law as the determinant of the actors’ behavior.330 As James Gibson
writes, these actors, “look to the internal practices of the relevant industries
and then apply the same market-referential standards that they would
expect the courts to apply if they were ever to litigate,” with risk-aversion
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the primary consideration for film-makers.331 Into this vacuum, created by
this absence of positive law inputs and regulation, steps the film-maker’s
insurer.
Insurers increasingly play the traditional governmental roles of
risk-spreading and loss prevention.332 Just as in the private regulatory
universe of tort law generally, liability insurance has the capacity to
translate the specific tort of copyright infringement’s incentives into prices,
and more importantly, directives.333 In the fair use context, in theory
regulation by insurance is facilitative, in that the E & O insurer spreads the
cost of losses arising from infringement actions, and thus permits filmmakers, investors, exhibitors, and distributors to proceed in their activities,
rather than be inhibited by the possibility a risk may become a loss.334
When an insurer elects to cover a documentarian’s exercise of fair
use, insurance abates the potential cost of copyright infringement in a
world where new creative works build upon and transform older creative
works.335 The fair-use friendly insurer thus enables and facilitates the
creation of new documentaries. Conversely, in the more likely scenario
that the insurer denies coverage to a documentarian invoking fair use, the
owner-friendly licensing market is reified and enabled by the denial, and
the insurer has successfully, if inadvertently, policed the content industry’s
copyright, without recourse to courts, legislators, regulation.336
Copyright regulation by insurance inheres in the insurer’s power to
refuse the risk of fair use, which creates leverage over the insured film-
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maker.337 And if the insurer accepts the fair use risk, this gives the insurer
incentive to manage the risk both before and after it matures into a loss.338
Leverage and incentive translates into several broad categories of
regulation by insurance: gate keeping, loss prevention, selective exclusion,
management of loss costs, and education.339
The insurer’s gate keeping role is elementary in the documentary
context: a film-maker’s contracts with distributors and exhibitors mandates
E & O coverage to protect those third parties, by covering losses they
might be exposed to in an infringement action.340 In the copyright context,
to get through that gate, documentarians are either compelled to drop any
un-cleared footage as soon as it has been disclosed to the insurer, or have
the film vetted by an attorney, who then furnishes an opinion letter for the
underwriter to either accept or reject.341 In both of these scenarios, the
film-maker must meet the insurer’s standards if she wants to pass through.
The insurer chooses whether to permissively regulate fair use by assessing
whether the risk comports with existing law, deny coverage if its risk
analysis does not jibe with the opinion letter, or affirmatively regulate an
owner-friendly copyright regime by a per se exclusion of un-cleared
footage.342
These last two choices fall under another quasi-regulatory
category, selective exclusion, wherein an insurer denies the use of uncleared footage because the underwriter has deemed the potential loss too
uncertain, given the instability of judicial readings of the four factors. (Pre2007, this was AIG’s policy.)343 Selective exclusion of uncleared footage
effectively eliminates the liability altogether.
337
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An insurer practices loss prevention to prevent harm, once it has
assumed responsibility for any consequences for a given harm.344 In the
context of fair use, this translates into underwriting procedures that make
loss prevention activities a condition of obtaining insurance, such as the
film-maker’s jettisoning of any un-cleared materials, or else an attorney’s
opinion letter vouching for fair use; risked-based pricing, such as Chubb’s
increase in premium costs proportional to the heightened degree of risk
once it had accepted a film-maker’s fair use assertion; and engaging in loss
prevention-oriented monitoring in the course of the entire insurance
relationship, typified by First Media’s recommendation at the outset that
the film-maker acquire copyright counsel to vet the film at every step,
followed as well by Media Pro and Chubb.345
Finally, the insurer can influence the behavior of the
documentarian through education.346 Insurers who deal with film-makers’
copyright issues have the benefit of years of experience weighing fair and
unfair uses, and accordingly formulate basic principles for the film-maker
before the relationship even formally begins. This will direct the filmmaker’s decision-making so that it is harmonious with the insurer’s
requirements.347 Media Pro, First Media, Chubb, and the brokerage C & S
all issue press releases and print articles on their websites providing overviews of fair use and its attendant case-law, typically stressing the
importance of competent counsel and advising cautious behavior by
prospective film-maker/insureds.348 In addition, insurers attend seminars
considerable nerves, might then roll the dice by accepting the exclusion, and
retaining the footage. Id.
344
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and workshops at documentary organizations’ events, and maintain a press
profile, furnishing quotes in trade journals on the rights and responsibilities
of film-makers and insurers alike with respect to fair use.349 In this way, the
insurers can advertise their products, while providing film-makers working
their way through the permissions maze with ex ante advice drawn from
expertise and experience.
C. THE ATROPHIED FAIR USE MUSCLE AND A SHOT ACROSS THE
BOW
By 2004, Michael Moore’s Fareneheit 911 raised documentary
films profile by achieving record box office grosses for the genre and
raised the genre’s profile to a summit.350 However, the consensus among
film-makers, their copyright counsel, and academic commentators was that,
as far as documentaries were concerned, “fair use was broken.”351
Documentarians who had experienced clearance hassles and whose efforts
at invoking fair use had not passed muster with insurers commented: “Fair
use has never been my friend…and my advice to would be to cover your
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tracks.”352 “If you’re doing a feature DVD or for theaters, you can’t invoke
fair use . . . You can say whatever you want, but at the end of the day you
can’t sell your film.”353 “Fair use is a defense. If someone is suing you,
you’re already in the situation where you would have had to have the
money to hire a lawyer . . . which is already out of the range of most filmmakers.”354
Veteran copyright attorney and general counsel to the International
Documentary Association Michael Donaldson stated that he won many fair
use negotiations with insurers, but it was challenging.355 Winning fair use
negotiations for Donaldson was always a fight. It was a cumbersome,
lengthy process, made doubly painful because it occurred so late in the life
of a film, shortly before release, but after the documentarian had spent
years in production.356 Any fair use victories with insurers were generally
kept secret, so no precedent could be built upon them, and the wheel was
reinvented in an ad hoc fashion with each fair use assertion.357 Donaldson
said that he was aware of some documentarians who had felt so thwarted
by the clearance process and subsequent denials of fair use by insurers that
they often abandoned projects at their inception.358 One insurer said that
her client Michael Moore, the most commercially successful and wellcapitalized figure in the field, has described insurance as his biggest
production headache.359
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Copyright scholars in legal academia seized upon the problems of
documentarians and their insurers as evidence that even the most
sympathetic users, whose work so often falls under the § 107 enumerated
purposes of criticism, comment, research, scholarship and news, were
blocked from availing themselves of effective fair use.360 James Gibson
termed the fair use logjam “doctrinal feedback.”361 Doctrinal feedback
occurs when copyright’s entitlement swallows up fair use, not within the
realm of positive law, but through an accretion of unrelated industry
customs and practices which inadvertently reinforce the necessity of
seeking licenses even where the use is fair.362
Gibson’s thesis laid out the preconditions of doctrinal feedback:
risk aversion of documentarians, their insurers, and their distributors, faced
with the legal uncertainties of fair use, breeding overly conservative
permission-seeking.363 The shadow the fourth fair use factor, effect on the
market, casts on any ex ante decision-making, because of the inherent
circularity where any appropriation can be found unfair if permission had
ever been sought in the past by anyone, or even could potentially be
sought.364 Owner’s rent-seeking propensities, via unreasonably high
clearance fees, reinforced by the practice of major corporate entities to
license everything at the maximum price;365 and documentarians own
ambivalent respect for a pro-licensing norm, given that their own work can
be subject to similar appropriation.366 Gibson concluded that even if all of
these motivations are rational and innocent, the solicitude shown by all
360
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parties to owner’s self-aggrandizing strategic licensing behavior ultimately
subverted the constitutional knowledge-creation purpose of the Copyright
Act, while acting entirely outside the realm of positive law.367
If, as Gibson implied, documentarians’ fair use impasse arose from
custom and practice, and was a collective action problem, then, perhaps,
only a collective action solution could break it. As one documentarian put
it, “[fair use is] like a muscle. You have to use it.”368 Beginning in 2004,
film-makers, assisted by lawyers and academics, began to flex that muscle.
That year, the Center for Social Media at American University produced a
study entitled “Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights
Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers,” authored by academic
and copyright lawyer Peter Jaszi and communications scholar and center
director Pat Aufderheide.369
“Untold Stories” was the product of interviews with 45
documentarians about their clearance difficulties and the inadequacy of fair
use as a cure.370 The authors concluded that the inaccessibility of licenses,
due to either exorbitant costs or rights-holders’ reluctance to part with the
material, had resulted in films whose message was diluted, and sometimes
in films not being made at all.371 These “untold stories” were prima facie
evidence of a shrinking public domain and the need for a stronger, more
effective fair use.372 The study also concluded that many film-makers—as
well as lawyers, distributers, and broadcasters—lacked a full understanding
of the doctrine, and called for greater educational efforts so that such
misunderstandings would not continue to be a hindrance to the application
of fair use.373 Finally, the study identified insurers as “the chokepoint of
rights,” a gatekeeper who, if swayed, could break the fair use impasse.374
367
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THE DOCUMENTARY FAIR USE SEA-CHANGE
A. BEST PRACTICES

Among the recommendations in “Untold Stories” was a call for
film-makers to craft a including: encouraging documentarians to rely on
fair use whenever reasonable; persuading gatekeepers, including insurers,
to accept well-founded assertions of fair use; discouraging copyright
owners from threatening or bringing infringement suits against
documentarians when the use comported with best practices;375 and, should
such a suit be brought, providing film-makers with an evidentiary basis for
a fair use defense, if their use complied with best practices.376
“Untold Stories’” co-author Peter Jaszi noted that the fair use caselaw, particularly the nonfiction film cases, used the four § 107 factors as a
covert means of determining whether the film-maker appropriated
copyrighted material for a legitimate documentary purpose, or for mere free
riding, commercial exploitation, or creation of market substitute.377 The
fair use inquiry thus compares the defendant’s actual practice and the norm
or pattern of use with which that defendant seeks to affiliate: documentary
knowledge-creation, or mere piracy.378 Therefore, if film-makers could, as
a group, articulate fair use custom and practice, then courts, as well as
gatekeepers, would be on firmer ground when weighing a fair use
assertion.379
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In a series of thirteen meetings, Jaszi and Aufderheide worked with
members of five filmmaker organizations380 to articulate principles of fair
use and limitations on those principals; the findings were then vetted by a
legal advisory board, and the results, The Documentary Filmakers’
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use (“the Statement”), was issued on
November 18, 2005.381
The Statement lists four situations where documentarians may
reasonably assert fair use, and for each situation articulates a fair use
principle, each with an attendant limitation.382 While the situations came
from the experiences of participating film-makers, the principles were
synthesized from extant documentary fair-use case law, with particular
attention paid to the requisite transformative inquiry.383 In addition, the
Statement folds the first “purpose and character of the use” into the third
“amount and substantiality” factor to ask whether the amount taken was
appropriate in light of the nature of the copyrighted work and the purpose
of the use.384 The situations where documentarians may assert fair use
include:
1) Employing copyrighted material as the object of
social, political, or cultural critique; the underlying
principle here reflects the enumerated fair use purposes in
the act. The Statement notes that so long as the film-maker
analyses or comments on the copyrighted material, and
uses it only as extensively as her point is made, then the
use is fair. The limitation flows from the last point, in that
the appropriated work cannot be used so much that the use
becomes a substitute for the original.
380
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2) Quoting copyrighted works of popular culture to
illustrate an argument or point; an example given is the use
of a film clip to depict changing attitudes towards race.
The illustrative power of such a use, subordinated to the
intellectual or artistic purpose of the documentary, renders
any entertainment value inherent in the original work
irrelevant, because the original is being transformed for a
new purpose, rather than free-riding. The limitations
include: Proper attribution; drawing from a range of
sources as much as possible; using no more than necessary
to make the point; and not employing the quoted material
in order to avoid shooting equivalent footage.
3) Capturing copyrighted material in the process of
filming something else. Here, tampering with reality by
removing the captured work would be in violation of
documentary practice.
The limitations include: not
requesting or directing that the media content be in the
scene, a manipulation of reality unacceptable to
documentarians anyway; the captured material must in
some way be integral to the scene; it must be attributed; the
captured content should not be there purely to be exploited
by being the scene’s sole point of interest; and if what is
captured is music, it must not functionally be used as a
synchronized soundtrack, that is, the scene must not be
edited to the rhythm of the music, or it cannot carry over
into another scene.
4) Using copyrighted material in a historical
sequence. Acknowledging that the best way to create
historical context may be the use of words, images or
music connoting the period; often this material is available
on reasonable licensing terms, but sometimes the cost is
exorbitant, or the owner otherwise refuses permission. The
principle stated is that due to the importance of historical
matter, in some instances fair use should apply. But here
the limitations are more stringent: the film must not be
designed around the material used; the film does not
disproportionally rely upon a single source; the material
must serve a critical illustrative point; no suitable
substitute for the copyrighted material can exist; no more
should be taken than to make the point; no license is
available, or the licensing fee is excessive in proportion to
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the documentary’s budget; and the material must be
properly attributed.385
Remarkably, almost before the ink was dry on the Statement, it had an
almost immediate impact upon the gatekeepers.
B. THE BELLWEATHER FILMS AND THE INSURERS
Eight weeks after the Statement’s release, three documentarians
successfully invoked its principles to justify their reliance upon fair use
when all three premiered films at the Sundance Festival.386 “This Film Is
Not Yet Rated,” which examined the arbitrary and capricious standards of
the Motion Picture Association of America’s (“MPAA”) film rating board,
used 143 film clips from Hollywood movies to illustrate that the ratings
system discriminated against independent films.387 The film-makers
quickly realized that given the critical posture the film took towards both
Hollywoods’s depiction of sex and violence and the MPAA rating practice,
it would be impossible to secure licenses.388 Primarily because through
criticism of the film quoted, “This Films’…” violated standard form
language in studio licensing agreements389 thus fair use was the only
feasible means of producing the film.390
The second Sundance film debut invoking fair use was “The Trials
of Darryl Hunt,” recounting the vindication of a wrongfully accused man
facing life in prison for rape and murder after a racially-charged trial.391 A
local broadcast outlet had permitted the use of news footage, but when the
licensor decided it wanted to make its own documentary on the subject,
permission was withdrawn; the film-makers stood their ground, asserted
385

Id. at 6-7.

386

Jaszi, Copyright, supra note 136, at 734.

387

Paul Cullum, supra note 89, at 1.

388

Id. at 1, 3.

389

Id. at 3.
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Elaine Dutka, supra note 94, at 16.

391

Jaszi, Copyright, supra note 136, at 734-35.
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fair use, and used the footage anyway.392 The final Sundance film screened
under the Statement’s aegis was “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes;”
this film quoted substantially from songs and music videos to critique rap
music’s celebrations of misogyny and violence.393 Taking on the music
industry, the most proprietary of content-owners, “Hip-Hop’s” makers
relied on fair use and the Statement, as their film was unquestionably
quoting in the service of criticism and commentary.394 Releasing a film
employing uncleared material through festivals is one thing, as festival
rights clearance is a pro forma affair. However, all three films went on to
either theatrical or broadcast distribution, and eventual DVD release.395
Additionally, the broadcast outlets that aired the films, including ITVS,
PBS, HBO and the Independent Film Channel, accepted the three filmmaker’s fair use assertions based on the Statement.396 This was only
possible because insurers had first accepted fair use.397 Subsequently, key
392

Id. at 735.

393

Id.

394

Id.

395

There were no negative repercussions from rights owners. Of the films, the
one which was almost entirely dependent on un-cleared clips was “This Film is not
Yet Rated.” Michael Donaldson has stated “there was not one peep from the
studios.” Telephone Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note
296; “I used fair use, and they couldn’t do anything about it,” said Kirby Dick.
Interview with Kirby Dick, Documentary Film Director (Sept. 21, 2007).
396

Interview with Pat Aufderheide, Director, Center for Social Media (Sept.
21, 2007). The Independent Film Channel, which aired “This Film is Not Yet
Rated” went so far as to incorporate the Statement into its own internal procedures:
Evan Shapiro, the cable network’s general manager, had vowed not to get involved
with clip-heavy films after producing “Z Channel: A Magnificent Obsession,” but
after accepting “This Film is not Yet Rated” he announced that all of IFC’s
documentaries would embrace fair use from then on. Dutka, supra note 393, § 2, at
16; Jaszi, supra note 136, at 735. PBS, which aired “Hip-Hop,” accepted the film
under the Statement, and its general counsel internally disseminated the document
to all counsel and general managers within its affiliates. Aufderheide, supra note
139, at 34.
397

Aufderheide, supra note 139, at 34.
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insurers went further than the usual ad hoc fair use acceptance which bore
no precedential impact.398 Within a year, two insurers would announce
formal fair use endorsements. Two others, while continuing their preStatement ad hoc fair use underwriting, would align themselves publicly
with the two furnishing endorsements.399
C. THE FAIR USE ENDORESEMENT
Of the seven insurers who handle the E & O needs of
documentarians, four of them: AIG, Media/Professional, Chubb and First
Media represent the bulk of the market.400 In early 2007 both AIG and
Media/Pro came out with endorsements affirmatively providing coverage
for fair use.401 AIG’s acceptance of fair use was particularly noteworthy,
because hitherto it had per se excluded uncleared footage.402 The
endorsements came about through a convergence of several discrete parties
operating independently, all of whom had been motivated towards the same
goal by momentum generated by the Statement.403
1. AIG’s Fair Use Doctrine
AIG’s turnabout was precipitated by Debra Kozee, President of C
& S Insurance Brokers, and Peter Jaszi.404 Kozee had been acting as an
insurance intermediary for several years, and had both a business and
personal commitment to documentarians405. In January of 2007, she was
398

Telephone Interview with Debra Kozee, supra note 289.

399
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Telephone Interview with Paul Paray, supra note 294.
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Telephone Interview with Debra Kozee, supra note 289.
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involved in procuring insurance for “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and
Rhymes.”406 Jaszi, working as copyright counsel for the film-makers, had
flagged “Hip-Hop” as a test case for insurers acceptance of fair use, largely
because of the film’s use of music and music videos met head-on with the
thorniest copyright arena and the most proprietary and litigious class of
owners.407 Jaszi wrote an opinion letter asserting fair use, and letter in
hand, Kozee went out with the film to underwriters for bids.408
Paul Paray, an underwriter at AIG, was impressed with the opinion
letter.409 He believed he discovered a clue on how fair use could be
responsibly used by film-makers, due to the fact that expert copyright
counsel vetted the film and adequately applied the four factors analysis.410
Furthermore, Paray concluded that though not dispositive, the factors
Statement was a “key” factors in the creation of the endorsement.411 He
believed that there was great care used in the creation of the
standards412and that the Statements represent a good-faith pledge of due
diligence.413
Shortly afterwards, Paray went to a highly attended film-maker
conference on fair use 414 that affirmed the documentarians’ desire to

406

Id.

407

Id.; Copyright Attorney David Reiff says “Music is a snakepit.” MARJORIE
HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE
AGE
OF
COPYRIGHT
CONTROL
6
(2005),
available
at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; “You have to
clear all music.” DONALDSON, supra note 118, at 289.
408
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Id.

414

Id.

2009]

FAIR IS FOUL

477

follow the Statement’s guidelines.415 Paray concluded that he would rather
have a fair use endorsement than not,416 thus AIG accepted “Hip-Hop’s”
fair use assertion and created a formal endorsement scheme.417 The
endorsement was predicated upon an attorney’s opinion letter that agreed
with the underwriter’s analysis of the film under the § 107 factors.
(footnote 320).418
Paray describes AIG’s fair use endorsement as helping all parties:
film-makers, because they are permitted greater freedom and creativity;
insurers, because the decision of underwriters compels documentarians to
rely on counsel creating clarity from a claims perspective; and the public,
because it gets the benefit of viewing the documentary as the film-maker
intended it.419 He is careful to note that the endorsement is not a substitute
for the film-maker’s due diligence with respect to acquiring clearance; but
because of the opinion letter requirement, the film-maker cannot say,
“insurance will cover it, so I’ll just take.”420
Paray credited Jaszi’s advocacy and momentum in the
documentary community generated by the Statement as the reason why
AIG reversed itself on fair use.421 The Statement had fostered film-maker’s
recognition of the benefits of the involvement of counsel, and this in turn
created the template for AIG’s endorsement.422 Finally, commerce played
a part. Paray believes that public perception of the failure of the
mainstream news media in representing the world has significantly raised
documentary film’s audience profile in the last two decades.423 The
415
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attendant explosion in documentary production and outlets revealed that a
market existed.424 Paradoxically, given the fear of copyright litigation kept
fair use from being accepted by insurers, Paray notes that “these policies
are profitable from our perspective, because in fact there is very little
litigation.”425
2. Media Professional’s Fair Use Endorsement
Media/Professional’s endorsement was the result of a two-front
initiative.426 The first approach was made by veteran copyright attorney
Michael Donaldson.427 Donaldson worked with documentarians for years
and was very hands on with his clients. He often observed his client’s
work in the editing rooms, guiding them through adherence to legally
sound fair use.428 He also served as general counsel to the Independent
Feature Project and the International Documentary Association,429 and
worked with Jaszi as legal advisor on the Statement. Through workshops
and seminars, Donaldson wanted to educate film-makers and industry
representatives on the importance of responsible fair use.430 Donaldson has
written thousands of opinion letters, and the fact that his clients have never
been subject to a fair use cease-and-desist order has made him very
comfortable in predicting fair use outcomes.431
424

Id.

425

Telephone Interview with Paul Paray, supra note 294.

426

See telephone interview with Michael Donaldson, supra n. 73; see
telephone interview with Leib Dodell, supra n. 283; see telephone interview with
Anthony Falzone, supra n. 313.
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See telephone interview with Michael Donaldson, supra n. 73.
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Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.

429

Id.

430

Id.

431

Donaldson at IFP Fair Use Summit; See Interview with Anthony Falzone,
supra note 315. Donaldson is fond of saying “fair use is like bad manners, a
spectrum, some clearly good, some clearly bad, much in between.” He describes
his job as putting his clients in a safe area by means of his own version of the four-
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In the fall of 2006 he began negotiations anew with
Media/Professional.432 By February of 2007, Media/Pro had hammered out
an endorsement which stated that if one of seven pre-approved attorneys
furnished an opinion letter saying a use was fair, the insurer would cover
the film.433
Simultaneously, Media/Professional was working out a different
type of deal with Anthony Falzone, an intellectual property litigator and
executive director of the Stanford Center for Internet and Society School
Fair Use Project.434 Falzone offered to Media/Professional a pro bono
defense promise for any covered documentary threatened with an
infringement suit.435 Like Donaldson, Falzone would work closely with the
film-maker in advance to ensure it comported with responsible fair use.436
Media Pro accepted the offer.437
Falzone, for his part, recognized that when the time comes that the
pro bono defense is called in, that scanty documentary fair use case law
may be expanded by any litigation that ensues.438 While cautioning that he
doesn’t want to see any of his clients sued for infringement, he believes
that more decisions in the reporters can only help bolster predictability in
an uncertain arena.439 Moreover, cease-and-desist letters from owners will
factor test: “Do I need it to tell the story? Is it only sufficient time-wise to make its
point? Is it clear why the use makes the point, and does the film itself explain the
use? If it doesn’t meet this test, I’ll tell the film-maker to leave it out.” Telephone
Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.
432

Id., supra note 73. In addition to Media/Professional, Donaldson has
worked and continues to work, exclusively with AIG and Chubb. Id.
433

Id.; see Telephone Interview with Leib Dodell, supra note 283.
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now be getting rapid legal responses from hitherto impecunious filmmakers.440 Film-makers would gain in confidence knowing someone is
standing behind them, while litigious owners will find their bullying
ineffective if it looks like the law is on the documentarians side.441
Media/Professional president Leib Dodell expressed his pleasure
because Falzone and his crew of activist attorneys had taken the weight of
litigation off of the insurer through shouldering the cost of defending filmmakers who adhered to the Statement.442 While the “Donaldson Way,” the
use of transactional attorneys to ascertain cut-and-dried fair use assertions,
was a formalization of Media/Professional’s prior policy, the “Falzone
Way” represented something truly novel.443 Dodell said it was ultimately
the key element in solidifying his company’s posture towards fair use.444
The cost of litigation, a significant barrier to covering even the fairest of
uses, evaporated in a heart-beat.445 In addition, Dodell acknowledged that
the thorough vetting of the films by either the seven approved lawyers or
Falzone reduced underwriting costs.446
Dodell still believes fair use case law in the documentary context is
unsettled, but because of the pro bono promise is now more comfortable
with Donaldson’s rejoinder that “it’s absolutely settled.”447 Dodell was
aware of the historical inconsistency between insurers who were reluctant
to accept fair use and attorneys, who were more comfortable arguing the

440

Telephone Interview with Anthony Falzone, supra note 313.

441
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442
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Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.
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doctrinal boundaries in a defendant’s favor.448 The insurer was formerly
viewed as the policeman or regulator of the fair use system. However
Dodell said “the lawyers have taken on the policeman role, they vet
everything now.”449 Since the endorsement was created, Dodell reports (as
do Chubb and First National), the fair use litigation front has been calm.
Film-makers are happy, no-one has been sued, and financing has opened
up.450
3. The Bandwagon
While the AIG turnabout quietly occurred a month before
Media/Professional’s fair use endorsement, the latter managed to generate a
publicity coup, Hollywood style, that landed the arcane doctrine of fair use
on the front page of both The Hollywood Reporter and Variety the very
next morning.451 In February, 2007, Media/Professional’s endorsement
was announced by the president of the International Documentary
Association, Diane Vicari, at the Los Angeles gala party for the
announcement of the Academy Award’s Best Documentary nomination.452
She brought representatives of each company on state, where the elite of
the documentary community greeted them with a thunderous standing
ovation.453
The next day, the announcement made the trade paper headlines,
and Donaldson received a phone call from a major insurer, outraged that
they had not been included in the festivities, or, more to the point,
448

Telephone Interview with Leib Dodell, supra note 282.

449

Id.

450

Id.

451

Gregg Kilday, Documakers Getting Aid on Fair Use, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
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approached with a similar endorsement proposal.454 He then fielded similar
phone calls from Lloyd’s and AIG.455 As the story gained traction in the
trades, blogs, and more specialized insurance and film-making news
organizations, First Media and Chubb, who had always accepted fair use
with an opinion letter, chimed in to align themselves with what now
appeared to be an irresistible tide of insurer capitulation to documentarians’
fair use assertions.456
Donaldson speculated as to why the other two joined in, and why
AIG was sure to raise its profile: They wanted to bask in industry applause
and retrieve any stolen thunder; exploit a growing demand for a new
insurance product; they had been quietly granting fair use already, but a
more openly permissive underwriting attitude, and a foregrounding of filmmakers’ copyright counsel’s role, would cut through the ad hoc struggles
such assertions bred.457 Finally, the opinion letter process ultimately saved
them money, if not to the degree Falzone’s pro-bono lawyers would on
litigation, at least on the underwriting side.458 Or, as Debra Kozee more
pithily put it, “monkey see, monkey do.”459
Peter Jaszi has written that the most powerful evidence of the
Statement’s impact on industry custom and practice, its most stunning
success, was the fact that it took a mere eighteen months for the majority of
insurers providing E & O coverage to documentarians to cover fair use.460
“At least where documentary films are concerned, the vicious circle has
become a virtuous circle.”461 While the respective stories of AIG’s and
Media/Professional’s arrival at fair use endorsements are dramatic, with
454
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460

Jaszi, Copyright, supra note 136, at 735.

461

Id. (citation omitted).

2009]

FAIR IS FOUL

483

many forces coalescing into a happy ending, the response by the other
primary insurers, Chubb and First Media, offers a slightly different angle
on the virtuous circle.462
4. Marketing v. Substance: Chubb and First Media
First Media and Chubb historically accepted documentarians’ fair
use assertions, if accompanied by copyright counsel’s opinion letter, and
continue to do so.463 Representatives of both companies aver that AIG’s
and Media/Professional’s fair use endorsements are merely cosmetic
changes in the underwriting process.464
Ken Goldstein of Chubb described the endorsements as “a
He stated that
marketing change, not a substantive change.”465
Media/Professional demands an opinion letter identical to what was
required prior to February 2007, and gives that letter the same underwriting
scrutiny as before, with the same consequences if it finds that the filmmaker has failed to satisfy the four factors: denial of coverage.466
When asked if Chubb would consider Media/Professional’s
acceptance of Falzone’s pro bono defense promise as a valid option, he
unequivocally said no.467 This is because Chubb’s E & O policy is
structured around the documentarian/insured’s participation in settlement
decisions. Goldstein stated that he wants the film-maker to have “skin in
the game,” and a pro bono defense promise would both let documentarians

462
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off the hook of making hard choices, and encourage them to avoid asking
for a license from a copyright owner at the outset.468
Michelle Tillton of First Media called the fair use endorsements
“spin,” and stated that any characterization of a “before and after” scenario
regarding the four insurers’ handling of fair use was “not valid.”469 She
believes commerce, and not a particular solicitude for documentarians’
clearance troubles, motivated the endorsements, pointing that the insurance
market has been a soft one for well over a year.470 Explaining that
documentarians E&O policies are “non-reoccurring premium business,”
that is, one-year policies without renewal, Tilton believes that
Media/Professional’s and AIG’s new products are merely a quick and
inexpensive means of collecting new insured s in a soft market, through
writing these policies on an ad hoc, one-off basis.471
However, both Goldstein and Tillton saw some value in the
endorsements, not because of innovative underwriting practices, but
because of better conduct by documentarians.472
Goldstein believes that insurers are not any more fair use friendly
than pre-Statement, but instead that film-makers are more responsible.473
Because the new endorsements require film-makers to have an experienced
copyright lawyer thoroughly vet their films, tell them what they can and
cannot do, and these decisions are the basis for the opinion letter, then
documentarians are being educated in the law.474 Film-makers, as a
consequence of this education, have shown a good-faith effort to exercise
fair use in compliance with the law. This good faith, engendered by the
Statement and validated by the availability of the endorsements, will
468
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certainly lead insurers to be more receptive to fair use claims, regardless of
whether an endorsement is offered or not.
VII.

THE FUTURE

While insurers, film-makers, academics, and attorneys have all
expressed optimism for the future of fair use in the documentary field,
especially since the insurers have become a more permissive gatekeeper,
they also concur that it is too soon to foretell the degree to which
documentarian’s invocations of fair use will resolve their clearance
issues.475 However, the players have flagged several key areas of
uncertainty, and in some instances have been comfortable with making
predictions.476 These areas of uncertainty include the response of copyright
holders, the thorny areas of music clearance and archival footage clearance,
the receptivity of third parties, such as distributors and broadcasters, to fair
use assertions already vouched for by insurers and copyright counsel, and
the potential for moral hazard when copying is protected by insurance.477
A. THE RESPONSE FROM COPYRIGHT OWNERS
A year after the insurer fair use was announced, copyright holders
have remained silent litigation-wise with respect to fair use and
documentaries.478 Anthony Falzone suggested that the silence may owe
475

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note 294.
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See Telephone Interview with Lieb Dodell, supra note 282; Telephone
Interview with Ken Goldstein, supra note 294; Telephone Interview with Anthony
Falzone, supra note 313; Telephone Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note
294.
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See Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73;
Telephone Interview with Lieb Dodell, supra note 282; Telephone Interview with
Ken Goldstein, supra note 294; Telephone Interview with Anthony Falzone, supra
note 313; Telephone Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note 294. Some studio
executives however, vented their frustration in the press in 2006, following the
Independent Film Channel’s acceptance of fair use for a clip-driven documentary
about “road movies” called “Wanderlust.” The clips requested from the studios
exceeded the budget by over $150,000. Representing the producers, Michael
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something to publicity and momentum, specifically with respect to
documentarians new-found boldness in asserting fair use, and the speed
with which insurers stepped up to support them.479 As Falzone explains,
“Owners’ counsel’s attention has been attracted to this assertion of a strong
positive law basis for fair use, and sense they can no longer bully a filmmaker with cease and desist letters as easily.”480 Michael Donaldson
believes that after twenty years of education and experience, rights holders,
movie studios in particular, “get it now,” and have come to understand fair
use in the documentary context knowing when they can sue for
infringement.481 Moreover, now that insurers are visibly on the filmmakers side, in the wake of the probability of being met with a strong
defense, owners are gun-shy of losing.482
Ken Goldstein of Chubb took the sympathetic view of copyright
holders in a fair use scenario.483 Goldstein pointed out that they perceive
the use as the loss of a valuable revenue stream, but he agreed that an
owner, faced with a legitimate fair use assertion, if furnished with an
authoritative explanation of why the law would favor the use, might be
relieved to be spared the burden of litigation.484 Leib Dodell of
Media/Professional, who like the other insurers represents owners as well
Donaldson offered a deal, a token license for $1,000 a title, or else the film-makers
would invoke fair use. 13 of the 18 copyright holders accepted the offer. James
Velaise, right’s holder for Jean-Luc Godard’s “Breathless,” and one of the 13 who
capitulated, called Donaldson’s offer “blackmail,” the deployment of fair use a
“dishonest” ploy to save money, and the use tantamount to stealing. Another unnamed executive said “If someone can’t afford a Mercedes, that doesn’t mean he
can’t drive,” suggesting documentarians should find cheap substitutes if they
cannot pay for a license. Dutka, supra note 94, at 16 (see also Correction,
N.Y.TIMES, June 4, 2006, § 2, at 8).
479
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as users, stated that he has conveyed to owners that the fair use
endorsement will ultimately benefit them as well, by sparing them needless
litigation headaches.485 Pat Aufderheide believes that the Statement can be
a litigation tool for owners in infringement suits, as they can point to a
defendant’s departure from its dictates as prima facie evidence that the use
was unfair.486
Michelle Tillton of First Media elaborated on this point.487
Because the four factors cut both ways, potential owner/plaintiffs now have
a heightened awareness of litigation costs and the possibility of a court
defeat.488 She agreed that since an adverse fair use court decision could
create precedent that hurts owners in future litigation, that they will choose
their legal battles carefully rather than reflexively firing off cease-anddesist letters.489 Tillton also opined that the zeitgeist and box-office success
of Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 911" have made owners, as aware as the
public at large, of the social value of documentaries.490 Finally, she
believes that policing copyright violations on the internet has kept the
content industry sufficiently preoccupied so as to make documentarians fair
use assertions a lesser concern.491
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owner’s point of view. See Telephone Interview with Debra Kozee, supra note
289; Telephone Interview with Paul Paray, supra note 294; Telephone Interview
with Ken Goldstein, supra note 296; Telephone Interview with Michelle Tillton,
supra note 294.
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B. MUSIC
Music presents a more difficult fair use analysis than film clips or
incidental captured material because it is harder to distinguish between
transformative use and mere use as soundtrack.492 While fair use assertion
by the producers of “Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes” went
unchallenged by music rights holders, one documentarian called music “the
next [fair use] frontier (clips being a settled issue).”493 Michelle Tillton of
First Media stated pithily, “music always sucks.”494
Donaldson and Falzone are comfortable in asserting that a filmmaker who comports with the Statement’s music guidelines are exercising
a legitimate use.495 Falzone, noting that there have been no challenges to
documentarians’ fair use of music recently, says that since the same fourfactor analysis in cases involving clips controls, then provided the filmmaker is properly guided by counsel through the editing process, he would
have no hesitation about defending a music-based fair use assertion.496
Michael Donaldson seconded this statement, saying “music appropriation is
now settled.”497 He qualified this belief by stating that what he calls “thirdparty music,” or music not composed for the original film appearing in a
film-clip that has been otherwise properly licensed is still unsettled, and an
area where he would like to see some cases create certainty.498

492

Michael Donaldson, Remarks at I.F.P. Fair Use Summit, supra note 232.

493

See supra text accompanying notes 396-400; David Van Taylor, Filmmaker, Remarks at I.F.P. Fair Use Summit (Sept. 21, 2007). (AUTHOR
QUESTION)
494

Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.

495

Id.; Falzone Interview, supra note 313.

496

Falzone Interview, supra note 313.

497

Such is the authority of the Statement; this marks a reversal from
Donaldson’s earlier advice to film-makers that all music must be cleared.
DONALDSON, supra note 145, at 118.
498

Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.
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C. ARCHIVE FOOTAGE
Michael Donaldson is wary of one fair use arena that is archival
footage.499 This is an area where film-makers have had considerable
difficulties in securing affordable licenses, and often crucial to the purpose
of a historical documentary.500 He characterized the depiction of archive
houses as monopolistic in “Untold Stories” as greedy as unfair, pointing
out that acquisition, digitization, cataloging, preservation, and storage of
this often fragile film is extremely expensive, and moreover, is often
licensed by the archive owner as well.501 His advice to film-makers is if
they cannot afford a license for archival film, get a suitable substitute
elsewhere rather than taking it under fair use, as the Statement provides.502
On the other hand, Pat Aufderheide believes that archive houses have
responded positively to the Statement on account of its clarity, and that the
houses’ litigation posture has diminished since its appearance.503
D. THE RESPONSE OF DOWNSTREAM DISTRIBUTORS
An insurer signing off on a documentary’s fair use of copyrighted
material does not guarantee that a distributor will follow.504 Because the
big commercial players, studios, cable and broadcast networks will
continue to unthinkingly pay top dollar for clearance, this precedent of
industry custom and practice will always be available for a litigation-shy
distributor to point to when it acquires a documentary.505 The president of
one documentary production company, whose work is largely aired on
499

Id.

500

Id.

501

Id.

502

Id.

503

Pat Aufderheide at IFP Fair Use Summit, Panel Discussion (Sept. 21,

2007).
504

Id.

505

See Marques, supra note 124, at 353.
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cable, believes that the only arena the post-Statement activity has created a
fair use safe harbor for are clip-driven films about cultural artifacts.506 For
anything less on point, distributors may still balk at a fair use assertion
despite available coverage.507 She explained that in work-for-hire
situations, especially in cable or broadcast television, while immediate
supervisors may be happy with vetted fair use assertions, corporate
resistance at the top still exists.508 This resistance will clearly need to be
eroded on a company-by-company basis over time, as fair use assertions
become more frequent and gain credibility.509
E. MORAL HAZARD
The doctrine of moral hazard posits that the presence of insurance
creates disincentives on the part of the insured to avoid risk, knowing the
insurer is there to pay the bill.510 Insurers and attorneys all acknowledged
the potential for moral hazard where fair use is covered, in that film-makers
at the very least might not go the extra mile to acquire a license, or would
just take copyrighted material without thinking.511 However, all of them
qualified this concern as well.512
Paul Paray, formerly of AIG, was conscious of a moral hazard
problem and indeed his company had been hit with bad claims once on an
506

Lesli Klainberg, Orchard Films, at IFP Fair Use Summit (9/21/07)

507

Id.

508

Id.

509

Even Eric Brass of public television network GBH, the outlet responsible
for producing the majority of documentaries on PBS, and a long-time champion of
fair use, believed that while the Statement was valid, even “great,” GBH did not
adopt it because of the fourth principle’s contention that historically important
copyrighted material may be taken if a license is too expensive or denied for other
reasons; he believed this posture was not doctrinally correct. Interview with Eric
Brass, GBH-TV, (Sep. 21, 2007).
510

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (6th ed. 1990).

511

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.

512

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.
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independent film when a film-maker/insured relied on insurance while
surreptitiously not clearing some footage.513 Paray said this case did not
involve a documentarian, and that he believed non-fiction film-makers
operate in good faith and only opt for fair use when they have no other
choice.514 Calling them consistently responsible actors, he made it
understood that moral hazard and malicious usage only surfaced in
commercial fiction feature films.515 Michelle Tillton of First Media’s
worst-case moral hazard scenario is that a documentarian will represent on
her application that she received all permissions, a policy will be issued,
and then it turns out no permission existed.516 This scenario remains
hypothetical, and given First Media’s directive to their insured on having
counsel vet the film, it will likely remain unrealized.517 She also expressed
that the danger of loss of the film to injunction would keep film-makers
honest, and only extraordinary ignorance and a complete lack of guidance
by counsel and insurer could ever allow this to happen.518
VIII.

CONCLUSION: A NEW TYPE OF REGULATORY INSURER,
OR A BETTER INSURED?

Before the appearance of the Statement and insurers’subsequent
embrace of documentarians’ fair use assertions, insurers filled a regulatory
vacuum operating on behalf of an owner-friendly copyright regime.519 As
gatekeeper, E & O insurers could deny documentarians from coverage for
un-cleared footage, and thus prevent a film from being seen.520 Even where
513

Interview with Paul Paray, supra note 294.

514

Id.

515

Id.

516

Telephone Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note 294.

517

Id.

518

Id.
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Interview with Anthony Falzone, supra note 313.

520

Pat Aufderheide at IFP Summit, Panel Discussion, supra note 503.
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no per se bar existed, as at AIG, the fair use underwriting process was
lengthy, cumbersome, ad hoc, and uncertain.521 From the film-makers
perspective, all of these factors were aggravated by the process’ proximity
to the film’s acquisition of a distributor, and its potential to delay a films
release.522
Since the appearance of the endorsements and public embrace of
fair use by the insurers who do not affirmatively endorse fair use, the E &
O insurer still fulfills a regulatory function, but of a different kind.523 All
four insurers require a documentarian asserting fair use to have the film
vetted by competent copyright counsel, with an opinion letter stating that
the use satisfies the four § 107 factors.524 The insurers may have been
persuaded of the validity of fair use,525 but perhaps more importantly, the
documentarian/insureds have been compelled by their insurers to use uncleared material in compliance with the doctrine.526 While this comes with
the added expense of retaining counsel to vet the film, the reward comes
not merely in the form of a more efficient underwriting process and greater
certainty of coverage.527 With each opinion letter, each subsequent grant of
coverage, and each film released exercising responsible fair use, the
doctrine may gradually be incorporated into industry custom and practice.
Since, as some theorists argue, custom and practice – “what is reasonable”lies beneath the often mechanical deployment of the four factors in the
courts, an expansion over time of customary fair use in documentary film
521

Interview with Debra Kozee, supra note 289.

522

Donaldson, supra n 188 at 198.

523

Pat Aufderheide at IFP Summit, Panel Disccusion, supra note 503.

524

Interview with Paray, supra note 294.

525

AIG, in dropping its per se exlusion certainly was; Chubb and First Media
maintain they have needed no such persuasion; and Media/Pro, in adopting the pro
bono defense promise offered by Stanford Law School litigators, have armed
themselves with a weapon that relaxes the need to be a policeman considerably.
Interview with Lieb Dodell, supra note 282.
526

See Interview with Michelle Tillton, supra note 294.
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See telephone interview with Leib Dodell, supra n. 283.
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may be dispositive, should the day comes that a case gets litigated. The
insurer as “good cop” regulator, granting the “carrot” of coverage of uncleared material by steering his insured towards responsible fair use with
the “stick” of retaining counsel is a vicarious educator. Through the
demand for an opinion letter, he guarantees that the film-maker will learn
the law during the post-production process. Both Michael Donaldson and
Anthony Falzone sit over the shoulder of their clients, and make sure that
the material taken makes its point, makes it with only as much taking as
necessary, and makes it in such a way that it explains itself contextually
(not just to the audience, but to a prospective judge as well).528
The insurer and copyright attorney schooling the film-maker are
but part of a team of teachers, indeed only the last ones in a line. The
events of February 2007 were the results of collective action by the
documentary community to solve a collective action problem, and
insurance was only a piece of it, even if it was the key piece.529 “Untold
Stories” established that film-makers were ignorant of fair use, or, if they
knew something about it, were too discouraged by resistance by
gatekeepers to exercise it. Since then, an active support system has sprung
up, to educate film-makers in their rights and responsibilities with respect
to fair use.
Conferences and seminars at documentary events, such as festivals,
are a regular occurrence.530 A network of linked electronic resources for
film-makers abound, where film-makers, attorneys, and activists can share
their knowledge and experience of fair use.531 Duke University’s Center
for the Study of the Public Domain even offers a fair use comic book,
explaining the doctrine and best practices.532 Under the aegis of the Center
528

Interview with Anthony Falzone, supra note 313; Telephone Interview with
Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.
529

See Telephone Interview with Michael Donaldson, supra note 73.

530

See, e.g., Center for Social Media at American
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
531
532

University,

Id.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY,
TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY LAW? (2006), available at
www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/digital.php.
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for Social Media, film students can enter their documentary projects for a
“Best Fair Use” award.533 All of this fosters a better, more responsible
insured. Michael Donaldson, when called “the hero of the story” because
of his victory after decades in the trenches of fair use wars, replied , “No.
The film-makers are the heroes.”534 Their progress, from fighting and
usually losing isolated battles on the clearance front, to becoming a unified
group dedicated to learning the law and then putting it into practice, is what
changed the game.535 Insurers, whether they smelled money, good public
relations, or always had a genuine sympathy for their insureds, provided the
key that un-locked the gate, but it was in large part because of the
momentum built by the community.

533

April 2008 Newsletter, CENTER FOR SOC. MEDIA (Am. Univ. Sch. of
Commc’ns),
available
at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
newsletter/entry/2008april/.
73.

534

Conversation with Michael Donaldson, IFP Fair use Summit, supra note
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This casenote discusses whether biotechnology should be endorsed by
federal crop insurance. It reviews the history and the goals of the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation, as well as the role that it plays in the
American agricultural system. Genetically modified crops are becoming
more prominent in U.S. agriculture, yet they have not been addressed by
federal crop insurance. The U.S. Department of Agriculture recently
established the pilot program Biotech Yield Endorsement, whose goal is to
bring together the federal crop insurance system with the growing industry
and market for genetically modified seeds. Agricultural policymaking is
also reviewed and categorized as economically inefficient. This note
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INTRODUCTION
As the wealth of biological and genetic knowledge has improved
over the past century, the ability to study and modify the genome of an
organism has revolutionized many industries. Agriculture in the U.S. has
seen as many changes as any other industry. Over the past several decades,
biotechnology has played an increasingly prevalent role in the agriculture
industry. For example, in 2001, 26% of corn grown in the United States
was genetically engineered.1 Since then, that number has more than tripled
to 80%.2 This technology has become so widespread because the ability to
engineer a plant resistant to certain pests or weeds allows farmers to
increase their yield and profits.
Along with subsidies, the federal crop insurance program has
played a major role in allowing the federal government to aid farmers and
stabilize the nation’s agriculture industry.3 Although the federal crop
insurance program has been in place for the past eighty years, it has not
been without its shortcomings.4 One aspect of agriculture that federal crop
insurance has not addressed, despite its prevalence in the 21st century, is
genetically modified crops. If a farmer plants seeds that are genetically
engineered to reduce the risk of crop loss, then logically, crop insurance
premiums should be adjusted according to this reduction of risk. For this
reason, in 2007 the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and Risk
Management Agency (RMA), both part of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), devised the Biotech Yield Endorsement pilot
program, which for the first time would lower the premiums paid by
farmers who planted specific hybrid seeds created by biotech companies.5

1

Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Factsheet: Genetically Modified
Crops in the United States (Sept. 2004), http://trusts.orgpewagbiotech/news_
room_detail.aspx?id=17950.
2

Nat’l Agric. Statistical. Serv., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Acreage 24 (2008).

3

Joseph W. Glauber, Crop Insurance Reconsidered, 86 AMER. J. AGR. ECON.
1179, 1179 (2004).
4
5

Id.

U.S. Dept. Agric., Pilot Biotech Yield Endorsement Insurance Standards
Handbook 2008 and Succeeding Crop Years 1-2 (2007), available at
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Despite the apparent merits of encompassing a biotechnology
endorsement in the federal crop insurance system, it is uncertain if the
endorsement can solve many of the old and lingering problems facing the
federal crop insurance program, or if it may in fact create new problems.
There are several economic and environmental concerns that are presented
by a biotechnology endorsement, rendering the promise and potential of the
new policies ambiguous.
Part I of this paper details the history of the federal crop insurance
program in the U.S. and examines the goals of this program. Part II
explains the recent biotechnology endorsements that have been instituted
by the USDA that have reduced crop insurance premiums for farmers who
plant seeds generated by biotechnology. Part III examines whether these
biotechnology endorsements will have a positive economic impact on the
federal crop insurance program. This includes whether the endorsements
could result in increased participation in the federal crop insurance
program. Part IV, however, discusses how, despite the promise of a
biotechnology endorsement, it could be, as similar agricultural legislation
has been, problematic both economically and environmentally. Lastly, Part
V explains why the specific pilot programs implemented by the USDA and
biotechnology endorsements could be generally beneficial as they safely
shift federal crop insurance into an age dominated by genetically modified
organisms and how these pilot programs can avoid certain pitfalls over the
course of their implementation.
I.

THE HISTORY AND GOALS OF THE FEDERAL CROP
INSURANCE PROGRAM

In order to evaluate the efficacy and potential problems presented
by a federal endorsement of biotechnology and hybrid seeds through crop
insurance, it is important to examine the role that crop insurance plays in
the U.S. agricultural system. This section discusses the purpose and
establishment of the federal crop insurance program, how federal crop
insurance is administered, and what is necessary for the program to
succeed.

http://www.rma.usda.gov/handbooks/20000/2008/08_20070.pdf) [hereinafter BYE
Handbook].
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A. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT
The Federal Crop Insurance Act (“The Act”) establishes an
insurance and reinsurance program whereby the holder of an insurance plan
is covered against “losses of the insured commodity... due to drought,
flood, or other natural disaster.”6 Through the USDA, the federal crop
insurance program is administered by the FCIC, a group that is also
established by the Act.7 For much of the history of federal crop insurance,
it was entirely administered by the FCIC, which acted as the primary
insurer.8 In recent years, however, there has been a shift towards a new
system, whereby federal crop insurance is not administered directly by the
FCIC. Instead, the FCIC acts as a reinsurer for private insurance
providers.9 Under this system, the eligibility of private insurance providers
and the terms of federal crop insurance policies are subject to approval by
the FCIC.10
The Act was passed in 1938 as part of the New Deal in an attempt
to help rejuvenate the state of American agriculture following the Great
Depression.11 The stated purpose of the Act is “to promote the national
welfare by improving the economic stability of agriculture through a sound
system of crop insurance and providing the means for the research and
experience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.” 12 The
6

7 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (2008).

7

7 U.S.C. § 1503 (2008).

8

U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Crop Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Reduce
Government Costs for Private-Sector Delivery 18-19 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter U.S.
GAO Report].
9

Christopher R. Kelley, The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000:
Federal Crop Insurance, The Non-Insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program, and
the Domestic Commodity and Other Farm Programs, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141,
143 (2001).
10

Id.

11

Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal
Crop Insurance Act, 185 A.L.R. Fed 419 (2003).
12

7 U.S.C.A. § 1502(a) (2008).
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Act, however, was unable to establish the prescribed “sound system of crop
insurance” as originally stated, resulting in several amendments to the Act
in the past century.13
A major problem with the originally-devised federal crop insurance
scheme was that incomplete and therefore ineffective coverage resulted.
Initially, wheat was the only crop insured under the Act and coverage was
geographically limited, thus, certain areas of the country were ineligible for
coverage.14 Thus, the program, as it was initially devised, created an
insurance system that was more costly than legislators and taxpayers
intended. Low participation led to an increase in premiums for the
participants and an increase in taxpayer contribution to the program.15 To
remedy the problem, numerous amendments were made to the program in
the following decades in order to increase coverage both in terms of
included crops and geographical scope.16 The hope was that these changes
would result in a more cost effective insurance program.
B. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM
TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION
Despite recognition that the success of federal crop insurance was
dependent upon high participation rates, by 1980, following the attempts to
improve the program, crop insurance was still only offered for thirty crops
in only one-half of the counties in the United States, and only 10% of the
eligible area was insured.17 Thus, it is not surprising that the USDA was
forced to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency loans during
the 1970s.18 In another attempt to improve federal crop insurance, the
13

David F. Rendahl, Comment, Federal Crop Insurance: Friend or Foe?, 4
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 185, 186 (1994).
14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. (stating that subsequent amendments to the Federal Crop Insurance Act
were enacted four times from 1949 to 1968).
17

Steffen N. Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Wasteland’: Defining a Justified Federal
Role in Crop Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505, 513.
18

Id.
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Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980 introduced more
government subsidies in order to promote the purchasing of insurance.19
Congress believed that if premiums were at least partially subsidized,
farmers would be more willing to participate in the program.20
While these changes did result in an expansion of the availability
and participation in the federal crop insurance program, the improvements
still resulted in only 25% participation within eligible acreage by 1988,
much lower than the 50% participation rate expected by Congress.21 Due
to the low participation, the federal government was again forced to pass
supplemental legislation to account for crop losses occurring from
disasters, which reached almost $5 billion for the years 1988-1989.22 In an
effort to continue to reduce these ex post payments, Congress passed the
Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 to further increase subsidization.23 In
fact, one way the 1994 revisions attempted to avoid making ad hoc
payments to uninsured farmers was by trying to remove the legal authority
to make such payments for a crop that is covered by the insurance.24
One of the most significant developments resulting from this
period of changes was the inclusion of private insurers in the insurance
program and an expansion of their role in the system.25 Rather than
administer insurance policies directly to producers, the USDA reinsures
private groups through the FCIC and the RMA. For the administration of
crop insurance policies, private companies that participate in the program
19

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179.

20

Johnson, supra note 17, at 514.

21

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179-1180. Coinciding with the increase in
participation was an increase in availability of federal crop insurance, as by the end
of the 1980s, some form of federal crop insurance could be obtained in all 50 states
and the number of insurable commodities increased by 70%. Johnson, supra note
17, at 515.
22

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179.

23

Id.

24

Johnson, supra note 17, at 519.

25

U.S. GAO, supra note 8, at 19.
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are paid a fee by the RMA.26 Furthermore, the private company and FCIC
share the underwriting gains, as well as the underwriting losses.27 Thus,
acting as a reinsurer can be greatly beneficial for the government, as they
can share the risks and potential losses of the crop insurance system and
avoid much of the responsibility for selling crop insurance programs
directly to farmers. As noted, however, by the United States General
Accounting Office, the relationship between the federal government and
private insurance companies has been an imperfect one, with the federal
government remaining responsible for significant losses.28
C. THE AGRICULTURAL RISK PROTECTION ACT OF 2000
Despite a large increase in the number of insured acres in the wake
of the 1994 amendments, from 83.7 million in 1993 to 220.5 million in
1995, further legislation was passed in 2000 to address the reductions in
participation and additional ex post payments were still required to cover
losses, which occurred throughout the later years of the decade.29 The
Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (“A.R.P.A.”) was passed in order
to further increase the subsidization of producers, as well as to implement
several other new practices.30 Two notable measures were adopted to
increase the ability and flexibility of the FCIC to adopt future measures
improving federal crop insurance.
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

See id. at 24, 29 (The GAO report details several examples of how the
federal government as a reinsurer is still taking on significant financial losses.
Between the years of 1990 and 1996, the federal government administered
$2,168,000,000 in reimbursements to private insurers, significantly higher than the
$528,000,000 earned by those private insurers in underwriting gains. Furthermore,
the administrative reimbursements made by the government to insurers is often in
excess of the administrative expenses of those insurers, thereby leaving the
government spending far more money than necessary. The GAO reports this
amount to be $38 million for the years of 1994 and 1995).
29

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179-1181.

30

Kelley, supra note 9, at 142-143.
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First, the A.R.P.A. provides for increased research and
development of new risk management tools.31 The FCIC was given the
authority to enter into contracts with private or public entities to advance
research and development targeting participation levels in federal crop
insurance.32 Additional objectives of the new provisions of the A.R.P.A.
were to “to allow producers to take preventative actions to increase end
product profitability and marketability and to reduce the possibility of crop
insurance claims,” “to develop a multifaceted approach to pest
management and fertilization to decrease inputs, decrease environmental
expose and increase applications efficiency,” and “to develop other risk
management tools to further increase economic and production stability.”33
A second significant inclusion in the A.R.P.A. is the authorization
of the FCIC to implement pilot programs.34 The FCIC can develop and
conduct pilot programs “to evaluate whether a proposal or new risk
management tool tested by the pilot program is suitable for the marketplace
and addresses the needs of producers of agricultural commodities.”35 The
types of issues that may be addressed through pilot programs vary greatly,
ranging from destruction of bees due to the use of pesticides to risks
associated with fruits, nuts, vegetables and specialty crops.36 Further, the
FCIC may implement programs that provide producers with reduced
premiums for using whole farm units or single crop units of insurance.37
The A.R.P.A. specifically prescribes a pilot program whereby approved
insurance providers may propose policies with reduced premium rates for
one or more agricultural commodities within a limited geographic area.38
31

7 U.S.C. §1522 (2008).

32

7 U.S.C. §1522(c)-(d) (2008).

33

7 U.S.C. §1522(d) (2008).

34

7 U.S.C. §1523 (2008).

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.
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Despite all of these attempts at improving federal crop insurance,
however, many of the problems that have plagued the program still persist.
In 2002, the costs of the program had tripled from the costs of 15 years
earlier.39 In the same year, Congress was still making supplemental
payments in order to recoup losses suffered during that year.40 Thus, even
though many changes have been made to the federal crop insurance
program improving some of the program’s shortcomings, there still is a
need for more improvements to the program to reduce the cost to taxpayers.
D. WHY DO FARMERS IN THE UNITED STATES NEED FEDERAL
CROP INSURANCE?
As evidenced by the effort put into the significant number of
amendments and the attempted improvements to federal crop insurance
over the past eighty years, and despite persistent problems, there are many
justifications for the government creating a successful crop insurance
program. A primary reason for a federal crop insurance program is the
importance of preventing American farmers from suffering substantial
losses that occur due to natural causes, such as weather, and unnatural
causes, such as market forces determining crop prices.41 Prevention of
these significant losses is necessary because they could threaten the
stability of a part of the American economy as well as of a significant food
source.42 Government programs, such as federal crop insurance, allow
farmers to reduce the cost of production, which subsequently has a positive
impact on all Americans, helping to lower the price of food.43
A second justification for federal crop insurance is the inability of
the private market to foster such a program.44 Insuring crops involves a
39

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1180.

40

Id.

41

Rendahl, supra note 13, at 186.

42

Id.

43

Galen E. Boerema, Comment, Turning Straw Into Gold: Federal
Securitization of Agricultural Commodities, 83 N.C. L. REV. 692-93 (2005).
44

U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 18-19.
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high degree of risk due to the unpredictability and high frequency of the
types of events that trigger crop losses.45 Severe weather, for example,
cannot be easily predicted or protected against by farmers and is a factor
that will affect a large number of producers. Due to the unpredictable
nature of losses insured against, such a program requires a substantial level
of participation in order to effectively spread the risk and consequently, the
costs.46 This feature can be much better addressed with a large, federal
system of crop insurance, rather than with a system of individual private
companies, each with separate and low participation rates. A further
consequence of the unpredictability of the risks involved with crop
insurance is the difficulty it creates when deciding on the cost of premiums.
In the lead up to the Federal Crop Insurance Act, the inability to determine
appropriate premium costs was cited as a significant failure of the
privatization of crop insurance and as reason for putting the system under
government control.47
Finally, as seen in the above discussion of the history of the
Federal Crop Insurance Act, because agriculture plays such a large role in
stability around the world, major losses will not go uncompensated. Thus,
without a high level of participation in some form of crop insurance there
will be a persistent need to administer ad hoc payments to farmers to
recover for losses that occur due to disasters.48 As pointed out by Steffen
Johnson, in the 1980s the federal government spent $19 billion on
emergency loans and disaster relief for farmers, more than tripling the
expense of federal crop insurance over that same period of time.49 Despite
45

Johnson, supra note 17, at 526.

46

Id.

47

Rendahl, supra note 13, at 187. The specific reasons given to President
Roosevelt that private companies could not administer crop insurance included:
“(1) The insurance was only offered in limited areas that did not sufficiently spread
the risk if there was a major crop failure; (2) The private companies tried to cover
losses from price declines, as well as crop failures, (3) The companies did not have
the capability to properly determine the degree of risk, so premiums were not
matched with the risk involved.” Id.
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Johnson, supra note 17, at 507.
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Id at 515-16.
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the increase in participation in crop insurance, however, these expenditures
are still prevalent, as in 2002 $2.1 billion was still spent in disaster
assistance to producers.50
II.

THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS
A. THE BIOTECH YIELD ENDORSEMENT

Beginning in the 2008 crop year, the USDA decided to make an
additional attempt at solving the lingering problems of federal crop
insurance by taking advantage of many of the mechanisms that were
established by earlier legislation, when it began the Biotech Yield
Endorsement (BYE). The BYE is a pilot program incorporating a
relationship with private industry groups. The program sought to bring
together the federal crop insurance system with the growing industry and
market for genetically modified seeds. Not an independent creation by the
USDA, the BYE came to fruition with the assistance of a prominent force
in the industry of genetically modified crops, the Monsanto Company.
Following two years of research, Monsanto presented the RMA with their
proposal and supporting data.51 The rationale supporting the program that
was presented by Monsanto, and accepted by the USDA, was that if a
farmer is planting a biotech hybrid, the farmer is doing so to reduce the risk
of crop loss and to increase yield amounts, so it is logical that the crop
insurance program should account for this risk-reducing practice.52 Thus,
for the first time, American farmers in the eligible states of Iowa, Indiana,
Illinois and Minnesota benefited, through the federal crop insurance
system, for planting seeds containing specific traits developed by the
biotechnology industry.53
Since the BYE is a pilot program, which by its nature will be
restricted in several ways through the Federal Crop Insurance Act, it is also
50

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1183.
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Peter Shinn, USDA Approves Unique Biotech Corn Insurance Policy,
BROWNFIELD AG NEWS, Sept. 27, 2007.
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Id.
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BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 1.
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limited in several other regards. First, the program did not apply to all
agricultural commodities, only non-irrigated corn for grain.54 Further, in
the unit of corn acreage which is to be insured, it is required that 75 percent
of the acreage planted be non-irrigated corn of a qualifying hybrid.55
Second, the producer seeking to take advantage of the BYE must
also have a certain type of crop insurance policy. In general, there are two
categories of coverage that are administered: yield-based and revenuebased.56 In yield-based insurance programs, the insurance policy and losses
are framed around the amount or value of a producers’ total expected
yield.57 In revenue-based insurance programs, producers insure an amount
of expected revenue, rather than yield. Under the BYE, three specific
policies are eligible for the program: Actual Production History (APH),
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assistance (RA) plans of
insurance.58
In order to understand how these specific plans function, it is
helpful to understand the general model by which federal crop insurance
operates. A participant in the program selects an amount of yield or
revenue to be guaranteed.59 If the production at the end of the harvest
results in less than the guaranteed amount, then the insured participant is
indemnified for the difference between the production and guarantee,
which is calculated in a form dependent upon the insurance plan.60
APH policies are yield-based and apply to losses in yield due to the
causes permitted by the FCIA.61 Thus, the indemnity given in the event of
54

Id. at 4.

55

Id.
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Kelley, supra note 9, at 144.

57

Id.
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BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at Exhibit 2.

59

Rendahl, supra note 13, at 188-89.

60

Id. For an example of how a payment is calculated for federal crop
insurance. See id.
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U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., Crop Policies http://www/rma.usda.gov/policies/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2008).
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loss is based on the selected amount of average yield insured and the price
at which the crop is insured, wherein the average yield can be determined
by examining at the insured’s historical yield productions.62 In contrast,
CRC and RA plans are both revenue-based plans. CRC insures revenue by
compensating for losses below the guaranteed average gross farm revenue,
which is based on the higher of an early season price or harvest price.63 In
RA plans, the producer is covered for a pre-selected target revenue
typically between 65 and 75 percent of the total expected revenue.64
A third limitation in the BYE is that the qualifying hybrids are
restricted to those containing combinations of specific traits. As a result of
the Monsanto Company’s role in developing the BYE, all of the traits that
qualify farmers for the premium reduction, YieldGard® Rootworm,
YieldGard® Corn Borer, and Roundup Ready® Corn 2, are produced by
the company.65 YieldGard® Rootworm is designed to protect corn roots
from various species of rootworm.66 The touted benefits of this feature are
increased nutrient uptake from the soil and decreased need for sprayed
insecticide.67 The second trait, YieldGard® Corn Borer, targets the corn
borer insect, which attacks the corn stalk.68 It carries with it many of the
potential benefits also possessed by YieldGard® Rootworm. The final
trait, Roundup Ready, unlike the previous two products, is an herbicide,
intended to provide protection from weeds throughout the growing

62

Id.

63

Id.; see also Kelley, supra note 9, at 144.

64

U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., supra note 61.
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BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at Exhibit 2.
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Monsanto Company, YieldGard Rootworm, http://www.monsanto.com
/monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/yieldgard_rootworm.asp#features
(last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
67
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Id.

Monsanto Company, YieldGard Corn Borer, http://www.monsanto.com/
monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/yieldgard_corn_borer.asp (last visited
Oct. 15, 2008).
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season.69 In order to be eligible for the BYE premium reduction, the hybrid
seeds planted by the producer must include one of the aforementioned
traits, or a combination thereof. Although they use different mechanisms to
achieve their goal, the traits are all designed to increase crop yields.
B. THE PILOT BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENT
In August of 2008, however, it was announced that the BYE
program would be modified in order to expand the geographic scope of the
program, the eligible seed hybrids, and to include specific insurance
providers.70 Renamed the “Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement”, premium
reductions were made available to farmers in Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
South Dakota, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Nebraska, in addition the original
four states.71 The number of participating seed producers also increased, as
hybrid seeds produced by Pioneer/Dow AgroSciences, LLC, and Sygenta
Seeds, Inc., will also be eligible to those traits manufactured by
Monsanto.72 Depending on the state and the seed variety, the program also
expands coverage for both irrigated and non-irrigated corn.73 Thus, the
program that started as a four-year pilot program in only four states will
soon see a great expansion as the USDA’s support for biotech hybrid seeds
in agriculture continues to grow.

69

Monsanto Company, Roundup Ready Corn 2 available at
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/ag_products/input_traits/products/roundup_r
eady_corn_2.asp.
70

U.S. DEPT. AGRIC, FCIC BOARD EXTENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY PILOT
COVERAGE AREAS AND QUALIFYING HYBRIDS, (Aug. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.rma.usda.gov/news/2008/08/fcicbiotech.html.
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U.S. Dept. Agric., Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement Insurance Standards
Handbook 2009 and Succeeding Crop Years 1 (2008) (available at
http://www/rma.usda.gov/ handbooks/20000/2009/20110.pdf) [hereinafter Pilot
BE Handbook].
72

Id.

73

Id.

2009] CROP INSURANCE IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 509
III.

HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS CAN IMPACT
DECISION-MAKING IN AGRICULTURE

In order to determine the likely impact on U.S. agriculture of a
crop insurance policy that endorses biotechnology based farming, one must
first examine whether a program of this nature will effectively alter the
habits of American farmers. One way in which the biotechnology
endorsements could have an impact is by attempting to increase
participation rates in the federal crop insurance program. An additional
possible effect of biotechnology endorsements is a shift in seed selection by
farmers towards those that carry lower insurance premiums, which in turn
could lead to higher crop yields.
As discussed above, it has long been a goal of federal crop
insurance reform to increase participation in the program.74 Lower
participation in the crop insurance program has resulted in increasing
program costs.75 Thus, one manner in which the success of the
biotechnology endorsements can be measured is by the increasing number
of farmers who purchase crop insurance associated with the BYE premium
reductions.
There is a potential market share of uninsured crop growers who
could be influenced by a biotechnology specific insurance plan. As of
2003, federal crop insurance had an eighty percent participation rate, thus
leaving one-fifth of farmers uninsured.76 In comparison, according to the
National Agricultural Statistics Survey in 2008 eighty percent of the corn
planted in the United States was of a biotech variety.77 Therefore, given
the fact that an overwhelming majority of farms are planting biotech crops,
it is likely that there is an overlap of these farmers with the 20% of farmers
who have not yet purchased insurance. The probability that many of the
uninsured farmers in the U.S. are planting genetically modified seeds is
high. This group, already utilizing biotechnology generated seeds, may be

74

See discussion infra Part I.B.
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Glauber, supra note 3, at 1179.
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Nat’l Agric. Statistical. Serv., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Acreage 24 (2008).
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induced to buy crop insurance centered around biotechnology premium
reductions.
Several factors influence the decision to purchase crop insurance
policies. One particular study by Makki and Somwaru found that the most
important factors influencing the decision included premium rate, the level
of risk, the availability of new revenue insurance products, the level of
subsidy, and the design of the contract.78 Additional studies have also
found many of these factors to be pertinent to the decision to purchase
federal crop insurance, in addition to other factors.79
The biotechnology endorsements incorporate many of these
factors. Most notably, the endorsements will address premium rates. The
primary element of the endorsements is to reduce premiums based on the
use of the specified products. This directly impacts the cost of federal crop
insurance for farmers. By decreasing the premium rate, defined as the total
premium cost by total liability, the program positively influences a farmers’
decision to participate in federal crop insurance.80 Furthermore, given the
prominence of biotechnology in agriculture in the U.S., an overwhelming
majority of farmers could immediately benefit from this premium
reduction.
Additionally, when considering the relationship between the cost of
a farmer’s premium and the farmer’s corresponding risk of loss, the
endorsements address a general inequity facing farmers in making their
crop insurance decisions. Generally, farmers who are low risk pay higher
insurance premiums relative to higher risk insureds.81 This is because
premium prices are determined by the average risk of the entire insurance
78

Shiva S. Makki & Agapi Somwaru, Farmers’ Participation in Crop
Insurance Markets: Creating the Right Incentives, 83 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 662,
664 (2004).
79

See Bruce J. Sherrick et al., Factors Influencing Farmers’ Crop Insurance
Decisions, 86 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 103, 103 (2004) (citing several studies that
have examined factors relating to the purchase of crop insurance and citing as
relevant factors: “costs and returns of insurance, yield and other business risks,
financial risks, farm size, enterprise and other forms of diversification, coverage
levels, and relationships to adverse selection and moral hazard”).
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pool, and not targeted to the specific level of risk that farmer carries.82 By
incorporating both high and low risks into an insurance pool and requiring
an average premium, insurance companies are effectively spreading risk
and the cost of insuring those risks. Naturally, this creates an entry barrier
for low or lower risk farmers to the insurance pool and thus to federal crop
insurance programs.83 A solution to that problem is a crop insurance policy
that lowers the premium cost on the basis of the nature of the crop. While
it may not properly take into account all of the risks that differ between the
use of genetically modified crops and non-genetically modified crops, the
type of premium rate allocation seen in the endorsements does, to some
extent, encourage low-risk farmers to purchase crop insurance.
Despite the fact that the endorsements present several reasons that
would seem to increase participation in federal crop insurance, there are
other indicators that suggest the opposite could occur, or that no change in
participation would result. A second of the factors found relevant by
Makki and Somwaru that is addressed by the biotech endorsements is the
level of risk.84 Biotech crops are designed to increase yield. Accordingly,
because of the genetically enhanced traits, there is less risk of loss and
consequently, it is less likely that a farmer needs indemnification.
In a study by Sherrick et alia, the attributes of those who do and do
not own crop insurance were examined.85 The study compared owners of
crop insurance policies to those without crop insurance. It found that those
without policies believed they would not need indemnity payments for loss
in crop yields.86 Based on this study, farmers who use biotech crops, and
who therefore perceive themselves as low risk, are less inclined to possess,
or purchase, crop insurance precisely because of their use of the genetically
enhanced crops. The biotech farmer probably has greater confidence that
the harvest is less susceptible to external stresses that could potentially
82

Id.

83

Id.
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Id. at 663 (The authors measure the “level of risk” by looking at loss
frequency and the probability of yield or revenue falling below the guaranteed
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diminish yields. Consequently, by using biotech seeds as a way to reduce
the risk of losses, a producer may find it unnecessary to insure against
losses.87 It has been found that where producers use mechanisms other
than crop insurance to reduce the risks of loss, it leads to a reduction in
participation in the federal crop insurance program.88
On the other hand, this particular finding may also suggest that
those who use biotech crops subject to premium reductions will be included
among those who are not currently participating in the program. This is
because non-participants are less likely to believe they will suffer losses
requiring payment; and presumably, biotech crop growers are also less
likely than those who do not grow biotech crops to believe they will suffer
losses, given the trait enhancements in biotech crops. If it is a goal of the
biotechnology endorsements to increase participation in the federal crop
insurance program, it is possible that the premium reductions are welltargeted towards a group in need of additional incentives to purchase
insurance. Ultimately, whether a non-participant is induced to purchase
crop insurance will come down to deciding if the cost of the premium is
less than the amount of indemnities that can be expected; therefore, it is
logical to lower the premium for a group targeted for potential participation
increases.89
Furthermore, the Sherrick et alia. study found that those who
participated in the federal crop insurance program had higher expected
yields than those who did not participate.90 One of the general principles
supporting the use of genetically modified crops is that it will lead to higher
yields because of their crops increased resistance to natural stresses, such
as insects, weeds, and weather. Therefore, this seems to indicate that those
farmers using biotech crops are more likely to own crop insurance and are
thus less likely to be among the non-participants that can be induced by a
biotechnology endorsement to purchase federal crop insurance.;
87

Glauber, supra note 3, at 1180 (discussing why crop insurance participation
remained low due to adverse selection and farmers using risk-management
strategies).
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With respect to the remaining factors effecting crop insurance
purchasing decisions cited by Makki and Somwaru, the endorsements have
a less significant impact on incentives for purchasing crop insurance. The
endorsements apply to Actual APH, CRC, or RA plans of insurance.91
None of these three insurance products are completely subsidized, a factor
for which consumers of crop insurance have a preference.92 However, the
availability of revenue-based insurance, as opposed to yield-based
insurance, was one of the most prominent factors cited.93
As evidenced by the inquiries into which factors have an impact on
a farmers’ decision to purchase federal crop insurance, the potential impact
a biotechnology endorsement could have on increasing participation is not
clear. By lowering the cost of a crop insurance policy, it is likely that the
biotechnology endorsements will persuade some to participate in the
federal crop insurance program. However, as the studies show, it is not at
all clear how many of the twenty percent of uninsured producers will be
effected by this decision.
Regardless of the ability of the biotechnology endorsements to
persuade non-participants to join the federal crop insurance program, there
is another way in which this program could directly impact the affordability
of the program. It has been suggested that a farmers’ decision of what crop
to grow is related to crop insurance policies.94 If a crop insurance policy is
far more favorable with respect to one crop versus another, the farmer is
more likely to plant the crop with the more favorable insurance policy.95 If
this were to occur as a result of biotechnology endorsements, there could be
an increase in the use of genetically modified seeds. The most obvious
economic consequence of using genetically modified seeds is increased
yields due to decreased crop loss. Accordingly, there would be a
diminished need for indemnifications or supplemental payments to be
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given for crop losses.96 Thus, by creating a shift to biotech varieties of
certain crops, the biotechnology endorsements could reduce the cost of
administering the federal crop insurance by reducing the amount of crops
that are lost as a result of weather, pests and other factors mitigated by
genetically enhanced crops.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIOTECHNOLOGY
ENDORSEMENTS IN CROP INSURANCE AND RECENT
SHORTCOMINGS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING

Although its success has been deemed necessary by both
lawmakers and farmers in the U.S., agricultural policymaking is generally
deficient in several regards. Many of the policies that are instituted are
economically inefficient. In addition, promoting agriculture has often
meant that environmental concerns are ignored. This section addresses
these issues and how the biotechnology endorsements could follow similar
patterns.
A. COMPARING THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS WITH THE
ECONOMIC SHORTCOMINGS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY
MAKING
In examining the impact of the biotechnology endorsements, it is
worth examining the nature of the relationship between large agricultural
corporations, such as those producing the genetically modified seeds at
issue, and the farmers who use those products. There has been a shift in
U.S. agriculture policy that favors corporate agriculture rather than the
contributions of rural farmers.97 The cause of this shift lies in several
harmful effects from subsidization.
First, corporations receive more funds from the farm bills than
smaller farmers.98 Subsidization payments, such as those implemented
96

Shiva S. Makki et al., Biotechnology in Agriculture: Implications for FarmLevel Risk Management, 19 J. AGRIBUSINESS 51, 56-7 (2001).
97

Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 345, 360 (2006). The author further explains how these policies have been
devastating to American rural farmers and the notion of the “family farm.” Id. at
357-359.
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Id. at 369.
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under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, are typically
tied to the amount and type of commodity produced.99 Because of this
method of distribution, statistics like those from 1997 illustrate that the
largest six percent of farms in the U.S. received 43% percent of the money
available for farm support.100 Furthermore, as Boerema discusses, more
profitable farmers receive a greater benefit from subsidization than less
profitable farmers who have a greater need for it.101 While profitable
farmers are able to keep or spend their subsidies, less profitable farmers are
forced to use their subsidies to repay loans, which as a result of poor credit
and low profitability carry a much higher interest rate than those for the
profitable farmer.102 As a result, “a federal subsidy can actually accelerate
the demise of the very farmers it is intended to protect.”103
Second, the use of subsidies has also become an inefficient and
ineffective way to improve the status of rural farmers and stabilize
agricultural production.104 Subsidies are administered for specific crop
types, which ultimately renders the subsidy ineffective. This is because the
subsidized crops lead to immense and unnecessary surpluses of those
crops.105 Rather than help the farmers, farmers have to sell these
oversupplied crops at lower prices, which in turn leads to a further need for
subsidies and the continuation of this cycle.106 Thus, even though it is
asserted that subsidizing agriculture is necessary in order for U.S. farmers
to compete on a global scale, the subsidies have resulted in inefficiencies
and have benefited large farmers disproportionately to others.107
99
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Although offering a lower crop insurance premium is by no means
equivalent to a subsidy, biotechnology endorsements are in some ways
similar to these unsuccessful agricultural policies. In fact, one of the ways
Congress attempted to increase participation in the federal crop insurance
program during the 1990s was by subsidizing premium payments.108 Even
though this type of subsidization is more beneficial than typical subsidies,
it also is a likely contributor to the fact that the cost of federal crop
insurance program grew during that decade.109 Another similarity is that if
the crop premium reductions are given for only a few seed varieties and
those seed varieties increase in prevalence, it could lead to similar
overproduction that arose from subsidization. As stated earlier, crop
insurance policies that are far more favorable to one crop in comparison to
other crops have been shown to lead farmers towards production of the
specified crop.110 Furthermore, the biotechnology endorsements favor one
group of farmers over another, as only those who plant biotech varieties
will be able to receive the benefits of the programs.
Additionally, if the crop insurance program favors only a few seed
varieties from a few producers, it could lead to a similar shift of corporate
favoritism. In the first year of the BYE, some farmers were unhappy with
the apparent favoritism the program shown toward Monsanto. When the
program was announced, the National Farmers Union came out with a
special order of business that stated:
WHEREAS, the purpose of the Federal Crop
Insurance Program is to provide appropriate and affordable
crop insurance to all producers, regardless of size,
equipment of technology, THEREFORE, BE IT
RESOLVED, National Farmers Union opposes RMA’s
approval of the pilot program which allows discounts
based upon the use of specific crop genetics. The approval
of the BYE pilot program is an endorsement by RMA of
Monsanto’s triple-stack genetically traited corn and it does
not take into effect other technologies or Best Management

108
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Practices. THESEFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,
National Farmers Union calls for an immediate
congressional oversight hearings to investigate the
continuation of the BYE pilot program and future RMA
partnerships with specific companies on crop genetics for
federal crop insurance premium discounts.111
Thus, there is a tension amongst farmers regarding whether the
crop insurance premium reductions are actually intended to favor them or
the biotech seed companies. Although the second year of the program will
involve seed manufacturers other than Monsanto, and some of the National
Farmers Unions fears of lack of competition may be alleviated, the
potential for disparately impacting farmers and seed manufacturers, or at
least the appearance of such a disparate impact, is a factor that must be
taken into account when establishing this type of federal crop insurance
program.
B. COMPARING THE BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS WITH THE
ENVIRONMENTAL SHORTCOMINGS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY
MAKING
As genetically modified agricultural products have gained
prominence around the world, they have presented a number of
environmental concerns. Furthermore, it has been suggested that these
crops will cause unforeseen harms to other species in the ecosystem in
which they are used.112 For example, it was suggested that a genetically
modified crop, such as those covered by the BYE and Pilot Biotechnology
Endorsement, that was engineered to protect against crop destroying pests
increased mortality in monarch butterfly larvae in comparison to those
larvae eating non-modified crops.113 However, these specific findings have
been challenged, and several studies have in fact found the genetically
111
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induced toxin was not more toxic to the monarch butterflies.114 Several
other environmental consequences have been noted. It has been suggested
that these crops will damage soil ecosystems and increase the use of
chemicals such as pesticides, which in turn has harmful environmental and
health effects.115 An additional problem that could arise from the use of
pest and weed resistant varieties of biotech crops, such as those involved in
the current biotechnology endorsement, is an increase in resistance by pests
and weeds.116 The use of certain biotech crops, over the long-term, has
been found to induce resistance in the pests it seeks to prevent from
destroying the crops. 117 Similar results have been found with certain
chemicals created by crops genetically modified for increased resistance
against weeds.118
However, accompanying all of these potential
environmental threats is an element of doubt as to their probability.119
Another environmental problem is the threat of gene flow from
genetically modified crops to wild plants in the surrounding ecosystem.
Gene flow occurs when the genetic material from one organism or group of
organisms is transferred and incorporated into the genetic material of
another group of organisms.120 Gene flow is a natural process and is
difficult to prevent in plants, as seeds or pollen can travel by many different
mechanisms to other plant varieties.121 If this were to occur with
genetically modified plants, it could have severe consequences for the
surrounding ecosystems. Wild plants could take on the genetically
114
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enhanced traits, making certain plants much weedier or more resistant to
natural threats, also reducing biodiversity.122 While it is uncertain whether
the genetically modified traits, which are specifically designed for
agriculture, will persist in wild plant species, gene flow between
genetically modified and wild plant species is one of the most significant
environmental threats posed by genetically modified crops.123 Not only
could this potentially harm the environment by reducing biodiversity and
giving normal plants the genetically modified traits, but it also creates a
potential liability problem for the farmers originally using the genetically
modified crops. If the genetic material were to escape into neighboring
farms, it could ruin others crops, leaving the user of the genetically
modified crop liable for damages.124
The way that the U.S. has addressed these environmental concerns
has different greatly from the regulatory approach of other countries. The
U.S. has taken an approach that views the risks of genetically modified
organisms with less caution. When the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development met in Brazil in 1992, it created the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, a set of principles that
would guide future international environmental regimes.125 Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration sets forth the precautionary approach as the guiding
principle in assessing environmental risks, stating that “[i]n order to protect
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”126 Thus, even if the potential harms presented by genetically
modified organisms (GMO) are not proven with scientific certainty, steps
can be taken to prevent those potential harms. The precautionary principle
has been incorporated in the Convention on Biological Diversity and the
122
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The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874.
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Id. at 879.
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, both of which govern much of the
international use of GMOs.127
In contrast to the approach of the international community, the U.S.
has taken a much different approach to assessing the environmental impact
of GMOs.128 U.S. regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the USDA, strive for scientific certainty before
taking regulatory action regarding GMOs.129 This approach allows for
fewer restrictions on GMOs in the absence of hard scientific evidence that
they cause environmental harms. As the USDA has taken this approach
over the years, it has provided for a lesser regulatory burden on biotech
crops and some have theorized that this relaxed approach to regulation is
inadequate in ensuring products are environmentally safe before they enter
the market.130 According to some, as a result of the standards exercised by
the U.S. in crafting agricultural policy, the environmental concerns
presented by farming have not been adequately addressed.131 The USDA
itself admitted the failure of their agricultural procedures, as it released a
report in 2005 stating that they had failed to monitor whether biotech crops
127

The Preamble of the Convention of Biological Diversity states: “Noting
also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological
diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.” Convention on
Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1762 31 I.L.M. 822. In the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety there are two inclusions of the precautionary principle. The preamble
reaffirms “the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration.” Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027.. Annex III states, “Lack of scientific
knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as
indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk.” Id.
at annex III.
128

Jessica McDonald, Note, Precautionary Pioneer Evades Biotech Giant?
Beyond the Cartagena Protocol: The EU Offers the World a Model, 8 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 157, 164-171.
129

Id. at 167.

130

Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 767-776 (2003).
131

Morrow, supra note 97, at 362.

2009] CROP INSURANCE IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 521
were segregated, that during field tests they failed to test for contamination
in the surrounding environment, and that they failed to meet shipping,
storage, and disposal standards designed to prevent crops that were not
approved from being dispersed.132 Although the precautionary approach
taken by the international community may be considered overly cautious,
the U.S. regulatory response to genetically modified organisms has been
one in which the potential environmental harms of the organisms are
underestimated relative to the international approach.133 But considering
the fact the USDA has decided to use federal crop insurance as a way of
promoting the use of biotech agriculture, it does not appear that they are
easing support of GMOs.
However, others argue that genetically modified crops may
actually benefit the environment. The majority of scientists believe that the
use of genetically modified agriculture has resulted in a decrease in
pesticide use and a shift towards less toxic herbicides.134 In turn, this could
lead to less water contamination, improved health for farmers, and
improved biodiversity.135
A different environmental problem would arise from the
biotechnology endorsements if they were to result in overproduction of
certain biotech crops. As mentioned earlier, subsidies have led to
overproduction of certain crops in the past.136 Not only is this practice
harmful economically, but it also reduces biodiversity and increases
chemical use.137 Although biotech crops seek to reduce chemical use,
biodiversity is an important environmental contributor to agriculture.138
132

Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to
Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 415
(2007).
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See Caplan, supra note 112, at 758-68.
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HUNTER, ET AL. supra note 116, at 1061.
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See supra text accompanying notes 104-107.
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However, as subsidization has shown, when only a few different crops are
grown, it will have harmful environmental consequences.139 This practice
reduces crop variety and biodiversity, which ultimately makes crops more
susceptible to harms such as those posed by pests.140 Further, production of
a select number of crops can also lead to poor usage of land and
dependence on certain chemicals.141
V.

HOW TO ADVANCE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE IN THE
AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM SHOULD OFFER
LOWER PREMIUMS FOR FARMER WHO USE BIOTECH CROPS

There are several significant points to take from the discussion of
the federal crop insurance program and the biotechnology endorsements.
First, it is an important goal of the federal crop insurance program to
increase participation in the program, which in turn should make it more
cost effective.142 Second, although premiums will be reduced for farmers
who plant certain crops generated by biotechnology, which are widespread,
it is uncertain if a biotechnology endorsement could induce additional
participation in the federal crop insurance program.143 Finally, in addition
to the simple notion that genetically modified crops increase crop yield,
there are numerous economic and environmental mistakes that have been
made by agriculture policymakers in the past that should be avoided when
the biotechnology endorsements are implemented.144
In light of all of those considerations, the biotechnology
endorsement still appears to be a necessary step in beginning the movement
towards tailoring crop insurance to biotech crop growers. It does not make
139

Id.

140

Id.
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Id.
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See discussion infra supra Parts IA-IC.
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See discussion infra supra Part III.

144

See discussion infra supra Parts IV.
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sense that two individuals, one carrying less risk of loss than another,
should contribute the same amount in premiums for federal crop
insurance.145 As is the case with other types of insurance, if one individual
is more likely to need an indemnity payment than another person is, then he
or she typically should have to pay a higher premium.146 A biotechnology
endorsement could be a step towards shifting the disparate payment scheme
of the federal crop insurance program, whereby the farmers with higher
risk pay relatively lower premiums compared to those with lower risk.147
Even if these endorsements are insufficient to lead to a significant increase
in participation in the federal crop insurance program, the biotechnology
endorsements will at least make crop insurance policies more affordable for
eighty percent of U.S. farmers.148
B. THE CONCERNS TO BE MONITORED IN ADMINISTERING A
BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENT
Despite the potential for lower premium costs, there are a number
of concerns that are brought up by the biotechnology endorsements that can
be monitored while carrying out this pilot program in order to avoid these
problems in the future. The most notable problem that the new
biotechnology endorsements will present is that of adverse selection. As a
result of the numerous insurance options and a lack of actuarial
information, farmers are able to “adversely select the option that maximizes
their net return.”149 In contrast to more typical forms of insurance, crop
insurance needs to have an extensive period of data collection that it can
rely on to establish an economically sound program.150 Because the
biotechnology endorsement is a new program, there are not going to be
very much actuarial data initially, thus making it more difficult to
145

Makki and Somwaru, supra note 78, at 666.
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150

Id. at 1185.

524

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

accurately project yields and proper premium payments in advance.
Considering that the FCIC still has difficulty finding proper ways to
calculate risks and yields for the non-biotech crops that have always been
covered by the federal crop insurance program, it is reasonable to believe
that there will be difficulties insuring a commodity for the first time.151
The problem of actuarial soundness and adverse selection becomes
more difficult to asses when also considering how widespread the use of
biotech crops is and the differences in yield that occur in different regions.
The assertion that the use of a biotech crop results in higher yields is not
always true, because yields vary from location to location.152 In some
locations, a certain pest may not be a factor in reducing yields.153 Thus, a
crop that is genetically modified to express one trait may greatly increase
survival in one area of the country, but may have little impact in another.154
All of this information would have to be taken into consideration before
applying blanket premium reductions to those who use GMOs, including
the ability of each of the many GMOs that can be used. Otherwise, there
would still be some producers who are paying a higher premium than those
taking on higher risks.
An additional problem posed by biotechnology endorsements that
should be examined given the effects of some U.S. agricultural policies is
whether or not the lowering of premiums will benefit all farmers, including
rural farmers and farmers who do not plant genetically modified seeds. As
stated earlier, U.S. agricultural policies have a history of not spreading
benefits equally among agriculturalists.155 On its face, the biotechnology
endorsements only help the farmers who plant qualifying biotech seed
varieties and the companies who produce those seeds. If this is the case,
then small farmers who do not plant these seeds could continue to be
marginalized by U.S. agricultural policies.156
151
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Solving this problem could be difficult, given that the typical
solution to aiding struggling farmers is through subsidies, which create
problems in their own right.157 A theoretical worst case scenario that is
derived from insurance programs such as the biotechnology endorsements
is that non-biotech farmers are over time less competitive with biotech
farmers, and are either placed out of business or are forced to join the
biotech farmers and buy seeds from biotech companies. While there could
be a market of consumers who prefer non-biotech crops to those that have
been genetically engineered, the lack of a requirement in the U.S. that
goods be labeled as biotech or not makes this difficult.158
Many of the other risks and increased costs biotech crops bring
could be borne by those who do not even use the biotech crops. Makki et
alia suggest that in order for growers to maintain their crops status as “nonbiotech,” it will require increased management and segregation costs in an
agricultural world that becomes more dominated by biotech varieties.159
These segregation costs are incurred in both transporting and storing the
seeds.160 How federal crop insurance will address this factor, or if it will be
able to adequately contemplate this factor, is uncertain.
Another problem that could be created by a biotechnology
endorsement is that it could pose a threat to biodiversity. While this
problem is hardly new to the field of agriculture, the biotechnology
endorsement certainly does not help solve the problem.161 Many of the
qualifying hybrids for the program have the same general traits, and in
some cases combine the traits into a single hybrid.162 The consequences of
this homogeneity could be severe if the worst case scenario for pest or
weed resistance were to occur.
Furthermore, despite the probability that biotech crops would
increase crop yields, there are a number of additional economic risks that
157
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they present. First, although yields may increase and overall profits may
see a corresponding increase, there are a number of additional costs that go
into using genetically-modified crops. Biotech seeds are generally more
expensive than natural seeds because of the research and development costs
that seed companies seek to make back.163 It is also unclear whether or not
in certain situations a farmer using a biotech crop variety will need to
purchase more chemicals.164 Although one would think fewer chemicals
should be used if the crop is engineered to protect against the same threats,
this has not been entirely the case, as many seed companies require a
treatment regimen to go with the use of their seeds, which in many cases
has increased the use of herbicides.165 Use of genetically-modified crops
also requires farmers to keep a certain percentage of their crops a nonbiotech variety, for reasons which will be explained in the next section.166
This in turn imposes a number of additional costs on farmers, such as the
costs of keeping seeds and crops segregated so that the two crop varieties
do not mix.167
If crop insurance is to be revised for biotech crops, the
consequences of contaminating neighboring non-biotech crops should also
be taken into account. However, this becomes problematic when
attempting to accurately project how often this would occur and what the
damages of such an occurrence would be. There is little evidence that
conclusively indicates the likelihood of such an event, making it difficult to
factor into a crop insurance policy. However, if this possibility is not taken
into account, farmers who do not use biotech crops could be the ones who
suffer, instead of those who do use the biotechnology.
Another complicated factor that would have to be taken into
consideration when attempting to establish insurance premiums for biotech
163

Makki et al., supra note 96 at 55. The authors state that for certain biotech
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crops is how to account for those who switch from biotech varieties to nonbiotech varieties, or vice versa.168 As explained above, one of the main
factors in establishing insurance premiums for some types of insurance,
including those included in the BYE and Pilot Biotechnology Endorsement,
base the amount of coverage on the farmer’s yield history.169 This creates
an inherent problem when a farmer who formerly used a non-biotech seed
variety begins using biotech varieties, as such farmers would be offered
yield contracts which guarantee payments for yield levels based on
previous non-biotech variety yields. In this case, farmers may find the
expected value of such a contract to be lower than their willingness to pay
for the contracts. Furthermore, the increased yield differentials can alter
farms’ risk classification, which increases the cost of insurance to biotech
crop producers.170
If the problem in this case is caused by a wide differential between
annual yields, it can then be inferred that this problem could arise not only
when shifting from non-biotech to biotech varieties, but also when there is
a switch from one biotech variety to another that is more effective at
increasing yield.
The final element that makes the biotechnology endorsements
difficult to administer is the problem of moral hazard. Moral hazard “is the
susceptibility of actual yields to the influence of producer actions...or
inactions,” making it difficult to determine the reason for a farmers yield
reduction.171 Seed producers often have a variety of additional instructions
that must be followed when planting biotech crops.172 The increase in
procedures also present increased options for a farmer to not follow the
procedures, leading to crop losses from a cause that crop insurance is not
intended to cover. Therefore, in order to avoid making payments for crop
losses that are “voluntary,” there would have to be increased supervision of
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the practices of the farmers who are participating in the biotechnology
endorsements.173
Therefore, while the biotechnology endorsement is a beneficial
model for the federal crop insurance program with respect to improving the
insurance premiums of the farmers who plant genetically modified seeds, it
is not a perfect model. Because of the number of different factors that
could play into the implementation of such a crop insurance program, it is
crucial that the biotechnology endorsements serve as tools for monitoring
the pros and cons of lowering crop insurance premiums for biotech crops.
If this program, and future programs established by the FCIC are created
for the primary benefit of corporate agriculture without an eye to the
impact on rural farmers and the environment, then the consequences will be
severe enough to outweigh the insurance premium savings.
C. THE BENEFITS OF USDA PILOT PROGRAMS SERVING AS A
MODEL FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY ENDORSEMENTS
The current pilot program system implemented by the USDA
should serve as a beneficial way of phasing in lower premiums for biotech
crops for several reasons. The first attribute of the current biotechnology
endorsements that makes it a good model for beginning to phase biotech
crops into the federal crop insurance program is its status as a pilot
program. This is beneficial in several regards. First, it is not a permanent
program, but it only will last until 2011, pursuant to statutory prohibitions
on a pilot program lasting more than four years.174 Because the program is
unprecedented and because there are a number of questions and doubts
about some of the impacts of the program, it is important that a permanent
program is not established prior to obtaining more knowledge about the
impact of such a program. If it is proven that after a period of time, the
environmental consequences of increased use in biotech crops or the
economic consequences of endorsing specific agricultural products make
lower crop insurance premiums for biotech crops inadvisable, the program

173
174

Johnson, supra note 17, at 529.

BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 1; 7 U.S.C.A. § 1523(a)(4)(B) (2008).
However, the program can be extended beyond that date or cancelled earlier than
that date by the FCIC. 7 U.S.C. § 1523(a)(4)(C) (2008).
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can be cancelled and the previous federal crop insurance programs can be
reinstated.
Additionally, as can be seen by the transition from the 2008 to
2009 growing seasons, the current structure of the biotechnology
endorsements has allowed for reviewing of the program in order to
determine how it can be improved. For example, one of the weaknesses of
the first year of the program was that only a few seed varieties produced by
Monsanto were covered. Although the reason for only including these
seeds could be justified (as Monsanto was the only company that had
contributed data that their seeds would increase yield,) by only
incorporating this one company in the process, it presents the appearance of
favoritism and, if the program were to be successful in influencing farmers’
choices in seed selection, would give Monsanto a huge advantage over
their competitors. However, because the program is constantly reviewed
and closely scrutinized by the USDA, after the first year, this deficiency
could be improved by covering the seeds of other companies. It is in this
fashion that similar improvements can be made from year to year based on
the problems that are observed. Because the program includes a great deal
of monitoring of the farmers who participate, there is great potential to find
weaknesses in the coverage or consequences of using the biotech crops that
can be taken into account with future crop insurance policy decisions.175
Although the future of the federal crop insurance program is far
from clear, what does appear to be certain is that crops generated by
biotechnology have become a significant part of U.S. agriculture and will
continue to grow. In order for the federal crop insurance program to
remain relevant and actuarially sound, it will have to accommodate these
changes in farming practices coinciding with changes in technologies. By
implementing pilot programs that exercise caution as premiums begin to be
reduced for biotech crops, the USDA has established a system where they
can monitor the impacts of the new policies and hopefully avoid the pitfalls
of previous crop insurance regimes and agricultural policies.

175

See BYE HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 27-37 for a discussion of spotchecks of randomly selected policies.
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RACE BASED UNDERWRITING AND THE
DEATH OF BURIAL INSURANCE
J. Gabriel McGlamery*
***

This casenote explores the reasons why industrial life insurance, and
the use of racial discrimination, died. The history, as well as the
problems presented by industrial life insurance, including
discriminatory practices, is reviewed. The 2005 case, Guidry v.
Pellerin Life Insurance Company, although a minor suit, is the only
industrial life insurance case to offer a holding in regard to the use
of race in industrial life insurance. Although the Guidry court held
that no rule, law, or statute prevents a life insurance company from
using race as a criterion in underwriting life insurance, it can be
described as a provocative artifact since industrial life insurance has
effectively died. The theories examined include the adoption of
legislation that bars the use of race in underwriting life insurance
premiums, social pressure to stop using race as a tool in
underwriting, and other theories, including the closing of the racial
mortality gap, and the success of group life insurance. This note
concludes that not one theory on its own is satisfactory, but taken
together as a whole they provide some understanding of why
industrial life insurance died.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, a Louisiana federal district court came to the remarkable
conclusion that there was no rule, law, or statute that prevents a life
*
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insurance company from using race as a criterion in underwriting life
insurance.1 The case, Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Company,2 was a
minor case that came at the tail end of a wave of class action litigation
against life insurance companies that had offered industrial life insurance to
African-Americans.3 Guidry was remarkable only because it actually
reached the merits rather than settling or failing on statute of limitation and
class certification issues.4
The reason why this little case did not cause more than a ripple in
the insurance world was because industrial life insurance effectively died
almost thirty years ago.5 So, the case is more relevant as a provocative
artifact than as an influential decision. But, as a provocative opinion it
raises questions. First, was the Guidry holding correct? Briefly, yes it was.
The way the law looks today, in the state of Louisiana, nothing stopped the
insurer from doing what it was doing.6 It becomes more complex if you
widen the holding of Guidry to other states and jurisdictions.
1

Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (W.D. La. 2005).

2

Id.

3

E.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006); In
re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Liberty Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Nat’l Sec. Ins. Co., 237
F.R.D. 685 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 346 (D. Conn. 2006); Hunter v. Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 384 F.
Supp. 2d 888 (D.S.C. 2005); Carnegie v. Mut. Savs. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. CV99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004); Brown v. Am.
Capital Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL 2375796 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2004);
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
4

See infra pp. 14-18.

5

See appendix for a chart showing the decline in industrial life insurance. All
charts in the appendix are taken from information in the Life Insurance Fact
Books. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (eds.
1954-99). As of 2006, industrial life insurance premiums accounted for less than
0.1% of the life insurance market with $239.6 million in premiums written.
Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics: The Life/Health Insurance
Industry, www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/life/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
6

See Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
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Second, if, according to Guidry,7 the industrial life insurance
industry did not stop using race as a factor in pricing because of legislation,
why did they stop? Industrial life insurance was inexorably linked to racial
discrimination, to cut off the availability of racial discrimination as a tool
for underwriting crippled the product. In this paper I will look at a mix of
theories as to why industrial life insurance, and the use of racial
discrimination, died when it did. The theories I examine are (1) legislative
and judicial influence, (2) social pressure, and (3) other forces, such as
competition from non-discriminatory insurance products and the drop in
the mortality gap between African-American and white policyholders.
In the first section of my paper, I will briefly describe industrial life
insurance, its history and the discriminatory practices that came to light in
the recent litigation. In the second part I will examine the legislative
action, or lack thereof, that may have lead to the death of industrial life
insurance. The third part of my paper will discuss the theory that social
pressure changed the way the insurance industry used race in underwriting
life insurance. The fourth part of my paper will discuss the influence of the
decline in the mortality gap between African-American and white
policyholders, and the rise of group life insurance. Finally, in the
conclusion I will discuss how all of these factors drove the cost of
industrial life insurance, and the use of race in underwriting up, past the
point where it could survive on the market.
II.

A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE
A. WHAT IS INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE?

Originally named after the industrial workers to whom it was
marketed,8 it is distinguished by its small premiums, the small face value of
its policies,9 and the fact that it was usually collected by hand. 10 An agent
7

Id.
David A. Ivry, Historical Development of Some Basic Life Insurance
Terminology, 28 J. INS., Sept. 1961, at 65, 67-68. At the time, the insurance was
provided to industrial workers. Id.
8

9

The cost and coverage of industrial life insurance has varied from $25 when
it was first offered in America to around $2,000 toward the end of its existence.
MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 75
(The Viking Press 1947) (Metropolitan first offered industrial life insurance with
benefits from $25 to $1,000); Note, Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life
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of the insurance company would travel door-to-door along a weekly or
monthly route, sometimes called a “debt,” to collect the premiums from the
policyholders.11 The logic behind the product was that the working poor
that needed inexpensive insurance would not be able to budget effectively
enough to pay on the quarterly basis, or afford the minimum level of
benefits that ordinary life insurance demands.12 Personal collection was
used because mailing was not cost effective and, theoretically, the
policyholder did not have the time or motivation to deliver their payments
themselves.13
However, because of the high overhead costs, the ratio of
premiums to the policy’s face value was horrible for all industrial life
insurance,14 and it got much worse if the policyholder was a high risk. 15
Industrial life insurance was sometimes referred to as “debt
insurance” after the route the agents would take to collect their premiums.16
Insurance, 61 YALE L.J. 46, 46 (1952) ($300); INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (1962) ($1,000); INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 30 (1979); In re Monumental, 365 F.3d 408, 412 n.3 (less
than $2,000).
10

Monumental, 365 F.3d at 412.

11

Id. See Alan Gurganus’s story, Blessed Assurance, in his collection, WHITE
PEOPLE (1991) for a personal story of a former premium collector.
12

ALEXA BENSON HENDERSON, ATLANTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY:
GUARDIAN OF BLACK ECONOMIC DIGNITY 15 (The University of Alabama Press
1990).
13

MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 7
(McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1944).
14

Note, supra note 9, at 49. The cost may be attributed to the high mortality
of the policyholders and the high operating costs. Id.
15

See Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. The plaintiff in Thompson spent
10¢ a week ($5.20 per year) for 30 years for a “substandard” life insurance policy.
By the end of the period he had paid $156 for a policy with a face value of $178.
Id. A “standard” policy with a face value of $178 would have cost him $112 over
the same period, while an ordinary (not industrial) life insurance policy would have
cost $81.80. Id.
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It was also referred to as “burial insurance” when it was marketed as a way
for poor people to afford a large funeral.17 It would pay its small sum soon
after the death of the policyholder, sometimes arranging the funeral for the
decedent.18
1. What Was Wrong With Industrial Life Insurance
Industrial life insurance has been criticized since its inception
because of its deceptively low value, its high overhead, its incredibly high
lapse rate, its possible connection to infanticide, and even whether such
arrangements benefited the working class at all.19 Official inquiries have
been made into the fairness of industrial life insurance on these grounds
throughout its existence.20 However, the evil this note, and the recent wave
16

The agent collecting the premiums was assigned a fixed area that was
referred to as a “debit.” DAVIS, supra note 13, at 7. The agents were paid roughly
15% of the premiums they collected on their route. EARL CHAPLIN MAY & WILL
OURSLER, THE PRUDENTIAL 81-82 (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1950). See also 1 U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights, Discussion by Gayle Lewis-Carter, Special Assistant to
the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS AND HEALTH LIFE AND DISABILITY
INSURANCE, 197, 199 (1978) [hereinafter DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES].
17

MAY & OURSLER, supra note 16, at 32-33.

18

LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:42 (3d ed.
2007); DISCUSSION BY ELEANOR LEWIS, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
INSURANCE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES,
supra note 16, at 193. See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 189 for a description of the
prompt payment, low levels of investigation in industrial life insurance, and
marketing the insurance based on the consumer’s need to pay for their funeral.
19

See generally, DERMOT MORRAH, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE
ASSURANCE, 172 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1955).
20

See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 9, at 332-33. In 1936 the New York department
of insurance examined Metropolitan’s sale of industrial life insurance and found
that the high cost of the insurance was justified, but the lapse rate was too high,
and the volume of insurance being written on children was questionable. Id. See
also DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 194-200
(mentioning the poor rate of return on industrial life insurance policies, their unfair
claims practices, and mentioning that no insurance at all may be a better option for
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of litigation focuses on is industrial life’s connection and reliance on racial
discrimination.21
Because of the need to keep the premiums low despite high
overhead costs, the policyholders were rarely given the full medical
examination that an ordinary life insurance policy would merit.22 Instead
the industrial policies would be issued on the soliciting agents observations
and recommendations as well as the applicant’s own statements about their
Because these proxies were used in place of medical
health.23
examinations, African-American customers were either steered into low
paying industrial life insurance policies rather than ordinary policies (the
“dual-plan” practice), or the mortality tables were racially segregated
(“dual-rate” policies).
Not to condone the practices of the industrial insurers, but it is
important to note that the actual mortality rate of African-American
policyholders at the time was disturbingly high, and may correspond to the

industrial life insurance policyholders). The assistant to the commissioner of
insurance in Pennsylvania mentions attempts to deal with industrial life insurance
while it was still a problem by using the unfair trade practices act. Id. at 199-200.
Their efforts were frustrated by policyholder’s distrust of government bureaucracy
and their fear of testifying. Id. at 199. The industry also tends to write a check and
settle the problems of anyone who is vocal enough to cause a problem. Id. In
1978, an article in Consumer Reports was often cited in the modern cases as
evidence of mainstream society’s awareness of some of the problems with
industrial life insurance. Insurance that Preys on the Poor, CONSUMER REPORTS,
Nov. 1978, at 661 (calling for a ban of industrial life insurance). See generally
MAURICE TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE (1934).
21

DAVIS, supra note 13, at 107 (“The race of the applicant also has an
important bearing on prospective longevity. Nonwhite races have been found to
have a much higher mortality than white persons, which should be considered in
underwriting.”).
22

Note, supra note 9, at 47. “Medical examination of applicants was at best a
hasty look-over by a physician who received fifty cents a head for his services.”
JAMES, supra note 9, at 86.
23

Id. If the policyholder died within a year or two their death would be
looked into and the “sound health” clause may be used to contest their claim. Id. at
58.
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high rates charged by the insurers.24 The actions on the part of the insurers
seem to be, at least from the record, motivated by a legitimate fear of the
high correlation of risk and race in the first half of the twentieth century, 25
rather than out of racial animosity.26
24

An investigation into the mortality rates of African-Americans in 1942 by
the insurance commissioner of New York found that the mortality rate for AfricanAmericans with ordinary policies was 50% higher than white policyholders.
DAVIS, supra note 10, at 112. For African-Americans with industrial life insurance
policies, owing to different age distributions and different socioeconomic status the
rate was 83% higher than white policyholders. Id. See also the Appendix for
charts showing the mortality gap between white and non-white Americans. The
charts used the INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK (eds.
1954-99).
25

See JAMES, supra note 9, at 86-87. In the 1870’s the mortality gap between
white and African-American policyholders first became an issue. Major
companies entering the industrial market such as Prudential and Metropolitan first
offered industrial life insurance without using race as an underwriting
characteristic. Id. By 1881 both companies realized the significance in the
mortality difference between the two groups and raised their premiums. Id. When
states made laws prohibiting discriminatory premiums Prudential stopped selling
any insurance to African-Americans in those states while Metropolitan heightened
the requirements for African-American applicants. Id. In 1907 new industrial life
table were produced that showed the considerable difference in mortality. Id. at
551. Both companies reacted by instituting dual-rates and dual-plan practices
discussed infra pp. 6-9. See also Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 at 46-47.
Many studies have been made with respect to the mortality
among negroes and all have shown that, class for class, their
mortality is higher than that of white persons. It is not true, of
course, that all Negroes have higher mortality than any white
persons because Negro physicians would undoubtedly show up
better than white underground miners. The important fact that
needs to be emphasized is that Negroes have higher mortality
than white persons of the corresponding class.
Id.
26

See WILLIAMSON & SMALLY, NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE: A CENTURY
OF TRUSTEESHIP, IN DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 550.
From time to time Northwestern insured the lives of Negroes. In
1885 the problem of getting a full medical history on Negro
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While the largest sellers of industrial life insurance were some of
the largest insurance companies in the market, it would be a mistake to see
industrial life insurance as only a dynamic of large white businesses against
poor African-American policyholders. Industrial insurance laid the
groundwork that allowed several African-American owned and controlled
insurance companies to enter the insurance market.27 Oddly enough, the
desegregation of life insurance, both in its sales practices and in its hiring,
lead to increased competition with large “white” life insurance companies
and the death of industrial life insurance was actually the nail in the coffin
of some of the African-American owned companies.28
a. Dual-Rates
“Dual-rate” is the term used for charging African-Americans
higher rates for the same benefits as white policyholders.29 Insurance
underwriters used to use two separate tables to predict mortality, one for
white policyholders, and another for “non-white” policyholders.30 The
applicants raised the question as to the advisability of continuing
this practice. Kimball made it clear, however, that “we have no
prejudice against insuring colored men growing out of mere fact
of color.”
Id.
27

See ROBERT E. WEEMS, JR., BLACK BUSINESS IN THE BLACK METROPOLIS 126, 29 (Indiana University Press 1996); HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 15-19;
WALTER B. WEARE, BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEW SOUTH 14-15 (University of
Illinois Press 1973).
28

WEEMS, supra note 27, at 115-18. In the early eighties, following criticism
of industrial life insurance and after the large “white” insurance companies had
already stopped offering industrial life insurance, many of the African-American
owned companies attempted to follow suit. Id. Of the six largest AfricanAmerican insurance companies, only three, North Carolina Mutual, Atlanta Life,
and Golden State Mutual, survived. Id. at 115-22.
29

30

In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 331, 336. (5th Cir. 2003).

Id. (“Liberty national employed the term ‘standard rates’ to refer to
insurance rates applicable to African-Americans and the term ‘premium
rates’ to refer to insurance rates available only to white individuals.”).
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insurance agent would be asked to mark the race of the policyholder, and
their premiums would be adjusted accordingly.31
Following the industry’s abandonment of dual-rates, companies
merged the two rate tables,32 or changed the title of the rate tables, but little
else.33 Companies that had an African-American market suffered the most
from their inability to separate rates by race.34
b. Dual-Plans
“Dual-plan” practices refer to the various means insurance
companies used to steer African-American applicants into discriminatory
This tactic was often adopted when states or insurance
plans.35
commissioners banned or pressured insurance companies into using raceneutral rate tables. 36 Generally, the insurer would offer two tiers of

31

DAVIS, supra note 13, at 107; In re Monumental, 365 F.3d at 412 n.4. The
actual difference in the rate structure varies radically amongst plans, but a variety
of discriminatory plans were apparent in the cases. For example, in Monumental
an ANICO rate book from 1962 with an industrial policy for a twenty year old with
a face value of $500 had a weekly premium of $0.41 while a white policyholder
would pay $0.32. Id.
32

E.g., Thorn., 445 F.3d 311, 315.

33

See infra pp. 9-11.

34

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 590-91. While
companies with a predominantly white market could shift their merged rates
toward their white rates, companies with a primarily African-American market had
to shift their rates toward the higher mortality of their “non-white” rates or face
insolvency. Id. at 591. This rate was non-competitive so these companies
continued to be restricted to African-American markets. Id. Unfortunately, many
of the companies that had focused on the African-American market were also
African-American owned, and suffered from competition for both applicants as
well as personnel. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 191-95.
35
36

See text accompanying note 3.

Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“Since the laws of several states do not permit us to take race into account in
appraising an applicant for insurance, we have had to adopt other means of
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industrial life insurance, sometimes referred to as standard plans and substandard plans.37 This is where the term “dual-plan” originates. While the
plans would be facially race neutral and their rate tables would be approved
or created by the insurance commission, there would be an understanding
that the tables were made from data specifically gathered from AfricanAmericans and would reflect their particular mortality rates.38
The insurance companies used direct and indirect methods of
steering African-Americans into the sub-standard policies. A common
practice was to pay agents no commission,39 or only partial commissions40
avoiding unfair discrimination against white policyholders in the cost of their
insurance.”).
37

See id. at 46-47 (using standard and substandard tables); Carnegie v. Mut.
Savs. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. CV-99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446, at *1 (N.D.
Ala. Nov. 23, 2004). Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company divided their
policies into “colored cash,” “white cash,” “colored burial,” and “white burial”
where the only underwriting factor differentiating between the “white” and
“colored” policies was race, as determined by the agent. Carnegie, 2004 WL
3715446, at *1. In the 1960’s they stopped calling the bad policies “colored,” but
the tables were not changed, with the same S for standard, and R for substandard
policies using occupational proxies for race. Id. at *2.
38

See Brown v. Am. Capital Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL
2375796, *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2004), explaining that in New York there was no
specified standard mortality table for “substandard” policies, and the tables that the
insurance commissioner approved did not explicitly segregate by race. It was
“commonly accepted that the [Commissioners Standard Industrial Mortality Table]
was created using ‘the experience of white risks’ and the [Commissioners
Substandard Industrial Mortality Table] was ‘created using African-American
risks.’” Id.
39

Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349 (D.
Conn. 2006). The plaintiffs were described as “white” on the application so that
the agent could collect his entire commission for selling them standard, rather than
substandard policies. Norflet v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 3:04cv1099
(JBA), 2007 WL 2668936, *2 (D. Conn., Sept. 6, 2007). On a subsequent
application John Hancock corrected this. Memoranda within John Hancock
discussed the use of the no-commission policy, excepting sales in New York to
avoid anti-discrimination laws. Id.
40

Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (80% reduction in commissions to offset
the mortality risk); Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7 (MetLife only paid their
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if they sold standard policies African-Americans, but they allowed full
commissions if they sold substandard policies to minorities.41 Driving
down the incentive to sell reasonably priced policies was used as a crude
underwriting technique.42
Some insurance companies created a system to steer AfricanAmericans towards substandard policies based on their occupations.43
Under this point system, certain jobs had a greater number of points then
others.44 The jobs that were selected were manual labor jobs, commonly
held by African-Americans in the pre-civil rights era south.45
Like the discriminatory use of redlining in homeowners insurance,
some insurers would map out the racial ratios of neighborhoods in order to

agents when African-Americans bought substandard insurance); Norflet, 2007 WL
2668936, at *2 (a memo altered John Hancock’s “no-commission” policy for
African-American policyholders in New York in order to conform to New York
laws. They justified their discriminatory steering and commissions because they
had a “unitary rate” for their policies and did not use racially based rate tables.).
41

Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 43.

42

Id.

43

E.g., Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7.

44

Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44.

45

Friedman Decl. Ex. M, Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44. From a 1945
memo, “Re: Underwriting Negro Lives”:
Lowering the underwriting limit for standard Industrial insurance
from 200% to 150% of standard Ordinary mortality. Since a
materially higher proportion of negro lives would be in
occupations rates more than +50 and since a higher proportion of
negro lives would also be rated more than +50 for reasons other
than occupation, the effect of drawing the limit for standard
Industrial insurance at 150% would result in considerably more
negro lives than white lives being assigned to the substandard
Industrial classification.
Id.
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determine the risk associated with that area.46 In some cases, different
applications would be used in those neighborhoods.47 These applications,
and the agents providing them, would ask questions about the morals,
environment, and habits of the policyholder that were considered “too
detailed and otherwise unsuitable” for the standard applications.48 The
46

Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270-71 (N.D. Ala.
2000) (“Liberty National, after ceasing to make explicit, race-based distinctions
among individuals in setting policy rates, nonetheless continued to sell raciallydiscriminatory policies by including in the calculation of policy rates factors often
directly correlated with race, such as employment in certain occupations or
residence in ‘undesirable’ neighborhoods.”); Brown, 2004 WL 2375796, at *2 n.7.
47

Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 45.

48

Friedman Decl. Ex. R., Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 44. The “Special
Questions Report” issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance stated:
In connection with the proposal now under consideration for the
insuring of colored lives, it was agreed ... (ii) to use special
questions designed to bring out poor environmental, moral
hazards, or bad habits, either as part of the regular application or
perhaps in the form of a special application to be completed in
districts where a substantial proportion of the applications are on
low grade risks.
Id. The report also included some suggested questions about the applicant’s home
and habits:
(a) Number of rooms in the home?
(b) Number of persons living in home, including lodgers?
(c) Does home contain toilet facilities?
(d) Does home contain running water?
(e) Is home in good repair?
(f) Is home clean? …
(a) Does applicant or premium-payer associate with criminals or
gamblers such as those in the policy number game?
(b) Does the applicant or the premium-payer get into fights?
(c) Have the applicant's or the premium-payer's drinking habits
been criticized?
(d) Is there any other criticism of the applicant's or premiumpayer's habits or reputation?
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answers would be used to determine or justify the underwriting risk of the
policyholder.49
II.

THE PRESENT LITIGATION

The present wave of litigation against industrial life insurers began
with a widely publicized settlement. Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill
Nelson filed an order stating that American General continued to collect
premiums on racially discriminatory industrial life insurance policies sold
by insurance companies it had purchased years ago.50 Two months after
receiving the order, American General settled for $206 million.51 A
Id. The report stated that the questions were “too detailed and otherwise
unsuitable” for the standard application and only suitable for a “special
application” that would give the insurer grounds for refusing the applicant.
A special application which asks a fairly large number of plain
spoken definite questions regarding poor home environment and
questionable morals or habits is more likely to elicit an answer
on the basis of which the case may be declined, than would a few
question, necessarily somewhat generalized, on the regular
application. Furthermore, the intent of questions of the type
suggested for the special application should soon become
obvious to the agent.

Id.
49

Id.

50

Mark Hollis, Company Cited for Overcharging Poor Blacks for Burial, Life
Policies, SUN-SENTINEL, June 22, 2000, at A1. Senator Nelson, at the time
running for office, stated that he became interested in burial insurance after he saw
a program where a television crew followed an insurance salesman door to door
collecting premiums from low-income residencies, “even prying money out of a
family piggy bank with a coat hanger.” Id. It is likely that the program dealt with
ordinary home life insurance, a different product that also involves door-to-door
collection of premiums. Ordinary home life insurance is a topic beyond the scope
of this paper.
51

Id. For a detailed description of the negotiations between the Florida
Commissioner and American General see American General Life & Accident
Insurance Company, Nationwide Settlement, Florida Department of Insurance –
Primary Negotiator (unpublished manuscript, on file with Florida State
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number of suits and settlements followed in order to correct the racially
discriminatory premiums throughout the insurance industry.52
1. Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Company
Guidry v. Pellerin Life Insurance Co.53 was a minor suit compared
to In re Monumental54 or Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life 55 (both of which
were class-actions), but it was the only industrial life insurance case to
offer a holding in regard to the use of race in industrial life insurance.56
After a brief preamble about his awareness and the continued presence of
discrimination the judge acknowledges that, like many of the other
industrial life insurance cases, the defendant “did charge AfricanAmericans as a class, higher premiums than it did Caucasians as a class, for
the same life insurance coverage.”57 This is followed by the conclusion,
and admittedly counterintuitive notion that:
[D]efendant’s differential in the pricing of premiums for life
insurance between African-American and Caucasians was based on risk,
not race. In that regard, the known risk assumed by defendant for a sum
University), available at http://consensus.fsu.edu/academic_directory/casestudies
2001/Crowell_AmGenIns.pdf.
52

See text accompanying note 3.

53

364 F. Supp. 2d 592. (W.D. La. 2005).

54

365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004).

55

445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006).

56

The Corpus Juris Secundum cites to Monumental and Williams as cases
holding that insurers cannot discriminate based on race; however, both cases were
settled without reaching the issue of race. 44 C.J.S. INSURANCE § 43 (2007). See
In re Monumental, 365 F.3d 408; Williams, 237 F.R.D. 685. Monumental was
settled after the 5th circuit addressed issues of class and statute of limitations. 365
F.3d at 413, 420. Williams was a certification of a settlement and only stated that
after five years, taking the case to trial would cost a small fortune and possibly
bankrupt the National Security Insurance Company before a judgment was
reached. 237 F.R.D. at 695.
57

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
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certain as it related to insuring the lives of African-Americans and
Caucasians was akin to an insurer charging a lower premium to a female
than to a male and a higher premium to a smoker than a non-smoker.58
The facts of Guidry are almost the same as all of the major
industrial life insurance cases; the plaintiffs represented a class of AfricanAmerican and minority policyholders who purchased policies from Pellerin
Life Insurance Company.59 Pellerin used dual-rate tables until they
switched to a dual-plan practice, pushing African-Americans into “higherpriced, inferior policies.”60 Pellerin continued to charge their policyholders
at the same discriminatory rates.61 The plaintiffs addressed this problem by
bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.62
In applying the facts to the framework of §§ 1981, 198263 the court
found that actuarial tables to determine risk were a legitimate, non-

58

Id. at 594.

59

Id. at 594-95.

60

Id. at 594.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 597.

63

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97.
To establish an inference of discrimination under §1981,
consistent with McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs must allege facts
in support of the following elements: (1) the plaintiffs are
members of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the
basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination
concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.

Id. at 596 (citing Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)).
In order to bring an action under § 1982, a plaintiff must allege
with specificity facts sufficient to show or raise a plausible
inference of the following: (1) the defendant’s racial animus; (2)
intentional discrimination; and (3) that the defendant deprived
plaintiff of his rights because of race.
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discriminatory reason for Pellerin’s use of dual-plans, and rates.64 The
plaintiffs attempt to use a decision by the Louisiana insurance
commissioner that states that race is considered “unfair discrimination” and
violated La. Rev. Stat. 22:1214(7).65
La. Rev. Stat. 22:1214(7) was based on the NAIC’s Model Unfair
Trade Practices Act.66 This act was not meant as a form of protection
against any vulnerable class, rather it owes its origin to a practice among
insurance agents where they would offer a rebate in certain customers to
encourage business.67 Other applicants would not know if they were
paying the same price as the other individuals who contributed to the same
pool, so the NAIC offered this model statute to prevent “unfair”
discrimination.68 It was quickly adopted, in some form, by all 50 states.69
Id. at 597 (citing Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616-17
(1987)).
64

Id. at 597.

65

Id. at 597-98 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214(7)(a) (2007)):
(7) Unfair discrimination. (a) Making or permitting any unfair
discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal
expectation of life in the rates charged for any contract of life
insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends or other benefits
payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of
such contract, provided that, in determining the class,
consideration may be given to the nature of the risk, plan of
insurance, the actual or expected expense of conducting the
business or any other relevant factor…

66

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES MODEL ACT § 4(G) (NAIC 2007) (defining
unfair discrimination as an unfair trade practice “[m]aking or permitting any unfair
discrimination between individuals of the same class” and similarly situated for
rates charged in life insurance policies).
67

Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s
Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1656-57 (1995).
68
69

Id.

Herman T. Bailey et al., The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance
Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 782 n.17 (1976).
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However, the judge held that Pellerin did not discriminate
“between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life.”70 The
Louisiana Code § 65271 specifically states that “fair” was not meant to be
interpreted in the usual social context, but in an “efficient” view of fairness,
barring practices where the classification of an individual had no relation to
their risk, like the rebates La. R.S. 22:1214(7)(a) was supposed to
remedy.72
The second challenge the plaintiffs offered was a comparison to a
similar favorable case that passed summery judgment, Brown v. American
Capital Insurance Company.73 Brown shared the fact pattern of Guidry,74
but in Brown there was a question of whether the mortality tables were out
70

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98. In a later affidavit the insurance
commissioner stated that there was no evidence that Pellerin priced its policies on
anything other than life expectancy, and that “after the passage of [LA. REV. STAT.
§] 22:652 an insurer charging ‘different groups of people different premium
amounts because of differing risk determined by life expectancy, would not violate
rule and/or regulations of the Louisiana Department of Insurance or Louisiana
statutory law.” Id. at 599.
71

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:54 (2008):
No insurer shall make or permit any unfair discrimination in
favor of particular individuals or persons, or between insureds or
subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring risk, and
exposure factors, or expense elements, in the terms or conditions
of any insurance contract, or in the rate or amount of premium
charged therefor, or in the benefits payable or in any other rights
or privileges accruing thereunder.
This provision shall not
prohibit fair discrimination by a life insurer as between
individuals having unequal life expectancies. (italics in Guidry,
364 F. Supp. 2d at 599 n.1).

72

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 599.

73

Brown v. Amer. Corp. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 01-2079, 2004 WL 2375796
(E.D. La. 2004).
74

Id. at *1-2. See also Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (“…as the facts and the
expert testimony in the instant action are almost identical to the facts and expert
testimony in Brown.”).
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of proportion to the actual mortality risk of African-American
policyholders and to the amount of reserves kept by the insurance
The possibility that the rate tables themselves were
company.75
discriminatory and did not correlate to the risk of the policyholders created
a matter of evidence that was not present in Guidry.76 Brown was fought
over the issue of whether those tables were “fair” discrimination, rather
than Guidry, where there was no evidence of insufficient reserves, biased
tables, or anything that would show that the higher premiums were based
on racial animus rather than realistic approximations of risk.77 So despite
the explicit use of race, Pellerin did not actually use race to price the
policies, they only used race to gauge the life expectancy of the
policyholders which was used to price the premiums.78
75

Brown, 2004 WL 2375796 at *2. “[A] pivotal dispute in this case is
whether historically the 41 SSI table reflected underwriting practices, supported by
objective factors, which placed the mortality rate for African Americans
significantly higher than whites; or whether these socioeconomic underwriting
factors were deployed as a ‘mask’ for racial discrimination.” Id. The issue was
complicated by the fact that the New York Insurance Commissioner actually made
the tables, and set the necessary reserves. Id.
76

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 598 (“While the expert testimony related to the
evidence adduced in Brown created a genuine issue of material fact, plaintiffs in
this case have failed to introduce any evidence that suggests that the basis of dualpricing (dual-rate and dual plan practice) was based on anything other than life
expectancy.”) (italics in original). The defendant’s expert, which the court agreed
with, showed the correlation of race and mortality by presenting Society of
Actuaries papers from 1952, and 1965 as well as 1961-98 U.S. census data. Id.
77

Id. at 599 (“[P]laintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment is devoid of even
a supeon of evidence that the subject insurance policies Pellerin issued were priced
in a racially discriminatory manner or that any of Pellerin’s actions were racially
motivated.”) (italics in original).
78

Id. at 598.
Frank Pellerin testified that race was not used in setting an
insured’s premium, but rather was used only to determine risk.
Because that risk was reflected in the premium paid under some
Pellerin policies, African Americans paid a higher premium than
Caucasians for the same coverage under those policies. Id.
(internal citation omitted).
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II.

WHAT KILLED BURIAL INSURANCE?

Industrial life insurance, and the racial discrimination that
accompanied it, died out during the 1960s and 1970s,79 but the exact reason
why they died is not clear.80 Several possible theories are that legislation
either stopped racial discrimination in underwriting, or affected industrial
life insurance directly. Another theory is that the social climate changed
and social pressure pushed the insurance industry to abandon the use of
racial discrimination in underwriting and the sale of industrial life
insurance. A third theory is that market forces and chances in population
demographics drove industrial life insurance from the open market. In this
section I will examine each of these theories and see if there is any
evidence of their validity. None of these three theories are mutually
exclusive, but there is an assumption that needs to be clarified. Industrial
life insurance is directly linked to, and relied on racial discrimination.
Industrial life’s inefficiency and reliance on racial discrimination is
shown in three different ways. First, it was an expensive product, which
makes it very vulnerable to any competition that could fill its niche market.
79

See e.g., Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2001) (Liberty National’s counsel admitted in the June 20th 2000 hearing that
the debit route collection system was dismantled in 1995-96); Thorn v. JeffersonPilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (Jefferson stopped issuing
policies in 1973, but continued to collect dual rate policies. In 1988 they adjusted
the dual rate policies to merging the tables but they still left a difference between
the merged tables and the white tables. In 2000 at the time of filing Jefferson
declared all dual-rate policies “paid up”.) In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d
408, 412 (5th Cir. 2004) (Monumental and the companies it acquired had not sold
dual-rate policies since the 1970’s. As early as 1988 some insurers voluntarily
adjusted premiums and/or death benefits to equalize coverage.); Williams v. Nat’l
Sec. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 685, 687 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2006) (National Security
stopped using dual rates on December 1st, 1980); Carnegie v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
No. CV-99S3292NE, 2004 WL 3715446 at *3 n.18 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2004)
(While Mutual stopped calling the bad policies “colored” in the 1960s the tables
were not changed, with the same S for standard policies, and R for substandard
policies, except they used occupational proxies for race); see also LIFE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK, supra note 5, (eds. 1953-97).
80

Robert Randall, Risk Classification and Actuarial Tables as They Affect
Insurance Pricing for Women and Minorities, in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 590-91.

550

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

Desegregation allowed greater competition which industrial life insurance
was not able to handle.
Second, it relied on crude underwriting, particularly assumptions
about the mortality of African-Americans. If it was forced to use
characteristics that were more costly than an agent’s personal assessment it
would become too costly, even by its own standards.
Finally, and most compelling, there is the evidence of the timing.
There is plenty of evidence of dual rate and dual plan practices and their
close connection to the sale of industrial life insurance. The times that
insurance companies gave for their discontinuing their discriminatory
practices coincide with their abandonment of industrial life insurance as a
whole. It looks like if they gave up one, they gave up both. The remaining
question is why did industrial life insurance or race based underwriting die
at all.
A. THE LEGISLATIVE THEORY
Surprisingly, while a number of states enacted laws that dealt with
the use of race in insurance,81 very few of them prohibited the use of race in
underwriting,82 and none of them could stop the use of dual-plan
discrimination. Guidry is interesting because it is evidence that in at least
one state there was a surprising lack of legislative action.83 Guidry is not
proof of this, but it does open up the possibility that race based

81

See supra, p.17 and note 71. See also DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
MINORITIES, supra note 13, at 195-209. In interviews with various state insurance
commissioners, they were not able to tell congress about any negative rights
against discrimination in life insurance, and they commented on the difficulty of
passing informational laws to prevent abusive practices in the sale of industrial life
insurance. Id.
82

Randall, supra note 16, at 195-209. Various insurance commissioners
testified to their efforts to reduce discrimination, but the only laws concerning
industrial life insurance dealt with disclosure, and that law exempted industrial life
insurance. Id. at 199.
83

2005).

See Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (W.D. La.
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underwriting is more legal that we assume. Under our present laws,
Guidry’s holding could apply to roughly 34 states.84
As far as state adoption of legislation that bars the use of race in
underwriting life insurance premiums, only thirteen states have adopted
statutes specifically prohibiting racial discrimination in life insurance
premiums.85 Three of those states, Texas, Maryland, and New York, only
passed their laws after industrial life insurance was on its last legs in 2009,
1998, and 1984 respectively.86 Three other states bar insurers from using
race, but only in conjunction with credit scores, and have only done so
recently.87 Five more states bar the use of race in relation to purchasing,
canceling, or limiting the amount of life insurance an applicant can
purchase, but do not prohibit racially discriminatory premiums or

84

See infra note 85 and accompanying text.

85

California (CAL. INS. CODE §§ 679.71, 679.72, 10141, 10140 (West 2008));
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-447 (West 2008)); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304 (West 2008)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-4 (West
2008)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085 (West 2008)); Maryland
(MD CODE ANN., INS., § 27-501 (West 2008) (prohibits discriminatory
cancellations, or refusing to offer insurance, and prohibits inquiring about race on
applications)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 151B § 4(3A) (West 2008)
(prohibiting insurers and bondsmen from inquiring about the race of the
applicant)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.12 (West)); New York (N.Y.
INS. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 2008)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 583-25 (West 2008)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.16 (West 2008)); Texas
(TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 560.002 (Vernon 2008)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 625.12
(2008)). New Jersey’s statute (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29B-4(7)(c), 17B:30-12(a)
(West 2008)) was repealed insofar as it applies to life insurers. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17:36B-3.
86

MD CODE, INS., § 27-501 (West 2008) (prohibits discriminatory
cancellations, or refusing to offer insurance, and prohibits inquiring about race on
applications); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
560.002 (Vernon 2008).
87

Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.103 (West 2008) (insurers cannot use credit
scores that are based on race)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5104 (2008)
(insurers cannot use credit scores that are based on race)); New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-17A-4(A) (West 2008) (insurer can’t use credit scores based on
race)). None of these statutes was enacted prior to 2003.
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underwriting.88 So only 10 states have statutory prohibitions against race
based underwriting that could have had an impact on the sale of industrial
life insurance.89 In the 1950s, when industrial life insurance sales began
their long decline, only three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Ohio
had enacted laws barring race based underwriting.90
On the whole, states that passed laws barring race based
underwriting saw a decline in the sale of industrial life insurance in
proportion to the national market, with the only exception being
Wisconsin.91 When the sale of industrial life insurance in states barring
racial discrimination is compared to states that passed no laws, it is not
clear whether the laws were the only factor.92 Almost all states saw a drop
in the late 1970s, even if they did not pass a law.93 Seven states lost more
than one percent of their share of the national industrial life insurance
market between 1954 and 1984, but only four of those states passed laws
88

Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.2027 (West 2008) (cannot
refuse to insure, cancel insurance or limit the insurance because of race)); Missouri
(MO. ANN. STAT. § 375.007 (West 2008) (cannot refuse to insure, cancel insurance
or limit the insurance because of race)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
417:4 (2008) (cannot refuse to insure or cancel insurance because of race));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.2 (2008) (prohibits cancellation based on
race)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.178 (2008) (cannot refuse to insure
or cancel insurance because of race)).
89

See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.

90

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-447 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
151B § 4(3A) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.16 (West 2008).
91

Wisconsin dropped 0.12% after passing its anti-discrimination law in 1969,
but by 1984 its market share grew 0.13%. See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT
BOOK, supra note 5 (showing life insurance market share changes over time); see
also author charts on file with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal. To make
Chart VI, in the appendix, I found the yearly change in the face value of insurance
for each year. The chart shows the average change in face value for all states with
laws affecting the underwriting of minorities purchasing industrial life insurance
and for states without these laws.
92

See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5.

93

See chart 5, infra app. 5.
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during that time that might have influenced the sale of industrial life
insurance.94
However, the theory that legislation destroyed the industrial life
insurance market is not quite compelling because as some states passed
laws barring discrimination, the laws were either ineffective, or the
industry shifted to the many other states where it was still legal. Of the ten
states that sold the most industrial life insurance in 1954,95 four passed
laws.96 Thirty years later, three out of those four states, as well as New
York and Michigan, fell from the top ten.97 However, of the twenty-one
states that had more than two percent of the national market at any point
between 1954 and 1984, seven passed laws.98 However, passing laws
never led to a state dropping below two percent of the national market.99
On the whole, laws barring racial discrimination had an impact on
the sale of industrial life insurance in those states, however the impact does
not seem to be significant, and the laws only seem to have impacted a small
section of the market. What is interesting is the sudden drop-off in the late
1970s. Four states passed laws in the 1970s, and some of those states had a
94

Illinois fell 1.06%, Massachusetts 2.92%, New Jersey 1.47%, New York
5.57%, Ohio 1.59%, Pennsylvania 2.24%, Connecticut 1.19%. New Jersey
repealed their law for the benefit of life insurers in 1974. Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Connecticut also passed laws. Ohio was still one of the top ten states in terms of
market share in 1984 despite passing a law barring discriminatory premiums
roughly thirty years before. See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note
5 (showing life insurance market share); see also author charts on file with the
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal. See also Chart VI in the appendix and note
91, supra.
95

Pennsylvania, 10.2%; New York, 9.3%; Ohio, 6.8%; Illinois, 6.3%; New
Jersey 4.8%; California, 4.4%; Texas, 4.3%; Massachusetts 4.2%; Michigan 3.8%;
Florida, 3.0%. Id.
96

Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, and Ohio. See discussion supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
97

See discussion infra Section IV, Part 3.

98

See author charts on file with the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal.

99

See generally LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, in eds. 1954-

1994.
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significant share of the national market.100 Still, the theory that legislation
kills industrial life single-handedly has the critical flaw that at the end of its
impact on the market, only 10 states passed laws barring the sale of
industrial life insurance.101
Another factor that might hurt the legislative theory is the absence
of legislation that regulates the industrial life insurance market in
particular. All of the statutes mentioned above concerned racially
discriminatory premiums. It is not clear whether these statutes were
effective in stopping dual-plan practices, and there were no cases litigated
during the decline of industrial life insurance to show what impact the few
statutes that were passed would have had.
Federal laws, specifically §§ 1981-83102 may have applied to race
based underwriting, but, again, without any litigation or other evidence,
nothing supports the theory that the possible application of these federal
laws deterred the sale of industrial life insurance to the point where it was
driven from the market.
B. THE THEORY OF “SOCIAL REPUGNANCE”
In academic articles, “repugnance” is given as the reason that the
industry abandoned racial discrimination.103 The insurance industry claims
it abandoned dual-rates and dual-plan practices because the differences in

100

California, Georgia, North Carolina, and Kentucky. All of these states had
a significant, greater than 2%, share of the market at the time they passed their
laws. See generally id.
101

See discussion supra, note 95 and accompanying text.

102

Guidry, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 594-97.

103

Robert Jerry, II, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another Perspective, 34 AM.
U.L. REV. 329, 348 (1985). What is curious about this article is that while it uses
society’s rejection of race as a factor in insurance to argue for unisex insurance, it
cannot point to any law, case, or event that pushed the life insurance industry to
reject racial underwriting. Jerry presumes that the change occurred “when insurers
realized that the torrent of federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in
various aspects of society could reach insurance practices if the industry did not
take steps to eliminate such discrimination. Id. at 367 n.139.
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mortality, “were felt to be socioeconomic and hence reflecting them was
felt to not be socially acceptable.”104
There was some public outcry in the late 1970s and early 1980s
that add some credibility to this theory. However, some of the recent
industrial life class action suits actually turn on the public knowledge of
industrial life insurance’s discriminatory dealings.105 The defendants in
those cases referred to negative publicity that industrial life insurance
received at the time and argued that the plaintiffs should have been aware
of the racially discriminatory practices of industrial life insurers.106 Among
some of the minor news articles were some rather well circulated reports
such as an interview on 60 Minutes,107 and the hearing before the United

104

RANDALL, supra note 80 at 527. See also DOUGLAS CADDY, LEGISLATIVE
TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION, 105 (1986) (the insurance industry bases the
high mortality of African-Americans on poverty rather than race itself).
105

See, e.g., Carnegie v. Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 99-S-3292-NE, 2002
WL 32989594, *6 (Nov. 1, 2002, N.D. Ala. 2002); Thompson v. Metro, Life Ins.
Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D. Conn. 2006). The issue was relevant because various
state and federal statute of limitations toll when the plaintiff, using ordinary care,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment. Carnegie, 2002 WL 3715446
at *6 (citing Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (N.D.
Ala. 2000)).
106

Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing Derek T. Dingle, Insurance
Schemes Still Plague Poor, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, June 18, 1980, at A1; Albert
Edward Wiggam, Let's Explore Your Mind, THE DETROIT NEWS, September 26,
1936 at 10 (“It is arithmetic not race prejudice that makes life insurance higher for
Negroes.”)); Winfred Bryson, Insurance Companies: An Overview, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, June 1977, at 121-122; Paul M. Barrett, Delaware Settles Insurance
Complaints on Blacks' Policies With Five Firms, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August
26, 1988. In total, the defendants in Thompson submitted 24 articles over a 60year span. Id.; See also Carnegie, 2002 WL at *6 (the defendants submitted 50
articles).
107

60 Minutes: Soak the Poor (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 1979). Mike
Wallace only briefly mentioned the racially discriminatory aspect of industrial life
insurance; much of the program primarily focused on the impact of industrial life
insurance on poor Americans in general.
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States Commission on Civil Rights.108 While this shows there was at least
some media attention, there was not enough attention to convince the court
that the public knew about the issue.109
There was some official criticism of industrial life insurance during
this period as well. The Federal Trade Commission issued a report on
industrial life insurance, but it focused on the fact that industrial life
insurance was overpriced and inefficient.110 This report led to a widely
circulated Consumer Reports article,111 which in turn led to an investigation
by the NAIC.112 Their conclusion was that despite its faults, it served a
useful social function.113
The trouble with the evidence supporting the theory of social
repugnance is that industrial life insurance has always had extremely vocal
critics.114 These critics provoked inquiries and the inquiries lead to the
same conclusions, that industrial life insurance is inefficient but it fills a
niche.115 Few of the major criticisms focused on the racial aspect of
108

Supra note 16. However, like the Sixty Minutes piece, the commission
touched on industrial life insurance briefly, most of its focus was on gender and it
was assured that the use of race based underwriting had already been abandoned.
Id.; RANDALL, supra note 80.
109

The court in Thompson only found that there was a material issue of fact as
to whether the plaintiffs were even aware of the issue. Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d
at 52. In Carnegie, the court was unconvinced that there was enough media
attention to the issue of racial discrimination to alert industrial life insurance
policyholders. Carnegie, 2002 WL 3715446 at *6.
110

Joan Koonce Lewis, Home Service Distribution System: A Method of
Marketing Life Insurance to the Poor, 9(1); FINANCIAL COUNSELING & PLANNING
35, 36 (1998).
111

Insurance that Preys on the Poor, 43 CONSUMER REPORTS 658, 661, Nov.

1978.
112

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Home Service Life
Insurance: A Commentary 93, Dec. 1982.
113

Id.

114

See supra, pp. 5-6 notes 16-18.

115

Id.
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industrial life insurance, rather they focused on the way it preys on the
poor.116 None of these other past attacks succeeded, so while the presence
of criticism certainly contributed to industrial life insurance’s decline, it
does not explain it.
It would be wonderful to believe that social acceptability guides
the insurance industry. However, other practices with a disparate impact
on race, such as redlining117 and the use of credit scores,118 as well as the
differing treatment of men and women, show that the insurance industry
can be strongly attached to unethical practices as long as they are efficient
and actuarially sound.
This is not to say that the insurance industry and the people in it are
unethical, but that ethical changes may only be possible if the social
pressure is stronger than they countervailing economic incentive.119 In this
case some of the economic incentives for using race as a tool in
underwriting disappeared over time while other insurance products,
particularly group life insurance, took away industrial life insurance’s
comfortable monopoly on the working poor.

116

See e.g., Thompson, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 52. Quoting the interview with
Mike Wallice, the court calls attention to the fact that the only mention of
discrimination was the fact that the majority of consumers of industrial life
insurance are African-American. Id.
117

See generally GREGORY D. SQUIRES, INSURANCE REDLINING:
DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1997).
118

Credit-scoring is an example of an accurate predictor of risk that had no
causal connection to that risk. There were many objections to the use of credit
scores and some litigation over them. The social outcry against insurance
companies using credit scoring has had more success in the legislator than in the
courts. See generally Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
After years of protest, forty-eight states passed some kind of law controlling the
use of credit scores. See National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies,
State
Laws
Governing
Insurance
Scoring
Practices,
http://www.namic.org/reports/credithistory/credithistory.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
2008) (an index of the state laws and their treatment of credit scoring).
119

See Jerry, supra note 93. at 330.
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C. OTHER POSSIBLE THEORIES
Two factors that do seem to align with the fall of industrial life
insurance are the closing of the racial mortality gap, and the success of
group life insurance. The mortality gap between white and AfricanAmerican policyholders dropped by more than half in the period between
the introduction of industrial life insurance in America and its
abandonment.120 This would have reduced the economic impact of raceblind insurance sales. Group life insurance took off during the same
period, offering cost efficient insurance to the same working-class market.
i. The Mortality Gap
The difference in the life span and average mortality of AfricanAmerican policyholders and white policyholders is particularly relevant. It
represents an adverse selection risk that the insurance industry would have
to accept before they stop using racially discriminatory factors in their
underwriting. At the turn of the century there was approximately a 14.6
year difference between the life span of white and non-white Americans.121
By the 1960s the gap had halved itself and it continued to decline
significantly until the 1980s.122. In either case, the sale of industrial life
insurance leveled off at the same time that the difference between “white”

120

See app., p.38.

121

See app. for comparative charts based on figures from the INSURANCE FACT

BOOK.
122

LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5 (ed. 1999) at Table 13.3. In
1900, the difference between the life expectancy from birth of white and “nonwhite” males was 14.1, between females it was 15.2, and combined it was 14.6.
By 1950 it fell to 7.4, 9.3, and 8.3. In 1965 it was 6.5, 7.3, and 6.9. By 1975 it fell
to 5.8, 4.9, and 5.4. The mortality continued to drop until the 1980s. The
mortality gap has continued to close since that point, but slower, reaching 4.5, 3.2,
and 3.5 in 1997. But see Robert S. Levine, MD, et al., Black-White Inequalities in
Mortality and Life Expectancy, 1933-1999: Implications for Healthy People 2010,
116 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 474, 480 (2001) (“We have seen no sustained
decrease in black-white disparities in either age-adjusted mortality or overall life
expectancy at birth at the national level since the end of World War II…”).
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and “non-white” mortality showed its greatest improvements.123 At this
point race was not as relevant an underwriting factor as it had been in the
past.
The timing of the decline in the mortality gap and the decline in the
use of race as a criterion for underwriting is the best evidence that they are
related; no publicly available study has mentioned it. It is possible that this
is just a coincidence, that the same social an political pressure that
improved African-American living conditions and improved mortality rates
also provided a social incentive to stop racial underwriting. However, it
may be useful to compare the life insurance industry’s quiet abandonment
of race based underwriting with its fight to continue sex based
underwriting.124
The insurance industry has clung to sex based underwriting.125
Since the criterion affects all of their policyholders and since the effect is
substantial,126 the industry claims it would suffer from severe solvency
problems if it switched to gender-neutral rate tables.127 They believe that
men would over-consume life insurance while women abandoned it
because their premiums do not correspond to the value of their policies.128
The insurance industry has had mixed results in their fight.129
123

See app., pp. 37-42.
See generally United States Commission on Civil Rights, Statement of
Richard Minck, Vice President and Actuary, American Council of Life Insurance
in DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 224-40.
124

125

See Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance:
What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1647-49 (1994-1995), for a breakdown of the
academic battle over the economic justification of gender discrimination and the
arguments against it.
126

See app.

127

See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Statement of Richard
Minck, Vice President and Actuary, American Council of Life Insurance in
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 224-40.
128
129

Id.

See Stephen R. Kaufman, Comment, Banning “Actuarially Sound”
Discrimination: The Proposed Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, 20 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 631, 633 n.22 (1983) for an overview of failed federal legislation
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If we compare the industry’s differing treatment of sex and race
based underwriting from only an economic standpoint the closing racial
mortality gap was still rising at the time when it came under fire in the
1970s.130
As a result of the closing mortality gap the incentive for any
insurance product to use race based underwriting was rapidly dwindling.
Combined with the social and legal pressure to stop racial discrimination,
various life insurance products began to enter minority markets, competing
with industrial life insurance.
ii. Group Life Insurance
Group life insurance offered unprecedented competition to
industrial life insurance.131 The decline of industrial life insurance during
the 1960 and 1970s corresponds to the point where group life insurance
took off.132 Both plans appealed to similar demographics, but considering
the expense of industrial life insurance, compared to the administrative ease
of group life, it is easy to see why group life insurance quickly became one
of the strongest life insurance products.133 Contrasting its strengths with
banning the use of gender as a classifier in insurance. Gaulding, supra note 63, at
1652-53.
130

See app.

131

See LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 18, at 34 (eds. 1973-77)
(stating that industrial life insurance lost 10% of its market share in the decade
between the 1960s and 1970s, and that increased availability of group life
insurance may have been a factor). Group life insurance, as its name suggests,
requires an employer or “central entity” in addition to the insurer and policyholder.
RUSS, supra note 15, at § 7:1. The central entity acts as the policyholder as they
enter into an agreement for the benefit of the employees or group members. Id.
132
133

See app.

LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 30 (ed. 1974) (as of 1974,
group life was 42% of the insurance market). A reason for the growth of industrial
life insurance was that risk aversion, a by-product of the great depression, was a
strong factor for many employees and unions. After the war, when employers had
to find new employees in a competitive market they found that group insurance
was an attractive incentive for hiring as well as retention. HENDERSON, supra note
9, at 157-58. By 1954, group insurance was the most popular benefit offered to
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the enormous expenses involved in industrial life insurance could explain
why industrial life insurance died when it did.134
Group plans replace uninformed consumers with a central entity,
such as a union, an employer, or an association.135 This reduces the
informational imbalance between the insurer and the policyholder than
leads to dual-plan practices. In addition, group plans have the advantage of
skimming a group of the healthiest risks, those who have regular
employment, out of the life insurance pool, leaving industrial life insurance
the high risk, unemployed, self employed, or irregularly employed
individuals. 136
For minority policyholders, group life insurance offers both
statutory and structural protection from discrimination. Structurally, the
premiums are fixed to the characteristics of the group rather than the
individuals.137 This means that while there might be a disparate impact
because of racism in hiring, direct discrimination should not be a
problem.138 Statutorily, discrimination against minorities and women
employees. Id. at 157. See also app. for charts of the growth of group life
insurance.
134

One of the advantages of group plans is the low transaction cost, in contrast
with industrial life insurance’s poor underwriting and premium collection fees.
RUSS, supra note 18, at § 7:1.
135

Id. The entity then contracts with the insurer, and acts as the policyholder
for the chief contractual relationship. Id.
136
Id. (“[T]hey typical scenario where the insured party is a group of
employees, because such group members are by definition healthy enough to be
employed at the time they become insured.”).
137

MCGILL’S LIFE INSURANCE 817 (Edward E. Graves ed., 3d ed. 2000). The
general underwriting considerations are the reason for the group’s existence, its
stability, its persistency, the method of determining benefits, the provisions for
determining eligibility, the source and method of premium payments, the
administrative aspects of the group insurance plan, the prior existence of the plan,
the size of the group, the composition of the group (which may include the general
age and sex of the group participants), and the industry represented by the group.
Id. at 817-22.
138

See DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES, supra note 16, at 589. While
sex and age are used to calculate the group rate, the employee or employer only
pays the overall rate rather than their particular portion of it. Id. Race is not a
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might be allowed at the state level, but additional protection is provided
when the group plan is attached to employment and falls under the more
expansive laws protecting individuals from discrimination in the
workplace.139 Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart140 is an
example of how differently the plaintiffs in Guidry would have been treated
if they were in a group plan covered by federal employment laws. When
the Supreme Court in Manhart reached the same central issue that was the
crux of Guidry, whether discrimination based on a protected characteristic
is actually “fair” discrimination based on mortality, the court quoted Judge
Duniway that “one cannot say that an actuarial distinction based entirely on
sex is based on any factor other than sex. Sex is exactly what it is based
on.”141
Another more theoretical explanation for group life’s consumption
of the industrial life insurance market might involve the reduction of
adverse selection risks when the insurance is attached to a more vital
attribute of the consumer.142 Some kinds of insurance pools require a
factor in their underwriting because of “its social unacceptability, but the
proportion of our total population that is nonwhite is so small (10 percent) that the
impact has been minimal.” Id.
139

See generally Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 708-10 (1978).
140

Manhart, 435 U.S. 702. Manhart dealt with an employer who required
female employees to contribute 14.84% more to the employee retirement funds
than their male coworkers to compensate for the difference in their mortality. Id.
at 704-05. In Manhart the court held that Title VII focused on individuals and
precluded their treatment as part of “a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.”
Id. at 708 (“The statute makes it unlawful ‘to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis in Manhart)).
141

Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712-13 (quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles,
Dep’t of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
142

The theory behind adverse is that when a high risk section of the market is
offered insurance at the same rate as the low risk portion of the market, the high
risks may over-consume insurance, forcing up the claims, and driving the price of
insurance past the point where it becomes a reasonable investment for lower risk
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common attribute from the policyholders, like church attendance,143 union
membership, or employment.144 The purchase of insurance may be seen as
a socially driven act of collective reasonability. This both keeps low risks
in an insurance pool when they may find better offers on the open market,
and it stops high risk individuals from over insuring by preventing any
individual from buying more than a set amount of insurance under a single
policy, or preventing them from purchasing multiple policies. This might
explain the survival of mutual benefit societies into the early 20th century,
despite their lack of underwriting.145 It also would explain how the “death
spiral” is more apparent when the choice between two competing pools is
not dependant on any shared social attribute of the policyholders.146
Industrial life insurance policyholders are not unified by any social
bond or attribute that would prevent high-risk individuals from overinsuring themselves at the expense of low risk applicants. Actually,
industrial life insurance’s rudimentary underwriting techniques147 allow
individuals. When low risk individuals are driven out of the insurance pool, the
rate of claims become higher then the value of the pool and forcing the insurance
provider into liquidation. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of
Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
143

See HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 12-13.

144

Group life insurance, as its name suggests, requires an employer or “central
entity” in addition to the insurer and policyholder. See Russ, supra note 18, at §
7:1. The central entity acts as the policyholder as they enter into an agreement for
the benefit of the employees or group members. Id.
145
See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: An
exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1255 (2003-2004) (“mutual assessment
societies” survived in Canada and America into the 1920’s).
146

See generally David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection
in Health Insurance, 1 FRONTIERS HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1 (1998). Here, Harvard
offered its employees a choice between an expensive PPO and an in expensive
HMO. When budget cuts forced the university to adjust the premiums of the plains
to their actual cost, the younger, healthier, lower risk individuals switched to the
cheaper plan. When the premiums were adjusted the next year the departure of the
low risks raised the premiums, driving more low risks out of the PPO until, within
two years of the initial premium adjustment, it was disbanded. Id. at 13-14.
147

Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life Insurance, supra note 9, at 47.
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high-risk individuals to hide health problems.148 It is clear why high
mortality helped drive up the price of industrial life insurance so
drastically.149 The only protection against this is the vigilance of the agent,
and the low caps on each industrial life insurance policy.150
On the other extreme, group life insurance policyholders must have
a unifying attribute; states will not allow a group to obtain insurance if that
is the group’s only purpose.151 This attribute may compensate for overconsumption of insurance by high-risk individuals.
Because of the structure of life insurance, its costs, and federal
laws that apply to employment, group life offers many more protections
against discrimination, while also supplying competition against industrial
life insurance. This competitive replacement for insurance was certainly
part of the reason why industrial life insurance died without much social
pressure and legislative action.

148

Id. at 47. There is usually a clause allowing the insurance company to
rescind the policy if the applicant lied about the condition of their health. DAVIS,
supra note 13, at 34.
149

Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life Insurance, supra note 9, at 50 (“The
mortality rate of industrial policyholders is indeed 20 per cent higher than that of
ordinary life insurance policyholders.”).
150

One argument against the risk of adverse selection is that premiums for life
insurance fall as more insurance is purchased. Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1280
(citing John Cawley & Thomas Philipson, An Empirical Examination of
Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 827, 841 (1999)).
This is counter intuitive since high-risk individuals should be the ones overconsuming, and reducing their rate of consumption would drive up the cost of
insurance. Id. However, industrial life insurance does not offer this feature, but
demands that applicants purchase multiple policies to reach their desired level of
protection. Willis v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, No. 400CV323PB, 2001 WL
34403088, at *2 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2001); Justin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No.
00-2208, 2000 WL 1741858, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2000). While this does not
conform to a prediction that rationing to avoid adverse selection would mean
increasing the price of subsequent policies, it shows a trend toward reducing the
risk of over consumption by high-risk individuals.
151

RUSS, supra note 18, at § 7:7.
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CONCLUSION
None of these theories are entirely satisfactory, but taken together
they form a rough understanding of what happened; An inefficient product
was driven from the market when its costs grew and its advantages were
lost.
Social repugnance is certainly a cost, and while most insurance
products were able to adapt by ending race based underwriting, industrial
life insurance could not. In some instances, such as the use of redlining
and credit scores, the insurance industry has been willing to pay the social
cost of an unpopular but profitable tool.152 In those instances the only thing
that stopped the industry, was legislation and legal action.153 In the case of
race based underwriting the industry may have realized that racially
discriminatory pricing and practices were becoming less and less useful
while their social repugnance rose. There was no reason to wait for the
inevitable social backlash. When the majority of the insurance industry
abandoned their use of race in both their products and their hiring practices
it took away industrial life insurance’s monopoly on the African-American
market.154 Industrial life insurance’s inefficiency was only tolerated
because consumers had few realistic alternatives.155 Once that reason fell
away the product did as well.
One of the lessons that the death of industrial life insurance can
teach is the inefficiency of racism. When racist practices disappear we
expect that it is the result of a social or political effort to rub out the
offensive practice. In this case, whatever economic advantage industrial
life insurance had slowly dwindled without much of a concerted effort and
died when it was confronted with more efficient products. While there was
some social repugnance it was similar to other inquiries and outrages that
152

See supra notes 117-118, at 27 and accompanying text. The perfect
example of this is the life insurance industry’s discrimination against the elderly.
The elderly are certainly a vulnerable minority, but no amount of social
repugnance could stop them from using an incredibly accurate underwriting
criterion.
153

E.g., supra note 118, at 27.
The best evidence of this is the collapse of African-American owned life
insurance companies, who primarily provided industrial life insurance, after
desegregation. See supra notes 28, 34, at 8-9 and accompanying text.
154

155

See supra notes 18-20, at 5-6 and accompanying text.
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industrial life insurance had weathered in the past. While there was some
legislation, its effect was limited and probably unnecessary. The social
changes that closed the mortality gap and increased the number of AfricanAmericans enrolled in group life insurance plans were probably as
significant as any concerted effort to end industrial life insurance directly.
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Chart I: Mortality Rate from Birth Am ong Selected Groups
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Chart III: The Number of Gr oup and Industrial Life Insurance Policies Outstanding (000,000 Omitted)
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Chart IV: Face Value of the Group and Industrial Life Insurance
In Force for the Period of 1940-60 (000,000 omitted)
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Chart V: Face Value of the Group and Industrial Life Insurance in Force for
the Period of 1900-75 (000,000 omitted)
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INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
Hazel Beh*
Amanda M. Willis **
INTRODUCTION
The Association of American Law Schools Insurance Law
Section’s 2008 meeting was devoted to an examination of insurance
intermediaries. Intermediaries play a critical middleman role in the
distribution and operations of insurance. Besides bringing insureds and
insurers together, intermediaries also provide advice to insureds, gather
underwriting information for insurers, and generally help facilitate the
relationship between insured and insurers all the way through the claims
process. Despite the critical importance of intermediaries, judicial
decisions considering the duties, obligations, and loyalties of intermediaries
have left the law muddied and insureds largely unprotected.
In 2004, the New York Attorney General launched an investigation
into whether the common compensation schemes offered to insurance
intermediaries by insurers had induced intermediaries to improperly steer
their clients’ insurance business to those insurers paying the most lucrative
commissions, without regard to their client’s interests. New York’s
investigation raised the question of whether the longstanding practice of
paying brokers contingent commissions undermined broker loyalty and
tainted the broker-insured relationship. The investigation and its aftermath
revealed the vulnerabilities of insureds to the undisclosed practices of
insurers and intermediaries. Impoverished case law on the loyalties and
duties owed by intermediaries to insureds, together with ignorance about
the conflicts raised by compensation and contingent commissions likely
exacerbated the problem. Thus, the time to look more closely at
intermediaries was long overdue.
*

Hazel Glenn Beh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
Hawai‘i, William S. Richardson School of Law.
**

Amanda M. Willis, Class of 2008, University of Hawaii, William S.
Richardson School of Law.
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This article explores the role of the intermediary in the context of
insurance in order to introduce reflections on intermediaries presented by
Professors Jeffrey Stempel, Daniel Schwarcz, and others at the 2008 AALS
program. Daniel Schwarcz considers the problems of compensation
schemes in the context of both commercial and personal lines of
insurance.1 Jeffrey Stempel examines the relatively unexamined role of
intermediaries employed after the formation of the insurance contract,
including so-called independent claims adjusters and managing general
agents.2
Part II discusses the various methodologies employed to
understand the legal relationship of intermediaries to insurers and insureds.
It concludes that principles of agency law do not provide a particularly
helpful framework to understand the legal relationships among insured,
insurer, and their intermediary because the intermediary’s role, even in a
single transaction, is inconstant.
Part III discusses judicial treatment of claims against
intermediaries. It finds the outcomes are fact-driven and unpredictable; it
is often difficult for courts to determine to whom an intermediary owes its
duties. It observes that courts frequently impose a relatively low standard
of care toward insureds upon intermediaries. The majority of courts apply
a low standard of care even to those intermediaries who are deemed
brokers working for the insured, and captive and independent agents have
even lesser obligations. The judicial treatment of intermediaries is out of
step with the pro-insured treatment courts generally adopt in disputes
between insurers and insureds.
Part IV then briefly considers whether contingent commissions
paid by insurers to intermediaries add further mischief to already confused
legal relationships. It introduces two views to be considered.
Professor Daniel Schwarcz contends that dangers indeed exist,
particularly the temptations of improper steering, and that disclosure of
intermediary compensation schemes to insureds is not sufficiently

1

Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom”
in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 878 (forthcoming).
2

Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Other Intermediaries:
The Increasingly
Anachronistic Immunity of Managing General Agents and Independent Claims
Adjusters, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 741 (forthcoming).
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protective.3 Schwarcz posits that even if “consumers understand their
intermediaries face a potential conflict” they cannot on their own “police
the quality of the advice they receive from their intermediaries or …
calculate the expected costs of this limitation.”4 Schwarz believes that
disclosure is insufficient even in the commercial insurance market with
sophisticated insureds, because even equipped with that disclosure,
insureds will lack a means to protect themselves.5 Schwarcz proposes
methods to reduce or eliminate the conflicts raised by compensation,
including perhaps by moving away from differential compensation in the
consumer insurance markets altogether.6
On the other hand, insurance insider Sean Fitzpatrick contends that
we should not abandon the contingent commission scheme, rather that
adding the safeguards of mandatory disclosure of compensation practices
should suffice.7 Fitzpatrick argues that the incidents of improper steering
and the conflicts raised by contingent commissions are exaggerated.8
Moreover, he views contingent commission schemes as beneficial to
consumers, because they encourage intermediaries to consider “long-term”
performance of insurers.9
3

Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 324 (2007) (concluding that
contingent commissions should be banned in the consumer market and possibly
banned in the commercial market as well).
4

Id. at 323.

5

Id. at 325-26.

6

Schwarcz, Differential Compensation, supra note 1.

7

Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Market
Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3067-71 (2006) (calling for voluntary
disclosure of compensation mechanisms). Sean M. Fitzpatrick is employed within
the insurance industry. He currently holds a Senior Vice President position with
The Chubb Corporation.
8

Id. at 3061-62.

9

Id. at 3061.
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Part V briefly comments on Jeffrey Stempel’s viewpoint on
outsourced independent adjusters and managing general agents – those
intermediaries employed by insurers to facilitate insurance functions after
the policy has been issued. He notes that bottom line interests have made
outsourcing these insurance tasks more common. Stempel cautions that
although these intermediaries carry out important functions associated with
insurance, the lack of regulation and a lack of viable legal theories
(particularly bad faith) against downstream intermediaries leaves them
largely immunized for their own errors. Stempel argues that expanding tort
liability to outsourced adjusters and administrators will improve
accountability, advance public policy, and enhance the effective operation
of the insurance market.10
Discussions about the legal status of intermediaries, the conflicts of
interest they encounter, and their potential liability to insureds has been
little explored or understood. Their role in the marketing, processing, and
management of insurance is vital and increasing.
I.

CLASSIFICATION OF INTERMEDIARIES

Insurers have access to a wide “variety of marketing channels.”11
These channels include direct marketing to buyers, through means such as
soliciting by Internet, mail, and company employees.12 To a large extent,
however, insurers rely on insurance intermediaries of various kinds to sell
their products.13
In direct writing, the insurer does not utilize an intermediary, but
engages in mass merchandising of its own insurance products.14 Direct
10

Stempel, supra note 2, at 741.

11

See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, 73 J. Risk & Ins. 359, 360 (2006). See also Background on
Insurance Intermediaries, 2004 Ins. Info. Inst. 4 , available at
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/774206_1_0/InsuranceIntermediaries.doc.
12

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360; Background on Insurance
Intermediaries, supra note 11, at 4.
13

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 (stating “the vast majority
of commercial [property and casualty] insurance sales involves an intermediary”).
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writers are employees of the insurer, working as the insurer’s sales force
and representing only the insurance company. With a direct writer, there is
often no face-to-face contact with a prospective insured, and no local agent.
Instead, communications are through employees, and via phone, mail, fax,
and Internet. Direct writers are simply the insurer’s own sales force.
Often, however, insurers use intermediaries to sell insurance, and
to bring insurers and prospects together. These intermediaries perform an
essential service in the insurance market that enables both the insured and
the insurer to transact business. Intermediaries may be labeled as “captive
agents,” agents that principally sell the products of a single company;
“independent agents” that typically sell for several insurers;15 and brokers,
that are engaged by insureds to procure insurance on their behalf. Brokers
“tend to service larger and more complicated business insurance needs.”16
Large brokers, with a global reach, are “highly concentrated” and “the bulk
of commercial [property and casualty] lines for the large and international
buyer segment of the market is placed by a small number of brokers for
each of whom it is their biggest source of revenue.”17
While there are numerous ways to classify intermediaries, each
merely describes aspects of their role. Commentator Sean Fitzpatrick
observes, “[i]ndeed, one can hardly locate an in-depth legal analysis of the
broker-agent distinction that does not feature words such as ‘blurry’ or
‘cloudy.’”18 Determining what intermediaries do and for whom they work
has not leant itself to easy answers; definitive characterizations have been
illusive. The intermediary’s relationship with the insurer and the insured
must often be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Among the ways to characterize intermediaries are a) by the
exclusivity-independence they have established in their contractual
relations with insureds and insurers; b) by the extent to which the insurer’s
mode of market distribution utilizes intermediaries; and c) by principles of
14

Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 638, 640 (1996).
15

Robert H. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law 64 (3d ed. 2002).

16

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361.

17

Id. at 363, 367.

18

Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3054.
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agency law, including the nature of the agent’s authority vis-à-vis the
insured or insurer. However, as described below, while these classification
exercises may help us understand the role of the intermediary, each does
little to help us understand the legal relationship between the intermediary,
the insurer, and the insured.
Characterization of intermediaries by the independence or
exclusivity they maintain is often unsatisfactory because the actual
relationship an intermediary has with insurers and insureds may be less
categorical.19 Many are neither strictly exclusive agents working for an
insurer nor strictly independent agents working for an insured. For
example, a “captive” agent is one who purportedly sells for a single insurer
and ought to be the most clearly an agent of the insurer. Yet a captive
agent may sell insurance products of other companies in some
circumstances.20 Moreover, by conduct directed toward the insured, a
captive agent may transform from an agent of the insurer to one for the
insured in a particular case.21
Just as captives may not be strictly captive, “independent” agents
are in fact be less independent than that label implies. Although agents are
called “independent,” implying that they are free from ties to any particular
insurance company, independent agents usually sell only for a handful of
insurers with whom they have agency appointment contracts.22
Importantly, although they have the independence to place insurance with

19

See, e.g., Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla. App. 1990) (whether
an agent works for insured or insurer presented a triable issue of fact).
20

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361. Captive agents may be
employees or independent contractors. Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 63738 (1996).
21

See Campbell v. Valley State Agency, 407 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Minn. App.
1987) (“agent may undertake an affirmative duty by entering into a special
relationship with an insured”).
22

In 2000, “the average independent insurance agency … represented 7.3
personal lines insurers, 6.7 commercial lines insurers, and 4.8 life and health
carriers.” JERRY, supra note 15, at 64.
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multiple insurers, they are not necessarily agents for the insured.23
Independent agents are vested with authority to perform certain acts for the
insurer and are paid commissions by the insurer based upon agreements
with particular insurers.24
Brokers, whose name implies that they work for the insured and
negotiate contracts on the insured’s behalf,25 are also not as independent as
their name implies. Brokers who purport to work for the insured also may
“place a significant portion of their business” under agency appointment
contracts.26 These contracts vest authority in brokers to perform certain
services for the insurer. This may be so even where the broker also charges
the insured a separate fee for their services.27 Thus, brokers in fact may be
working on behalf of both the insured and the insurer in a particular
transaction.28
Modes of market distribution may also help to characterize the role
of the intermediary. Modes of distribution tend to sort by the nature of the
lines sold.29 Personal lines, sold to consumers, are more frequently
distributed through direct marketing by insurance employees or through
23

See Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659, at *7
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006) (observing that independent agents may be agent of
the insured, but also for the insurer for some functions).
24

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 374-78.

25

The dictionary defines a broker as “an agent middleman who for a fee or
commission negotiates contracts of purchase and sale… between buyers and
sellers…” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 281 (3d ed.
1981).
26

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 361. See generally Md. Cas. Co. v.
J.M. Foster, 414 P.2d 672 (N.M. 1966) (agency agreements authorized
independent agent to bind and place insurance with four companies).
27

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 376-79 (observing that fees charged
to insured clients are “offset by commissions”).
28

See Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Fla. 1998) (“it is
equally well settled that an insurance broker may act in the dual capacity of broker
for insured and agent of the insurer”).
29

See JERRY, supra note 15, at 64.

578

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

captive and exclusive agencies.30 Commercial lines are more often
distributed through so-called independent agents and brokers.31 Notably,
some insurers now market through several distribution channels, “blurring
the boundaries that used to exist among insurers based upon distribution.”32
Intermediaries may also be characterized by agency principles,
particularly by the intermediary’s relationship to its principal, and the level
of authority vested in them. The problem here is that insurers vest varying
degrees of authority in agents, defying classification by their title. A
general agent, enjoying the broadest authority on behalf of an insurer, “is
authorized by an insurer to accept risks, to agree upon and settle the terms
of insurance policies, to issue and renew policies, and to modify or waive
the terms of existing policies.”33 “The powers of such an agent are
coextensive with the business entrusted to his care, authorizing him to act
for the principal in all matters coming within the usual and ordinary scope
and character of such business.”34
Insurers conduct much of their business through the use of
intermediaries with more limited authority. These limited authority agents
30

Id. (characterizing captive agents and insurance marketing through insurer
employees directly to buyers as examples of direct marketing).
31

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 362 (noting that independent
agencies and brokers “control 32 percent of personal lines business” and 68
percent of commercial lines of property and casualty.); Regan & Tennyson, supra
note 14, at 653 (observing the dominance of exclusive agencies in personal lines
and dominance of independent agents in commercial lines). More specifically,
Firms which use tied sales [exclusive agents] agents sell nearly 80 percent of
life-health insurance but hold only a 45 percent market share in property-liability
insurance; the remainder of each of these markets is sold by firms using
independent sales agents. The distribution of market shares by organizational form
is also systematic within more narrow classes of insurance: for example,
independent agency firms sell only 35 percent of private passenger auto insurance
but control 65 percent of the commercial auto insurance market.
Id. at 638.
32

JERRY, supra note 15, at 65.

33

Douglas Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 3 (2004).
34

Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Strickland, 491 So. 2d 872, 874 (Ala. 1985).
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are “authorized to act for the principal only in a particular transaction or in
a particular way.”35 Agents with limited authority to bind insurers are
characterized as “special agents,” and include “soliciting agents,” who are
not authorized to bind the insurer, but are authorized only “to solicit
insurance, to take applications for insurance and forward them to the
company or its general agent, to deliver policies once issued by the insurer,
and to collect premiums.”36 Although agents with limited authority cannot
bind the principal beyond the scope of that authority, the principal may still
be liable for the agent’s conduct, for example, when the agent commits
fraud under ‘respondeat superior’ principles.37
Characterizing the loyalties and duties of intermediaries by
examining the agent-principal relationship is imperfect at best, because
whether the insured or the insurer serves as the principal can depend on the
actual tasks performed. Intermediaries, both independent and exclusive,
perform valuable services that are desired and beneficial to both
prospective insureds and insurers.38 Thus, “[a]lthough an independent
agent or broker is normally an agent for the insured, for some purposes he
may be an agent for the insurer as well.”39 Determining for whom the
35

Id.

36

Richmond, supra note 33, at 4.

37

Washington, 491 So. 2d at 874-75.

38

Intermediaries can be characterized as “two-sided firms.” Cummins &
Doherty, supra note 11, at 361 n.3.
Three conditions must be present in a two-sided market: (1) two distinct
groups of customers; (2) the value obtained by one group increases with the size of
the other; and (3) an intermediary connects the two. Coordination of two-sided
markets requires that this intermediary or "middleman" create a platform for the
groups to interact. The intermediary must ensure the existence of a critical mass on
both sides.
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)application of the
Economics of Two-sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, at 517. As a
result, each side of the market intermediaries bring together may to some extent
subsidize the other. Id.
39

Washington, 491 So. 2d at 875. See also Young v. Allstate, 812 N.E.2d
741, 752 (Ill. App. 2004) (“An independent broker may act as agent of the insurer
and insured in certain circumstances.”).
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intermediary works in any given transaction at any point in time involves a
complicated factual inquiry.40 Determining for whom an intermediary
works may also require a factual analysis of how the intermediary was
engaged in this particular transaction.41
Insurers utilize intermediaries not only to sell their products, but
also to gather information utilized during the underwriting process, and to
provide services on behalf of the insurer to insureds during the coverage
period.42 As Regan and Tennyson observe, to ensure profitability,
“insurer[s] must devise an effective method of classifying applicants.”43
Generally, when underwriting requires gathering more sophisticated or
complex risk information, insurers utilize the services of independent
agents rather than captive agents.44

40

See Richmond, supra note 33, at 7-9. Richmond comments that brokers
“may be an agent of the insured for purposes of obtaining coverage” but an agent
of the insurer for purposes such as “issuing policies, issuing certificates of
insurance, collecting premiums, and the like.” Id. at 7-8.
41

See Young, 812 N.E.2d at 752 (quoting Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v.
Gitelson, 801 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (identifying four factors to
determine to whom a broker owes a duty as “1) who first set the agent in motion;
2) who controlled the agent’s action; 3) who paid the agent; and 4) whose interests
the agent was protecting”).)
42

Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 638-39. As Regan & Tennyson
explain the agent’s value in underwriting:
Although insurance sales agents do not typically participate in the
formal underwriting process, they frequently play an important role in
applicant risk assessment. The agent is the first contact the insurer has
with a potential policyholder and may be able to obtain information
about the consumer which would be difficult or costly for the firm to
verify. It is widely acknowledged that agents often employ subjective
criteria in evaluating insurance applicants. The agent's information may
then be used by the insurer in the decision regarding whether to insure,
or under what conditions to insure, an applicant.
Id. at 639.
43

Id. at 638.
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Prospective insureds also benefit from the expertise and labors of
intermediaries. A buyer, whether sophisticated or not, would be hard
pressed to intelligently compare characteristics of insurance products
beyond the premium charged without the expertise of an intermediary. For
example, nuances in policy language, insurer solvency, claims practices,
and reputation of the insurer are matters for which even sophisticated
insureds need the counsel of intermediaries. “[T]he buyer of insurance
faces the daunting task of first deciding what sort of insurance protection is
needed given the risks faced, and then comparing policies offering
alternative coverage at different prices from several insurers with different
levels of credit risk and reputations for claims settlement and policyholder
services.”45 Buyers, thus, turn to intermediaries to “match buyers with
insurers who have the skill, capacity, risk appetite, and financial strength to
underwrite the risk, and then help the client select from competing
offers.”46
Despite their vital functions in the insurance market, the
inconstancy and vagueness of their legally prescribed allegiances is
problematic. In any given intermediary relationship, the intermediary, the
insured, and the insurer cannot be certain for whom the intermediary is
working. Each time, ad hoc, and without definitiveness, courts must ask if
the intermediary was working in their own self-interest, the interest of the
insured, or the interest of the insurer.
II.

TREATMENT OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
COURTS
A. THE INTERMEDIARY’S STANDARD OF CARE

Although the relationships between insurer, intermediary, and
insured are complex and not easily categorized, cases have frequently
44

Id. at 663. The authors explain that the advantage of utilizing independent
agents “arises because the independent agent’s multiple placement opportunities
and ownership of policy expirations reinforce his incentives to participate in risk
assessment, thereby lowering the insurer’s marginal cost of obtaining agent
information.” Id.
45

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 359-60.

46

Id. at 360.
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adopted a relatively simplistic approach in disputes between insureds and
intermediaries. In litigation between intermediaries and their insureds,
little judicial attention is paid to the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds,
even though these same courts have developed special protective rules to
protect insureds in the context of suits between insureds and insurers.
Professor James Fischer, explaining why insurance contracts
traditionally have been judged contractually by special rules, explains that
insurers enjoy such a uniquely superior position in the relationship that it is
proper to treat the insurer-insured contract differently than any other.47
There are a variety of justifications for special rules. To name a few,
insurers are repeat players with greater knowledge and sophistication about
insurance than consumers. Insurers understand more about risk and about
the nuances and complexities of coverage and non-coverage in the context
of endless factual uncertainties that may arise. Insurance contracts are
super-adhesionary; insurers have unilaterally and carefully drafted the
insurance policy, and are unwilling to negotiate the language of the
document. Most importantly, Fischer explains, insurers hold substantially
more information than insureds about nearly every aspect of insurance, and
can use this asymmetric possession of information to their advantage.48
Reasonable expectations, contra proferentum, estoppel, and most notably
the tort of bad faith are all judicial inventions aimed at leveling the playing
field for insureds.49 Likewise, for the other important intermediary in the
third-party insurance context, the defense attorney, courts have created
extraordinary safeguards to protect insureds.50
47

See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1049-50
(1992).
48

Id. at 1050-51.

49

See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 85, 85-86 (2004) (discussing justifications for proinsured canons of contract interpretation, “including the adhesive quality of the
insurance product, the parties’ relative bargaining power, the relation of trust, the
parties’ asymmetric access to information, the unique nature of insurance, and the
quasi-public nature of the insurance industry”).
50

See, e.g., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc.,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing insured separate and
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The imbalance of knowledge, power, and sophistication that exists
between insureds and insurers is apparent between intermediaries and
insureds as well. Intermediaries are more like insurers than insureds: they
are repeat players in the insurance industry; they are equipped with
expertise, experience and a sophisticated knowledge of insurance; they
market products that insureds do not understand; they can exploit this
asymmetric possession of information to their advantage. Simply put,
insureds have no more savvy, knowledge, or power in the relationship with
their intermediary than they do with their insurer.
Despite the imbalances in the relationship between insureds and
intermediaries, case law often does not impose a particularly high standard
of care upon insurance intermediaries. Usually, courts do not regard these
intermediaries as fiduciaries and they are merely held liable under a
negligence theory. For some courts, it is the insured who bears most of the
risks associated with imperfect communications or failure to purchase
appropriate coverage. “[T]he majority of courts have placed the burden on
the client to know potential coverages and ask for a particular coverage”
rather than “requiring the agent to clarify the request and educate the
client.”51
A few courts have flirted with the notion that intermediaries,
particularly independent brokers, may be fiduciaries, on compelling facts52

independent counsel at insurer’s expense in instances of conflict). Even
jurisdictions that do not require so-called “Cumis counsel” establish enhanced
obligations to govern both the attorney hired by the insurer and the insurer itself.
See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1156-57 (Haw. 1998); see also Tank
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986).
51

Daniel Gregory Sakall, Note, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance
Agents to Advise Them? A Critique of the “Special Circumstances” Test, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 1002 (2000).
52

See, e.g., Watkins v. HRRW, LLC, No. 3:05-00279, 2006 WL 3327659 at
*8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2006) (a broker may be a fiduciary “if Plaintiff
establishes that: 1) that the transaction was not an ordinary arm’s length, business
transaction; and 2) that the particular facts establish a confidential relationship had
been established” and that to establish a confidential relationship the plaintiff must
have “reposed confidence in the agent who exercised dominion and influence to
act for the plaintiff’s benefit”).
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or for particular tasks.53 Only a handful of jurisdictions have characterized
the broker relationship generally as fiduciary.54 Arizona has adopted a
professional standard of care, that requires brokers to “exercise reasonable
care, skill and diligence in carrying out the agent’s duties . . . .”55
In spite of a handful of notable attempts to classify insurance
intermediaries as either professionals or fiduciaries, in most cases absent a
so-called “special relationship,” the only duty the intermediary actually
53

See, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. PRG Brokerage, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2272
(GHB), 2004 WL 35439 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2004) (noting that in New York, a
broker is a fiduciary in narrow circumstances, specifically collecting and receiving
premiums); see also Philips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 325,
327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (insurance agent is a fiduciary for the insured “with
respect to procuring insurance, correctly naming the insured in the policy, and
correctly advising the insured about the nature and extent of his coverage” but has
no fiduciary duty to advise insured in the absence of a request).
54

Illinois courts view the insured-broker relationship as fiduciary. However,
legislation limits broker liability. See DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Serv., 887
N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (insured stated a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty for alleged misappropriation of premiums, an exception to statutory
immunity). In New Jersey, a broker’s duties have been characterized as fiduciary:
Further, as a result of the special nature of their relationship, an insurance
broker owes a fiduciary duty towards its principal:
Any individual seeking insurance should be able to rely on the expertise of the
agent, regardless of the prior contract between the parties. The fiduciary nature of
such a relationship should not depend solely upon the length of the relationship.
Because of the increasing complexity of the insurance industry and the specialized
knowledge required to understand all of intricacies, the relationship between an
insurance agent and a client is often a fiduciary one.
In re Payroll Exp. Corp., Bankruptcy No. 92-B-43150 (CB), 2005 WL
2438444 at *17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005) (summarizing New Jersey law
and quoting Sobotor v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.).
55

Sw. Auto. Painting and Body Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268, 1271
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). See Shane Ham, Arizona Case Note, Webb v. Gittlen:
Assignability of Professional Negligence Claims Against Insurance Agents, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 650-51 (2008) (observing that Arizona is in a minority of
jurisdictions elevating agents to a professional standard of care).
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owes the insured is to act reasonably to procure the specific policy the
insured requests.56 It has proven difficult for insureds to establish that a
special relationship in fact existed. “A special relationship in the context of
insurance requires more than the ordinary insurer-insured relationship.”57
The agent must take some affirmative step to elevate the relationship, such
as “hold[ing] himself or herself out as a highly skilled insurance expert, and
the insured relies to his detriment on that expertise.”58 It may “also be
demonstrated by a long term relationship of confidence, in which the agent
or broker assumes the duty to render advice, or has been asked to provide
advice, and the advisor is compensated accordingly, above and beyond the
premiums customarily earned.”59
Lewis-Williamson v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co.60 illustrates
judicial reticence to find a special relationship. There, the plaintiff, a 78year-old homeowner, had insured her home through Grange Mutual since
1981.61 Beginning in 1991, plaintiff purchased her insurance through
Clute, an agent who wrote “property insurance exclusively for Grange
Insurance unless Grange Insurance d[id] not offer the requested insurance,
in which case Clute [wa]s authorized to seek coverage from another
insurance company.”62 In 1996, when plaintiff’s policy limits were
$200,000, she attended a Grange Hall meeting63 and discussed her
56

Michael Childress et al., A Matter of Trust, 2005 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 30,
32; Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability: Crossing
the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 242 (2002); Richmond, supra note
33, at 16.
57

Sadler v. Loomis Co., 776 A.2d 25, 35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

39 P.3d 947 (Or. App. 2000).

61

Id. at 948.

62

Id.

63

Grange Hall is a national social and community centered association for
farmers with local affiliates in rural communities. Importantly, Grange Mutual is
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insurance with Clute after the meeting. According to the court, Grange
Insurance was only available to Grange members and Clute discussed
insurance needs with members after the Grange meetings.
Plaintiff asked Clute to increase her insurance “to at least double”
and that she wanted “replacement cost.”64 Focusing on the “casual nature
of the relationship,” the court observed that Clute told plaintiff he would
“stop by,” but did not make a formal appointment with her.65 Thereafter,
Clute did stop by when she was not there, and examined only the exterior
of her home. Intimidated by a large dog, Clute did not fully inspect the
home.66 Nevertheless, Clute did provide the plaintiff with advice. “Based
on his exterior inspection and a telephone conversation with plaintiff, Clute
recommended to plaintiff that she increase her coverage on the residence to
$510,000.”67 Plaintiff followed his recommendation.
In 1998, plaintiff’s residence was completely destroyed and
replacement costs were estimated at $700,000, well in excess of the insured
value.68 Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Clute, and against
Grange on vicarious liability. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of both defendants, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.69
The court explained that, absent a special relationship, “an
insurance agent acting as an agent for the insured owes a general duty to
exercise reasonable skill and care in providing the requested insurance.”70
an insurer that focuses on the insurance needs of rural and farm communities.
HOOVER’S BASIC CO. REC., GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY (2009); see
also Malcolm Trupp, Locally, Granges Thriving, THE REGISTER GUARD, May 20,
2008, at A7.
64

Lewis-Williamson, 39 P.3d at 950.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 948.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 949.

69

Id. at 948-49.

70

Lewis-Williamson, 39 P.3d at 949.
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The court acknowledged that plaintiff placed trust in Clute to advise her,
but distinguished between the factual trust plaintiff placed in Clute and
trust establishing a legal obligation to act in her interest. “The fact that she
trusted him and deferred to his judgment does not make him her agent or
show that he was acting on her behalf.”71 The court continued, “[a]lthough
plaintiff trusted Clute to take care of her insurance needs, there is no
evidence that she had reason to expect, other than through her trusting
nature, that he would work on her economic behalf.”72 The court noted that
as a captive agent, Clute was Grange’s agent, not hers, and had “been
available to her for her convenience by virtue of his presence at Grange
Hall meetings, but that was for the economic benefit of Grange and himself
and not plaintiff.”73
The result is troubling. A 78-year-old homeowner purchased an
inadequate amount of insurance through a mutual insurer who particularly
catered to rural clients, whose captive agent had purposely cultivated a
lengthy and trusted relationship, and who affirmatively offered faulty
advice. Yet in the court’s view the insured was not reasonable to trust
Clute’s advice.74
71

Id. at 950.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

The plaintiff would have been better off if Clute had advised her to obtain
an appraisal of the cost of replacement, rather than to suggest an amount. Had he
not wanted her to follow his advice, he could have easily warned her that it was
merely his own personal opinion or better yet, not rendered any advice at all.
Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 583 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003), is equally disturbing. Canales, a customer of independent agent Wilson for
several years, sought automobile insurance to cover his vehicle in both the United
States and Mexico. Canales did not speak English, and brought an interpreter with
him to the insurance agency. After the insured vehicle was destroyed in Mexico,
the insurer denied the claim because driving in Mexico was excluded from
coverage. Canales filed suit against Wilson claiming Wilson did not procure the
proper insurance for Canales. At summary judgment, the fact of whether Wilson
expressly said the automobile policy would cover trips to Mexico was hotly
contested. Both the interpreter and Canales claimed Canales requested Mexico
coverage and that Wilson said the policy would cover driving in Mexico, while
Wilson denied the alleged statements. Id. at 204. On the other hand, it was
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B. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE
PRODUCT AND CURRENT STANDARDS FOR INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY
Lewis-Williamson illustrates the majority rule that, absent “special
circumstances,” little is owed by an insurance intermediary to the insured.
It further illustrates judicial reluctance to find that special relationship, even
on quite compelling facts. This approach does not appropriately account
for the level of trust commonly placed in intermediaries or the lack of
Insurance
sophistication and expertise common to insureds.75
intermediaries are generally viewed as a sales force for insurers and
“something less than professionals”76 by the courts,77 despite the
importance and complexity of the product they sell.78 While courts may
undisputed that Canales, who did not read English, did not read the policy issued
nor have his interpreter read it to him. Canales also claimed that he relied on
Wilson to obtain appropriate insurance, that he trusted Wilson to advise him,
particularly because of their prior dealings and because Canales was
unsophisticated in matters of insurance. Id. at 204-205. Despite the contested
facts regarding what was said, Wilson obtained summary judgment, because the
language of the policy issued was clear and Canales had a duty to read the policy
or have someone read it to him. Id. The court observed, just because “two
people…have come to repose trust and confidence in each other as a result of such
dealings is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a finding that a confidential
relationship exists between them.” Id. at 205 (quotation marks omitted).
75

The special circumstances exception that many jurisdictions adhere to
requires the plaintiff insured to establish something more than an ordinary brokerinsured relationship, i.e., a factual basis for a heightened standard of care imposed
on the intermediary. See Richmond, supra note 33, at 27-28 (describing instances
where courts have found a special relationship). Yet, even when confronted with
special circumstances, courts seem reluctant to find the exception applies. As
Richmond observes, “special relationships are not lightly created.” Id. at 27.
76

Sakall, supra note 51, at 1004.

77

Id. at 993.

78

Sakall, surveying approaches adopted by courts observed that the standard
of care set by courts is inappropriately low, and the special circumstances test
unwieldy. He argued that an Arizona approach is preferable. Under Arizona
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not regard intermediaries as professionals, intermediaries commonly
market themselves as professionals with expert knowledge that consumers
can trust.79
Paradoxically, courts frequently have imposed unrealistically high
expectations on insureds in these transactions: to read and understand an
insurance policy, and to understand and communicate precisely their own
insurance needs.80 Insureds, both commercial and individual, are expected
to carefully research the purchase of insurance as they would the purchase
of any commodity, including checking with multiple sources and
comparing prices and benefits.81 Caveat emptor applies to the procurement
caselaw, Sakall explains that the duty of agents may include a duty to advise. He
writes:
The Arizona approach is preferable to the majority’s “special circumstances”
test for a number of reasons. First, agents’ duties do not turn on whether they are
company agents or brokers. All insurance agents are held to a general professional
duty. Second, an agent’s liability turns not upon some dictate by the court but,
rather, upon the conduct of the agent’s colleagues and a jury’s determination. If
both their colleagues and a jury believe it reasonable for an agent not to have
advised a client, the agent will not be found liable. Third, agents gain some
certainty in knowing that they must keep up with industry customs rather than
hoping that a judge does not create some new type of “special circumstance.”
Fourth, courts are open to clients who truly entrust their insurance concerns to their
agents and seek their agents’ advice. Fifth, the Arizona approach does not decrease
judicial efficiency, as the “special circumstances” rule still requires a jury trial
before the judge can determine whether a duty exists. Finally, if a client's damages
are limited to the policy limits of a policy that should have been recommended,
there is no danger of subverting the fundamental purpose of insurance in allocating
risk.
Sakall, supra note 51, at 1013.
79
80

Id. at 1011.

In this regard, both sophisticated commercial insureds and unsophisticated
consumer insureds fare similarly. See, e.g., Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no duty of insured’s broker to
advise or explain “watchman” warranty to an insured corporate owners of a river
vessel purchasing marine insurance).
In my view, Richmond also has
unrealistically heightened expectations of insureds. See Richmond, supra note 33,
at 33 (“[c]ommerical insureds are keenly attuned to deductible amounts and
issues”).
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of insurance.82 Notably, the brokerage houses involved in the Spitzer
investigation dealt with large commercial insureds. Yet even these highly
sophisticated insureds were unable to discern whether they were obtaining
the services they needed at a fair price. It begs the question, if even
business savvy commercial insureds are unable to protect their interests,
how can we expect personal insurance consumers to guard against their
agents’ undisclosed financial motives without safeguards?
Judicial reluctance to impose a professional standard of care on
intermediaries ignores the realities that insurance products are so complex,
the customers so unsophisticated, and the bargaining aspects so one-sided
that insureds deserve special advantages to level the field. The market for
intermediaries exists because of the complexity and incomprehensibility of
insurance policies. Even sophisticated insureds must seek the counsel and
advice of an intermediary to understand what they are purchasing.83
Nevertheless, despite the fact that courts understand the vulnerabilities of
the insured and protect them in other aspects of the insurance transaction,
they neglect a principled approach of imposing a professional standard of
care on intermediaries. A heightened standard of care better protects
insureds and acknowledges the trust intermediaries nurture, expertise they
possess, and the advice they provide.
III.

INSURANCE INTERMEDIARY COMPENSATION

On October 14, 2004, then New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer filed a complaint against one of the world’s largest insurance
brokers, Marsh and McLennan, alleging that the compensation scheme
between it and certain insurance companies constituted fraudulent business
practices.84 The suit alleged that Marsh improperly steered its customer
81

Richmond, supra note 33, at 12, (citing Weisblatt v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
82

Id.

83

Beh, supra note 49, at 94, 97-98.

84

See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3041 (recounting events and
repercussions of the New York lawsuits and investigations). See also In re Marsh
ERISA Litigation, No. 04 Civ. 8157(SWK), 2006 WL 370169 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
2006). Insurers were also targeted in the Spitzer investigation. For example, Aon
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business to insurers in order to take advantage of Marsh’s commission
structure with these insurers. The suit alleged that the compensation
agreements Marsh had developed with key insurers created an incentive for
Marsh to steer business to insurers that paid maximum contingent
commissions, regardless of whether those insurers offered the most
competitive rates to Marsh’s clients. The suit raised the question of
whether the compensation scheme between insurers and intermediaries
created insurmountable conflicts of interest between insureds, insurers, and
their intermediaries.85
A. CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS
Independent agents and exclusive agents both typically earn
compensation through commissions paid by insurers.86 Brokers, who are
selected by insureds to provide broader risk management assessment than
simply placing insurance, earn commissions for the insurance they place,
even while charging fees to insureds for other services.87
It has been “a familiar and public feature of the insurance market”88
to also pay “contingent commissions”89 to intermediaries, and it is these
Corporation eventually settled with the State of New York, apologized for
participating in contingent commission steering schemes, and established a fund
for insured claimants. See Piven v. Ryan, No. 05 CV 4619, 2006 WL 756043, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2006).
85

While attention was largely directed at large commercial brokers, such as
Marsh and Willis, in fact contingent commissions were common compensation
schemes with brokers of all sizes. Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3045, 3056-57.
86

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. Cummins and Doherty
also observe that “[s]ome intermediaries also receive noncash compensation from
insurers” to reward “superior performance.” Id. at 379, n.17.
87

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.

88

Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3049.

89

Id. The practice of paying commissions based upon profitability is not new.
See, e.g., Harris & Spear, Inc. v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 68 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1933) (describing terms of a 1922 broker contract with an insured: “By
the terms of the contract the said general agents or managers were allowed ‘a flat
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types of commissions, more so than commissions based solely on
premiums, that have drawn criticism. Contingent commissions are
typically earned based on the intermediary’s profitability to the insurer.90
“Typically, contingent commissions are based on the profitability of the
intermediary’s business placed with the insurer, the persistency rate, and/or
on the volume of business.”91
Contingent commission compensation structures vary from insurer
to insurer, even between intermediaries for the same insurer, and from line
to line.92 They may be contingent on volume sold, i.e., the intermediary
receives a commission based on reaching certain volumes; or they may be
profit based, i.e., the intermediary receives a commission based on factors
such as claims filed on a policy.93
Contingent commissions reward intermediaries for meeting profit
aims of the insurer. Until recently, there was no obligation or practice that
encouraged intermediaries to disclose the manner or amount of
compensation they earned from the insurer to the insured.94

commission of thirty-five per cent of the net premiums written,’ and, in addition
thereto, ‘a contingent commission of fifteen (15) per cent of the net profits of the
business under their charge, said profits to be computed as of the 31st day of
December, 1923, and annually thereafter on the business of each ‘single’ year so
long as this agreement shall continue.”). An agreement between a broker and an
insurer from the 1980’s described the contingent commission as based on 25% of
the “[n]et underwriting profit” described as “the excess of income to plaintiff
[insurance company] over outgo from plaintiff.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Risk Exchange, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 7461 (MJL), 1990 WL 210258
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1990).
90

Regan & Tennyson, supra note 14, at 648-50.

91

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379. See Roth v. AON Corp., 2008
WL 65069 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2008) (“‘contingent commissions’ refers to a
practice in which brokers such as Aon received payments from insurers based on
the overall volume or profitability of business that brokers placed with those
insurers.”).
92

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 379.

93

Id.

2009]

INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

593

The perceived problem with contingent commissions is that
intermediaries earned additional and different commissions based upon
where they placed an insured’s business.95 Some assert that these
commissions create an irreconcilable conflict between the intermediary and
the insured because the intermediary’s self interest in compensation may
not be aligned with the insured’s interest in obtaining the best insurance for
their needs at the best price.96 The variability in compensation between
insurers and the availability of contingent commissions tend to pit the
insured’s interests against the intermediary’s own financial interests, while
the lack of disclosure makes it unlikely that insureds would be able to
protect themselves.
Contingent commissions may force the intermediary to choose
between their own desire to enhance their income and their responsibility to
place the insured with the insurer and policy most ideally suited to meet the
insured’s needs. This type of commission creates the risk of “steering,”
where the insured is placed with the insurer that provides the best
commission rather than the best policy for the insured.97 Contingent
94

Douglas Richmond argues that intermediaries do not have any duty to
disclose their compensation to insureds. Richmond, supra note 33, at 35-36. He
argues that the competitive marketplace and other market forces, state regulation,
impracticalities, and its attenuated effect on premiums favor a no duty to disclose
compensation rule. Id.
95

The intermediary’s value to the insurer is the fact that they own their client
lists. “Agent ownership of policy expirations means that the insurance provider
has no legal right to solicit an independent agent’s clients directly or to replace the
agent and assign his customers to another agent.” Regan & Tennyson, supra note
14, at 640. When a policy is first placed or later renewed, an agent earns a
“premium based commission.” Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375. This
is “a commission which is a proportion of premium volume.” Regan & Tennyson,
supra note 14, at 648. Some insurers only pay premium-based commissions.
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 375.
96
97

Schwarcz, supra note 3.

Id. at 297. See Jeffrey Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common
Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial Lines Insurance (U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004),
available at http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/S02-Wilder.pdf. The study found that
contingency fees affect where brokers place their customers in several ways.
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commissions may also serve to limit the intermediary’s drive to search for
low prices and bargains.98 If the intermediary chooses to prioritize “their
receipt of contingent commissions over their market-matching role,” their
customers may receive suboptimal insurance, or a much more expensive
policy than their needs dictate.99
B. REPONSES TO CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS
Different schools of thought exist regarding the best way to
counteract the harmful effects of contingent commissions. Some are
convinced that contingent commissions are efficient and do not harm
insureds.100 For those who view contingent commissions as benign, a
solution to calm fears is to permit contingent commissions but require
Brokers receiving contingency fees are more likely to place new customers with
insurers offering contingency fees, they are less likely to move renewing insureds
to non-contingency fee paying insurers, and they are less likely to place customers
with insurers “for which contingency fee contracts have been ‘swamped’ by past
losses and are unlikely to pay contingency fees in the current year.” Id.
98

Victor P. Goldberg & Richard A. Epstein, Introductory Remarks: Some
Reflections on Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 509,
512 (2005).
99

Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878. Recently, an Illinois Appellate Court
recognized that an allegation that the broker’s undisclosed contingent commissions
“led [the broker] to place certain policies for the customer’s needs” could state a
claim for misappropriation of premiums. DOD Tech. v. Mesirow Ins. Servs., Inc.,
887 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ill. App. 3d 2008). On the other hand, Richmond takes the view
that intermediaries have no duty to disclose and that no cause of action for failure
to disclose contingent commissions is viable. Richmond, supra note 33, at 33.
Richmond contends that claims based on a failure to disclose commissions are illconceived. Id. He writes, “[b]oth agents and brokers are entitled to what the
insurance industry considers to be reasonable compensation for their services, even
if cost-conscious insureds think otherwise.” Id. at 36. However, in our view,
Richmond does not adequately consider the allegation of self-motivated steering. .
100

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 360 (“Although contingent
commissions, like most business practices, can be misused by the unscrupulous, in
general such compensation plans play an important role in aligning incentives
between buyers and insurers and thus facilitate the efficient operation of insurance
markets.”)
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disclosure of the compensation scheme by which they are earned.
Proponents of contingent commissions view disclosure as a compromise
that would enable insurance customers to make informed decisions.101
Opponents of contingent commission argue that disclosure alone
cannot correct the fundamental unfairness in the marketplace that
contingent commissions exacerbate. For them, nothing short of banning
contingent commissions altogether will suffice.102 Notably, New York’s
investigation involved extremely sophisticated insureds, employing and
paying for the services of one of the largest brokerage firms in the world.
Yet they were unaware of potential conflict posed by contingent
commissions or the steering that might or did occur at their expense.103
Full disclosure might have helped them to negotiate a clearer deal with
their brokers, but only if they had true choices. Arguably, in a concentrated
broker market they may not have had choices. Disclosure cannot protect
insureds in the consumer or smaller markets, where there is little ability to
negotiate a different arrangement.
Thus, Schwarcz’s position is
particularly compelling in the personal lines market.
IV.

OTHER INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES

Insureds at least know that an intermediary is brokering the
procurement of insurance; however Professor Stempel writes about
intermediaries of whom insureds know far less.104 These intermediaries are
employed by insurers after the contract has been formed and do work on
behalf of the insurer. Many of the functions undertaken by these

101

Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 3067-71 (citing “transparency” as the key to
the problem posed by contingent commissions).
102
103

Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 878.

Joseph B. Treaster, Connecticut Suit Says Marsh and Insurer Misled State,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
22,
2005,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/business/22insure.html (“Clients paid Marsh
a fee or commission for unbiased recommendations and, according to the lawsuit,
were often unaware of the incentive payments”).
104
Stempel, supra note 2, at 741.
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intermediaries are those that have traditionally been in-house operational
functions, such as underwriting, adjusting, and claim-handling.105
The issue concerning these intermediaries is not for whom they
work or where their loyalties lie. We know that downstream intermediaries
work for the insurer. The issue here is whether it better protects insureds
and serves the public good to subject these intermediaries to tort liability
when their actions harm insureds. If they act as agents for the insurer, is it
sufficient that the insured can pursue a claim against that insurer, or would
it be advantageous to allow an independent claim against the intermediary
as well?
Lack of privity between the insured and these intermediaries
generally has made them untouchable, under either tort or third party
beneficiary theories. Stempel notes that the prevailing view is that there is
not a pressing need to create a cause of action because the insured can
adequately vindicate claims by suing the insurer, who should be liable as
the principal.106 He complains that it is unfair to use the barrier of privity
to preclude tort liability.107 After all, in these instances the intermediary
usually deals directly with the insured, and even if they are not in privity,
the insured is obviously a foreseeable plaintiff. Insulating a tortfeasor for
its own conduct toward a foreseeable plaintiff, simply on the grounds of
privity, undermines basic tort principles.
Stempel argues that these intermediaries should be subject to
potential liability.108 Among other reasons, he observes that potential
105

Independent adjusters are independent contractors who work for insurers
and self-insurers to investigate and adjust claims. Public adjusters, on the other
hand, work for insureds to help them present their claim. See, e.g., Hammill v.
Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226, 232 (Vt. 2005) (explaining that
independent adjusters works “in behalf of the insurer” and public adjuster works
“in behalf of insured”); Benjamin v. Thomas Howell Group, No. Civ.1996-071,
2002 WL 31573004, at *2 (D.Virgin Islands Apr. 22, 2002) (explaining that a
public adjuster works on behalf of the insured, while an independent adjuster
“represent[s] the interests of the insurer”). See also NY Adjusters: Who We Are,
http://www.nyadjusters.org/Who_we_are/who_we_are.html.
106

Stempel, supra note 2, at 547.

107

Id.

108

See id.
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liability to insureds will make intermediaries more directly accountable for
their wrongdoing, and that in and of itself advances societal interests. He
also notes we cannot count on insurers to always have the ability or
incentive to police the conduct of intermediaries who are authorized to act
on their behalf, because these intermediaries often function in capacities
beyond the tight control of the insurer, operating with some independence
and autonomy.109 The public policy interests that legitimate claims be
promptly investigated and paid, and that unfounded claims be denied are
better served by holding those who impede those interests to account. Each
cog that carries out the functions that facilitate the proper administration of
insurance should bear the attendant liability. Finally, insureds here are just
as peculiarly vulnerable as they are in all other aspects of insurance
transactions. Downstream intermediaries stand between insureds and the
insurer who owes a duty to investigate, process, and pay claims honestly
and expeditiously. The insured has little power to leverage here, except
what power judicially constructed protections can provide.
CONCLUSION
Several dominant themes emerge in the examination of insurance
intermediaries that lead to a single conclusion. First, the public knows little
about the intermediary who sells them a product or processes or
investigates their claims on behalf of insurers. In the case of intermediaries
brokering insurance, fundamental questions include: Who does he work
for? To whom does he owe his allegiance? Who is paying him? Is he a
professional or a salesperson? What recourse is there if he fails to carry out
his duties? In the case of downstream intermediaries, similar questions
arise, such as: What independent responsibilities and liabilities to the
insured does he shoulder for his negligence? That these basic questions are
so difficult to answer should compel us to re-think how we regard the
intermediary.
The second theme is how relatively low the standard of care is for
intermediaries considering the important work they do to facilitate the
insured-insurer relationship. The law has established special contract and
tort principles to judge the conduct of insurers. It has done so because it
recognizes the peculiar vulnerabilities of insureds and strengths of insurers.
The insured is just as vulnerable in dealings with intermediaries, and
intermediaries share similar strengths with insurers. Intermediaries also
109

Stempel, supra note 2, at 547.

598

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

operate in a complex world where insurers and insureds do not share a
common language. Intermediaries know a lot about insurance and have an
important role in the interface between insureds and insurers but they also
have competing interests that are unknown to insureds.
Courts have been champions of insureds when it comes to policing
the relationship between insurers and insureds. Courts often favor insureds
in the interpretation of insurance contracts; courts construct contractual and
tort claims to restrain overbearing conduct, and courts place heightened
duties on attorneys who represent insureds at the behest of insurers.
Curiously, courts have paid scant attention to the important role of
intermediaries in the insurance transaction, and have barely considered
whether this to is an area that needs judicial vigilance. It is therefore an
opportune time for all of us to examine more closely these important and
mysterious middlemen and develop a more principled approach.

THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES:
THE INCREASINGLY ANACHRONISTIC
IMMUNITY OF MANAGING GENERAL AGENTS AND
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS ADJUSTERS
Jeffrey W. Stempel٭
***
This article addresses the “other” intermediaries involved in the
administration of insurance policies, specifically “downstream”
intermediaries, who are engaged in the administration of insurance
claims. The focus is on managing general agents, third-party
administrators and independent contractor claims adjusters, who perform
the nuts-and-bolts tasks of the insurance industry, and are generally less
well compensated than commercial insurance brokers. Since these “other”
intermediaries are immune from judicial claims by policyholders, they are
also less incentivized to perform their duties well. The article argues that,
in order to improve the claims process, the “other” intermediaries should
be held accountable for their misconduct, at least in tort, or even for “bad
faith” in the manner of an insurer. It reviews the benefits of accountability
and suggests a workable standard for intermediary liability where an
intermediary is potentially liable when a policyholder has alleged
negligence or some greater wrongdoing.
***

٭
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INTRODUCTION

As a result of headline-grabbing investigations regarding
commissions, the role and conduct of major insurance brokers has received
prominent attention in the news1 and also in the academy.2 In this
Symposium, Professor Daniel Schwarcz continues his scholarly inquiry on
1

See, e.g., Ian McDonald, Marsh, Spitzer Settle with $850 Million, An
Apology to Clients, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2005, at C1; Monica Langley & Ian
McDonald, Marsh Averts Criminal Case with New CEO – Resignation and Shift
On Business Model Reflect Pressure of Spitzer Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004,
at A1; Monica Langley & Theo Francis, Policy Matters: Marsh Probe May Be Tip
of U.S. Insurance Scandal – As Spitzer Broadens Inquiry Into Bid-Rigging, Rivals
Like Aon are Felling Heat, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct 18, 2004, at A1; Theo Francis,
Spitzer Charges Bid Rigging in Insurance - Top Broker, Major Firms Named in
Legal Actions;`Trust Me: This Is Day One’, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at A1.
See also Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against
Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study
of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111 (20042005) (concluding that Spitzer’s use of the media, although questionable on
fairness grounds, violated no rules of attorney professional conduct); Stacy
Anderson, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2004, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 1, 94 (2005) (“New York Goes After the Insurance Industry”).
Former Attorney General and Governor Spitzer’s assessment of the practice of
undisclosed contingent commissions is reflected in the title of a press release. See
Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
Investigation reveals Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html.
Ironically, Spitzer later would resign the governorship in disgrace after an
embarrassing tryst with a very expensive prostitute that raised the prospect, later
dropped, of criminal prosecution. See Tom Precious, No Charges for Spitzer in
Probe of Prostitution; Federal Prosecutors Conclude Investigation, BUFF. NEWS,
Nov. 7, 2008, at A1; Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns as N.Y. Governor;
Fierce Enforcer of Ethics is Brought Down by Sex Scandal, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar. 13, 2008, at 1.
2

See, e.g., Sean Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to
Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2006); J. David Cummins
& Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS.
359 (2006). For a pre-Spitzer scholarly examination of the issue, see Laureen
Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance
Marketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON. 637 (1996).
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this topic,3continuing to make common sense regarding the limits of
permissible broker compensation and the wisdom of regulation of broker
commissions. His suggestion in this symposium, that hidden or contingent
commissions are more of a problem for consumer insurance than for
commercial insurance, seems to me unassailable.4 As Schwarcz argues
persuasively, the problems presented by undisclosed contingent
commissions in the world of commercial insurance brokerage are
magnified in the context of consumer insurance purchases. Defenders of
commercial brokerage contingent commissions have generally had the
weaker of the argument in general. Applied to consumer insurance
purchases, the defenses-cum-apologies for traditional contingent
commissions seem even more wanting.
Reviewing the law of insurance intermediary liability, Professor
Hazel Beh concludes “that courts frequently impose a relatively low
standard of care toward insureds upon intermediaries.”5 She also finds that
“traditional principles of agency law do not provide a particularly helpful
framework to understand the legal relationships among insured, insurer,
and their intermediaries because the intermediary’s role is inconstant.”6
The insurance intermediary is a different type of agent, one that not only is
the assigned arm of a primary principal but also has duties to another party
to the transaction and is subject to public interest considerations generally
surrounding the insurance industry.
Rather than echoing Professor Schwarcz’s compelling critique of
the pitfalls of traditional broker compensation or Professor Beh’s insight
regarding the limits of traditional agency law as applied to insurance
intermediaries, this article addresses the seemingly overlooked “other”
intermediaries involved in the administration of insurance policies. Rather
than focusing on the “upstream” intermediaries involved in the sale of
insurance policies, this article concentrates on “downstream”
intermediaries involved in the administration of insurance claims. In
3

See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent
Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007).
4

See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the
Bottom” in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
5

See Hazel Beh, Insurance Intermediaries, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming
2009).
6

See id.
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particular, it addresses the question of whether “downstream” insurance
intermediaries should be responsible to policyholders and third parties for
errors in claims handling. The primary focus is upon managing general
agents (“MGAs”), third-party administrators (“TPAs”) and independent
contractor claims adjusters, rather than the legal and medical professionals
that could also be characterized as downstream intermediaries in the
relationship between policyholders and insurers. This article also touches
upon the law’s treatment of other actors commonly involved in the claims
process as a useful guide to determining the proper legal governance and
liability exposure of MGAs, TPAs and adjusters.
As compared to MGAs, TPAs and independent claims adjusters,
commercial insurance brokers, the primary focus of recent scholarship on
intermediaries, are the “sexy,” “Hollywood” intermediaries of the
insurance business. Figuratively, at least, they eat at the Four Seasons and
are fixtures at the industry’s golf outings in Bermuda or other resort
destinations, as they schmooze with clients and insurers in search of policy
sales.
For their efforts, brokers, like Marsh and Aon, are well
compensated, often paid six figures in annual base pay for representing a
policyholder in search of insurance, as well as typically receiving longstanding (but now occasionally controversial) commissions based on the
insurance products they procure for their large, wealthy, prestigious
business clients.
In contrast, MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters are saddled
with the decidedly less festive task of underwriting (sometimes), billing,
record-keeping, and claims processing: ensuring that the insurance policies
for which the brokers have already been well paid are properly
administered. In return for shouldering these nuts-and-bolts tasks and
potentially alienating policyholders through claims denial or mishandling,
these other intermediaries are generally less well compensated, particularly
as respects claims adjusting. They are more likely to be wolfing down a
Big Mac in the office or on the way to an appointment then lunching in the
finer restaurants of a major city.
The comparatively low-budget drudgery of these other
intermediaries unfairly masks their importance to the insurance system.
Many insurers have “outsourced” substantial parts of their operations,
making MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters de facto insurers, at least
for purposes of these key tasks related to policy administration and claims
handling. Despite their increasing importance, these intermediaries have
historically been immune from claims by disgruntled policyholders (or
others, including claimants) so long as the insurer for whom they work is
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known to the policyholder or there is no formal written contract between
the downstream intermediary and the policyholder or other third party.
As a result, these intermediaries have been effectively beyond the
reach of judicial regulation while being simultaneously under-regulated by
executive branch insurance departments. Faced with reduced incentive to
discharge their duties well, the other intermediaries frequently act
negligently, recklessly, or even in bad faith, needlessly creating claims
imbroglios that could be avoided, minimized, or streamlined.
In the past, legal reluctance to hold these other intermediaries
responsible for errors may have been tolerable or even efficient. Today,
however, the greater near-autonomous role now shouldered by MGAs,
TPAs and independent adjusters demands that they be treated under the law
on a par with the insurers they represent. Instead of essentially being
immunized from the consequences of their errors, these intermediaries
should be held accountable, at least in tort for misconduct even if not for
“bad faith” in the manner of an insurer.7 Holding these intermediaries
more accountable holds at least some promise for improvement of the
claims process.

7

See Largest MGAs/underwriting managers, BUS. INS., Sept. 8, 2008, at 20
(ranking of MGAs shows ten largest to have 2007 premium volume of more than
$5 billion, reflecting the degree to which these intermediaries have become big
business.) This article does not address questions of the duties and liabilities owed
by “front end” insurance intermediaries generally but instead addressed the “back
end” or “downstream” (my preferred term) intermediaries involved in policy
administration and claims. See id. As noted above, the issue of the degree to
which brokers or sales agents may be liable to insurers, policyholders, or others
and the standard of care applicable to these “upstream” intermediaries lies beyond
the scope of this article. Id. In general, both brokers and agents may be
independently liable to insurance applicants and policyholders for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of their duties even when their actions are not
binding on their principals. See, e.g., Terrain Tamers Chip Hauling, Inc. v. Ins.
Mktg. Corp. of Oregon, 152 P.3d 915, 918 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (settlement with
insurer does not extinguish policyholder’s claim against agent). But see Bentley v.
North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 705, 712-713 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(policyholder cannot bring bad faith claim against insurance sales agent because of
lack of privity of contract). See also Londo v. McLaughlin, 587 A.2d 744, 748
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (by statute, brokers owe duty of good faith to policyholder
clients).
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INTERMEDIARY

Just as insurance law is a subset of contract law, the law of
insurance intermediary liability is a subset of agency law. The principal is
the insurer that hires a downstream agent (the intermediary) to represent it
in the administration of the policies it has sold. The agent in turn interacts
with the principal’s “customers” or policyholders and also represents the
insurer in dealing with third parties who make liability claims against the
policyholder. A “hornbook” rule of agency law, most authoritatively stated
in § 320 of the American Law Institute’s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY and continued in § 6.01 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY, is that an agent for a “disclosed” principal is not itself liable for
any acts of the principal.8
The law of insurance intermediaries, like insurance itself, is also a
subset of contract law. To enjoy contract rights, one must normally have
entered into a contract with the entity from which one seeks contract rights.
Unless one was in “privity” of contract with the party from which relief is
sought, the claimant would ordinarily be barred from relief by the historical
8

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958) (“Unless otherwise
agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for
a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006) (“When an agent acting with actual or apparent
authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, (1) the principal and
the third party are parties to the contract; and (2) the agent is not a party to the
contract unless the agent and third party agree otherwise.”). See also 3 C.J.S.
Agency § 485 (2008) (Ordinarily where the agency is disclosed, a plaintiff entitled
to recover is entitled to recover against the principal but not the agent); 2A C.J.S.
Agency § 365 (2008) (An agent who contracts on behalf of a disclosed principal
and within the scope of his authority, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, or other circumstances showing that he has expressly or impliedly
incurred or intended to incur personal responsibility, is not personally liable to the
other contracting party, although he may execute the contract in a manner which
would otherwise bind him personally, and he need not expressly negate his
liability); 12-88 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 88.5 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2008).
Because the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) is so recent, the limited case law invoking
agency principles to shield insurance intermediaries has been based on the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND). At this juncture, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6.01 has been
cited by only a handful of courts, with none of the decisions involving liability of
insurance intermediaries.
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“citadel” of privity of contract, which held that an entity not in contractual
privity owed no contract-based duties to an aggrieved party and generally
owed no socially imposed tort duties as well.9 Although recovery could be
premised on a theory that the claimant was a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between agent and principal, courts were historically reluctant to
give contract rights to any third-party beneficiary not specifically so
identified in a written instrument.10
These hornbook rules became established during the 19th Century
as Anglo-American law grappled with the question of the apt extent of
liability in a growing, increasingly industrial society. The courts largely
accepted, at least implicitly, the proposition that unduly broad imposition
of liability would throw too much sand in the metaphorical gears of
progress and exact too high a tax on commercial activity. Where a

9

See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 353 (2000); William S. Prosser,
Hornbook of the Law of Torts §§ 93, 96-104 (4th ed. 1971). See also Lee R. Russ
with Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 208:10 (3d ed. & Supp. 2008):
Although there are exceptions, investigators and adjusters
working under contract for the insurer are, for the most part, not
considered to have sufficient privity with or duty to the insured
to be directly and personally liable to the insured. Insureds have
a better chance of surviving preliminary dismissal motions by
framing their actions as breaches of duty owed to the public at
large---torts of various types. Of these, the most likely sources
of an actionable duty involve the investigator or adjuster acting
in a way that “interferes” with the insured’s relationship with the
insurer, or with some other legally protected right of the insured.
For more discussion of basic tort law as a ground for holding claim intermediaries
liable to policyholders or claimants, see infra text accompanying notes 177-221.
10

See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.2 (3rd ed. 1999)
(historically, third parties generally did not enjoy rights under contract unless
contract text expressly indicates that third party was intended beneficiary of
contract). See, e.g., Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 668, 672 (Pa.
1970) (“Without such a [contractual] relationship, it is impossible for the
[independent claims] adjusters to be liable for breach of contract to the insureds.”).
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commercial actor was linked to another by contract, this created certain
rights. But absent such links, law was reluctant to impose liability.11
In addition, immunity for the agents of disclosed principals could
be defended on the ground that an aggrieved party nonetheless had
substantial legal rights as against the principal. Imposing liability on the
agent of the disclosed principal thus seemed unnecessary. Under a rough
cost-benefit analysis, the tacit notion appears to be that although agent
liability would provide an additional source of compensation for the
injured, it brought with it a greater burden of discouraging socially useful
agency activity and encouraging needless expansion of disputes.12
Applied to the typical commercial transactions of the era, the
traditional rules of privity and agency immunity made sense, at least
initially. Consider a sale of goods by Merchant Marley through Agent
Cratchett to Consumer Dickens. If it is clear that Cratchett is selling on
behalf of Marley, Dickens knows with whom he deals: a ruthless
businessman not above cutting corners (who would have an ethical
epiphany only after death) and not the fair, guileless agent.13 After the sale,
if Dickens finds the goods to be substandard, he may sue Marley for relief
but generally could not also sue Cratchett, an agent for a disclosed principal
who has no contractual privity with Dickens.
Because Cratchett appears not to have had any fault or to have
much in the way of autonomy, assets, or insurance (the liability insurance
11

See sources cited supra note 9. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842)
152 Eng. Rep. 402. Accord National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203
(1879). But as Prosser also noted, the “citadel” of privity protecting manufacturers
and wholesalers not in direct contract with consumers fell during the first half of
the 20th Century as courts permitted product liability claims in cases where a
product caused physical injury to its ultimate user. See PROSSER, supra note 9, §
97. By contrast, the privity prerequisite to liability has retained considerable force
regarding agency issues outside the context of product liability.
12

See infra text accompanying notes 15-22, 122-149 (discussing this
rationale in modern cases rejecting liability claims against insurance
intermediaries).
13

Although Dickens presumably did not know ex ante that Marley would
have a posthumous epiphany (in time to save his partner Scrooge), Dickens
famously acquired ex post knowledge. See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS
CAROL (Atlantic Monthly Press) (1843).
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industry did not really emerge until after the industrial revolution and was
not well-established until the 20th Century)14 there is not a particularly
strong case for permitting him to be sued by Dickens or other dissatisfied
customers. Marley is the one responsible for the substandard goods and he
should be the one responsible for rectifying things for Dickens. One could
argue that making Cratchett liable as well will induce greater care by
Cratchett, but this could manifest itself in socially wasteful activity such as
Cratchett inspecting the Marley products or standing over the shoulder of
Marley’s operations.
Further, as a practical matter, agents like Cratchett with little
autonomy are not expected to do much more than be conduits for making a
sale and to take orders accordingly. He probably would not be permitted to
attempt to provide some quality control to Marley’s operation but would be
summarily fired by Marley for his temerity.
As this aspect of the
hypothetical illustrates, Cratchett in this case is more like an insurance
sales or soliciting agent and quite removed in scope of authority from the
modern MGA or adjuster, who may have quite a bit of either express or
practical authority about the manner in which a claim is resolved.
If instead of being the sales agent, Cratchett were the Complaint
Department at Scrooge & Marley, his situation would be closer to that
found in modern insurance, at least if Marley had delegated significant
authority to Cratchett.
In addition, law has subsequently moved
substantially in the direction of holding front-end intermediaries such as
insurance agents liable under some circumstances, such as when the agent
knows of a particular customer’s coverage needs and then procures an
inappropriate policy or fails to follow through on a promised purchase.15
14

See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004)
(describing the rise of accident and liability insurance in reaction to increase in
injuries associated with industrial revolution); John Fabian Witt, The
Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107
YALE L.J. 1467 (1997-1998) (also describing the rise of accident and liability
insurance in reaction to increase in injuries associated with industrial revolution).
15

See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 35 (3d ed.
2002); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.5 (1988). See,
e.g., President v. Jenkins, 853 A.2d 247 (N.J. 2004) (no duty to advise applicant
doctor about gap in coverage where doctor did not advise broker about lapse of
prior policy); Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 583 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (no duty to advise policyholder that auto policy provided no coverage
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Consequently, the historical immunity of agents for disclosed principles
has begun to look outdated.
When Dickens makes the purchase, there is of course the danger
that Marley, a notoriously mean character, will only make good on the
contract if sued to judgment or that he might seek to avoid his lawful debts.
But Dickens knew he was dealing with Marley and historically was
constructively charged with knowing these things about his infamous
vender. In addition, the law of debt relief was considerably less favorable
to the Marleys of the world at the time that the general rule was crafted.
Rather than risk debtor’s prison, Marley was likely to pay a court judgment
obtained by Dickens. Secreting assets was more difficult as well in a world
predating electronic funds transfer, sophisticated corporate shells, and
cooperative tropical havens for capital.16
Under the traditional rules protecting agents, if an insurance
policyholder or third party claimant knows that the MGA, TPA, or adjuster
is working for the insurer, the MGA, TPA or independent contractor
adjuster is generally not itself liable for any misconduct that injures the
policyholder or the claimant. The identity of the insurer as principal is
almost always disclosed in that the policyholder of course knows that it has
insurance with a particular company/principal and the claimant is usually
made aware of this by the MGA/adjuster. As a result, under the traditional
agency law analysis, MGAs, TPAs and independent adjusters were not held
outside U.S. and Canada). The broker’s limited exposure is something of a twoway street. See, e.g., DeHayes Group v. Pretzels, Inc., 786 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (insurer lacked special relationship with broker sufficient to require
broker to advise insurer that policyholder sprinkler system was inadequate to
suppress fire). The agent’s potential liability exposure often hinges on the specific
facts of a case. See, e.g. Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2006) (agent not
liable for failing to procure policy where evidence shows that possibility of
additional insurance was discussed but policyholder never directed agent to
procure insurance); Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1997) (insufficient
“special relationship” between agent and customer to make agent liable for alleged
failure to advise customer regarding “possible additional insurance coverage
needs.”). Where an agent sells or distributes a merchant’s dangerous products, the
law long ago removed the shield of contractual privity as a defense to product
liability claims. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
16

1997).

See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996-
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liable for mishandling of claims, even when their misconduct amounted to
bad faith toward a policyholder.17
Case law concerning this issue is almost uniformly favorable to
insurance intermediaries until the late 20th Century. Where an independent
claims adjuster or administrator is accused of mistreating a policyholder or
otherwise causing injury, the comparatively few reported cases find the
intermediary immunized as a matter of law so long as its representation of
the insurer was adequately disclosed.18 That the cases are so few in number
suggest that most aggrieved policyholders or claimants may not have even
considered a claim against the intermediary or that such claims were
quickly dismissed at the trial level and never challenged on appeal.
Ironically, comparatively few of these cases specifically cite
Agency Restatement § 320.19 More commonly, decision is based on the
absence of contractual privity between the intermediary and the
policyholder or claimant,20 although agency concepts are also occasionally
17

See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979);
Larkin v. First of Georgia Underwriters, 466 So.2d 655 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
18

See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973)
(defendants other than insurers not liable for alleged bad faith conduct toward
policyholder, resulting in dismissal of investigative service hired by insurers,
claims adjuster employed by service, law firm representing insurers in claims
adjustment, and individual lawyer in firm).
“Obviously, the non-insurer
defendants were not parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are not,
as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. at 576.
19

An October 2008 search of the LexisNexis federal and state court database
yields fewer than 40 cases citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320
(1958) in cases even tangentially involving insurers. Fewer than 15 cases
expressly cited § 320 and address the issue of the liability of an intermediary,
including both “upstream” sales intermediaries and “downstream” policy
administration intermediaries.
20

See, e.g., Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (auto
policyholder cannot sue independent claims adjuster because “in the absence of a
contract between Sentry [adjuster] and Bullock [policyholder], there can be no
implied duty of good faith that Sentry would have owed Bullock. This holding is
consistent with approaches taken in other jurisdictions.”) (citing cases from
Alabama, California, Louisiana,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and
Pennsylvania as well as Kansas); Wathor v. Mut. Assur. Adm’rs, 87 P.3d 559, 562
(Okla. 2004) (TPA owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to policyholders
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invoked,21 sometimes without a specific citation to § 320.22
Little
consideration is given to the issue of whether the overall context of the
and facts of the case do not permit policyholders to recover against TPA as thirdparty beneficiaries of contracts between TPA and an insurer); Natividad v. Alexsis,
Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1994) (holding no adjuster duty of good faith and
fair dealing and no special relationship with policyholder absent contract); Amica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957-58 (Utah 1989) (holding there is no
adjuster duty of good faith and fair dealing and no special relationship with a
policy holder absent a contract); Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 48, 50-51
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (“Although Connecticut recognizes a common law duty of
an insurer to act in good faith in the settlement of the claims of its insured, a cause
of action for breach of that duty may be asserted only against an insurers. An
action for bad faith, therefore, does not lie against a person who is not a party to
the contract of insurance, including an attorney.”) (citations omitted); Larkin v.
First of Georgia Underwriters, 466 So.2d 655, 657 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a
homeowner/policyholder alleging breach of contract and bad faith cannot sue
independent claims adjuster because no privity of contract between homeowner
and adjuster).
In occasional twists of irony, the traditional approach may on occasion prevent
insurers from obtaining relief against intermediaries. For example, in Farmers
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. N.M. 2006), an insurer
facing a presumably questionable claim when fire destroyed a furniture store hired
an investigator and independent engineer to conduct a cause-and-origin
examination of the fire. When these individuals allegedly failed to preserve
evidence useful to the insurer’s defense (presumably one based on arson), the
insurer sought to hold each personally liable. The individual investigator sought
dismissal on the ground that the insurer’s contract was with his employer, an
investigation company, and that the insurer had no claim against him. The court
agreed, even though the company was a company he had founded and controlled.
See 452 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (citing RESTATEMENT § 320, as well as noting
absence of direct contract between individual investigator and insurer). See also
First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. NovaPro Risk Solutions, Inc., 468 F. Supp.2d 1321,
1343 (D.Kan. 2007), see infra notes 161-176 and accompanying text.
21

See, e.g., LaFontaine v. Mass. Cas. Co., No. C05-5059FDB, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27137 at *7 (W.D. Wash., April 27, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
on other grounds, No. 06-35434, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26392 (9th Cir. Nov. 9,
2007) (independent claims adjuster for disability insurer initially sued by insured,
but dropped from the case by mutual consent when defendant adjuster and insurer
argued that adjuster was “a disclosed agent of Massachusetts Casualty Insurance
Company [because] Washington follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 320 (1958)”) (citing Hopkins v. Anderson, 766, 502 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App.
1972)); Am. Ins. Co. v Material Transit, Inc., 446 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Del. Sup. Ct.,
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1982) (holding an agent processing insurance premium payments that erroneously
misapplied funds resulting in wrongful cancellation of policy not itself liable
because it acted as agent for disclosed principal and had no contractual relationship
with policyholder).
[I]n making these payment arrangements [payment processor] Montgomery
was not acting for itself but was solely acting as the agent of American Insurance.
It is established law that an agent for a disclosed principal is not a party to a
contract and is not liable for its nonperformance. Restatement (Second) Agency §§
320, 328; 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 8832 at 459 (1968). Thus,
the only parties to this allegedly breached payment contract are American
Insurance [insurer] and Material Transit [policyholder]. Montgomery, acting as
agent on behalf of a disclosed principal, American Insurance, is not personally
liable to third-party, Material Transit, for acts performed within the scope of its
authority.
Id. at 1104-105.
See also WESTRM-West Risk Markets, Ltd. v. XL Reinsurance America,
Inc., 02 Civ. 7344 (MGC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48769, at *17-*18 (S.D.N.Y.,
July 19, 2006) (dismissing claim against issuing agent on contract and agency
grounds); Seigworth v. State, 539 P.2d 464, 466 (Nev. 1975) (holding an
individual agent for bail bond company is not liable for bond forfeiture when
criminal accused fails to show up for court date). Of course, the agency at issue in
Seigworth is one of upstream sales agency rather than insurance policy (and a bail
bond is an insurance policy or surety arrangement and thus falls outside the scope
of this article). However, the short-and-sweet resolution of the question provides a
good example of the traditional rule in action.
[W]e now turn to the question, is a bail agent, as attorney-in-fact for the
purpose of binding the insurer, himself a surety for the appearance bond?
Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract
with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the
contract. Restatement, Second, Agency § 320. See also, Restatement § 4(1),
Restatement § 4, Comment (a) and Restatement §328.
[In this case,] Resolute Insurance Company is a disclosed principal; Drendel,
dba Mac’s Bail Bonds is an agent. Drendel cannot be liable for the bond forfeiture.
Id. at 466.
In WEST-RM, another case technically involving more of an upstream agency
problem than one of policy administration, the federal district court was almost as
succinct in applying the traditional rule but held out some ground for possible
liability in the future depending on agent activity.
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situation creates a relationship for which the law should apply tort law
duties of reasonable care.
In addition to fighting this general rule of agent immunity, third
party claimants had the additional barrier of the legal rule that an insurer’s
misconduct in claims administration generally does not create a direct
cause of action for the claimant due to the absence of privity of contract
and a public policy reluctance to allow such direct actions because of the
nature of liability claims in which the insurer is usually charged with
[T]he settled rule in New York is that “when an agent makes a contract for a
disclosed principal, it becomes neither a party to the contract nor liable for the
performance of the contract. Accordingly, it is not liable if the contract is
breached.” Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 761 F.2d 855, 850 (2d
Cir. 1985)(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 320, 328). Although an
agent might be held liable on a contract if he acted outside the scope of his agency
in executing the contract, [there is no evidence that this occurred and no evidence
that the intermediary was subject to the indemnity provisions of the surety bonds in
question].
WESTRM-West Risk Markets, Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48769 at *17-*18
(emphasis in original).
22

See, e.g., Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents, Inc., 661 P.2d 1196 (Colo. App.
1983), in which the Court affirmed a dismissal of a claim against an independent
insurance sales agent, but found that its principal, California Union Insurance,
could be sued for negligent failure to settle.
Central to the plaintiff’s right to recover on these [negligence and breach of
contract] claims is the contractual relationship arising from the Cal Union errors
and omissions policy. [citation omitted] Since Equity General is the agent of Cal
Union, and is not a party to the contract of insurance, it is not bound by duties
created under the contract. Accordingly, liability for breach of those duties,
whether the breach be contractual or tortuous in nature, cannot be visited upon the
agent.
Id. at 1198 (citing Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Inc., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979) and
Iversen v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). The Colorado
Supreme Court subsequently rejected this approach and made adjusters potentially
liable for negligent failure to settle in Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins., 68 P.3d
462 (Colo. 2003). During the intervening 20 years, Colorado caselaw had been
edging away from the pure historical rule of agent and intermediary liability set
forth in Gorab.
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defending the policyholder and questioning as necessary the merits of the
claim.23
Bad faith scholar Stephen Ashley adds an additional historical
perspective on the manner in which the requirement of contractual privity
has insulated insurance intermediaries. In his view, part of the problem is
that basing the existence of a bad faith cause of action on a contract’s
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which was the fulcrum of
the modern spurt in first-party bad faith law emerging from California
Supreme Court caselaw of the 1970s, resulted in obsessive judicial focus
on a formal contractual relationship and privity of contract between the
party seeking relief and the actor alleged to have committed misconduct.24
In particular, Ashley views the source of the problem as Gruenberg
v. Aetna Ins. Co.,25 which he describes as “the landmark case” recognizing
“a cause of action for bad faith in first-party cases.”26 Gruenberg found
that a first-party policyholder (in this case one involving life/health
insurance) had bad faith rights vis-à-vis the insurer, which was at the time a
novel view, even though bad faith rights of third party liability insurance
policyholders had been recognized for several decades.27 However, the

23

See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal.

1988).
24

See Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Liability and Damages §§ 6:09,
6:15 (2d ed. 1997).
25

510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).

26

ASHLEY, supra note 24, at 6:15. California also launched the modern era of
bad faith in the third-party liability context with cases like Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958) and Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d
173, 176 (Cal. 1967). But the widespread emergence of bad faith actions in the
first party insurance context did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s. See also Seth
William Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: Problems in Applying
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 268
(2002)(referring to Comunale as a “benchmark case”).
27

See, e.g., Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 258-59 (Wis. 1930);
reaff’d on reh’g, Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931); Douglas
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 127 A. 708, 709 (1924). See generally JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS Ch. 10 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp.
2009).
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The ability of a liability policyholder to sue for bad faith was recognized much
earlier than any similar right for first-party policyholders largely because courts
viewed the liability policyholder as considerably more vulnerable and dependent
upon the insurer since the insurer was controlling the defense of any third-party
claims against the policyholder. In particular, courts have seen the insurer and
policyholder as part of a defense “team” involving mutual obligations of protection
and cooperation, while viewing first-party insurance as something closer to a pure
arms-length commercial contract where either party is free to take advantage of the
other (although this odd view has fortunately eroded over the past 30 years).
Further, liability claims have the potential to greatly exceed the amount of
available insurance if settlement of the claim is not reached and expose the
policyholder to potentially bankrupting liability. By contrast, first-part insurance
is, at least in theory, supposed to be available in amounts sufficient to provide
adequate indemnity once any bad faith wrongs of the insurer have been righted.
For example, a homeowner’s policy is likely to be more in sync with property
value than may be the case when comparing auto liability policy limits and a
serious auto injury claim.
However, the path to modern bad faith law was not necessarily linear or
smooth. Hilker, cited above, is often viewed as the seminal case of what might be
called the early modern era in which liability insurers charged with defending
claims against policyholders were held to reasonably rigorous standards of conduct
toward policyholders. Prior to Hilker, many cases had stated generally that an
insurer may not act in bad faith, but, when examined closely, these cases tended to
define bad faith as an actual, specific intent to harm the policyholder or outright
fraud. This is a more constrained view of bad faith than found in modern cases,
which find bad faith where an insurer’s conduct has been non-malicious but
unreasonable, insufficiently solicitous of the policyholder’s interests (as opposed to
the insurer’s interests) or otherwise deprived the policyholder of the benefit of the
bargain embodied by the insurance policy.
For example, in Best Bldg. Co., v. Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp., 160 N.E.
911 (N.Y. 1928), the court observed:
[t]hat the insurance company in the handling of the litigation or in failing to
settle is liable for its fraud or bad faith is conceded and has been repeatedly
stated in all the cases bearing on the subject. So also it has been held by this
court that the company is not liable on its contract for a failure to settle; a
contract imposes upon it no such duty.
[T]here is no implied obligation in the insurance policy in this case that the
company must or will settle according to the offer made. * * * The
insurance company, in refusing to settle the actions, did what it had the legal
right to do under the terms of the policy.”
Id. at 912.
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In other words, on the eve of the Hilker decision, the bad faith law of New
York and most other jurisdictions were relatively toothless in that it did not include
the now familiar “duty to settle,” which is not literally a duty to settle under any
circumstances and throw money at even frivolous claims, but instead requires that
an insurer accept a reasonable settlement offer at or below the available policy
limits in cases where there is a substantial risk of an excess verdict that would put
the policyholder’s own assets at risk. A significant exception is Texas, which
established a duty to settle in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15
S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). Today, the duty to settle in Texas
is still routinely labeled the insurer’s “Stowers duty.”
The facts of Best Bldg. v. Employers’ Liab. created a situation ripe for
declaring the existence of a duty to settle, but the New York Court of Appeals
showed no interest. An employee was injured and made a claim. The liability
insurer, which had a $10,000 policy limit, defended the claim. The plaintiff
offered to settle for $8,500; the insurer counter-offered at $6,500 and did not
inform the policyholder of the offer or counter-offer. Trial resulted in a judgment
of $16,000 for the injured plaintiff, leaving the employer policyholder
understandably upset that it faced $6,000 of its own liability. Further, the
policyholder alleged that it was willing to contribute up to $2,000 of its own funds
to resolve the matter and therefore could have worked with the insurer to effect a
settlement had it merely been informed of the offer and counter-offer.
Despite these sympathetic facts, the Court was unmoved, viewing the insurer
as having unfettered contract rights to settle or try the case as it saw fit regardless
of the consequences to the policyholder. The Court dismissed the bad faith claim
as a matter of law. It was not even willing to permit fact-finding and trial
regarding the circumstances of the insurer’s seemingly obvious error in failing to
resolve a case that resulted in a 160% excess verdict. As long as the failure to
settle resulted from mere negligence rather than intent to disserve the policyholder,
the insurer was unregulated in this regard, a situation quite different than the norms
of modern insurance bad faith law.
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hilker found the negligently
unreasonable behavior by the insurer could support bad faith failure to settle
claims. The insurer had rejected the injured plaintiff’s settlement offer and
responded only with a low offer.
The adjuster for the company exhibited an indifferent and hostile attitude,
refusing to meet and discuss settlement in the offices of the attorneys representing
the [plaintiff] girl and her father.
[The adjuster and defense counsel] must have known that the testimony of
these eye-witnesses of the accident tended to establish actionable negligence on the
part of the [defendant and] that the injury was one for which a verdict might be
rendered for a sum much in excess of the coverage of the policy. They knew that
they had absolute control of the litigation and of its adjustment. They also knew
that plaintiff would be liable for all sums in excess of $5,000 which might be
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Gruenberg Court refused to recognize any bad faith cause of action against
the independent adjuster involved in the case or the law firm representing
the insurer.
Obviously, the non-insurer defendants were not
parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are
not, as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Moreover, as agents and employees of the
recovered in these actions. Under such circumstances the failure to make some
more effective effort to adjust the cases does present evidence which sustains the
finding that the defendant acted in bad faith toward the plaintiff in handling these
claims and conducting this litigation. Hilker, 231 N.W. at 260.
As the quotation above might suggest, the first Hilker decision left some
uncertainty as to whether the insurer’s errors amounting to bad faith were negligent
or intentional, leading counsel to seek rehearing to clarify the legal standard to be
derived from the case. After rehearing and decision a year later, the Court made
clear that the insurer’s settlement failures need not be willfully intended to injure
the policyholder in order to be actionable as bad faith.
[Although it] is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judgment upon the
question of whether the claim should be settled or contested . . . the decision
should be an honest and intelligent one. . . . . In order to be honest and intelligent it
must be based upon a knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which
liability is predicated upon a knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries so
far as they reasonably can be ascertained.
This requires the insurance company to make a diligent effort to ascertain the
facts upon which only an intelligent and good-faith judgment may be predicated. *
* * [I]t should exercise reasonable diligence in this behalf, which means such
diligence as the great majority of persons use in the same or similar circumstances.
This is ordinary care. Hilker II, 235 N.W. at 414-15.
The modern era had arrived regarding duty-to-settle/failure-to-settle bad duties
imposed upon liability insurers and it in essence required insurers not to be
negligent in their investigation, defense, and settlement conduct regarding a claim
against the policyholder. Over the ensuing four decades, third-party bad faith law
became more favorable to policyholders in that it generally came to hold that the
insurer failing to settle was automatically responsible for the amount of the excess
verdict, and also permitted policyholders to seek punitive damages where the
insurer’s failure to settle went beyond negligence and exhibited willful indifference
to policyholder rights. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra, § 10.06.
However, it was not until the 1970s that there was significant recognition of a bad
faith cause of action for first-party policyholders faced with unreasonable insurer
claims adjustment.
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defendant insurers, they cannot be held accountable on a
theory of conspiracy.28
To Ashley, the focus on contract as the source of rights to demand
reasonable insurer behavior was something of a wrong turn in the law, even
though California (in Gruenberg and other decisions) and most other states
treat breach of the covenant of good faith as a tort, which can subject at
least the insurer to a range of compensatory damages as well as punitive
damages, at least if it is the policyholder or its proper assignee that is suing
the insurer. As Ashley points out, claimants injured by the policyholder
seldom have a direct right of action against the insurer that acts in bad faith,
a limitation in the law he regards as related to limits on the policyholder’s
ability to bring bad faith claims against independent adjusters and MGAs.29
My own view is in some disagreement with Ashley in that I see
nothing wrong with the basic analysis that has led to the modern
establishment of the tort of insurance bad faith in actions by policyholders
against insurers. These parties have a contract. The insurance policy
contract, like all contracts, carries with it an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. But unlike most consumer and commercial contracts, the
insurance arrangement and the relationship of insurer and policyholder
establish a context in which the meaning of good faith changes (from mere
“honesty in fact” to a requirement of reasonable behavior giving equal
consideration to the interests of the policyholder) and the covenant of good
faith creates tort duties imposed by law on the insurer. The breach of the
covenant and those duties correspondingly subjects the insurer that acts in
bad faith to tort law damages, including punitive damages if the

28
29

510 P.2d at 1039 (quoted in ASHLEY, supra note 24, § 6:15).

See ASHLEY, supra note 24, § 6:15 (Gruenberg approach of “reliance on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the foundation for the tort of bad
faith has posed problems for the California courts in determining which persons
harmed by an insurer’s unreasonable rejection of a claim may sue the insurer for
bad faith. The same problems have plagued the courts’ efforts to determine which
persons responsible for the insurer’s unreasonable conduct may be sued for bad
faith.”). See also Francis J. Mootz, III, The Sounds of Silence: Waiting for Courts
to Acknowledge That Public Policy Justifies Awarding Damages to Third-Party
Claimants When Liability Insurers Deal With Them in Bad Faith, 2 NEV. L.J. 443,
443 (2002) (arguing in favor of third-party claimant standing to bring bad faith
actions against insurer that breaches duty to policyholder to defend/settle claim).
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unreasonable behavior is accompanied by a willful indifference to the
rights of the policyholder.
This is not a bad syllogism or analysis and provides a sound basis
for holding both liability insurers and first-party insurers (property, life,
health, disability) liable to policyholders for bad faith breach. Ashley,
however, seems to suggest it is an imperfect or even defective analysis
because it does not automatically establish standing to sue for bad faith for
the third-party complainants themselves or for actions against the
downstream intermediaries that administer insurance policies.
From my perspective, Ashley’s lament is only partially well-taken.
Requiring a sufficiently significant, not-too-attenuated contract connection
as prerequisite for bad faith liability makes sense. Failing to do that
arguably expands bad faith liability in ways that may prove inefficient and
unwise in situations where the claimant is not nearly so vulnerable as the
average policyholder suffering a loss or facing a claim.
The failure of the traditional jurisprudence, in my view, is not its
presumptive insistence on contract privity or its respect for the disclosed
principal rule of agency. The historical approach has become problematic,
not because of the contract underpinnings of the bad faith tort, but because
too many courts and litigants have seen adjuster liability as an all-ornothing proposition. Either the adjuster is liable in bad faith, or the adjuster
is immune. There is an intermediate position. The adjuster should
ordinarily be protected from imputed liability due to an insurer’s
misconduct, but the adjuster should be liable for negligence (or certainly
for more egregious misconduct such as gross negligence or recklessness)
based on basic tort principles and overarching agency axioms that
overcome the protection provided by the disclosed principle rule.
As discussed below, one need not be in a contract relationship to
owe tort duties to third parties and Agency Restatement (Second) §320 is
really only a rule protecting agents for disclosed principals from being held
to the contracts made by the principals through the agent.30 It is not a
general tort immunity statute for agents, and courts have erred to the extent
they have expanded the Section to have this effect. Picking up on Ashley’s
critique, I agree that adjusters owe to policyholders the same duty of good
faith owed by insurers as principals. Where insurance intermediaries have,
in essence, 1) assumed the functions of the insurer (which seems to take
place in many MGA and TPA operations, or where adjusters have
30

See infra notes 177-221 and accompanying text, proposing and defending
tort liability for downstream intermediaries.
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substantial discretion in evaluating claims), 2) are in a position of special
relationship to a policyholder or other party, or 3) are in a “joint venture”
with the insurer, intermediaries should be held to account as if they were
the insurer, including facing bad faith exposure.
These downstream intermediaries may or may not owe good faith
duties to claimants, depending on whether applicable state law permits
claimants to make bad faith claims against a defendant’s insurer. But these
downstream intermediaries logically still owe at least tort duties to the
claimant, even where the adjuster has more limited discretion. The nature
of the intermediary-claimant relationship is one that should impose at least
modest duties on the intermediary. Where the intermediary is negligent or
reckless and causes injury, the claimant should not be barred from pursuing
recompense through tort law.
Currently, because claimants initially and often have styled their
claims against adjusters, TPAs, or MGAs as bad faith litigation, the field
was shaped by cases like Gruenberg that found insufficient contractual
connection to impose insurer-like obligations on the intermediaries. So
bent, the branch of intermediary liability law grew from simply ruling that
intermediaries were not liable to the extent of insurers, to assuming (and
least in the seeming majority view) that intermediaries were not liable at all
to third parties. But the latter legal rule does not follow even if one
strongly accepts the former premise that bad faith liability for downstream
intermediaries might be overkill.
In addition, the issue of adjuster or MGA liability has been unduly
commingled with the question of whether a third party, such as an accident
claimant, can sue an alleged tortfeaser/defendant/policyholder’s insurer for
bad faith in claims handling. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
have refused to permit such claims, reasoning that they induce undue
complications and conflicts into the liability claims adjustment process,
which requires the liability insurer to defend the policyholder and thus
focus its loyalty on protecting the policyholder/defendant rather than
pleasing the third party who is suing the policyholder.31
For a ten-year period, California permitted such claims per the
famous Royal Globe32 case, but reversed field in its 1988 Moradi-Shalal33
31

See STEMPEL, supra note 27, § 10.05.

32

See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1979).

33

See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 60 (Cal. 1988).
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decision. Although neither the California legislature nor the California
Supreme Court shows any sign of returning to the Royal Globe regime, the
intellectual argument on the issue continues. Like many observers, I
continue to be relatively ambivalent about any perceived need to give tort
plaintiffs and other claimants a direct bad faith right of action against
liability insurers. Although scholars have made strong arguments in favor
of this extension of the law and advocate Royal Globe as the preferred
approach,34 courts continue to adhere to the view that bad faith claims
against the insurer belong to policyholders and not to tort claimants.35
Judicial opinions on the topic rely not only on maintaining some
vestige of the historic citadel of privity but also upon the public policy view
that providing third parties with an action for bad faith against insurers
would introduce too much mischief into the claims settlement process,
likely increasing the costs of the tort system and putting unwise additional
demands on the legal system.36 Although these arguments may well be
overstated or even wrong,37 they are not merely crabbed, formalistic
34

See, e.g., Francis J. Mootz, III, The Sounds of Silence, supra note 29;
Francis J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable for Bad Faith
Litigation Tactics With the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 467, 507
(2002); Michael Cohen, Note, No Faith in Bad Faith, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 225
(1989).
35

See generally STEMPEL, supra note 27, Ch. 10.

36

See generally Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal.

1988).
37

In California, for example, there was a nearly 10-year period in which Royal
Globe was the law and third-party claimants could directly sue liability insurers for
bad faith failure to settle claims against the insurer’s policyholders. Needless to
say, the world did not end during the ten years in which Royal Globe held sway.
But see ANGELA HAWKEN ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE
EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH DOCTRINE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COSTS
AND
COMPENSATION
52-53
(2001),
available
at
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1199.pdf (concluding that the
Royal Globe rule permitting third party claimants to sue defendants’ insurers for
bad faith resulted in auto insurance premium increases of more than 10 percent).
What cannot be assessed from the Hawken study, however, is the degree to which
any increase in premiums may have also purchased more responsible liability
insurer/intermediary conduct that both better served claimants and policyholders
and reduced costs imposed on the justice system and the taxpaying public.
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West Virginia has for many years permitted modified Royal Globe-style
actions. See Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1981)
(permitting a third-party claim against an insurer but requiring that underlying suit
against policyholder be resolved first); see also Thomas C. Cady, et. al., The Law
of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 1,
70 (1988-1999). But this does not appear to be linked to any insurance or
economic woes in that state. Further, some states, most prominently Wisconsin,
have a direct action statute that permits claimants to sue for statutory rights similar
to those available in a common law bad faith action. See Wis. Stat. § 632.24
(2007); see also Wis. Stat. § 632.34 (2007); see also Wis. Stat. § 803.04 (2007).
Wisconsin’s insurance situation does not appear to be any more problematic than
that of California in the post-Moradi-Shalal era or that of other states barring
claimant suits against insurers. See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (2008); see
also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:983 (2008) (direct action statute); R.I. Gen. Laws §
27-7-1 (2008); see also R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2 (2008) (direct action statute). Jerry
and Richmond observed:
a few states and territories – Wisconsin, Louisiana, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico,
and Guam – have “direct action statutes.” The specific provisions of these
statutes vary considerably, but their common characteristics are making the
insurer directly liable to the injured party and permitting liability to be
established in a single action against the insured and insurer jointly, or in an
action against the insurer alone.
See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 15, at 628 (footnotes omitted). See also Viqar
M. Shariff, Recent Developments, Grubbs v. Gulf International Marine Co.: The
Louisiana Supreme Court Declares the Direct Action Statute Applicable to Marine
P & I Insurance, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1653, 1653-54, 1662 (1994).
Other states, through judicial decision or statute, appear to permit claimant
actions for bad faith even in the absence of a classic direct action statute such as
Wisconsin’s. See, e.g., Macola v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 451, 452
(Fla. 2006) (claimant may bring action directly against defendant’s insurer where
there is verdict in excess of policy limits); see also Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 89
P.3d 69, 71 (N.M. 2004) (recognizing Royal Globe-type action for auto liability
only); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117-18 (Ky.
1988) (interpreting Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.070 to permit such actions); Mont.
Code. Ann. § 33-18-242 (2005) (making Royal Globe-style action available to
claimants for failure to attempt good faith settlement after liability has become
reasonably clear). The availability in these states of this additional right accorded
third-party plaintiffs appears not to have resulted in substantial economic or
insurance mischief.
Under these circumstances, critics of the status quo such as Professor Mootz
can legitimately argue that the existence of third-party standing to sue for bad faith
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assessments dependent upon only the privity of contract notion. It remains
difficult (at least for me) to say with certainty whether the traditional view
of generally limiting standing to sue for bad faith to insurance
policyholders is clearly incorrect or misguided.
In addition, this seems to be an area where the legislative process
has produced some positive reaction to a perceived insufficiency of
common law judicial remedies for claimants aggrieved by insurer behavior.
Nearly all states have some form of Unfair Claims Practices Act and nearly
20 permit third party claimants to sue insurers directly for violations of the
relevant state Act.38 In addition, a number of states permit third party
claimants to sue insurers directly regarding policy coverage.39
Consequently, limiting common bad faith actions directly against
insurers by third-party claimants due to absence of contract privity appears
not to be a major defect of modern insurance jurisprudence (although
neither does it seem essential to the effective operation of insurance).
Some of the same arguments can of course be marshaled in favor of
intermediary immunity.
But properly assessed, the immunity of
would encourage better behavior by insurers with relatively little negative external
costs. But conversely, neither does it appear that the absence of these third-party
rights has prevented policyholders and their proxies from enforcing good faith
obligations upon insurers. Most commonly, where insurer bad faith occurs in
significant degree, the policyholder assigns its potential rights of relief to the
claimant and the action is pursued. Although insurers with less vigilant
policyholders may “get away” with some bad faith conduct as a result of the status
quo, this does not appear to be a gaping hole in the fabric of justice. More
potentially troublesome is the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages
jurisprudence, which as a matter of law has constitutionalized limits on punitive
damages that may be imposed upon insurers even for intentional, serious,
widespread, and long-standing bad faith conduct. See State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003); see generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL v. STATE FARM Chs. 17, 22-23 (2008)
(despite considerable evidence of record of insurer’s recalcitrant insistence on
treating liability policyholders in bad faith, presumptive maximum punitive
damages limited to nine times amount of substantial compensatory awards).
38

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118
(Ky. 1989) (interpreting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.070 to permit such actions);
see also MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-18-242 (2005); supra note 37.
39

See, e.g., supra note 37.
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intermediaries is another matter, both in terms of public policy and law.
Unfortunately, courts have tended to overly equate the concept of a direct
tort victim action against the policyholder’s insurer and a policyholder’s
action against the independent adjuster hired by its insurer.
For example, during the brief reign of Royal Globe, California
courts appeared to accept the proposition that the state’s Unfair Claims
Practices Act applied to independent adjusters (and by inference other
downstream intermediaries) because these adjusters were in the insurance
business within the meaning and purpose of the statute.40 However, since
Moradi-Shalal deposed Royal Globe, several California courts have
disapproved of these holdings, reasoning that if a third party cannot sue an
insurer directly for bad faith, persons without a contract with an adjuster
cannot sue the adjuster for bad faith.41 The California Supreme Court has
never resolved the issue and it remains a technically open one in the state,
although most observers would probably conclude that the current
California Supreme Court is unlikely to permit bad faith suits against

40

See, e.g., Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (noting that it would “be odd to construe the [Unfair Claims Act] as
prohibiting unfair settlement practices by employees of an insurance company but
as not prohibiting identical acts when perpetrated by an independent adjuster
working for an insurance company” and observing that licensing and regulation of
adjusters fell under the auspices of the state insurance commissioner); see also
Davis v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 224 Cal. Rptr. 66 (Cal. App. 1986); see also James I.
Devitt & Robert C. Hastie, Note, Independent Insurance Adjusters Liable for Bad
Faith: Fair or Farce?, 64 W. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 233, 235 (1986-1987)
(approving Bodenhamer and Davis results).
41

See, e.g., Stone v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714. 730-31 n.26
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (”the Davis and Bodenhamer cases, which extended statutory
bad faith liability to independent adjusters, were decided prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Moradi-Shalal and are now of doubtful validity”) (citation
omitted); see also Henry v. Assoc. Indem. Corp., 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990). Even prior to Moradi-Shalal, some California decisions resisted
holding independent adjusters accountable under the Unfair Claims Practices Act.
See, e.g., Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 684 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Richardson v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
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downstream intermediaries by parties not in privity of contract with the
intermediary.42
Nothwithstanding the conventional wisdom, the assessment that
adjuster statutory liability was erased by Moradi-Shalal is in my view
incorrect, at least if the “third party” suing the adjuster is a policyholder of
the insurer that retained the adjuster. Under these circumstances, it is quite
clear to the adjuster that it is the representative of an insurer with fiduciarylike duties of good faith to the policyholder and that the policyholder is
dependent upon the adjuster’s actions just as it is dependent on the
insurer’s actions at a time of substantial vulnerability. A harder question is
whether anyone other than the policyholder can lay claim to a statutory
cause of action against the adjuster. But in between the extremes of no
liability and bad faith exposure to a bevy of third parties, lies the
reasonable common law compromise of permitting tort actions in
negligence (or perhaps only for greater misconduct) against downstream
intermediaries.
As a matter of legal realism, Ashley’s lament that courts have
focused too formalistically on privity of contract holds considerable force.
Although MGAs and independent adjusters may not have formal contract
relations with policyholders or others involved in the transaction, these
intermediaries in essence assume the role of the insurer in addressing loss
claims. Under these circumstances, courts have been too slow to realize
that intermediaries playing this role have also in essence stepped into the
shoes of the insurer for these claims and thus logically should be held to the
same legal standards governing the insurer. In these cases, both
policyholders and other reasonably foreseeable third party claimants should
be able to bring claims if injured by the misconduct of the
intermediary/insurer.
The problem is not that courts initially focused on the insurance
contract and the covenant of good faith in articulating the existence of a
bad faith cause of action against insurers. The problem is that courts have
been too slow to realize an absence of contract rights hardly answers the
question of whether one social actor owes duties to another. An obvious
example is simply driving. We have no contract relations with other
42

For example, Stone v. New England Insurance, discussed in the previous
footnote, was authored by Judge Walter Croskey, who is also co-author of the
California Practice Guide on Insurance Litigation and an acknowledged authority
on the topic. See generally 214 Cal. Rptr. 679; see also WALTER CROSKEY & REX
HEESEMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE LITIGATION (2005).

2009]

THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES

625

motorists on the road, pedestrians, or bicyclists. But this is not any
defense, much less an absolute defense, to our tort liability should we
negligently injure any of these persons. The very nature of our activity in
relation to these third parties creates duties of reasonable care.
The mistake of courts insisting on independent intermediary
immunity is that they have wrongly assumed that the absence of a contract
with policyholders not only fails to create contract rights but also erects a
shield exempting the intermediary from the ordinary application of tort law.
Under accepted tort law principles, claims intermediaries stand in a close
relation to policyholders, are in a position to inflict considerable harm on
vulnerable policyholders, and are well aware of their substantial power to
inflict this harm. Injury to policyholders from wrongful behavior by
adjusters is readily foreseeable. Courts have also been too reluctant to
recognize that intermediaries assuming the functions of the insurer are a de
facto part of that same contract and same covenant that protects
policyholders by imposing legal duties on the insurer.
After decades of resisting recognition, courts like Gruenberg were
finally recognizing what in retrospect seems obvious. A first-party
insurance policy creates a special relationship between policyholder and
insurer just as does a third-party insurance policy. Further, the first-party
policyholder looking to an insurer to pay a property, life, health or
disability claim is often just as vulnerable and dependent upon the insurer
as is the third-party liability policyholder facing a lawsuit. But having just
come to this realization, courts were understandably reluctant to
immediately begin making this new action for first-party bad faith available
against intermediaries as well as insurers.
Regardless of the issue of contract privity, there still remains the
separate issue of whether the intermediary as a disclosed insurer’s agent
should be immune from tort-based claims for compensation by parties
injured from the intermediary’s activity. As discussed above, courts have
traditionally taken this view but such cases are far less frequent than cases
immunizing intermediaries on privity of contract grounds. Infrequent or
not, however, this rationale remains one that must be addressed. Further,
the agency rationale arguably has a sounder public policy grounding than
the lack-of-privity defense to intermediary liability. One can argue with
some force that intermediary liability is unnecessary so long as the insurer
is itself held accountable for misconduct toward the policyholder. But
ultimately the agency immunity rationale, like the lack-of-privity rationale,
founders for the reasons set forth in the next section.
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A. PROBLEMS OF THE NOW DATED TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Like the citadel of privity itself, the privity defense to agent
immunity began to look shopworn over time and out of sync with modern
commerce, as did the traditional rule of immunity for the agents of
disclosed principals. The story of the fall of the citadel of privity in
product liability tort law has been well chronicled in the near-century since
the walls began to crumble.43 Although retailers and manufacturers are not
strictly in a principal-agent relationship, there are enough similarities to
make this development of product liability law analogous to the eroding
rationale for insurance intermediary immunity.
In the product liability context, society found retailers selling
products that, if defective, could exact substantial injuries on consumers
and the public generally. If Marley’s products are adulterated and Dickens
consumes them after purchase at Cratchett’s corner store, an odd variant of
the earlier hypothetical illustration occurred. Dickens was injured
(physically as well as economically). If he had purchased knowing that
Cratchett was but an agent for Marley, he would have a cause of action
against the deeper-pocketed Marley. But because the Dickens contract is
with Cratchett, traditional contract warranty law and tort law gave Dickens
a legal claim only against the more modestly heeled Cratchett.
In a world prior to the widespread sale of commercial general
liability insurance, this potentially left Dickens with little hope for
significant compensation, unless he was willing to force a sale of
Cratchett’s assets and potentially remove a well-liked merchant and store
from the neighborhood. The real culprit is Marley, purveyor of adulterated
products, but under the traditional privity of contract rule, he lay beyond
the reach of tort or contract law in any claim by Dickens.
The situation soon proved untenable from a public policy
perspective. Once New York Court of Appeals Judge Benjamin Cardozo
broke through the formalist barriers to a saner approach in MacPherson v.

43

See Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353; M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 1.2 (2d ed. 1988); see generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1965-1966); William L.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1959-1960).
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Buick, the walls of the citadel of privity began to crumble rapidly.44 By the
middle of the 20th Century, courts were permitting the Dickens plaintiffs of
the world to successfully sue the Marley defendants under a theory of
consumer product warranty or tort law product liability or both.
Manufacturers and wholesalers could no longer hide behind contractual
privity. Not only injured customers but often other third parties whose
injuries were foreseeable could vindicate their legal rights.45
Similarly, retailers like Cratchett were unable to hide behind
agency immunity. In operating retail establishments and making sales of
products, they were in direct contractual relationships with consumers.
They may have been agents of sorts for manufacturers but they were not
pure agents acting only as conduits for the principal. They were freestanding contracting parties in their own right. As a result, consumers and
the public had available to them a relatively broad scope of potential legal
relief against multiple culpable defendants in cases of product liability.
Although some may argue that the rights of injured product users are too
broad and impose too great a burden on commerce, this legal regime enjoys
general acceptance.46
44

See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see also
Prosser, supra note 9, § 96; Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353 (2000); see generally
Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 43, at 793.
45

See Prosser, supra note 9, § 100.

46

See Prosser, supra note 9, § 100. Dobbs, like other modern product liability
scholars, also notes the degree to which perceived problems with the breadth of the
mid-20th Century product liability regime resulted in some revision and arguable
contraction in the scope of strict liability. Dobbs observes that the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (1998):
[D]rops all references to strict products liability. Its view is that courts have
mostly come to apply negligence standards in determining design and warning
defects, even when they maintained the language of strict liability. The effect,
although not the language of the Products Restatement is that strict liability is
retained when it comes to product flaws, but negligence or something very much
like it, is the test of liability when it comes to design and warning defects.
Dobbs, supra note 9, § 353 (footnotes omitted).
Although the Dobbs analysis is correct as to the substantive law of torts, the
pro-defendant product liability trends of the past 20 years have not in any

628

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

But the arguable flip side of the fall of the citadel of privity has yet
to take place regarding insurance intermediaries – at least not completely -even though the insurance industry arguably has changed in ways
paralleling product sales and distribution. Cases today are divided
regarding the liability of downstream intermediaries, with the majority
clinging to the general rules protecting these intermediaries: privity of
contract and disclosed principal grounds.
Until the mid-20th Century, insurers tended to themselves
administer the policies they sold. The policyholder was billed for
premiums by an insurance company employee. Documentary records were
maintained by an insurer employee. When there was a claim (either firstparty or third-party), the claim was handled by an insurer employee. This
began to change significantly after mid-century as insurers increasingly
outsourced policy administration and claims adjustment functions to
independent contractors. By the 1980s, even the underwriting and policy
placement functions had been outsourced by some insurers. Instead of
compartmentalized outsourcing of billing, record-keeping, or claims
adjustment, insurers increasingly made use of MGAs, who not only
combined these functions but also in essence did the underwriting
traditionally performed by insurers.
Some of the wave of solvency problems affecting insurers during
the 1980s and early 1990s were blamed on the lax underwriting standards
of MGAs, who had an economic incentive to write lots of business (and
earn higher fees) while having comparatively less motivation to make sure
that the policies were issued to good risks. When the figurative chickens
came home to their metaphorical roost, there were a number of prominent
insurance insolvencies. Although the solvency problems facing Lloyds of
London were primarily rooted in long-tail asbestos and environmental
coverage obligations, some of these problems – which led to the form of
Equitas in 199647 were also ascribed to overly aggressive underwriting by
appreciable way restricted a potential plaintiff’s array of potential target
defendants. Manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and installers are
all subject to suit by foreseeable product users while the “disclosed principal” and
“lack of privity” defenses have generally not been available to defendants.
47

See Lloyd’s v. Jaffray, (1999) Q.B. (Colman, J) (describing background of
Lloyd’s crisis of early 1990s and formation of Equitas Re); see generally
ELISABETH LEUSSENHOP & MARTIN MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT LLOYD’S OF LONDON (1995); see also Richard J.
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MGAs for American insurers reinsured by Lloyd’s or involved in risk
placement for which Lloyds’ syndicates provided excess or umbrella
insurance.
My concern in this article is not whether independent contractors
like MGAs and independent adjusters are better or worse at their jobs than
insurer employees or their respective contribution to problematic insurance
practices. My point and contention is much narrower and simpler. For
better or worse, these intermediaries have assumed many of the traditional
functions of an insurer to a sufficient degree that for most practical
purposes, the actions of the intermediary are the actions of the insurer.
Under these circumstances, the traditional citadel of contract
privity now seems as outmoded in this situation as it does in the context of
product liability. In addition, these intermediaries have morphed from
mere agents into the alter ego replacements of insurers, as least as respects
their dealings with policyholders and the public. Consequently, a rule of
law immunizing them from the consequences of their conduct toward these
groups appears increasingly outdated, unfair, and insufficiently deterrent of
negligent or wrongful behavior by these intermediaries.
Some of the problem may result from the relative youth of the bad
faith cause of action, particularly in first-party cases. Liability insurers
have been subject to bad faith faith claims for as long as 75 years in some
jurisdictions. But many states did not solidify this potential exposure until
the 1960s or later. First-party bad faith came later, essentially being
birthed in the 1970s or later.48 When confronted with these relatively new
causes of action against insurers, courts were understandably reluctant to
expand bad faith liability to entities other than the insurer. Until courts
better understood the relatively new tort of insurance bad faith, they were
inclined to apply traditional agency and privity of contract rules as a means
of regulating the spread of bad faith claims.

Astor, Lloyd’s of London: The Curious Case of Equitas Re, 23 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 32 (2004).
48

See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 27, Ch. 10; see also,
supra notes 24-29.
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B. THE HALTING MODERN EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY
As the use of intermediaries increased in the claims process, there
was of course a corresponding increase in complaints about the manner in
which they performed this function. When denied insurance coverage or
victimized by claims handling misconduct, aggrieved policyholders and
claimants brought suit against the intermediaries as well as the insurers
involved. Although the intermediaries often avoided liability under the
traditional immunizing doctrines of lack-of-privity and agent-for-adisclosed-principal, an increasing number of courts recognized that the
nature of the intermediaries’ role made it inappropriate to apply the
traditional rules.
The first prominent case to expressly impose duties to the
policyholder upon an independent adjuster was Continental Insurance v.
Bayless and Roberts, Inc.49 In Bayless, the policyholder was sued due to
explosion of a “paint pot” it owned that was used by the victim in painting
aircraft.
The insurer, using an independent adjuster, accused the
policyholder of failure to cooperate and threatened to cease defense of the
claim unless the policyholder agreed to a reservation of rights. The
policyholder “refused to accept such a conditioned defense” and the insurer
“withdrew from the case.” Left in the lurch,
B&R settled the tort action, agreed to entry of a
consent judgment for $618,000, and then sued [insurer]
Continental and its chief adjuster to recover the amount of
the judgment as well as punitive damages. The case went
to trial and resulted in an award of $622,000 in damages to
B&R, based on the jury’s finding that Continental and its
adjuster, Arthur Stanford, had negligently conducted
B&R’s defense, and that the insurance company had
breached its duty to defend its insured.50
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that under these circumstances, the policyholder was entitled to make a bad
49

608 P.2d 281, 288 (Alaska 1980).

50

See id., at 283-84.
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faith claim against the adjuster, affirming the verdict as reasonable. The
unfortunate adjuster found liable (Arthur Stanford) was branch manager of
Underwriters Adjusting Company, an Anchorage-based “subsidiary of
Continental Corporation” that functioned “as the claims department of
Continental Insurance,” which was also a subsidiary of Continental
Corporation. Notwithstanding Stanford’s perhaps incestuous relationship
with the Continental family, it appears he qualified as an independent
adjuster and was not sued in the capacity as an arguable individual
employee of the insurer.
The policyholder had successfully accused Stanford of failing to
adequately investigate the claim against it as well as failing to inform the
policyholder regarding the case, all in breach of an asserted fiduciary duty
that demonstrated “gross and wanton disregard” for the interests of the
policyholder. Evidence presented at trial suggested that adjuster Stanford
had failed to inform defense counsel of problematic facts and had failed to
disclose to counsel that the insurer had authorized up to $10,000 to settle
the case.
Relying on Gruenberg51 and Iversen,52 adjuster Stanford argued
that he could not be sued because of his absence of a contractual
relationship with the policyholder. Even though Iverson had, like
Gruenberg, generally been viewed as a case tending to immunize
intermediaries, the Alaska Court noted that even under Iverson a claim for
relief could lie, describing Iverson as a case in which “[t]he court held that
the agent’s liability would depend upon the plaintiff’s theory of recovery.”
If the plaintiff was asserting only contractual claims, California law per
Gruenberg and Iverson barred the claims on lack-of-privity grounds and
“Stanford could not be held liable for a breach of the fiduciary duty of good
faith arising out of the insurance contract . . . .” However, intermediaries
like Stanford “could be held liable for negligence arising out of a breach of
the general tort duty of ordinary care.”53
The Bayless Court’s interpretation of California law is open to
more than a little debate and appears to have been refuted by the latter
state’s continued practice of largely immunizing intermediaries during the
51

See generally Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (1973).

52

Iversen v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 49, 50-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).

53

See 608 P.2d, at 287.
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ensuing 17 years.54 But regardless of whether Bayless correctly interpreted
California law, it nonetheless provided a beachhead in opposition to the
historical view that contract privity and disclosed agency protected TPAs
and adjusters. The Bayless Court also saw its decision as a natural
extension of Alaska law holding that an insurance agent could be liable for
negligent failure to provide requested insurance even if the agent was
working for an insurance company that was a disclosed principal.55
Bayless broke away from the traditional formal rule of adjuster
immunity but hardly produced an avalanche of case law rejecting the rule.
It would be six years before another state supreme court followed suit. In
Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos.56, New Hampshire took a similar approach.
The home of the policyholders was destroyed by fire and they sought
coverage from their property insurer, which retained an independent
investigator to perform a cause-and-origin analysis of the fire.57 The
investigator subsequently assessed the fire as suspicious, leading to claim

54

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d
799, 802-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (policyholder may not bring claim for injury
based on independent adjuster’s negligence).
55

See Cont’l Ins., 608 P.2d at 287-88 (citing Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 498
P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1972)). Bayless & Roberts remains good law in Alaska but
there has not been any particular flood of litigation against adjusters, who appear to
remain peripheral to much insurance coverage litigation. See, e.g., Gibson v.
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 312, 316-17 (Alaska 2007) (affirming trial court
decision to prohibit discovery directed at independent adjusters in policyholder’s
underinsured motorist claim made against her insurer). Oddly, the policyholder
claimed only that she was owed additional UIM benefits from the insurer after
having received $50,000 policy limits “plus $12,747.50 in add-ons” under the
tortfeasor’s coverage and did not allege bad faith against the insurer, which
presumably would have opened the door to discovery from adjusters. Id. at 314.
The policyholder prevailed at trial, but only to the tune of a few thousand dollars.
Id. at 315-16. The opinion has an air of trying to put the case to bed and some
annoyance with the policyholder (or counsel’s) insistence on prosecuting a case of
such limited magnitude.
56
57

506 A.2d 333 (N.H. 1986).
Id. at 333.
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denial by the insurer.58 The policyholders sued the investigator as well as
the insurer, alleging negligence in the conduct of the investigation.59
The trial court accepted the investigator’s defense of lack-of-privity
and dismissed the claim.60 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that an
investigative agent of an insurer conducting a claim investigation owed a
duty of good faith to the policyholder “arising out of the [insurance]
company’s duty of good faith and fair dealing.”61 The Court bolstered its
determination by noting that investigators were required to be licensed and
were subject to a “general duty to use due care” in the performance of their
work.62
In addition, the Court noted that existing precedent had held a bank
responsible to a beneficiary with which it had no contract for failing to
establish a survivorship account requested by the bank’s customer.63 A
contractual tie was not necessary to create duties in that case because the
bank was aware that the beneficiary would be harmed from negligent
discharge of the bank’s contractual duties.64 Although the investigative
agency and the individual investigator were not in privity with the
plaintiffs,
[T]hey were fully aware that the plaintiffs could be
harmed financially if they performed their investigation in
a negligent manner and rendered a report to [the insurer]
that would cause the company to refuse payment to the
plaintiffs. [They] were also aware that there was a mutual
duty of fair dealing between [the insurer] and the plaintiffs.
58

Id. at 334.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Morvay, 506 A.2d at 334.

63

Id. at 334-35.

64

Id. (citing Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Sav. Bank, 254 A.2d 837, 839
(N.H. 1969)).
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Under these circumstances, we hold that the plaintiffs have
stated a cause of action in negligence [against the
investigator and the employee.] . . . .
....
. . . Although . . . the investigators may give
reports only to the insurer, the insured is a foreseeably
affected third party. . . . Both the insured and the insurer
have a stake in the outcome of the investigation. Thus, we
hold that the investigators owe a duty to the insured as well
as to the insurer to conduct a fair and reasonable
investigation of an insurance claim and that the motion to
dismiss should not have been granted.65
The Morvay Court also analogized the liability of the investigator
to that of accountants, who “are liable in an action sounding in negligence
to that group of persons who foreseeably may rely on the accountants’
work.”66 Consequently, “accountants may be held liable to persons with
whom they are not in privity if they perform their work negligently and the
plaintiffs are within the class of persons who could have reasonably relied
on the accountants’ work product.”67 Without actually articulating the
connection, the Court had implicitly put the relatively new wine of claims
intermediary liability in the old skin of liability for misconduct that causes
foreseeable injury to a known person or class of persons, something that
had been part of the majority rule regarding public accountant liability for
more than 50 years68 and was also part of the accepted approach to the
65

Id. at 335 (citing Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281,
287-88 (Alaska 1980)).
66

Id.

67

Id. (citing Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308, 1312
(N.H. 1982)).
68

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 552 (1977) (auditor liable to
foreseeable users of audit for negligence). See, e.g., Nevada Nat’l Bank v. Gold
Star Meat Co., Inc., 514 P.2d 651, 654 (Nev. 1973); M. Miller Co. v. Central
Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). But see,
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444-45 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting auditor
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liability of attorneys preparing instruments upon which non-clients would
rely.69
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court was potentially
casting a very broad net of liability that included not only the entity
involved in claims processing, but also individual employees working on a
matter, it placed some practical theoretical limits on its expansion of
intermediary liability.
[T]he scope of the investigators’ duty must be
determined in the light of their contract with the insurer.
The investigator who contracts to perform a $200
investigation is not obligated to expend the same effort that
might be reasonable for a fee of $2,000, nor is an
investigator obligated to continue an inquiry when the
insurer instructs him to stop. The investigator’s obligation
is to exercise reasonable care in performing the work
within the limits set by the insurer and to advise the insurer
in the event that the investigator has reason to believe that
the investigation is too limited to form the basis for a
reliable conclusion.70
In essence, the Morvay Court was making the common sense
conclusion that where a claims intermediary was acting as a surrogate or
alter ego of the insurer, liability was likely to follow. But where the
intermediary’s role and authority were limited, the traditional defenses of
lack of contractual privity and disclosed agency would likely continue to
have force in apt cases.
After Morvay, it would be another five years before another state
supreme court spoke in favor of the potentially emerging modern rule.
Then, in Bass v. California Life Insurance Co., Mississippi affirmed the
general rule that the policyholder could not sue an independent adjuster for
liability for negligence to situations where auditor is not in contractual privity to
injured party).
69

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000);
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois
law).
70

Morvay, 506 A.2d at 335.

636

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

simple negligence, but then broke ranks with the historical norm by also
holding that a cause of action would lie if the independent adjuster had
acted with gross negligence, malice, or reckless disregard for the rights of
the policyholder.71 However, the adjuster must have sufficient independent
authority to make it more than simply an appendage of the insurer. If the
adjuster lacks authority to rule on claims without insurer approval, the
traditional rule of no intermediary liability still obtains.72
Additional support for the modern approach accelerated during the
1990s. Courts in New Jersey,73 Georgia,74 and Nevada75 as well as some
federal decisions76 endorsed the view that intermediaries with substantial
insurer-like duties and autonomy could be liable for bad faith or other
misconduct toward the policyholder. In the 21st Century, Oklahoma

71

581 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted).

72

See, e.g., Ironworks Unlimited v. Purvis, 798 F. Supp. 1261, 1265-66 (S.D.
Miss. 1992) (acknowledging that Bass is controlling state law but distinguishing
the instant case because the independent contractor adjuster lacked autonomy of
adjuster in Bass). In a tangentially related development indicating relaxation of
historical doctrine favorable to intermediaries, Pennsylvania held that brokers owe
a duty of good faith and fair dealing rather than merely a duty of reasonable care.
See Londo v. McLaughlin, 587 A.2d 744, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
73

See Miglicio v. HCM Claim Mgmt. Corp., 672 A.2d 266, 273 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1995). Regarding the rather complex web of bad faith and related
liability in Pennsylvania, see Goren, supra note 26, at 276-81.
74

See Gardner & White Consulting Servs., Inc. v. Ray, 474 S.E.2d 663, 665
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
75
76

See Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 969 P.2d 949, 960 (Nev. 1998).

See, e.g., Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 797-98 (10th Cir.
1995) (applying Oklahoma law) (finding a requisite special relationship existed
between the medical plan beneficiary and the plan administrator where the
administrator performed many of the tasks of insurer). Wolf not only correctly
predicted the path of Oklahoma law but influenced it in that subsequent state
decisions were persuaded by the reasoning of the Wolf court.
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adopted this approach,77 as did Colorado, specifically disapproving
contrary precedent from the 1980s.78 Favorable New Mexico precedent
also emerged.79 Most recently, a Rhode Island federal trial court predicted
that the state would eventually permit bad claims against independent
adjusters where the intermediary has sufficiently assumed the traditional
administrative and adjusting functions of an insurer80 and an Ohio appellate
court has also written approvingly about this “management theory” of
liability for parties linked to insurers when sued by persons not in direct
contract privity with the defendant.81
The cases permitting actions against the adjuster tend to divide, a
bit unevenly, as to both the type of action permitted and the factual
77

See Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1100-03 (Okla. 2005);
Wathor v. Mut. Assurance Adm’rs, Inc., 87 P.3d 559, 562-63 (Okla. 2004); Brown
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
78

See Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. 2003)
(overruling prior contrary line of cases, including Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents,
Inc., 661 P.2d 1196, 1198-99 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)).
79

See, e.g., Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115 (N.M. Ct. App.
2004) (largely following Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis in Cary v. United of
Omaha).
80

See Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Chubb Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274-275
(D.R.I. 2007).
81

See Dombrowski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2007). In Dombrowski, however, the issue for decision was slightly different in
that it focused on whether a parent company of an insurer could be held
responsible for insurer misconduct. Id. at 228-29. The federal court ruled that
corporate separateness was not a bar to liability if the facts demonstrated sufficient
parental company control over the insurer’s coverage and claims decisions. See id.
at 230. Although Dombrowski was in a narrow sense a “piercing the corporate
veil” case, the court gave a rather ringing endorsement to what it termed the
“management theory” of liability for parties not in contract privity with a plaintiff
and cited approvingly Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 102 P.3d 111 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2004), Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) and other cases supporting liability for claims intermediaries that in effect
take over the insurer’s traditional claims handling and decision-making function.
Id. at 235-39.
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predicate required to impose liability on the claims intermediary. One
group of cases is willing to permit bad faith or similar actions against the
intermediary if it is in a collaborative “joint venture” arrangement with the
insurer or otherwise has stepped into the shoes of the insurer for purposes
of claims administration.82 Another group permits claims against the
adjuster based on a lower threshold of mere tort duties owed to the
policyholder or other third party sufficient to permit a claim sounding in
simple negligence.83 Some jurisdictions appear to recognize both grounds
for liability.84 One court predicting state law was willing to allow a bad
82

See, e.g., Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 969 P.2d 949, 959 (Nev.
1998) (bad faith claim against intermediary permitted if it is in a “joint venture”
with insurer as evidenced by sharing of financial incentives); Farr v. Transamerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Dellaira
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). See also id. at 116
(“An insured’s expectations of good faith handling and ultimate determination of
his or her claim for benefits by the insurer extends no less to an entity that both
handles and determines the claim than to the insurer issuing the policy. `Absent the
prospect of damages for bad faith breach, [the entity performing claims
determination] has no incentive to pay in good faith[.]’”) (quoting Cary v. United
of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462, 468-69 (Colo. 2003)).
83

See, e.g., Bass v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 581 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 1991)
(intermediary can be liable for gross negligence, recklessness, or other misconduct
exceeding mere negligence); Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d 333, 335
(N.H. 1986) (adjuster owes duty of reasonable care to policyholder and may be
liable for negligence); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d
281, 287-88 (Alaska 1980) (same). See also Shephard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 562, at *18 (S.D. Ohio. June 6, 2006) (predicting that Ohio will
eventually adopt this view).
84

For example, a leading Colorado case, Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins.
Co., 68 P.3d 462, 468-69 (Colo. 2003), found defendant third-party administrator
to have performed most of the functions normally done by insurer and to have a
substantial financial interest in denying claims because of the administrator’s
reinsurance contract with policyholder municipality. Therefore, it was logical to
hold the TPA to insurer standards of conduct and liability. See also Robertson
Stephens, Inc. v. Chubb Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273-74 (D. R.I. 2007)
(reading Cary as a case requiring substantial intertwinement of administrator and
insurer similar to joint venture theory of Wohlers and Farr (See supra note 70) to
impose bad faith liability on TPA. I read Cary more broadly as also permitting
negligence and other tort actions against a TPA under apt circumstances even if the
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TPA does not rise to the level of being a surrogate insurer subject to bad faith
liability.
Oklahoma is clearly a jurisdiction that operates on a two-track system of
liability for claims intermediaries. Two state supreme court cases have largely
adopted the “joint venture” or “intertwinement of functions” theory of
intermediary liability under which the claims intermediary may be sued for bad
faith in the manner of an insurer if the facts demonstrate that the intermediary has
largely assumed the functions of the insurer regarding policy administration,
including wide discretion in claims decision-making, particularly if there are
significant financial incentives for the intermediary to deny claims. See Badillo v.
Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1101-03 (Okla. 2005) (refusing to dismiss
bad faith claim against intermediary at pretrial stage); Wathor v. Mutual Assur.
Adm’rs, Inc.., 87 P.3d 559 (Okla. 2004) (accepting joint venture theory of
intermediary bad faith but dismissing instant claim as a factually insufficient as a
matter of law). But see 87 P.3d at 564 (Opala, V.C.J. and Watt, C.J., dissenting on
ground that preliminary facts entitled plaintiff to discovery on intertwinement
issues and that general agency principles could support tort liability depending on
facts adduced at trial).
In addition, Oklahoma has a strong precedent supporting the existence of
a negligence cause of action against insurance intermediaries where the facts of the
case establish sufficient connection to the plaintiff to create a duty of reasonable
care. See infra text accompanying notes 151-52 (discussing the reasoning of
Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002)
approvingly). The state Supreme Court has never cited Brown, a particularly odd
omission in cases like Badillo and Wathor, which dealt with the issue of
intermediary liability. My own theory is that the blinders counsel and courts
occasionally put on themselves created a situation in which the Supreme Court was
so focused on the bad faith claims as prosecuted by the plaintiffs in Badillo and
Wathor that it did not think to address whether tort liability via negligence and the
Brown precedent might be applicable.
In any event, although Brown has not had ringing endorsement from the
state supreme court, it continues to be treated as authoritative Oklahoma law, both
for its pronouncements on tortious interference with contract and its views on
claims adjuster liability, the more germane part of the opinion for purposes of this
article. See, e.g., D & D Equip. & Supply Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74784, at *7-8 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2007); Ishamel
v. Andrew, 137 P.3d 1271, 1274-75 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006). Brown also was
favorably cited by a federal trial court applying Ohio law in an intermediary
liability situation. See Shephard v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 76, at *17. At this
juncture, it thus appears that persons aggrieved by claims intermediaries may
pursue either a straight-forward negligence tort for recovery or seek to sue the
intermediary for bad faith where the adjuster has sufficiently assumed core insurer
operations.

640

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

faith claim against an administrator sufficiently intertwined with an insurer
but refused to allow a simple negligence action against the administrator.85
As discussed in more detail below, my proposed framework for
intermediary liability would permit both types of actions against adjusters
based on the facts of the particular case.86
Despite their differences at the margin, the common thread of these
decisions is not so much a rejection of the general rule as a recognition that
in many cases, insurance intermediaries act more like substitute insurers
than mere agents. Almost all of the decisions sustaining liability claims
insisted that the intermediary engage in more than merely ministerial and
robotic claims handling commanded by the insurer as principal to the
intermediary’s limited agency.87 Some of these decisions went further in
85

See, e.g., Robertson Stephens, 473 F. Supp. 2d, at 273-78. The Robertson
Stephens opinion is so thorough and scholarly that one flinches from disagreeing
with it, even in part. However, the Court’s refusal to permit a negligence action in
a situation it found apt for a bad faith action seems irreconcilably inconsistent,
even if it as a practical matter does not strip the plaintiff of any serious litigation
prerogatives. (If the policyholder can sue for bad faith, suing for mere negligence
is unlikely to lead to a greater recovery.) If the claims administrator is sufficiently
linked to the insurer to be sued as an insurer and owe a fiduciary-like duty of good
faith to the policyholder, this same administrator must also logically owe the
policyholder at least a basic tort duty of reasonable care.
Robertson Stephens is a finely crafted opinion that seems to veer off track in
this regard, although it was arguably forced to by controlling Rhode Island
precedent, particularly the state’s general hesitance to impose on commercial
actors liability for negligence toward third parties. See id. at 276-81. The Court
noted that it was “not entirely unsympathetic to Plaintiffs’ call to augment in law
the obligations of independent administrators . . . but Rhode Island precedents and
the majority approach [of adjuster immunity absent a joint venture with the
insurer] must stay the Court’s hand. The Rhode Island Supreme Court is perfectly
capable of pioneering new frontiers in the law of negligence on its own, and is in a
better position to do so.”). See id. at 280-81 (also noting that plaintiff chose
federal forum and therefore cannot “grumble” about federal court reluctance to
push boundaries of state law).
86
87

See infra text accompanying notes 177-221.

Bayless & Roberts and Morvay are arguably close to permitting liability
even if the agency is limited. See supra notes accompanying text 49-63. For
example, the Robertson Stephens court read them this way. See Robertson Stevens,
473 F Supp. 2d at 280. I disagree. In both Bayless and Morvay, the agents (an
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requiring substantially autonomous claims administration so that the
intermediary was in effect the decisionmaker regarding the claim and not
merely a vessel of communication between insurer and policyholder.88
Some also required a partnership or joint venture-like financial stake by the
intermediary that gave it an incentive to dispute claims going beyond
whatever natural tendency the adjuster might have to minimize payments in
order to please the principle.89
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed:
In a situation where a plan administrator performs
many of the tasks of an insurance company, has a
compensation package that is contingent on the approval or
denial of claims, and bears some of the financial risk of
loss for the claims, the administrator has a duty of good
faith and fair dealing to the insured.90
If an intermediary “acted sufficiently like an insurer” to
create a “special relationship” between policyholder and
intermediary, the intermediary could be liable to the same extent as
an insurer.91
Nevada took a similar view but couched it in perhaps problematic
language requiring that the degree of the intermediaries assumption of
insurer functions rise to the level of a “joint venture.” The general rule of
insurer immunity remained operative but where an intermediary was
engaged in a “joint venture” with the insurer, the intermediary was subject
investigator and an adjuster) had substantial autonomy in conducting their duties
and substantial practical control over the outcome of the claims in question.
88

Oklahoma’s Badillo and Wathor cases fall into this category, as arguably
does Cary v. United of Omaha. See supra notes accompanying text 78, 82-4.
89

The joint venture cases, Wohlers and Farr, clearly are in this vein. Also,
one might argue that Badillo, Wathor, and Cary also depended on some significant
financial incentive impinging on the claims adjuster’s ability to be fair.
90
91

See Wathor, 87 P.3d at 563.

See id. at 563. However, on the facts of that particular case, the Court found
that the intermediary did not “act sufficiently like an insurer.” Id. at 562.
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to the duties of an insurer and faced potential liability similar to that of an
insurer.92 According to the Nevada Supreme Court, the instant case
provided sufficient evidence of the requisite joint venture in that the
intermediary
[d]eveloped promotional material, issued policies,
billed and collected premiums, adjudicated claims, and
assisted [the insurer] in the development of [contract
language]. Further, because [the intermediary] shared in
[the insurer’s] profits, it had a direct pecuniary interest in
optimizing [the insurer’s] financial condition by keeping
claims costs down. [The intermediary’s] administrative
responsibilities and its special relationship with [the insurer
are] indicative of the existence of a joint venture. . . .
Due to the extent of [the intermediary’s]
administrative responsibilities, policy management duties,
and special relationship . . . we conclude that [the
intermediary and the insurer] were involved in a joint
venture to an extent sufficient to expose [the intermediary]
to liability on all contract-based and bad faith claims.93
Although the Nevada decision arguably would have been more
doctrinally satisfying if it had simply said that MGAs or other
intermediaries taking on insurer roles were subject to the law governing
92

In Wohlers, the court noted:

In general, no one “is liable upon a contract except those who are parties to it.”
County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 96 Nev. 643, 548-49, 615 P.2d 939, 943
(1980). However, according to a well-established exception to this general
rule, where a claims administrator is engaged in a joint venture with an
insurer, the administrator “may be held liable for its bad faith in handling the
insured’s claim, even though the organization is not technically a party to the
insurance policy.” William M. Shernoff et al., Insurance Bad Faith Litigation
§ 2.03[1], at 2-10 (1998).
Wohlers, 969 P.2d at 959 (citing County of Clark and William M. Shernoff).
93

See id. at 959.
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insurers (and dispensing with joint venture talk),94 it was not only another
state supreme court supportive of a departure from inflexible application of
the historical rule but also provided a striking illustration of the degree to
which MGAs in fact often take over insurer functions. The MGA found
liable in Nevada’s Wohlers decision was a world away from the traditional
limited autonomy agents the law envisioned when it adopted the historical
rule of intermediary immunity when the agent’s principal was disclosed.95
94

The very terminology “joint venture,” tends to conjure up images of major,
formal business combinations and thus subconsciously suggests that much is
required before MGA or claims intermediary can be held liable like an insurer.
However, all that is really necessary is relatively standard administrator or adjuster
behavior. When the joint venture language is peeled back, the Nevada Supreme
Court appears to be saying that where an intermediary acting within its authority
makes a key coverage decision in place of the insurer, the intermediary should be
liable like an insurer, particularly if the intermediary has economic incentives
adverse to coverage and is involved in significant administrative operations for the
insurer.
In adopting the joint venture terminology and concept, the Nevada
Supreme Court was obviously influenced by the treatise it cited authored by
prominent California policyholders’ attorney William Shernoff.
Shernoff
characterized pre-Wohlers case law as supporting MGA and adjuster liability if
they were sufficiently intertwined with the insurer to constitute a joint venture.
Although this is one valid interpretation, one could as easily looked at the case law
assessed by Shernoff and concluded that the pre-Wohlers courts were looking not
so much for a joint venture as for situations in which the intermediary was making
decisions historically made by the insurer rather than one of its agents.
95
Nevada is not alone in its attraction to the joint venture rationale as well as
the realization that much of modern insurance is administered not by the insurer
itself but by intermediaries. Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal.
took a similar approach and found, much like Wohlers, that a health insurer’s
independent claims adjuster was sufficiently economically linked to the insurer to
be liable to the policyholder on a joint venture theory. Farr, 699 P.2d at 386.
Farr’s imposition of liability upon an intermediary creates some tension
in Arizona law because another prominent Arizona case is frequently cited in
support of modern adherence to the traditional rule of adjuster immunity. See
Meineke v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 ( Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)
(basing independent adjuster immunity on grounds of lack of contract privity). See
also Napier v. Bertram, 954 P.2d 1389, 1394-1395 (Ariz. 1998) (independent
insurance agent had no duty to taxicab passenger to ensure that taxicab company
has required uninsured motorist coverage; Court feared that imposition of liability
would “impose on agents a duty to a vast number of non-clients—literally all who
reside in or travel in this state”).
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In Cary v. United of Omaha Life Insurance,96 Colorado set forth
one of the most recent and forceful rejections of the traditional approach.
The City of Arvada provided a self-funded insurance program to its
employees, one managed by United of Omaha and Mutual of Omaha of
Colorado (the Plan Administrators). Thomas Cary’s 15-year-old daughter
shot herself while attempting suicide, incurring substantial injuries that
required extensive medical treatment, including multiple surgeries and
hospitalization. The Plan Administrators denied Cary’s claim for benefits
based on an exclusion in the policy for self-inflicted injuries. He responded
by suing for benefits and seeking damages for bad faith against the Plan
Administrators.
The trial court agreed with claimant Cary that the self-inflicted
injuries provision of the policy was ambiguous and ruled in favor of
coverage but held that the Plan Administrators could not be sued for bad
faith because “Cary was not in contractual privity with the Administrators.”
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on similar grounds. The Colorado
Supreme Court reversed, stating that it disagreed with the court of appeals’
strict application of a privity of contract analysis to this case. Here, the
insurance administrators had primary control over benefit determinations,
assumed some of the insurance risk of loss, undertook many of the
obligations and risks of an insurer, and had the power, motive, and
opportunity to act unscrupulously in the investigation and servicing of the
insurance claims. Under such circumstances, we hold that a special
relationship existed between the Administrators and the insured sufficient
to establish in the Administrators a duty to act in good faith.97
The cases are reconcilable in that Meineke based its holding on a view that in
the instant case the “relationship between adjuster and insured is sufficiently
attenuated by the insurer’s control over the adjuster to be an important factor that
militates against imposing a further duty on the adjuster to the insured.” Meineke,
991 P.2d at 270. Neither Meineke nor Napier cited Farr but Farr remains good
law in Arizona. Presumably, then, an Arizona court faced with adjuster-insurer
intertwinement sufficient to make for a “joint venture” would, like the Nevada
Supreme Court in Wohlers, refuse to immunize the intermediary.
96
97

68 P.3d 462 (Colo. 2003).

Id. at 465. Under Colorado bad faith law, in order to prevail, Cary would be
required to prove that the Plan Administrators had acted unreasonably and either
“knew their conduct was unreasonable or acted in reckless disregard of whether
their conduct was unreasonable.” Id.
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In addition to the these facts of Plan Administrator authority and
conduct that supported permitting the claim, the Court also made a legal
analysis differentiating cases of this type from those subject to the general
rule of immunity from suit in the absence of privity. First, it noted that
“insurance contracts are not ordinary commercial contracts” and that
breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith gives rise to a tort action.98
In the typical insurance case, only the
insurer owes the duty of good faith to its insured; agents of
the insurance company – even agents involved in claims
processing – do not owe a duty, since they do not have the
requisite special relationship with the insured.
*

*

*

In the typical case, the insured is adequately
protected by the non-delegable duty the law imposes on the
insurer. However, the existence of this nondelegable duty
does not mean that a third-party claims administrator never
has an independent duty to investigate and process the
insured’s claim in good faith. When the actions of a
defendant are similar enough to those typically performed
by an insurance company in claim administration and
disposition, we have found the existence of a special
relationship sufficient for imposition of a duty of good
faith and tort liability for its breach – even when there is no
contractual privity between the defendant and the
plaintiff.99
98

Colorado had not formally recognized first-party insurance bad faith actions
until the mid-1980s. See Farmers Group, Inc., v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141
(Colo. 1984).
99

See Carey, 68 P.3d at 466-67. As the Court noted, prior case law had
already eroded the wall of immunity provided under the traditional rule. For
example, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, the Court held that a workers
compensation insurer owes a duty of good faith to the employees within the scope
of the plan and not only to the employer who purchased the policy. 706 P.2d 1258,
1264-65 (Colo. 1985). In Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Brighton Sch. Dist.,
the Court ruled that sureties were subject to the bad faith regime that governed
insurers. 27J, 940 P.2d 348, 352 (Colo. 1997). In addition, the Court had moved
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Consequently, “[w]hen a third-party administrator performs many
of the tasks of an insurance company and bears some of the financial risk
of loss for the claim, the administrator has a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the insured in the investigation and servicing of the insurance
claim.”100
Two justices dissented, viewing the majority’s expansion of
potential liability to additional insurance activity participants as
“unworkable” even it its social policy goal of protecting insureds “by
providing a disincentive for wrongful behavior by agents of the insurer” as
well as “an alternative source of recovery” was “laudable.”101 Invoking
policy considerations of its own, the Dissent also argued that bad faith
exposure for the Plan Administrator was inappropriate because it was
obligated to serve the interests of the City of Arvada, which might often be
in conflict with the interests of employees like Cary. Whatever empathy it
felt for the family, the City might have preferred the claim be denied in
order to have more coverage available for other matters or to keep payment
for the program to a minimum.102
Even in California, often cited as the home of continuing adherence
to the general rule that claims intermediaries as mere agents are not subject
to suit, there is appellate court caselaw permitting such claims where the
away from strict privity requirements in other contexts. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan
Homes v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Colo. 1983) (homebuilder owed duty
of care to subsequent purchaser even if no contract privity between builder and
purchaser).
100

See Carey, 68 P.3d at 469.

101

Id. at 469 (Coats, J., dissenting, joined by Kourlis, J.).

102

In Carey, the court noted that:
[T]he significance of [the Administrator’s ] involvement in
processing claims for the City is not that it is acting like an insurer
but rather that it is acting for an insurer. To the extent that it
insured the City with a stop-loss or reinsurance policy, it has a
“semi-fiduciary” relationship with the City, its insured, and owes
the City a special duty that potentially conflicts with a similar duty
to the City’s insured.

Id. at 471 (emphasis in original).
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intermediary has taken on the essential identity of an insurer or is
intertwined economically with the insurer beyond a mere independent
contracting relationship.103 There is also some authority finding rights as
intended third party beneficiaries for persons that are not part of the
contract between policyholder and insurer,104 although there is also much
precedent taking a narrower view of entitlement to contract benefits.105
103

See, e.g., Bus. to Bus. Mkts, Inc. v. Zurich Specialties London Ltd., 37
Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 299, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (surplus lines broker may owe
duty to judgment creditor plaintiff for negligence in procuring insurance policy for
judgment debtor policyholder that did not cover work done by policyholder in
India); Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 740-41 (Ct. App.
2003); Delos v. Farmers Group, Inc.,155 Cal. Rptr. 843, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(“for legitimate business considerations, the [administrative intermediary] was
formed to render management services for the [insurer] for which it received a
percentage of premiums paid by the [insurer’s] policyholders”). See also id. at
653, 850 (administrative intermediary was “engaged in the business of insurance”
and “may be held liable” under state unfair claims practices statute). Id.
The same is true for Arizona, which is generally considered a state favoring
the traditional rule of claims adjuster immunity on the strength of Meineke v. GAB
Business Services, Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 268 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), at least where the
adjuster’s agency authority is relatively circumscribed. But where the claim
intermediary has substantial authority or more than a mere contract to perform
ministerial services, Arizona courts have either permitted claims against the
intermediary by policyholders or suggested that liability may be apt. See, e.g.,
Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins., 821 P.2d 725, 731 (Ariz. 1991) (recognizing
management theory as basis for holding insurer responsible for TPA misconduct);
Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984) (TPA may be liable to policyholder when there is sufficient economic
intertwinement with insurer to constitute joint venture-like linkage between them).
Accord, Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1137-38 (Ariz.
1982)(approving jury instruction on joint and several liability regarding claims
intermediary handling investigation and payment of claims, determining joint
venturers both owed common duty of good faith toward policyholders).
104

See, e.g., Delos, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 853. (“There are no public policy or
doctrinal considerations that preclude Mr. Delos from having an independent cause
of action against defendants. He was a party to the insurance contract and the
effect upon him of the improper denial of his wife’s claim was reasonably
foreseeable”).
105

See, e.g., Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 294-95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (tenant not intended third-party beneficiary to insurance
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Although the state’s Supreme Court has never endorsed any of these
approaches, neither has it disapproved them in the context of claims
intermediaries.
In addition, the “alter ego of the insurer” and “joint venture”
theories are arguably perfectly consistent with famous California precedent
rejecting claims against intermediaries (Gruenberg, Egan, Iversen)106 in
that in all of these cases, the Supreme Court considered the intermediaries
to be engaged only in more limited, ministerial agency rather than a joint
venture with the insurer or assumption of the insurer’s role. Further, the
immunity for insurance intermediaries, at least if they have substantial
authority, would also appear to be inconsistent with state law permitting
professionals such as an auditor or notary public to be held liable to persons
that are not strictly part of the contract in question.107
Going into the 21st Century, one might have reasonably predicted
increasing erosion of the traditional rule of claims intermediary immunity
from suit by policyholders or other claimants allegedly injured by the
intermediary’s errors or misconduct. However, the formal doctrines
shielding these intermediaries have proven surprisingly resilient.
C. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE
Notwithstanding the emergence of a significant number of cases
holding that intermediaries sufficiently assuming insurer functions could be
liable to the same extent as insurers, many courts continue to apply the
traditional doctrine and to accord broad immunity to MGAs and

policy contract between lessor/policyholder and insurer). See also id. at 1724, 295
(“it is well settled that [California law] excludes enforcement of a contract by
persons who are only incidentally or remotely benefited by it”) (citing Cal. Civil
Code § 1559 and Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)).
106

See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 154 (Cal. 1979);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973); Iversen v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 168, 170 (Cal Ct. App. 1976).
107

See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 17-19 (Cal. 1958) (notary public can
be liable to persons reasonably expected to rely on notarization even if these
persons were not in contractual privity with notary and person contracting to have
signature notarized).
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independent adjusters.108 Courts continue to hold that a claimant does not
have standing to bring a claim directly against an independent adjuster or
administrator.109

108

See, e.g., Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280-81 (D. Kan.
1998)(Kansas law does not permit policyholder to bring bad faith action against
independent adjuster due to lack of contract privity); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.,
875 S.W.2d 695, 698-9 (Tex. 1994)(policyholder may not sue independent adjuster
for alleged bad faith in administering claim); Koch v. Bell, Lewis & Assoc., Inc.,
627 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (2006); Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 267,
270-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire and Cas. Co., 656 So.2d
1338, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Larkin v. First of Georgia Underwriters, 466
So.2d 655, 657 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (insurance MGA not subject to bad faith claim
by policyholder due to lack of contract privity); Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.,
620 P.2d 141, 154 (Cal. 1979)(independent agents selling and servicing policies
for disclosed insurer not subject to covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
policyholder due to absence of contract privity); Troxel v. American States Ins.
Co., 596 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Bentley v. N.C. Ins. Ass’n, 418
S.E.2d 705, 707 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accord Kim v. O’Sullivan, 137 P.3d 61, 62, 65 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2006)(no policyholder cause of action against insurer-provided attorney
for legal malpractice because of lack of express contract between attorney and
policyholder); Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 48, 51 (Conn. Super Ct.
1994)(no claim against attorney for insurer due to lack of contract privity). See
also Badners v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 567 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Ala.
1990)(no policyholder claim against bank that was supposed to debit monthly
premium payments for life insurer due to lack of contract privity between bank and
policyholder’s ex-spouse, who suffered injury due to missed payments and lapsed
policy prior to policyholder’s death).
Kim v. O’Sullivan clearly seems wrongly decided. Although many states
consider insurers to be “clients” of an attorney retained by the insurer to defend
third party’s lawsuit against a policyholder, all states consider the policyholder to
be the lawyer’s client by operation of law even in the absence of a written retainer
agreement between counsel and the policyholder. Consequently, it simply cannot
be correct that the policyholder has no claim for legal malpractice against a
malfunctioning defense lawyer retained by its insurer. Some states even provide
that only the policyholder is a client of the attorney and that insurers are but third
party payers with contract rights vis-à-vis counsel.
109

See, e.g., Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 586
S.E.2d 586, 588-89 (S.C. 2003); Meineke, 991 P.2d at 270; Sanchez v. Lindsey
Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (1999); King v. Nat’l Sec.
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In some instances, legal arguments for removing intermediary
immunity probably fall on deaf judicial ears because the facts of the case
are not particularly compelling for the plaintiff. For example, in Akpan v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, Inc.,110 the policyholders, owners of a convenience
store, suffered three separate incidents of burglary and vandalism within a
two-week period. Although this alone does not make the claim suspicious,
the policyholders’ post-loss behavior undoubtedly raised eyebrows as they
backed out of submitting to an examination under oath on five separate
occasions, ultimately refusing to answer questions about the losses. When
they sued the insurer and independent adjuster, the court was not very
sympathetic in view of the case’s aroma of insurance fraud.111
Further, the policyholder claim against the intermediary was that it
had been slow to deliver a copy of the policy to the claimants. Because the
duty to cooperate and submit to examination if requested is so common in
first-party property insurance, it is hard to take seriously the contention that
without a copy of the policy, the insured was unsure of its basic obligations
in this regard. Even if the delay in furnishing a copy of the policy was
wrongful and unreasonable, Apkan hardly presented an attractive case for

Fire and Cas. Co., 656 So.2d 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Velastequi v. Exch.
Ins. Co., 132 Misc.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986).
As previously discussed, the judicial immunity for adjusters facing lawsuits
from claimants is hardly surprising in light of the general rule that third party
claimants may not sue insurers (other than their own) directly because of the law of
privity. See notes 8-12, supra. If there has been bad faith by the insurer, the claim
is often pursued by the claimant possessing an assignment of rights from the
policyholder. In some states, bad faith claims are considered personal and nonassignable. In these states, a policyholder may agree to sue its insurer for bad faith
and to award most of any proceeds from the suit to the third-party claimant as a
means of settling the underlying tort litigation between the claimant and the
policyholder.
110

Akpan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc. 961 So.2d 865, 866 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007).
111

Id. at 867-71 (emphasizing importance of policyholder’s compliance with
policy provision requiring it to submit to examination under oath if requested by
insurer).
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departing from the traditional rule and permitting suit against the
independent adjuster.112
Dear v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.113 presented similar problems for
the cause of law reform. Policyholder Dear was a private investigator with
professional liability coverage. He was sued by a former client for alleged
overcharging and “fraudulent and negligent” investigation.
During
mediation, the former client made a policy limits ($300,000) demand to
resolved the case, one which the mediator had advised the insurer that it
would be “well advised to accept [plaintiff’s] policy limits demand” and
that the mediator “believed that a jury might find against Dear” and award
significant damages.”114 Not surprisingly, the insurer settled, as was its
right under the terms of the liability policy. In a subsequent smaller case,
Dear was sued by the former client’s mother for an allegedly intrusive
investigation in retaliation and then was sued by two other clients for
“improprieties while investigating their daughter’s disappearance.”115 The
insurer settled both of these claims as well.
Demonstrating that good deeds rarely go unpunished, Dear sued
the insurer, the adjuster, the insurance sales agent, and the law firm that
defended the claims. His claim against the adjuster is that it changed its
evaluation of the case in response to “pressure” from the defense attorney,
conducted a poor investigation, settled a claim in spite of his objection, and
tortiously interfered with his relationship with the insurer. Reading the
case, one gets the impression that the policyholder was in essence suing the
parties for saving him from himself. Clearly, he faced substantial claims
112

Nonetheless, the Apkan Court felt compelled to cite nearly all the modern
cases on the subject, noted the majority approach, embraced the reasoning of
majority rule cases, and rejected the analysis of cases like Bayless and Roberts and
Morvay. See Apkan, 961 So. 2d at 873-74. See infra text accompanying notes 4971 for criticism of the analyses of modern traditional rule cases such as Sanchez v.
Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (1999) and Meineke v.
GAB Bus. Servs., 991 P.2d at 267, both of which have been influential in shoring
up traditional intermediary immunity in the faces of cases like Morvay and Bayless
and Roberts.
113

Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App. 1997).

114

Id. at 911.

115

Id. at 911-12.
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that could have resulted in an excess verdict and his own personal exposure
had settlement not been effected. The claim of settlement without
confidentiality, however, is more compelling in view of the bad publicity
that dissemination of the lawsuit information could produce for someone in
Dear’s line of work.
Nonetheless, the case as a whole is not one that would likely
prompt a court to make new law to assist a sympathetic claimant. The
Dear result – continued adherence to the rule of intermediary immunity,
was also aided not only by a relatively recent state supreme court decision
affirming adjuster immunity116 but also by substantive Texas law which
does not impose on insurers a specific common law duty of good faith in
the investigation and defense of claims, although it requires insurers to
accept reasonable settlement offers within available policy limits.117
But even where the policyholder’s plight is sympathetic, a number
of modern cases continue to cleave strongly to the traditional rule. In
Troxell v. American States Insurance Co., the policyholders suffered a
home fire.118 The insurer hired an independent investigator to perform a
cause and origin analysis of the fire, which resulted in an adverse
116

See id. at 916 (citing Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.

1994)).
117

See id. at 914, (citing Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs.,
Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 27-29 (Tex. 1996)).
The duty to settle in Texas is routinely labeled the “Stowers duty” but Texas
common law has otherwise been resistant to imposing other good faith obligations
on insurers. However, Texas policyholders enjoy significant statutory rights and
remedies. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151 (2005) (unfair and deceptive
practices in the business of insurance); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060 (unfair
claims settlement practices); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-17.826;
Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0768-D, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68646 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (insurer defendant seeking to remove
policyholder statutory claim to federal court bears heavy burden to demonstrate
lack of any reasonable basis for recovery under Texas unfair claims practices
statutes); South Texas Med. Clinics, P.A. v. CNA Fin. Corp., No. H-06-4041, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11460 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2008) (Chapter 542 claim requires
that there be coverage under the policy at issue to permit unfair practices claim and
Chapter 541 claim may be sustained on unfair claims practices independent of
coverage determination).
118

596 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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evaluation and the policyholder being “indicted on charges of arson” with
the investigator serving as a prosecution witness at trial.119 After the
policyholder was acquitted, she sued the insurer and investigator.120
The suspicions of arson may have been reasonable (depending on
the evidence), but if they were not the investigator’s activity caused more
than a little harm to the policyholder, harm that was readily foreseeable to
an investigator that should at least constructively have been aware that in
acting as an agent of an insurer it was required to proceed with good faith
toward the policyholder.121 But the court remained unmoved by Troxell’s
plight, at least as respects the immunity of intermediaries. The investigator
“was the agent of [the insurer] and had no direct [contract] relationship”
with the policyholder and hence was immune from suit.122
If nothing else, the sheer weight of history and precedent have
made it difficult for reformist decisions such as Bayless & Roberts,123
Morvay,124 or Cary125 to get traction in other jurisdictions. For example,
the South Carolina Supreme Court, although aware of the split in authority
on the topic, viewed immunity for intermediaries as continuing to be the
solidly entrenched majority rule.126 “We decline to recognized a general
duty of due care from an independent insurance adjuster or insurance
adjusting company to the insured, and thereby align South Carolina with
the majority rule on this issue.”127
119

Id. at 922.

120

Id.

121

See id. at 925.

122

Id. at 925, n.1.

123

608 P.2d 281.

124

506 A.2d 333.

125

68 P.3d 462.

126

See Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 586
S.E.2d 586, 588-89 (S.C. 2003).
127

Id.
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The Court based its continued preference for immunity on the state
precedent holding that “foreseeability of injury is an insufficient basis for
recognizing a duty” of good faith or reasonable care.128 It also strongly
suggested that intermediary liability was unnecessary because “a bad faith
claim against the insurer remains available as a source of recovery for a
[policyholder] plaintiff” [and that] “in a bad faith action against the insurer,
the acts of the adjuster or adjusting company (agent) may be imputed to the
insurer (principal).”129
Despite the strong support for intermediary liability (at least when
the intermediary steps significantly into the shoes of the insurer) expressed
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Morvay,130 neighboring Vermont
took quite a different view some 20 years later. In Hamill v. Pawtucket
Mutual Ins. Co.131 the Vermont Supreme Court specifically rejected
Morvay and affirmed a trial court’s summary judgment in favor of
independent insurance adjusters, finding no legal duty owed by the
adjusters to the policyholders – at least for solely economic damages
claimed from alleged negligent investigation and evaluation, including
substantial delay in processing the claim.
In Hamill, the homeowner policyholder was away on a business
trip during which a power outage took place, resulting in loss of heat to the
home, frozen pipes, and subsequent pipe bursting and flooding.132 When
the policyholder sought recovery under the policy, the insurer contracted
with independent adjusters to handle the claim.133 The policyholder
provided estimates of the damage ranging from $150,000 to $200,000.134
128

See id. at 588 (citing South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen &
Hamilton, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986) (foreseeability of injury alone
does not create duty owed to foreseeably injured party)).
129

See id. at 589.

130

506 A.2d 333.

131

892 A.2d at 228-29.

132

Id. at 227.

133

Id.

134

Id.
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In response, the adjuster “rejected the estimates, accused [policyholder]
Hamill of insurance fraud, and offered to settle the matter then and there
for $5,000.”135
Even if these allegations were true, the Vermont Court was
unmoved.136 Like the South Carolina Court in Dry Cleaners,137 Hamill
found foreseeable injury alone an insufficient basis for created a duty to the
policyholder.138 Siding with and citing cases for the majority rule, the
Hamill Court found the adjuster protected by both the absence of a contract
directly with the policyholder and that imposing liability would be
“contrary to the law of agency” since the adjuster worked for a disclosed
principal.139
Further, the Court found public policy considerations to weigh
against imposing liability upon claims intermediaries because “in most
cases, imposing tort liability on independent adjusters would create a
redundancy unjustified by the inevitable costs that eventually would be
passed on to insureds.”140

135

See id. at 227. Hamill also alleged that after he rejected the adjuster’s
settlement offer, [adjuster] Andrulat did not get back to him for weeks, even
though Andrulat knew or should have known that the water-damaged premises
needed to be repaired immediately to prevent the possibility of mold growth.
According to the complaint, [Hamill also alleged that] as a result of Andrulat’s
failure to carefully investigate Hamill’s claims, to consider his repair estimates,
and to make an immediate and thorough inspection of the subject premises, mold
spread through the house, making it uninhabitable. [Had the adjustment process
been conducted properly]…the interior of Hamill’s house would have been gutted
and rebuilt before the mold had begun to grow. Id.
136

Hamill, 892 A.2d 226.

137

586 S.E.2d 586.

138

892 A.2d at 227-28.

139

Id.

140

See id. at 230-31 (noting that policyholder Hamill had settled bad faith and
breach of contract claims against his insurer and that he had not produced any
evidence that he had not been sufficiently compensated by that settlement).
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In addition, “the insurer contractually controls the responsibilities
of its adjuster and retains the ultimate power to deny coverage or pay a
claim.”141 Another consideration was that
to some extent, insurers can define and limit their
risks, and set their premiums commensurate with those
risks through conditions, limits, and exclusions in their
insurance policies. . . . In contrast, absent any contract with
insured, adjusters cannot circumscribe their potential risks
and thus could face potentially open-ended liability. This
is particularly troublesome because of the unlikelihood that
an action claiming negligent mishandling of a claim would
be available against even the insurer.142
The Hamill Court also rejected the argument that Vermont’s unfair
claims practices act or other insurance regulator statutes applied to
independent claims adjusters.143
III.

THE BENEFITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY: ILLUSTRATIONS
OF THE POTENTIAL MISCHIEF OF INTERMEDIARY
IMMUNITY

In spite of its tenacious persistence and resistance to cases like
Bayless144 and Morvay,145 the traditional approach of intermediary
immunity has become inappropriate to the modern world of insurance.
Although cases like Hamill146 in Vermont and Charleston Dry Cleaners147
141

See id. at 231.

142

See id. (citing Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 799, 801-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) and Meineke v. GAB Business Servs.,
Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)).
143
See 892 A.2d at 231-32.
144

608 P.2d 281.

145

506 A.2d 333.

146

829 A.2d at 230.

147

586 S.E.2d 586.
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in South Carolina make substantial public policy arguments in favor of
intermediary immunity, they are ultimately no more persuasive than the
dated formalism of the citadel of privity or rigid adherence to the disclosed
principal rule of agency law. These modern cases, like their predecessors,
rest on a weak foundation of questionable empiricism and argument.
Examining a leading case favoring intermediary immunity serves
to illustrate the comparative weakness of arguments for intermediary
immunity. Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc.,148 is a case
frequently cited in support of continued adherence to the traditional rule of
intermediary immunity and is unusual in that, like the Vermont Supreme
Court’s Hamill149 opinion (which built on Sanchez), it defends the
traditional rule upon functional public policy grounds rather than merely
invoking the formalism of disclosed agency and lack of contract privity,
although those were also applied by the Sanchez Court.
In contrast to Sanchez,150 Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
151
Co., like the Colorado Supreme Court’s Cary opinion discussed above,
rejects the traditional rule of intermediary immunity on the basis of
extensive functional analysis rather than any outright refusal to follow
traditionally venerable privity and agency doctrine.152 Upon closer
examination, the Sanchez153 public policy reasons for the traditional rule
wilt while the analysis of Brown154 and Cary155 (like Morvay and Bayless &
Roberts) is more persuasive. However, because Sanchez and its deceptive
policy-based assessment has been influential in shoring up the traditional

148

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799.

149

829 A.2d 226.

150

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799.

151

58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).

152

See supra text accompanying note 84 (discussing Cary opinion).

153

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799.

154

58 P.3d 217.

155

68 P.3d 462.
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rule of immunity in the aftermath of its rejection in states some states, some
extensive analysis of Sanchez is required.156
Sanchez was in the business transporting commercial machinery
and had purchased cargo insurance from Lloyd’s of London.157 While
moving a commercial dryer to a customer in Los Angeles, the dryer was
damaged.158 Sanchez made a claim under the policy for repair as soon as
possible, with apparent agreement that the damage could be repaired in
about a week for a cost of $12,000.159 Like many policyholders, Sanchez
wanted things taken care of as soon as possible but he had a good reason
beyond ordinary impatience.160 The customer that was slated to receive the
dryer was losing business every day that delivery was delayed.161 Sanchez
informed Lloyd’s through its independent adjuster of the need for speed in
handling the claim in order to prevent huge losses from accumulating
(thereby at least arguably making Lloyd’s responsible for these additional

156

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799.

157

See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800. More precisely, Sanchez had purchased cargo
insurance from an underwriting syndicate at Lloyd’s. Id. Although perhaps the
most famous insurer in the world, Lloyd’s is not actually an insurance company
but is an exchange of sorts at which a number of underwriters operate as agents for
syndicates that provide the financial backing for the operation. Typically, a
prospective policyholder retains a broker in the United States (or elsewhere), who
in turn contacts a Lloyd’s broker, who arranges coverage through a Lloyd’s
underwriter. A similar process is followed for obtaining insurance from London
Market insurers that might be analogized to an “off-Broadway” counterpart to
Lloyd’s. Consequently, where a policyholder sues for coverage, they are
technically suing “Certain Underwriters” at Lloyd’s rather than Lloyd’s as an
entity.
158
Id.
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.
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damages and a Hadley v. Baxendale162 defense unavailable, at least if the
insurer was in breach of the policy).163
Apparently unmoved by Sanchez’s plight, the claims adjuster took
three months “before the claim was paid and the repairs completed. As a
result, the dryer’s purchaser sued and . . . obtained a judgment against
Sanchez” for (I am not kidding) more than $1,3 million.164 Sanchez then
sued Lloyd’s under the policy and sued the adjuster “on a negligence
theory,” with the adjuster claiming immunity under the traditional lack-ofprivity and disclosed agency defenses165 seemingly well enshrined in
California law.166
162

(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.

163

Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, a party
breaching a contract is not liable for consequential damages unless they not only
flow from the breach but are also within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the contract is made. See DAVID EPSTEIN, BRUCE MARKELL & LAWRENCE
PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 831-846 (2d
ed. 2002); Farnsworth, supra note 10, § 12.14.
As a matter of contract law, Sanchez might have been out of luck because
most courts hold that the consequential damages in question must have been
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting rather than after the loss event.
In addition, Lloyd’s could probably argue successfully that Sanchez should have
come up with his own $12,000 for dryer repair and mitigated the damages rather
than waiting for three months while Lloyd’s and its adjuster apparently diddled.
But even if consequential damages for the breach are not available, one can make a
strong argument that taking three months to process an emergency claim after
being put on notice by the policyholder constitutes bad faith and entitles the
policyholder to damages (e.g., an adverse judgment by the customer) proximately
resulting from the bad faith, provided that Sanchez’s failure to mitigate does not
cut off the claim.
164

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.

165

See id. By suing the adjuster on a negligence theory, which of course
sounds in tort, Sanchez was probably trying to avoid the problems facing him in
prosecuting the breach of contract claim against the insurer due to the Hadley v.
Baxendale foreseeability problem and his failure to mitigate consequential
damages. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
166

See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 824, 620 P.2d 141,
169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510
P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), discussed at TAN 27-42, supra.
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Sanchez begins as a noble effort of a busy state court to take an indepth look at the problem. It even cites Cardozo’s classic work of
sociological jurisprudence The Nature of the Judicial Process.167 But
despite theses pretensions, Sanchez quickly dissolves into what I term
“pseudo-policy lite.” This is the type of “analysis” that occurs when a court
trots out non-doctrinal, seemingly prudential reasons for a ruling that are
based primarily on assertion, illogic, poor reasoning, failure to consider
other factors, or a misunderstanding of the manner in which either its rule
or the rejected rule would operate. “Pseudo-policy lite” analysis pretends
to be applying a real world appreciation of the collateral consequences of
its decision making when it in reality is merely invoking over-simplified or
misleading arguments that do not in fact square with reality.
Rather than basing its decision in favor of adjuster immunity upon
California Supreme Court decisions pretty squarely on point (and which
presumably controlled disposition of the case no matter how much
commentators might criticize them),168 the Sanchez Court chose instead to
look at a relatively recent state supreme court decision limiting the liability

167

See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800-801 (“While courts do not generally make
broad policy in the manner of legislatures, they do make policy decisions in the
“gaps,” filling in the “open spaces” or “interstices” of the law.” (citing CARDOZO,
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (1921))). Courts deciding questions of
duty are engaged in the limited “legislative” aspect of the judicial function. From
this promising premise, the Sanchez Court immediately slides into analogy to other
California cases rejecting liability and a prediction of adverse consequences from
adjuster liability that betrays lack of understanding about the operation of
insurance intermediaries in the field.
The Sanchez Court is right to note, as did the Cardozo Court, that courts must
often make policy-based assessments in determining the reach of common law
liability. But, for reasons that I hope are apparent in this section’s discussion, it
did a weak job of public policy analysis. One wonders why, in view of the existing
California Supreme Court precedent in Egan and Gruenberg, the Sanchez Court
did not just declare adjuster immunity as a matter of settled doctrine. If it had, it
would have arguably better served the nation by not being a part of the
counterattack against a possibly emerging rule of intermediary responsibility for
misconduct.
168

See supra text accompanying notes 25-29 (discussing Ashley’s criticism of
Gruenberg and similar analyses limiting intermediary liability on privity of
contract grounds).
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of auditors to third parties169 and a 40-year old decision permitting a
beneficiary’s claim for lawyer malpractice regarding a will that resulted in
financial loss to the beneficiary.170 Sanchez analogized claims adjusters to
auditors in making its adjuster immunity ruling and minimized the analogy
of adjusters to attorneys in attempting to avoid a precedent imposing
liability.171
Rather than relying on the settled state law of adjuster immunity,
the Sanchez Court took it upon itself to apply a set of factors generally used
to determine the existence of a tort duty. Although this may have made for
a more Cardozo-like analysis for the Court, it was both unnecessary and
misleading in that the liability of auditors, particularly if they preparing
statements for the public or dispersal to third parties, is less problematic
than suggested by the Sanchez Court. Indeed, in most states auditors are
subject to liability under these circumstances.172 Although auditor liability
169

See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 760 (Cal. 1992) (discussed
at Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800-802 (holding an auditor is liable only to clients,
and not to third parties for negligent preparation of financial statement)).
170

See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1958) (discussed in Sanchez,
84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800-801 (holding a lawyer who renders a will void by
negligently failing to have it properly witnessed owes a duty of care to the intended
sole beneficiary)).
171

After citing the Biakanj v. Irving case and acknowledging that attorneys
enjoy less protection from third party claims than do independent insurance
adjusters, the Sanchez Court seemed unwilling to wrestle with those implications.
See generally Sanchez v. Lindsey Modern Claims Services Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d
799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). As discussed below, the degree of existing attorney
liability to third parties makes a case for at least as much insurance claims
intermediary liability to third parties. Lawyers stand in a significantly different
position than do claims adjusters in terms of their role and the social interests at
stake if they are made to compromise their traditional role of zealous fiduciary
loyalty to the client that hires them. This could tag attorneys for liability that
might, in part, be characterized as merely an outgrowth of steadfast loyalty to a
mistaken client. In spite of this, lawyers generally, and in the insurance context in
particular, are subject to significantly more liability exposure than independent
claims adjusters under the Sanchez ruling, a fact that seriously calls into question
the wisdom of the holding. See infra text accompanying notes 198-205.
172

See DOBBS, supra note 9, at § 480; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 552
(1977) (auditor liable to third parties if third party’s reliance on auditor work was
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may be established precedent in California, the minority status of this
immunity is not a particularly strong public policy argument for a rule of
auditor immunity.
If the rule of auditor immunity is correct, one’s first reaction may
be to apply it to adjusters as well. But first reactions can be deceiving. On
one hand, Auditors are to some extent the “weights and measures”
yardstick upon which much of the modern financial system depends.173
The seeming failure of auditors in notorious business meltdowns of the
early 21st Century brought on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which moved
auditing more toward being a regulated industry than an independent, selfregulating profession.174 Even widespread misfeasance by independent
adjusters, TPAs and MGAs does not pose the same danger to the economy
and is unlikely to produce the type of social upheaval or legislative
response spurred by perceived auditor failure.175
reasonably foreseeable). The contrary rule largely immunizing auditors from tort
liability (but permitting recovery where the third party was an intended beneficiary
of the contract between client and auditor) ironically stems from a famous Cardozo
opinion. See Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). The opinion was
subject to criticism almost immediately upon its issuance and over time most
jurisdictions have found the Ultramares precedent to grant too much protection to
accountants. It arguably is an opinion in which then-Judge Cardozo erred in filling
in the uncertain interstices of the law. But, of course, to the extent that California
follows the Ultramares rule, the Sanchez Court was bound to follow the
Ultramares rule. However, this hardly gave the Sanchez Court license to engage in
a wide-ranging attempt to analogize auditors to accountants when there already
existed reasonably clear adjuster precedent in California.
173

Ironically, the same Judge Cardozo, who was so resistant to auditor
liability to non-contractual parties in Ultramares, had recognized years earlier that
a scale operation serving the public was responsible for any injury caused by
reasonable reliance upon the supposed accuracy of its measurements. See Glanzer
v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
174

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006). See generally Jeffery D. Van Niel,
Enron – The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
16-17 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); MIMI SCHWARTZ WITH
SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF
ENRON 94-96 (2003).
175

See, e.g., BARBARA LEY TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL
ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 219-20
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But more important is the degree of attenuation presented by
auditor liability and adjuster liability. An auditor may perform work for a
client and then, without its knowledge or permission, have that work shown
to unknown third parties who later assert claims against the auditor when
something goes wrong. In such cases, the auditors are truly being sued by
complete strangers. By contrast, a claimant or a policyholder is hardly a
stranger to the adjuster or TPA, even if there is not a formal contract
between the adjuster and the claimant or policyholder. Consequently, the
relation of auditors to potential claimants is quite distinct from that of
claims adjusters and potentially much broader. Consequently, it hardly
follows that if auditors are immune, adjusters must also be immune.
Despite these fairly dramatic differences, the Sanchez Court
pressed the auditor analogy hard in arguing that imposing liability on
adjusters would be a major breach of the principles of duty and tort law.
“Like the auditors, the insurer-retained adjuster is subject to the control of
its clients, and must make discretionary judgment call. The insurer, not the
adjuster, has the ultimate power to grant or deny coverage, and to pay the
claim, delay paying it, or deny it.”176
While this is technically true, the insurer’s final say in calling the
shots of claims resolution hardly make the adjuster a mere functionary.
Independent adjusters have substantial impact on claims outcomes in that
they provide the insurer with a factual investigation and analysis of the
claim, usually making recommendations as to denial, valuation, and
payment of a claim. This is a far cry from a hypothetical Cratchett of the
19th Century simply selling the wares of Marley to customer Dickens.
In addition, the relationship of insurer to policyholder also
logically affects the relationship of the insurer’s agent to a claimant or
policyholder. Insurers stand in quite a different posture to both their
policyholders and even to third party claimants, than do ordinary
contracting parties. The obligations of good faith and fair dealing that are
often given a short shrift in much of the contract world (e.g., mere absence
of fraud qualifies as good faith no matter how much a breaching party
deprives the other of the benefit of the bargain) have real teeth when
(2003) (describing the closure of a famous accounting firm in light of criminal
litigation and bad press stemming from its role as primary outside auditor to
Enron).
176

See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-02.
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applied to insurance. In some cases, an insurer may be held accountable
for bad faith because of misconduct toward the policyholder even when it
was not required to provide coverage.
Although third parties have fewer rights vis-à-vis the insurer, it is
generally acknowledged that insurance has a public interest component as
part of a system of social policy that requires at least reasonable behavior
toward third parties. Although the insurer’s well-known “duty to settle” is
designed primarily to prevent the policyholder from facing uninsured
liability, it also has elements of encouraging rational and expeditious
dispute resolution so as not to unduly burden the state and society through
litigation or other means.
The net result of all this is well-established legal doctrine that
requires that an insurer not favor its own interests above the
policyholder’s.177 Logically, this also requires that an independent adjuster
or MGA may not favor the insurer’s interest at the expense of the
policyholder, and that the adjuster fairly, accurately, and competently
evaluate claims against a policyholder that have invoked the insurer’s duty
to defend and settle. Because the insurance intermediary is not an agent
acting as a mere conduit or solicitor, the intermediary logically has duties
of reasonable care and fair dealing approaching that of the insurer. Further,
those duties logically are owed to the policyholder as well as to the insurer
since the adjuster has stepped into the shoes of an insurer that must give
equal consideration to the rights of the policyholder in resolving claims.
In arguing that the insurer’s final decision making authority
excuses any intermediary responsibility to others, Sanchez failed to
consider the nature of the intermediaries tasks and the nature of the
insurance arrangement. Sanchez then made the argument that:
[w]hile the insurer’s potential liability is
circumscribed by the policy limits, and the other
conditions, limits and exclusion of the policy, the adjuster
has no contract with the insured and would face liability
without the chance to limit its exposure by contract. Thus,
the adjuster’s role in the claims process is “secondary,” yet
imposing a duty of care could expose him to liability
greater than faced by his principal the insurer.178
177

See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 27, at § 10.03.

178

See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
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This argument seems both odd and empirically incorrect in that it takes the
absence of traditional contract privity and instead of using it as a doctrinal
defense attempts to turn it into a policy argument in favor of intermediary
immunity. Although it probably should get points for creativity, it is wrong
about the law. Although it is true that insurer coverage liability is generally
restricted to the policy limits of the insurance in question, it is not true that
this provides an ironclad safe harbor against further insurer liability.
Insurers may often be required to pay counsel fees or interest upon
losing a coverage determination. They of course may also be responsible
for incidental and consequential damages for failure to properly process a
covered claim. Although this extra-limits liability is rare where the insurer
has acted reasonably, volitional, unreasonable insurer conduct amounts to
bad faith under the law of most states and makes these damages available
to the policyholder (and often its assignees). For example, where a liability
insurer (in California and most states) unreasonably fails to accept a
settlement offer, the insurer is responsible not only for paying the policy
limits, but also any judgment amount against the policyholder in excess of
policy limits. Where the insurer’s bad faith or other misconduct was the
product of willful indifference to the rights of the policyholder, the insurer
may be held liable for punitive damages.
In short, it simply is not true that insurers enjoy significantly more
ability to limit their liability than do claims intermediaries. Under these
circumstances, it is just plain strange that a court would feel itself
compelled to declare immunity for these intermediaries on the ground that
the absence of formal contracting somehow makes the adjuster’s lot worse
than that of the insurer.
The Sanchez Court also argues that since “[a]n adjuster owes a
duty to the insurer who engaged him,” a “new duty to the insured would
conflict with that duty, and interfere with its faithful performance. This is
poor policy.”179 Actually, it is poor analysis by the court. The claims
179

Id. (citing Gay v. Broder, 167 Cal Rptr. 123, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding a home appraiser owes no duty of care to a home loan borrower because
this would subject the appraiser to a conflict with the duty owed to the lender
retained by the appraiser); Felton v. Schaeffer, 279 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding a doctor hired by an employer to conduct a pre-employment
physical owes no duty to the applicant); Keene v. Wiggins, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3, 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding a doctor used by a workers’ compensation insurer to
assess the alleged disability of an employee did not owe the doctor-patient duty of
an accurate diagnosis to the employee)).
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adjuster represents the insurer. By law, the insurer cannot give regard only
to its own interests; it must not only consider the interests of the
policyholder but give them at least “equal” consideration, a legal rule
internalized in the custom and practice of insurance (where adjusters
frequently describe their role as being required to “look for coverage”
rather than “look for reasons to deny coverage”). The adjuster, like the
insurer, therefore already has obligations to the policyholder. By
immunizing the adjuster from a damages action, the Sanchez Court merely
deprived the policyholder of a legal right that it already possessed, i.e., a
right to have the adjuster act in the same manner as the insurer is required
to act.
More practically, the experience of decades of insurance claims
adjustment in the field has already demonstrated that, despite the
occasional glitches that produce coverage and bad faith litigation, insurers
(and their intermediaries) generally do a reasonably good job of balancing
the interests of policyholders against their own economic interests.
Attorneys retained by insurers are often particularly exemplary in this
For what I hope are reasons obvious to the reader, if not the Sanchez Court,
these cases are inapposite to the issue of insurance claims intermediary liability.
Recall that the adjuster stands in for the insurer, which is obligated to give equal
consideration or even priority to the interests of the policyholder. By contrast, the
home appraiser has only one interest: making sure that the home is not overvalued
so that the bank does not loan more money for purchasing the house than is
justified by the fair market value of the home.
Regarding doctors, the Felton and Keene cases, cited above, correctly state the
historical rule but like the tradition of adjuster immunity, the tradition of doctor
immunity is under attack and will, with luck, eventually fall. Physicians are
publicly licensed professionals accorded substantial privileges that historically
have also demanded at least some commitment to the public interest. They also
swear a Hippocratic Oath in favor of assisting life and health when they can
reasonably do so. It is borderline obscene to suggest that a doctor examining a job
applicant or a workers compensation claimant has absolutely no obligation to
notice obvious health problems and report them to the person under examination so
that the person may obtain appropriate follow-up care – even if the person
examined is technically not the doctor’s “patient.” The medical analogy to
insurance intermediary liability is explored at infra text accompanying notes 201202. See also Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (Minn. 1962)
(vacating a settlement in a case where defense lawyer learned of plaintiff’s lifethreatening medical condition through Civil Rule 35 independent medical
examination and failed to make disclosure).
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regard, arguing for the best interests of the policyholder even though it is
the insurer that is paying the bills and the insurer that the attorney hopes
will send additional business in the future.180
The strongest policy argument invoked by the Sanchez Court was
the contention that “[t]he deterrent effect of imposing a duty on adjusters is
questionable” because “[a]djusters are already deterred from neglect by
exposure to liability to the insurer who engaged them, for breach of
contract or indemnity.” According to the Court, “[o]nly some modest
additional deterrence, at most could be expected from imposing a new duty
owed directly to insureds.”181 Although Sanchez acknowledged that
“[i]mposing a duty also might benefit insureds by providing another source
of recovery for injuries caused by negligent claims handling or
investigation” the Court viewed this as “redundant” (in “most cases”)
because the insurer would also be liable for the adjuster’s mistakes and
“[th]hus making the adjuster directly liable to the insured would, again,
confer only a modest additional benefit.”182
Critical as I am of Sanchez and similar cases, I concede that this
argument had some force even if the court’s exposition of its rationale is a
little melodramatic. For example, the court went on to note:
Insurance is a highly uncertain and risky
endeavor, because it requires accurate predictions about the
occurrence and cost of future events. Insurers are able to
define and limit the risks, and to set premium levels
commensurate with the risks, using complex and nuanced
contracts (policies). By contrast, adjusters hired by
insurers have no contract with insureds, and thus no ability
to define or circumscribe their potential risks or liabilities
to insureds. If adjusters faced negligence liability to
insureds, market forces would tend to drive adjusting
activities in-house, where they could be shielded with
contractual exclusions, disclaimers, and limitations. Thus,
180

See infra text accompanying notes 198-204 (comparing the role and
liability of attorney intermediaries to that of claims adjusters).
181

See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.

182

See id.
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imposing a duty would reduce, perhaps severely, the
offering of independent adjuster services. Yet widespread
market acceptance has shown these services to be useful
and desirable.
Those adjusters continuing to operate independently
despite imposition of a new duty of care would attempt to
buy insurance against this liability, or create their own cash
reserves, adding these costs to their charges, and passing
them on to the insurers who used the adjusters’ services.
These insurers, in turn, would add the cost to the premium
charged to insureds. The insured thus would end up
paying more for insurance without obtaining more value
because, as noted above, adjuster liability would provide
only a redundant source of recovery usually available from
the insurer.183
Stripped of the excessive gloom-and-doom or parade-of-horribles
rhetoric, the Sanchez Court is merely asking the rhetorical question: if the
insurer ultimately is liable to the wronged policyholder, why does the
policyholder also need a cause of action against the adjuster? It’s a good
rhetorical question, but not good enough to support continued adherence to
a broad and inflexible norm of claims intermediary immunity.
It is also important to remember that (Cardozo, sociological
jurisprudence, and legal realism notwithstanding) courts are primarily
supposed to be deciding cases with reference to existing doctrine and caseby-case required modifications of doctrine rather than sweeping quasilegislative public policy pronouncements and predictions such as those
quoted in the passages quoted above. This portion of Sanchez reads like a
legislative committee report more than a judicial opinion. But legislative
committee reports are generally based on at least some fact finding through
receipt of hearing testimony, staff research, and review of public comment
submissions (although partisanship and interest group influence of course
play a role). This portion of Sanchez reads as though it was taken verbatim
from the musings of the adjuster’s brief. It was rendered without
supporting citation and is in part self-refuting, for the reasons discussed
below.

183

See id.
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To the extent that courts inevitably make some decisions on the
basis of public policy rather than application of existing doctrine or the
doctrinal refinements that result from treating like cases alike, Sanchez is
still unsatisfying because it embraces (without benefit of electoral mandate)
a view of public policy that is unduly protective of intermediaries for
reasons that appear empirically incorrect. The object of law is not simply
to provide some avenue for recompense when wronged (a view that might
support Sanchez’s contention that one responsible potential defendant is
enough). Rather, a rational legal regime should provide not just some
incentives for good behavior but optimal incentives that accurately reflect
the commercial and behavioral reality of the activity under scrutiny well as
taking account economic reality.
On the economic reality score, the “no need for additional
deterrence or compensation sources” rationale is not nearly as strong as
suggested by the Sanchez Court. Although insurers do not fail with the
seeming regularity of subprime mortgage lenders, dot.com start-ups, or
restaurants, insurer insolvency is a real danger. If it occurs, the
policyholder (or its proxy) may very well not be able to obtain recompense.
Imposing liability in apt cases upon claims intermediaries does not unfairly
create a deeper pocket for compensation but instead provides an alternative
pocket that provides additional protection if the insurer is unable to pay the
claim.
There may even be cases in which a reasonable adjudicator could
find the claims intermediary to have liability even though the insurer does
not. Had it been permitted to be litigated in full, Sanchez itself might have
been such a case. Recall that the policyholder faced some significant
coverage issues and arguably had failed to mitigate his contract damages.
However, under the (admittedly rare) right set of circumstances, the
adjuster might logically be held liable for tortuous conduct outside of the
terms of the insurance policy, just as many jurisdictions permit recovery for
bad faith treatment even when coverage did not exist or was doubtful.
But the risk that insurers will escape liability through insolvency is
not the primary problem with the Sanchez view that adjuster liability is not
necessary for reasonable deterrence. More problematic is that adjuster and
insurer incentives are often misaligned in a manner that does not by any
means ensure that in the event of policyholder mistreatment by the adjuster,
the insurer tagged with responsibility will pursue the adjuster, thus creating
sufficient consequences to in turn provide an adequate incentive for the
adjuster to treat policyholders fairly.
In real life, the insurer, even though perhaps facing liability for
adjuster wrongdoing, may be perfectly happy to have the adjuster taking
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sharp, unreasonable positions with the policyholder. If the insurer itself
behaved directly in this fashion toward the policyholder, it would be at
substantial risk of a bad faith judgment. Although the insurer remains
responsible for most agent activity within the scope of the agency, juries
might well tend to be more forgiving of the insurer in cases where the most
egregious misconduct is committed by the independent contractor agent
rather than the insurer itself.
Intermediary immunity allows insurers and their claims agents to
engage in at least occasional episodes of “good cop/bad cop” in which the
insurer portrays itself as very concerned for the policyholder, but unaware
of adjuster misconduct or unable to control it because of the adjuster’s
independence and distant operations. Even if a reviewing jury finds severe
misconduct by the adjuster, it may be reluctant to find bad faith by the
insurer and award substantial damages to the insurer, when the insurer has
not been actively engaged in wrongdoing. The adjuster agent dilutes any
negative picture a jury might have of the insurer, but the adjuster itself
cannot be held responsible for its active misconduct, even though jurors
might well be diverted from focus on the insurer (either as principal or
passive wrongdoer) because of the adjuster’s active misconduct.
If nothing else, the buffering effect of the immune adjuster agent
logically makes it far less likely that a jury will impose punitive damages
on the insurer. Although the court can painstakingly instruct the jury that
the insurer is responsible for the bad acts of the adjuster, but this hardly has
the same force as seeing the insurer itself act with willful indifference to
policyholder rights.
When Sanchez asserts that the “widespread market acceptance” of
outsourcing the claims function demonstrates the utility and desirability of
this delegation of insurer function, the court wrongfully forgets to ask
whether this is good or bad for the policyholder. Insurers might indeed
prefer to outsource the claims function – but this can be for reasons that are
either good (cost-savings, expertise, flexibility) or bad (cheaper because
shoddier, insulation of the insurer, a reflection of reduced concern for fair
claims treatment). Insurers may find independent contractor adjusters
“useful and desirable” but this hardly means they are good for
policyholders. Further, regardless of whether outsourcing the claims
function is good or bad on the whole, each individual policyholder is
entitled to be treated fairly by whoever adjusts the claim.
The Sanchez Court is probably wrong in predicting that removing
absolute immunity for independent intermediaries would drive the
adjustment function significant more in-house for insurers. If independent
adjusters are a money-saver for insurers, they will be inclined to continue
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following this business model, even if some of the savings are lost because
of imposition of adjuster liability that will be spread and potentially passed
on to policyholders.
But even if this Sanchez argument is correct, it hardly follows that
a return to in-house claims adjusting is a bad thing. Returning more of the
claims function to the insurer might well improve claims practices by
creating a culture of improved incentives and concern for policyholders. It
is a least plausible that outsourced adjusting (particularly when coupled
with immunity) leads to lowered standards and a more short-sighted
attitude toward the treatment of policyholders and others.
The independent adjuster arguably has a considerably more short
term perspective on the process than the insurer that both must live with the
results and wants to enjoy good public relations for customer retention,
future marketing, and the insurer’s anticipated receipt of premium
payments from a satisfied customer who stayed with the company, because
the insurer treated the policyholder fairly during the claims process. The
very leanness and meanness of some independent adjusters that produces
cost savings can contribute to shortcuts and slipshod claims processing.
Adjustment by the insurer itself may cost more in initial operation but bring
better results, both in terms of legal fairness and long-term cost savings
stemming from reduction in disputes.
In addition, this portion of the Sanchez public policy analysis posits
that removing immunity for disclosed agent adjusters would impose
substantial additional costs on the claims resolution process. The Sanchez
Court reasons as follows: liability for the intermediary will raise disputing
and liability costs; this in turn will raise adjuster fees and insurance
premiums; and therefore intermediary liability is bad. But this syllogism is
far from self-evidently correct.
In a competitive market, particularly a “soft” insurance market,
there may be enough adjusters competing for business that they will absorb
the relatively modest cost of liability insurance spread through the overall
pricing of their book of business. Alternatively, independent adjusters may
be able to increase their fees, but insurers may not be able to pass these
along (at least not completely or perhaps not substantially) as this risks
losing market share to competitors.
More importantly: an increase in adjuster fees and insurer
premiums is not necessarily bad if it results in better adjusting of claims
and greater insurer supervision of adjusters and more reasonable adjuster
and insurer behavior toward policyholders and claimants. Although no one
wants unaffordable or unavailable insurance, low premium insurance is of
little or no real value if the insurer and its claims intermediaries fail to
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accord apt treatment to policyholders and claimants. In addition, there is
considerable social cost if insurance error leads to economic waste,
dislocation, or intervention (e.g., public assistance for the unfortunate
policyholder who should have been protected by insurance that it had
purchased).
There is considerable wisdom in the adage that “you get what you
pay for.” The Sanchez Court wrongly assumes that lower costs for vendors
is always good (irrespective of their performance and incentives) and that
expansion of liability is always bad. The tradition of disclosed agent
immunity stems from the Dickensian time of Marley, but in its modern
form bears more resemblance to Scrooge. Essentially, the Sanchez Court is
implicitly arguing that the simple fairness of holding adjusters accountable
for the damage they inflict on policyholders or claimants is a burden
victims should simply bear for the supposed greater overall good of
hypothesized lower adjuster fees and insurance premiums.
More important, Sanchez overlooks that the insurer’s chief duty is
not to make insurance premiums as low as possible. Rather, the main
obligation of an insurer is to the policyholder suffering a potentially
covered loss. The insurer is required to act reasonably and give equal
consideration to the interests of the policyholder in adjusting the loss. If
doing this results in premium increases or contraction of future sales, this is
simply the price to be borne for honoring the insurer’s greater duty of care
to the vulnerable policyholder seeking coverage and for providing a better
insurance product.184
By extension, this analysis requires that the independent
intermediary employed by the insurer be subject to the same hierarchy of
184

In a recent advertising campaign, State Farm expressly touts its
performance in providing coverage as of higher quality while being “about the
same price” as other insurers. In what may have been an unfortunate harbinger of
the team’s 2008-2009 season, one commercial features Seattle Seahawks
quarterback Matt Hasselbeck getting pass protection from a group of 80-pound Pop
Warner league lineman (representing a Brand X insurer), with the predictable
result that he is sacked. This is contrasted with another scene in which a group of
gigantic lineman (representing State Farm) provide Hasselbeck with sufficient
protection to complete a pass. The ad campaign is a fairly direct attempt by State
Farm to sell “service-after-the-sale” (and perhaps solvency as well) in trying to
persuade prospective buyers not to select an insurer by premium price alone. This
sales pitch from the nation’s largest insurer is at least in tension with the Sanchez’s
courts “lower costs are the greatest good” contention, if not an outright refutation
of that contention.
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duties and set of obligations imposed on the insurer. Refusing to impose
substantially similar burdens on the claims intermediary undermines the
effective operation of the insurance market. While one can contend that
there is sufficient adjuster discipline because the adjuster must answer to
the insurer, this is a weak argument. The insurer hired the adjuster for a
reason – to outsource the job of handling claims. Realistically, the insurer
will rely heavily on the adjuster’s investigation and assessment (unless the
insurer is outsourcing the function so that the adjuster can be the insurer’s
“bad cop,” which is an even more troublesome scenario). The adjusters’
good or bad conduct will have significant impact on claims decisions, all
with relatively little supervision by the insurer. This strongly argues for
holding claims intermediaries to the same standards imposed on insurers.
Further, as discussed above, the insurer is not nearly as likely to
punish adjuster misconduct as was posited by the Sanchez Court. One
reason is that adjusters can run de facto interference for the insurer. Far
from punishing errant adjusters, insurers may enjoy the degree to which an
aggressive anti-coverage, low-payment adjuster increases insurer profits
while providing a useful (but immune) foil in the comparatively few cases
that result in litigation of any sort, much less bad faith or punitive damages
litigation.
In addition, because insurer sales, marketing, underwriting, and
claims departments often seem to act without much knowledge or
coordination among themselves, there is the practical reality that even a
pretty sloppy independent intermediary will continue to be used by the
insurer unless something (a) goes really wrong and (b) comes to the
attention of the proper person who can hire and fire intermediaries under
circumstances where (c) the errant adjuster is not on the whole making
money for the insurer. If proposition (c) obtainshappens, the insurer is
unlikely to seek indemnification for cases in which the adjuster’s
misconduct toward a policyholder resulted in insurer liability. Many
insurers would view this as simply straining relations with a useful business
partner and prefer to seek recompensatione through some informal
adjustment of pricing in future claims business.
In much the same way that a hospital may be tempted to turn a lax
eye toward malpractice suits against a doctor who performs many
procedures and generates considerable revenue, the insurer will most likely
not take aggressive action against the adjuster even where the adjuster’s
attributed misconduct results in the insurer paying a claim, particularly
where the claim was one the insurer was required to pay in any event
(which is usually the case). Only in cases of where bad faith/punitive
damages liability significantly exceeds policy limits is the insurer likely to
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be very bothered by intermediary error. In short, even the strongest of the
public policy rationales of Sanchez and similar decisions is unconvincing.
Sanchez is also awash in statements that suggest the court had an
underappreciation of the nuances of insurance concepts and insurance in
operation. As noted in the extensively quoted passages above, the court
seems to favor immunity for intermediaries because it seems them as the
analog to mom-and-pop grocery stores under attack from supermarkets. To
the Sanchez court, any contraction of the business of independent adjusting
and any movement toward adjusting by the insurer’s own employees is a
step in the wrong direction. But just as the supermarket is generally seen as
an improvement over the corner grocery store (and remains a superior
alternative to 7-Eleven and its counterparts), it might improve insurance
adjusting if the small independents were replaced by larger, more
professional organizations operated by the insurers themselves.
In addition to turning the concept of privity on its head (so that the
absence of contract not only protects the adjuster from a contract-based
claim but also makes imposition of tort liability unfair), Sanchez also
converts the notion of reasonable expectations from a concept generally
favorable to policyholders to one favoring adjuster immunity because “[a]
new rule would defeat their reasonable expectations.”185
Further, recognition of “[a]djuster liability would be an empty
slate, upon which the courts would have to write a whole new body of
‘`adjuster liability’ law” without the benefit of “contracts devised by
knowledgeable and imaginative private parties to give structure to the
risks” resulting in years of development of law in the area.186 This part of
Sanchez is a little shocking in that it seems to argue that courts should be
reluctant to recognize defendant liability simply because this will increase
the workload of the courts.
By this rationale, one might argue for complete abolition of all
liability irrespective of the question of individual rights and the social
benefits of court-imposed liability and enforcement. Or, to cite some less
extreme examples from real life, one might note that recognition of rights
such as anti-discrimination, desegregation, one person/one vote, arrestee
rights and manufacturer liability for unsafe products, all required courts to
devote subsequent judicial resources to developing these emerging bodies
185

See 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.

186

Id.
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of law. But this was never seen by the judiciary as a reason to refrain from
doing what the court otherwise viewed as the legally proper thing and
recognizing the basic right in question.
Similarly, the court’s desire to have “knowledgeable and
imaginative private parties”187 provide guidance begins to make it look all
the more as though a main underpinning of Sanchez was abdication of the
judicial function. Courts have for centuries developed the contours of duty
and breach necessary to apply tort law. They hardly need contract
draftsman from the insurance or intermediary industries to guide them in
fleshing out the contours of claims intermediary liability.
In addition, there is nothing to prevent insurers, intermediaries, or
other entities affected by any new rule of liability from doing their own
contracting around the new legal regime through indemnity agreements or
the like. Sanchez wrongly assumes that the announcement of a tort law
rule removing absolute immunity for intermediaries would forever freeze
the operations of participants in the insurance marketplace. On the
contrary, a tort law rule of no adjuster immunity would be, like most legal
rules, a default rule to which market participants could adjust (through
contract and other means).
Also problematic is Sanchez’s deployment of the case law on the
question of intermediary immunity. Predictably, Sanchez cites several
cases illustrative of what it correctly regards as the majority rule, but it
makes little effort to grapple with contrary precedent. New Hamphire’s
1986 Morvay188 decision, an opinion at loggerheads with much of the
Sanchez pronouncements, is not even cited. The 1980 Alaska decision of
Continental v. Bayless and Roberts is cited but given unfairly and
deceptively short shrift by Sanchez, which characterizes the rather
pathbreaking Bayless case as “simply “rel[ying] on an earlier Alaska case”
imposing liability on an agent.189
By contrast, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals opinion in Brown v.
State Farm,190 makes considerably more persuasive public policy
187

Id.

188

See Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 506 A.2d 333 (N.H. 1986).

189

See Sanchez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.

190

See Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla. Civ. App.

2002).
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arguments in favor of at least permitting adjuster liability. In Brown,
plaintiffs were homeowners seeking coverage after two March 2000 fires
damaged their property, claiming losses of more than $60,000.191 The
insurer retained an independent investigator that “concluded, “without
interviewing either Brown or any of the fire-fighters involved, that there
was only one fire, and that it resulted from ‘the deliberate act of a person or
persons’” and that some claimed damage predated the fire.192 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the investigative report was a significant factor in the
insurer’s decision to deny the claim.193
Brown sued both State Farm and the independent investigator,
settling with the insurer and continuing its claim against the adjuster,
presumably for losses that were not sufficiently compensated from the
funds paid by the insurer in settlement.194 Thus, Brown provides an
immediate example that, contrary to the assertions of Sanchez, it may well
be practically useful to have liability potentially applicable to more than
one entity involved in claim denial. In this sense, the removal of absolute
immunity for independent intermediaries can be an effective means of
providing more protection, spreading risk more widely, and facilitating
greater settlement of disputes.
Comparing the adjuster’s situation to that of others who could be
liable to reasonably foreseeable third parties, the Brown Court saw nothing
jarring about removing investigator/adjuster immunity.195 Because the
policyholder presenting a claim to the adjuster is so obviously someone
who could be hurt by poor performance of the adjuster’s duty, the Brown
Court had no problem finding that there was adequate foreseeability
sufficient to create a tort law duty owed the policyholder by the adjuster.

191

Id. at 218.

192

Id.

193

Id. (case states that the decision was “based at least in part on this report”).

194
195

Id.

In particular, the court considered attorneys, sellers of intoxicating
beverages, and individuals engaged in a love/lust triangle as having duties to those
who could reasonably be injured by their conduct, citing Oklahoma case law in
support. See 58 P.3d at 219-22.
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Brown was assisted in its decision by Oklahoma’s different law
regarding immunity for auditors. Unlike California, which follows the
limitations of Ultramares v. Touche,196 Oklahoma had for some time
rejected Ultramares and embraced the broader liability rule of Restatement
§552,197 at least regarding negligently supplied information.198 According
to the Brown Court, it “was reasonable” for the policyholder “to expect that
State Farm, through it’s [sic] agent JJMA/Cooper, would perform a nonnegligent investigation of the fire. Indeed, it is indisputable that ‘both the
insured and the insurer [had] a stake in the outcome of the
investigation.’”199
The jurisprudence of adjuster immunity generally suffers from an
underappreciation of the degree to which the incentives of insurer and
adjuster are insufficiently aligned with those of the policyholder (to whom
a duty of good faith is owed) and others to whom tort-like duties of care are
logically owed. As discussed above, under the current regime, the insurer
can to some extent use the independent adjuster to “do its dirty work” with
no liability risk to the adjuster and reduced bad faith and punitive damages
risk to the insurer. This potentially creates a huge practical loophole in the
law of bad faith that is supposed to provide adequate protection to
policyholders. It also can create problems for other participants in
insurance markets, as illustrated below. Put simply, without facing liability
196

See 174 N.E. 441, 447 (N.Y. 1931) (accountants not liable to third parties
for damages resulting from poor auditing, which was seen as beach of duty owed
the client but not a basis for tort liability to third parties, even those whose reliance
on the audit was reasonably foreseeable).
197

See, e.g., Stroud v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 793-94 (Okla.

2001).
198

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977):
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.

199

See 58 P.3d at 222 (citing Morvay).

678

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

itself, the claims intermediary simply lacks sufficient incentive to engage in
an optimal level of care toward policyholder’s and others.
Sanchez and other modern cases defending intermediary immunity
claim that there already exists adequate incentive for care because of the
principal’s potential contract claims against an intermediary who errors.
As previously discussed, this contention has problems even as a matter of
theory. As a matter of empirical evidence, the theory also seems infirm.
Although the case reports are not awash in suits against intermediaries,
they at least allege some very slipshod and wrongful conduct that should
probably never occur if the theory of adequate policing by insurer
principals is accurate.
For example, in Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.,200 the
state Department of Workforce Development retained the defendant as a
claims manager and TPA for the state’s Uninsured Employers Fund.201
Although the case focused primarily upon the degree to which the TPA
might share the employer’s immunity under state workman’s compensation
law, it is instructive in illustrating the degree to which claims
intermediaries can engage in egregious misconduct and the utility of
holding them accountable under such circumstances.
Plaintiff worked as a carpenter.202 In July 1998, he fell 18 feet
while working on a pole barn and sustained serious injury.203 His employer
lacked worker’s compensation insurance, forcing him to make a claim with
the Uninsured Employers Fund in January 2000 (after apparently receiving
medical care and other benefits in the interim, the source of which is
unclear from the opinion).204 Despite what seems a clearly work-related
serious injury without employee misconduct, the TPA denied the claim.205
It then required that the worker have in independent medical

200

729 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 2007).

201

Id. at 714.

202

Id. at 715.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id.
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examination.206 The March 2000 exam, while finding lower disability
levels than claimed by the worker, confirmed temporary and permanent
disability and “clearly entitled the plaintiff to worker’s compensation
benefits.”207
But despite repeated requires, the TPA did not pay the benefits,
even though its own vocational expert conceded up to a 10 percent loss of
earning capacity due to the worker’s injuries.208 As of September 2001,
benefits remained unpaid.209 The worker pursued administrative relief,
which resulted in an administrative law judge (ALJ) order that the TPA pay
approximately $100,000.210 But the TPA released only $4,000 from the
state Fund and “refused to pay the remainder of the award,” forcing the
injured worker to seek additional review.211 In May 2002, the state’s Labor
and Industry Review Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings.212 Rather
than pay, the TPA sought judicial review, which resulted in court
affirmance of the administrative decision in December 2002.213 The TPA
again refused to pay and sought further review, resulting in a September
2003 decision in favor of the worker.214 “Only then did [the TPA] finally
pay the balance of the plaintiff’s claim.”215
Although finally paid, the worker was not mollified, and brought a
bad faith action against the state Fund and the TPA, claiming (with
206

Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 715-16.

207

Id. at 716.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 716..
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seemingly good reason in light of the case history) that there was never any
reasonable basis for contesting the claimed benefits (or at least not 96% of
them) and “that the appeals were taken merely to delay payment of
rightfully owed benefits.”216 The Fund and TPA defended on grounds of
immunity under the state Worker’s Compensation Act, a defense the trial
court rejected as to the TPA.217 The intermediate appellate court reversed,
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a persuasive opinion centered
primarily on statutory construction, ruled that the state’s worker’s
compensation law did not immunize the TPA and that plaintiff’s bad faith
action could proceed.218
Apparently, there was no question under Wisconsin law that, in the
absence of statutory immunity, the claim could be brought against the TPA
notwithstanding lack of privity of contract and the TPA’s status as a
disclosed agent of the Fund.219 The Court viewed the claim as permissible
(in the absence of worker’s compensation immunity) under Wis. Stat. §
102.18(1)(b) “which provides a penalty for bad faith conduct” in worker’s
comp claims.220 Consequently, Aslakson is not, strictly speaking, a case
either embracing or rejecting common law immunity for claims
intermediaries. In spirit, however, Aslakson is more aligned with cases
rejecting intermediary immunity than with cases following the historical
rule.
More important for purposes of this section, Aslakson illustrates
the degree to which claims intermediaries can engage in pretty outrageous
conduct and that they, in the absence of liability, have relatively little
incentive to treat claimants fairly. Recall that the TPA in question was
taking the position – one rejected by an ALJ, an administrative review
board, and a trial court – that a carpenter could fall 18 feet and suffer only
$4,000 worth of permanent partial injury. Although the intermediate
appellate court mysteriously granted more leeway to the TPA, the
216

Id.

217

Id.

218

Aslakson,729 N.W.2d at 717, 728.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court overwhelmingly agreed with the assessment of
the ALJ, review board, and trial judge.
The bad faith claim in Aslakson centered on the TPA’s
recalcitrance in prosecuting appeals, one can make a strong argument that
even its initial position forcing the ALJ decision constituted bad faith. The
TPA’s own vocational expert concluded that Mr. Aslakson had incurred a
10 percent decline in earning capacity because of the injuries from the fall.
Even a lazy or bad carpenter will earn a lot more than $40,000 in what
remains of working life but the TPA was willing to pay only $4,000 after
the ALJ decision, and refused to pay anything prior to the ALJ order. On
its face, the TPA’s conduct looks unreasonable, yet the TPA was unwilling
to give apt concern to the worker’s interest and was unwilling to reevaluate its hostile stance in light of mounting factors favoring payment.221
Even if Asklakson had been a white collar worker and not suffered
neurological impairment in the fall, the TPA’s assessment would have been
extreme. Applied to a claimant whose livelihood depends on his physical
health, strength, endurance and dexterity, the TPA position seems
ridiculous on its face. One need not be a cynic to perceive the TPA’s
conduct as merely running out the clock on the claimant in hopes of either
forcing a settlement at a reduced amount or allowing the further investment
income to the Fund.
As discussed above, insurers are often attracted to TPAs who
engage in such conduct because it can be profit-enhancing for the insurer
without the carrier itself sullying its hands through directly connected bad
faith treatment of the policyholder. Under the traditional rule, the TPA acts
with impunity toward the policyholder/insured/claimant, no matter how
unreasonable or evil its conduct.
In the context of the Aslakson case itself, the incentive structure is
even worse because the state Fund is immune and lacks incentive to punish
the TPA for misconduct since the Fund will not suffer any adverse conduct
from the TPA’s wrongdoing – even though the Fund may enjoy economic
gain because of that wrongdoing. If the TPA is also immune, the victim is
left without remedy. Although the worker’s compensation or sovereign
221

In contrast to the TPA position, the ALJ decision seems reasonable on its
face. A carpenter of relatively young age could easily earn $1 million in gross
income over his remaining working life. Ten percent of that amount produces the
$100,000 award. Although a significant sum, it does not facially seem misaligned
with the facts of the case.
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immunity situations give particular illustration to the problems created by
intermediary immunity, private insurance presents much the same situation
with only the salve that the victim will usually have at least some claim
against the insurer as principal.
Although the primary victims of claims intermediary error (or at
least the victims without recompense)222 are policyholders and claimants
seeking recovery, insurers who are not the principals of an intermediary
may on occasion suffer harm due to the intermediary’s misconduct. In
such cases, the rule of intermediary immunity also needlessly shields
intermediaries and too greatly reduces the intermediary’s incentive to take
adequate care and to make a reasonable assessment of a claims situation.
This imposes costs not only on the affected insurers, policyholders, and
claimants but also can impose substantial externalized costs on the judicial
system and society.
A fascinating (but one hopes rare) illustration of the far-reaching
mischief of intermediary immunity is a case that began as First Specialty
Insurance Corporation v. Ward North American Holding, Inc.223 and ended
as First Specialty Insurance Corporation v. Novapro Risk Solutions, LP.224
The case started out simply enough with a barroom brawl in which one of
the patrons was severely injured.225 Actually, it was more of an
unprovoked attack rather than an escalating feud between patrons.226 The
attacking group had set upon another patron earlier in the evening,
inflicting significant but less severe injury and had not been immediately
ejected from the premises or arrested, which is the normal accepted
practice in such cases. The more severely injured victim thus had a pretty

222

Insurers can of course be harmed by intermediary error or misconduct.
However, as principals with contract relations with the intermediary, an injured
insurer will have at least breach of contract remedies and perhaps other avenues of
relief as well.
223

No. 04-2359-JWL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23726 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2004).

224

468 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Kan. 2007).
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Id. at 1323, 1332-33.
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good premises liability claim against the bar and consequently sued. The
bar nightclub submitted the claim to its insurance agent.227
Simple case, right? On its face, the matter seemed one to settle for
some reasonably serious money fairly quickly so that the plaintiff would
not get before a jury that could find him afflicted with seven figures worth
of injury (his face had been crushed and had to be extensively rebuilt with
metal plates and plaintiff, a school teacher in his thirties, had also suffered
significant cognitive injury).228 But the actions of the first TPA took the
case outside the realm of the simple.
The incident and injury took place in April 2000.229 In Summer
2000, the bar’s general liability insurer changed from a Lloyd’s group to
First Specialty.230 Plaintiff counsel’s February 2001 notice and demand
letter did not set forth the date of the incident.231 Suit was filed in October
2001 and the copy passed along was not clear regarding the April date of
the incident.232 The First Specialty TPA (Ward North American)
incorrectly assumed that the injury took place in April 2001, during the
First Specialty coverage period, rather than April 2000 during the Lloyd’s
coverage period. The First Specialty TPA (Ward, which subsequently
became NovaPro) retained defense counsel, who represented the bar
through arbitration, demanding trial de novo after a $175,000 award.233
Finally, in mid-March 2003, the First Specialty TPA discovered the
mistake and notified the apt Lloyd’s managing general agent (Mavon,

227

Id. at 1332-33 (“no question” plaintiff was “very seriously injured” and that
“the $445,000 settlement ultimately reached was reasonable, that it was the result
of good faith negotiations, and that [circumstances of the case] did not . . . result in
an ‘over-payment’ to [plaintiff].”).
228
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Id.
First Specialty Insurance Corporation, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
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which was the Lloyd’s independent contractor for claim notice purposes)
who in turn alerted the Lloyd’s TPA, Elliston.234
At this juncture, the situation was unfortunate on many levels. The
first TPA’s error had resulted in the wrong insurer expending defense costs.
But the defense to date had been a relatively light one, without substantial
attorney time spent fighting the arbitration or conducting discovery.235
234

Id.

235

The minimalist nature of the defense provided by First Specialty’s chosen
counsel became a major issue in the case in that Elliston/Lloyd’s took the position
that not only was notice of the claim late but that they had been prejudiced by the
late notice because the underlying tort claim was so far along and had not been
defended with sufficient aggressiveness. This type of late notice/prejudice
defense, although a staple of insurance law (and a frequent favorite of insurers
looking for reasons not to pay a claim), is a particularly hard one to make in New
Jersey. The state’s arguably leading case on the matter rejected the defense even
though the insurer did not receive notice of the matter until after a default
judgment had been obtained against the policyholder. See Morales v. Nat’l Grange
Mut. Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 325, 327 (1980); accord Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 1372-73 (D.N.J. 1992) (six-year delay in notice not
sufficient to cause actual prejudice to insurer); see also Cooper v. GEICO Ins. Co.,
237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968) (adopting appreciable prejudice test and noticeprejudice rule as state law); see also Molyneaux v. Molyneaux, 553 A.2d 49, 51
(1989) (reaffirming state law on the point). In one case rather similar to the instant
matter where the delay resulted from a misunderstanding that had the wrong
insurer initially defending the matter, the late notice defense of the right insurer
was rejected due to an absence of prejudice. See Vornado Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 254 A.2d 325, 328-29 (1969).
Winning a late notice defense in New Jersey is an uphill battle even with
compelling facts. Only if the defense lawyer used by First Specialty had done
horrendous work (or non-work) was this defense likely to succeed. In reviewing
the matter after hearing evidence at trial, the court:
. . . came away from trial with the distinct impression that, at best, Ward did
average or “C” work on the [underlying plaintiff’s] claim before suit was filed.
The record is very thin as to whether the way in which the [plaintiff’s] claim
was handled by Ward was materially better or worse than other claims it was
adjusting for First Specialty and other insurers. Nevertheless, after suit was
filed in Ocotober 2001, the record suggests that Ward and [defense attorney
Stephen] Wellinghorst together took reasonable actions to investigate and
defend the [plaintiff’s] claim.
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[T]he court formed the impression that Wellinghorst’s skills as a trial lawyer
are generally on par to those actually exhibited by the fine lawyers who
represented First Specialty, Lloyd’s and Ward in the instant coverage litigation.
The court further finds that Wellinghorst used the above-described skills to do
a reasonable and competent job in defending [the policyholder] in a case that
presented very few, if any, viable defense opportunities on the primary issues of
liability and damages. The court, however, has no illusions that Wellinghorst did
an outstanding job, let alone a “perfect” job, with his defense of [the policyholder].
[However,] it was Wellinghorst who discovered Ward’s mistake with regard
to the date of loss and policy coverage issue. He could have remained silent upon
that discovery in an effort to avoid the instant litigation. But instead he did the
right thing by notifying Ward. See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d at
1329-30 (emphasis in original).
With the exception of the statement that Ward “could have remained silent” on
the matter, the court’s assessment seems unquestionably correct. I was retained by
First Specialty as an expert witness in the case (more on that below) and have
reviewed the record in the underlying tort matter as well as the coverage dispute.
The court’s assessment of the litigation reality of the matter is close to
unassailable. Attorney Wellinghorst and Ward/First Specialty did not mount a
scorched earth defense of the barroom brawl claim but did an adequate job. More
important, a scorched earth defense would have only needlessly wasted resources
and potentially exposed the policyholder to an excess verdict. The case was a
strong one for plaintiff, with essentially no question regarding policyholder
liability and the essential magnitude of plaintiff’s injuries.
The case didn’t need aggressive defense but instead required aggressive
settlement efforts to resolve the matter at a figure that was sufficiently generous to
eliminate the claim without overpaying plaintiff. Wellinghorst, Ward, and First
Specialty in my view (and the court’s) accomplished this with almost flying colors.
A $435,000 settlement is not necessarily a bargain for the insurer, but is a more
than reasonable amount in a case with no good liability defenses and a young
plaintiff with substantial medical bills, a year of missed work, permanent brain
damage, and permanent facial disfigurement. There was also significant testimony
putting this settlement in range of similar cases in the locality in question (Atlantic
County and the New Jersey Shore). One need not be a Bon Jovi devotee (the
barroom brawl occurred in Sayreville, the singer’s home town) to realize that
bodily injury verdicts in a relatively urbanized part of the East Coast are frequently
substantial, often reaching seven figures. If the case had been venued in the rural
West, Lloyd’s might have had some ground for objecting to the size of the
settlement but this argument was in my view unpersuasive as a matter of law in
light of the actual trial location and the unquestioned seriousness of the injuries to
plaintiff.
But on the issue of attorney Wellinghorst’s obligations, the court’s assessment
was hopefully only a rhetorical tangent rather than a serious pronouncement about
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Now trial was scheduled for late summer 2003. Elliston complained that it
was now too late and that it (and more important) Lloyd’s had been
prejudiced by the late notice and need not cover the matter even though the
claim clearly arose during the Lloyd’s coverage period. The argument was
astoundingly weak in light of applicable New Jersey law236 and the
attorney professional responsibility. A defense attorney retained by an insurer or
claims intermediary owes a duty of candor to the insurer. Although the rights of
the policyholder defendant as primary client of the attorney are greater and take
precedence in the event of conflict, the attorney generally has no right to remain
silent when it discovers information that may affect the insurer’s rights as a party
that contracted to provide legal services to the policyholder. In this case, because
the policyholder had insurance with Lloyd’s during the time of the brawl, there
was no policyholder-insurer conflict sufficient to permit defense counsel to
withhold from the insurer the important information regarding the actual date of
loss. If First Specialty had attempted to use the information to abandon its
policyholder on the eve of trial, Attorney Wellinghorst would have presumably
advised the insurer of the policyholder’s rights and a possible bad faith claim
against the insurer. But in my view, Wellinghorst had no discretion to withhold
the information from Ward/First Specialty and would have been subject to breach
of contract or legal malpractice liability (in states that consider the insurer to be a
“client” of the defense attorney) had he done so.
236

See supra note 165. Elliston and Lloyd’s also argued, based on New
Jersey’s “Best Practices” rules, that the time for conducting discovery had passed
and that it was now too late to conduct discovery or other litigation activity that
could cure the alleged inadequacies of the defense prior to their notification. The
“Best Practices” rules set discovery deadlines for particular types of cases but, in
practice, appear to be as malleable as any other discovery deadlines. Discovery in
the barroom brawl case was “technically set to end on September 10, 2002”
months before notification to Elliston/Lloyds but:
[T]he evidence at trial was essentially uncontroverted that the parties
continued to conduct discovery through the summer of 2003 [the eve of
trial], including depositions of [plaintiff and three other arguably
important witnesses]. Despite Lloyd’s speculation, there simply is no
credible evidence in the record to support the notion that [plaintiff’s
counsel or the New Jersey trial court] would have sought to strictly
enforce Best Practices had Lloyd’s decided to become involved in
[defense] in the spring and summer of 2003. Nor is there any credible
evidence in the record that [plaintiff counsel] or the presiding judge
would have moved at trial to strike any discovery taken on behalf of [the
defendant policyholder] after the Best Practices discovery deadline.”
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practical realities of trial in every jurisdiction, where custom and practice
as well as the discretion accorded under the rules auger in favor of granting
additional discovery or postponement of trial where a party or counsel is
brought into a case late in the day.
The Elliston/Lloyd’s complaint about prejudice also appears to
have been mere pretext in that Elliston essentially articulated the defense
and sat on its hands rather than at least exploring the defense and settlement
options. Although Elliston was not in a great position, it made essentially
no effort to salvage the situation. It did not seek a postponement of trial. It
did not retain counsel or assume control of the case with existing defense
counsel. It did not seek to conduct additional investigation or discovery.
Most important, Elliston made no effort to assess the liability exposure
presented by the case or to settle the matter on reasonable terms.237
Instead, Elliston and Lloyd’s refused to take over the case, leaving
First Specialty holding the metaphorical bag. If First Specialty had stopped
defending the bar and trying to settle the case down the home stretch, it
would have been vulnerable to serious allegations of bad faith by the
policyholder.238 Making what it thought was the best of a bad situation,
See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F.Supp.2d at 1332. Because it is the insurer’s
burden to show prejudice from late notice, the absence of this evidence prior to
trial would logically have supported summary judgment for First Specialty on this
issue. Merely by permitting trial on this point, the court arguably did
Elliston/Lloyd’s a favor and gave the “discovery deadline has passed” defense
more regard than it deserved.
237

See Id. at 1335:

Clearly, Lloyd’s was placed in a less than ideal position by the late
notice of the Femia claim. The evidence at trial, however, simply does
not support the assertion that Lloyd’s irretrievably lost substantial
rights as a result of late notice of the [barroom brawl] claim. Indeed,
the evidence strongly suggests that, had Elliston actively intervened in
March 2003, and it definitely could have done so under a reservation of
rights, it still would have been able to investigate, defend, and/or settle
the [underlying] case without significant impediment.
Id.
238

See id. at 1339 (First Specialty “was essentially `stuck between a rock and
a hard place’” because of duties to policyholder, even if claim did not fall within
First Specialty policy period). See, e.g., Griggs v. Bertram, 443 A.2d 163, 167
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First Specialty conducted additional discovery and analysis (making up in
significant degree for the admittedly minimalist defense it had conducted
prior to that time) and settled the case in a range deemed appropriate by
seasoned counsel and ultimately by the court in the ensuring litigation
wrought by the mistakes of the two claims intermediaries (Ward and
Elliston).239
An old adage of the radio business is that “if you don’t have time
to do it right the first time, you’ll never have time to fix it.” Although not
literally true, the saying, like the better known “stitch in time saves nine”
nicely captures the higher remedial cost that is created by errors at the
outset. If Ward had correctly realized that the incident was not within the
First Specialty coverage period, the claim would have gone to Elliston and
Lloyd’s, who could have defended and settled (or not settled) the case as
seen fit. Instead, the matter went from largely simple and routine to more
complex and unusual. Having paid $445,000 to settle the bodily injury
claim plus defense costs, First Specialty wanted reimbursement from the
insurer that should have handled the claim from the outset.240
Although Elliston’s errors as the Lloyd’s intermediary are less
obviously fumbling than those of Ward, they were significant. Although
Elliston (and Lloyd’s) received notice later than desired, there was still a
significant amount of time to take over the case and defend or settle it to its
liking rather than whining that it was stuck with the alleged claims
handling errors of First Specialty and defense counsel. Instead of acting
reasonably, Elliston postured. For example, it claimed that further
discovery was unavailable due to the close of the discovery period without
even trying to obtain a reopening or an agreement with opposing counsel to
conduct depositions, physical examinations, or the like. As nearly every
litigator knows, most anything can be done by agreement of counsel, which
is not normally unreasonably withheld because courts are generally
empowered to grant these extensions and exceptions unless the matter is
one of the few “jurisdictional” deadlines over which courts have no
discretion.
(1982) (carrier beginning defense without reservation of rights estopped from
denying coverage). Because of the error of its TPA, First Specialty understandably
viewed the claim as falling clearly within its coverage and did not defend under a
reservation of rights.
239

See First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-41.

240

See id. at 1323-25 (describing background of litigation).

2009]

THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES

689

Elliston’s intransigence could have been simple laziness or
negligence. It could also have been (and in my view was) tactical
posturing designed to keep First Specialty “stuck” with the coverage
obligation that rightfully belonged to Lloyd’s and for which Lloyd’s (not
First Specialty) had received a premium. It is more than possible that
Elliston was not dropping the claims handling handoff because of
incompetence or sloth but because it was doing the bidding of Lloyd’s in
trying to paint First Specialty into a corner from which it could not escape
through using the pretextual excuse that is was now “too late” for Elliston
to pick up the claim and that Lloyd’s was prejudiced in its ability to defend
and cover the matter.
All of this brought about an additional lawsuit by First Specialty
seeking reimbursement from Lloyd’s based on subrogation and unjust
enrichment. First Specialty also sued its TPA (which had blown it so badly
on the actual date of the plaintiff’s injury at the bar) and sued Elliston as
well as Lloyd’s. An unfortunate but hardly remarkable barroom assault
that probably should have resulted in no significant litigation became a
battle royal that resulted in a second lawsuit (in addition to the injured
patron’s bodily injury/inadequate security claim), extensive pretrial
discovery, retention of experts,241 four pretrial judicial opinio242 a week241

See id. at 1336-37 (in which the court makes “specific credibility findings”
about various witnesses, including expert witnesses, even though the decision was
not, according to the court, based on any expert testimony). As noted above, I was
retained as an expert for First Specialty, as was former U.S. District Court Judge
Curtis Meanor of the District of New Jersey. Lloyd’s retained George Kenney, a
prominent practitioner and co-author of New Jersey Insurance law. See GEORGE
KENNY & FRANK A. LATTEL, NEW JERSEY INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
242

See First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America Holdings, Inc., 2004
WL 2672833, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2004) (denying Lloyd’s motion for change
of venue to New Jersey); First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Novapro Risk Solutions, LP,
468 F. Supp.2d 1321, 1336-37 (D. Kan. 2007) (referring to earlier pretrial ruling
rejecting Daubert challenge to proffered expert that resulted in written opinion not
available in LexisNexis database); see also First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward
North America Holdings, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33250, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec.
15, 2005) (denying St. Paul Travelers motion to dismiss without prejudice on
technical grounds that submission of affidavit converted it to summary judgment
motion that was premature); First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America
Holdings, Inc., 2005 WL 3447708, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2005) (granting
Elliston’s motion to dismiss) (all opinions by District Judge John W. Lungstrum);
First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Ward North America Holdings, Inc 2006 U.S. Dist.
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long trial and a 20-page bench opinion.243 The collective expense of the
enterprise was hundreds of thousands spent on out-of-pocket disputing
costs and at least tens of thousands of dollars worth of judicial resources
(by three different judges and their staffs) shouldered by taxpayers even if
not formally billed in itemized fashion.
And who paid for this train wreck? The claims indermediaries who
caused and exacerbated it? Hardly. In its findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the court found that Ward (First Specialty’s administrator) could
not be liable in negligence unless there was a finding of prejudice to either
insurer as a result of late notice. Finding no prejudice, the court granted
Ward’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.244 Elliston (the Lloyd’s
administrator) did even better in that it was dismissed from the case a year
earlier when the court, following the traditional rule on intermediary
liability, ruled that First Specialty had no claim against Elliston because
there was no contract between First Specialty and Elliston.245
LEXIS 60219 (D. Kan., Aug. 22, 2006) (issuing protective order) (by Magistrate
Judge Keith G. Sebelius). There were also judicial rulings that are not generally
available on online.
243

See generally First Specialty v. Novapro, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (discussing
findings of fact and conclusions of law by Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara).
244
245

See id. at 1343.

See First Specialty v. Ward, 2005 WL 3447708, at *1-2 (Kan. Dec. 15,
2005) (“First Specialty asserts the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
against Elliston without asserting any contractual relationship with Elliston. The
claim for bad faith in denying an insurance claim ‘is best understood as one that
sounds in contract.’”) (citing Kansas precedent and Charleston Dry Cleaners &
Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 586 S.E.2d 586, 588 (S.C. 2003) which
was discussed supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text) (citation omitted); see
also Wolverton v. Bullock, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280-81 (D. Kan. 1998). The
First Specialty Court echoed the Charleston Dry Cleaners sentiment that the “duty
of good faith arising under the contract does not extend to a person who is not a
party to the insurance contract. Thus, no bad faith claim can be brought against an
independent adjuster or independent adjusting company.” See First Specialty v.
Ward, 2005 LEXIS 33247 at *2, quoting Charleston Dry Cleaners.
In addition, the court rejected the claim that there was any special relationship
with Elliston that would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See id. at *7
(“First Specialty is not the insured in this case, and even more damaging to its
claim, Elliston is not the insurer. The parties are completely attenuated, and
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At the end of this litigation day, then, two entities substantially
responsible for a lot of wasted time, energy and money escaped liability, at
least judicially imposed liability. At a minimum, this seems inconsistent
with the basic notion that a rational legal system should create sufficient
incentives for adequate care and hold persons and entities accountable
when their errors cause injury to others who might reasonably foreseeably
suffer such injury.
One response to this concern and to my criticism of intermediary
immunity to third parties is that the parties who do have contractual
relations with the intermediaries will have a cause of action against the
errant intermediary, thus providing adequate deterrence and compensation
even though the third party will not be the instrument of that deterrence and
compensation. But cases like First Specialty refute this contention on both
legal and practical grounds.
First the legal grounds. The federal trial court ruled that Ward, the
administrator that was too dense to realize that it had improperly saddled its
principal with coverage responsibilities, was not liable to the principal
because the principal was ultimately able to get reimbursed for most of the
accordingly, First Specialty cannot assert any breach of fiduciary duty. Like the
claim for good faith and fair dealing, the claim for breach of a fiduciary entirely
turns upon a contract between the parties.” With no contract, First Specialty has
no claim.”) (citation omitted). The court’s conclusion that the parties are
“completely attenuated” is wrong. They may not have been contractually linked,
but there are only a couple degrees of separation between them. Complete
attenuation implies no logical ties whatsoever. On the contrary, it is more than a
little likely and foreseeable that two insurers and their intermediaries might
become involved in a claim against their common policyholder. For example, if
the barroom brawl had happened at midnight on the day on which the policy
periods changes, these parties could have been in dispute as to coverage and claims
handling obligations even without any misfeasance by either claims administrator.
With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, one might also chide First Specialty
counsel for not formally making a negligence claim against Elliston, the theory
being that although Elliston might not be a “fiduciary” to First Specialty in light of
its greater loyalty to (and contract with) Lloyd’s, Elliston at least had basic tort-like
duties to First Specialty and others reasonably foreseen as affected by its handling
of the claim. Elliston was actually and constructively aware that by failing to pick
up the defense and handling of the barroom brawl claim it was putting First
Specialty in a position where it had to protect the Lloyd’s policyholder even
though the loss was not the contractual responsibility of First Specialty and that
this would impose considerable costs on First Specialty, costs that could only be
recouped if First Specialty assumed the burden of settlement.
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costs by Lloyd’s once it was found that Lloyd’s was not prejudiced by the
delay in receiving notice of the matter. First Specialty “conceded” this
“during trial,” which may have been good judicial politics in that it made
the insurer look less greedy and reduced the adjudicative burden on the
court. But was it right under the law – and should the court have accepted
this concession even in an adversary system where parties are largely free
to drop claims for any reason?
Although First Specialty essentially gave up on its negligence
claim against Ward by taking the position that it was fully compensated if it
could prevail against Lloyd’s, First Specialty’s legal generosity and the
court’s summary disposition of the negligence claim is not very persuasive.
Without doubt, Ward was negligent and negligence of this type also breach
of contract as well as inflicting reasonably foreseeable injury upon an entity
to which Ward owed clear duties of care and minimal competence. Ward’s
negligence and breach of contract entitled First Specialty to relief and
payment of apt damages.
Even if a successful action against Lloyd’s largely made First
Specialty whole, there undoubtedly was lost time and productivity inflicted
on First Specialty because of the Ward’s error. Logically, at least some of
this injury remained uncompensated from the judgment against Lloyd’s. If
nothing else, it appears from the court’s judgment that First Specialty
shouldered all of its counsel fees in prosecuting its subrogation and unjust
enrichment claim. At the end of the day, then, we see a situation in which
even the principal of an insurance intermediary is not getting relief against
the intermediary even in a case of egregious error.
Now, the practical grounds. The other intermediary, Elliston, of
course was in a contract relationship with its principal, Lloyd’s. The errors
of Elliston arguably inflicted injury upon Lloyd’s, unless Lloyd’s was
calling all shots regarding the barroom brawl claim and therefore removing
any discretion. If Lloyd’s was calling the shots, presumably there was no
breach of contract by Elliston. But such a situation illustrates the
unwisdom of the traditional rule. If Elliston were subject to a liability
claim by First Specialty, it logically would have made Elliston think twice
about blinding taking orders from its principal to do nothing to salvage the
claims handling situation when it received notice of the problem.
An intermediary facing potential tort liability is more likely to
exercise independent judgment that might save all concerned needless
injury, aggravation, and litigation. If instead the poor decision to refuse to
take over the claim was really Elliston’s decision, it proved a costly one to
Lloyd’s. Under the theory underlying the majority rule protecting
intermediaries from liability to third parties, one would expect the principal
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to sue the errant intermediary. However, it appears that Lloyd’s has made
no such claim against Elliston.
After the dust of the First Specialty litigation settled, it appears that
neither intermediary (Ward nor Elliston) was forced to accept responsibility
for pretty poor performance of its duties to its principals and the duties I
argue they have to third parties. In this case, it is hard to get too emotional
about the result. First Specialty is a commercial entity of some wealth that
could have survived even it had not been able to recover against Lloyd’s.
Having recovered, it was not greatly harmed by the errors of Ward and
Elliston even though it in my view was far from made whole. Likewise,
Lloyd’s syndicates are unlikely to suffer substantial injury due to isolated
errors in claims adjustment or litigation.
More disturbing is the prospect that the errors of the intermediaries
could have resulted in substantial harm to the policyholder or the claimant
in situations like this. For example, the late notice and Elliston’s refusal to
accept responsibility (and the manner in which the intermediary errors
shaped insurer positions) could have created a situation in which the
policyholder was left without a defense or subject to a judgment in excess
of the policy limits. The claimant could have been put in a situation
requiring years of litigation simply to get compensation for what were
undeniably serious injuries resulting from pretty clear policyholder
negligence that was subject to liability insurance coverage. None of these
are good possibilities. Fortunately, the worse was averted in spite of the
unreasonable legal deference accorded to claims intermediaries who turned
in very defective performances of their basic tasks. The First Specialty
litigation, however intellectually interesting, was a huge waste of resources
largely due to intermediary error. This hardly provides a persuasive brief
for clinging to the historical rule of intermediary immunity.
Reviewing the First Specialty wreckage, one might recall the
public policy argument made in favor of the general rule (most prominently
in cases like Sanchez, Meineke and Hamill)246 positing that imposing
liability on intermediaries would be bad because it would move more of the
claims function back in house to the insurers or raise prices for basic
adjusting services. To that argument, I ask why this would be a problem.
In-house claims adjusters surely could not have done worse than Ward and
Elliston. And if the specter of liability results in an increase in adjuster
fees, this might be a penny well paid to reduce the pound-foolishness of
independent contractor intermediaries who cannot even put a loss in the
246

See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text.
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right policy period and that are unable to pick up defense and settlement of
a straight-forward assault case months before trial. Although the cases are
not legion and the problem is hardly law’s most pressing, one cannot help
but wonder why the judiciary strains so hard to protect claims
intermediaries under these circumstances.
IV.

THE ANALYTICAL AND PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF
REMOVING
BLANKET
IMMUNITY
FOR
CLAIMS
INTERMEDIARIES
A. REVISITING DOCTRINE: THE AGENT AS TORTFEASOR

The privity and disclosed principals doctrines, despite their
historical pedigree, have always rested on a relatively weak foundation.
The notion that a contractual relationship is required to grant one rights visà-vis other social actors was never as broad or absolute as its defenders
maintained. Even in the absence of contract, social actors have certain
social responsibilities if placed in situations where their behavior can cause
harm to others. The legal system acknowledges this, of course, through a
vast body of tort law in which actors are held to have duties toward others,
often even total strangers. Seen in this light, one can argue that the oldfashioned citadel of privity, which most famously collapsed in product
liability law,247 was always overreaching in its quest to immunize
defendants and limit the reach of tort law. Many of the traditional lack-ofprivity decisions tacitly but mistakenly assumed that there were no rights at
all in the absence of formal contract rights. These courts simply acted as if
tort law rights were beyond realistic consideration.248 As again revealed
most clearly in the product liability context, there were always strong
reasons to impose tort liability upon certain conduct with a sufficiently
close connection to foreseeable injury to certain parties once it was
recognized that the absence of a contract was not disqualifying.

247

See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing MacPherson v.
Buick and fall of the citadel of privity in product liability matters).
248

See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text (citing cases immunizing
intermediaries on lack-of-privity grounds, expressly or implicitly finding that
without contract-based rights, third parties had no legal liability rights against
intermediaries).
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In effect, courts were mixing apples and oranges by concluding
that the mere absence of a contract precluded legal relief on other grounds.
Often they were aided and abetted by plaintiffs’ counsel who, perhaps
having stars in their eyes about potential punitive damages awards, bet all
their litigation chips on seeking to make bad faith claims against
intermediaries and overlooked the compelling logic of holding a claims
adjuster accountable in tort, as would be a passing driver or machinery
operator.
Applied to claims intermediaries, the logic of tort law unfettered
from a contract-based limitation is compelling. The very nature of the
claims process and the intermediaries’ role should be recognized as
creating at least some duties of at least modest care toward claimants and
policyholders. Both are in a vulnerable position relative to the insurer and
adjuster. Failure of the adjuster to act in an honest, fair, objectively
reasonable manner is almost certain to cause at least some harm in the
disposition of the claim.
In some instances, the harm will only be the relatively minor
problem of delay or perhaps some quibbling over relatively small amounts
of money, insistence on nit-picking documentation, or similar wrongs, that
despite resulting from adjuster misconduct, are unlikely to result in
litigation. But in other instances, adjuster error can result in substantial
delay, dramatic underpayment, or outright denial – all of which may
impose not only ordinary breach-of-contract type harms but may also give
rise to substantial consequential damages, perhaps even significant physical
and mental injury to policyholders or others. In these latter types of cases,
there is no reason not to hold claims intermediaries accountable for their
actions.
In addition, the traditional agent immunity rule in disclosed
principal cases has always been in some tension not only with basic tort
law concepts (and jurisprudential or philosophical notions of justice,
responsibility and accountability) but also with other aspects of agency law.
For example, even agents for disclosed principals may be liable to those
with whom they negotiate if they have misled the third party as to the
agent’s authority.249 Although this traditional form of agent liability is
premised more on contract grounds (i.e., the agent misrepresenting his
249

See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 119-121 (2d edition); see, e.g., Schafer v. Fraser,
290 P.2d 190 (1955).
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authority has induced reasonable reliance that causes detriment to the third
party), it nonetheless provides strong historical support for the proposition
that where agents take volitional acts that cause injury to third parties,
liability is appropriate.250
In addition, notwithstanding the protection historically bestowed
by the disclosed principal rule, “[a]n innocent agent who is responding to
the orders of a principal may be liable without fault for torts such as
trespass to land, conversion and defamation.”251 In addition,
[f]or other torts the agent is liable only if it proved
that he possessed the requisite state of mind. Illustrative of
such torts are deceit, malicious prosecution, interference
with business and negligence. Under no circumstances,
except where he is acting to protect an interest of the
principal, is the fact that the agent is acting within the
scope of employment or the command of the principal a
defense. . . . [T]he liabilities of the agent may be increased
simply because he has asserted control over the property or
other agents of his principal or because he has presumed to
do something which, if properly accomplished, would have
prevented harm to others.252

250

And in misrepresentation of authority cases, the damages can be
significant. See id. at § 120 (damages may include net value of transaction that
would have taken place if authority had been represented, plus counsel fees)(citing
cases from the 1950s). See also id. § 125 (“mere fact that an agent acts on account
of his principal does not exonerate him of liability for misrepresentations he makes
to a third party).
251
See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, at § 124 (citations,
including two cases from the 19th Century, omitted).
252

See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, at § 124 (citations omitted).
See also Leathers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 500 So. 2d 451, 453 (Miss.
1986)(“[O]ur general rule in tort is that the agent or servant, the one whose conduct
has rendered his principal liable, [also] has individual liability to the plaintiff.”);
see generally WARREN SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 1 (1949); see generally
Warren Seavey, Liability of an Agent in Tort, 1 SOUTHERN L.Q. 16 (1916).
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Most important for purposes of assessing claims adjuster exposure,
“[t]he fact that one acts as an agent does not absolve him from liability for
his negligence.”253
Particularly relevant is that “[s]ome jurisdictions will hold the
agent liable if the agent has undertaken the sole and complete control and
management of the principal’s premises. In such circumstances, the
agent’s omission is an act of misfeasance, rather than mere nonfeasance”
although “the agent is not liable for the negligence of the principal” in the
absence of the agent’s own negligence.254
As noted above, in modern claims adjusting, insurers frequently
have essentially given independent contractor adjusters and MGAs
something quite close to “sole and complete control and management” of
the claims process and other aspects of the insurer-policyholder
relationship. Applying this general maxim of agency from the Restatement
(Second) rather than the disclosed principal immunity of Restatement
(Second) § 320, logically would require that claims intermediaries be held
accountable for their negligence to apt third parties without reference to
whether the third party enjoys a contractual relationship with the
intermediary. Other sections of the Restatement (Second) all are quite
supportive of agent liability under apt circumstances.255
253

See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 249, § 128 at 203 (citing ALI
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §348A). The citation to § 348A seems a bit
off here in that this section specifically addresses “Trespass to Land” rather than
general negligence. However, other portions of the Restatement (Second),
particularly § 343, support this view. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§348-§348A.
254

See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 179, § 128, at 203 (citing Paul v.
Sharpe, 181 Ga. App. 443, 352 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1987) and Robinson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 288, 290 (Ala. 1981)).
255

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 343 (1958):

An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the
fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the
principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal, or a
privilege held by him for the protection of the principal’s interests, or where
the principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person
harmed.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 350 (1958):
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An agent is subject to liability if, by his acts, he creates an unreasonable risk
of harm to the interests of others protected against negligent invasion.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 344 (1958):
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for his own personal conduct,
for the consequences of another’s conduct which results from his directions if,
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the conduct, or its
consequences, except where the agent or the one acting has a privilege or
immunity not available to the other.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 347 (1958):
(1) An agent does not have the immunities of his principal although acting at
the direction of the principal.
(2) Where, because of his relation to a third person, a master owes no duty, or
a diminished duty, of care, a servant in the performance of his master’s work
owes no greater duty, unless there has been reliance by the master or by a third
person upon a greater undertaking by the servant.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 348 (1958):
An agent who fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or knowingly
assists in the commission of tortuous fraud or duress by his principal or by
others is subject to liability in tort to the injured person although the fraud or
duress occurs in a transaction on behalf of the principal.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 348A (1958):
An agent who enters the land of another is not relieved from liability for
trespass by the fact that he acted on account of the principal and reasonably
believed that the principal had possession or the right to possession of the
land, or the right to authorize the agent to enter.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 349 (1958):
An agent who does acts which would otherwise constitute trespass to or
conversion of a chattel is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acts on
account of his principal and reasonably, although mistakenly, believes that the
principal is entitled to possession of the chattels.
Restatement (Second) Agency § 351 (1958):
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The Restatement (Third) continues in this vein, providing a general
rule that
[a]n agent is subject to liability to a third party
harmed by the agent’s tortuous conduct. Unless an
applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains
subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an
employee, with actual or apparent authority, or within the
scope of employment.256
Although this leaves for resolution the sometimes difficult question
of whether an agent’s conduct is “tortious” in that it negligently, recklessly,
or intentionally violated a duty,257 the modern “hornbook rule” of the

An agent who directs or permits conduct of another under such circumstances
that he should realize that there is an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
others or to their belongings is subject to liability for harm resulting from a
risk which his direction or permission creates.
256

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.01 (2006). Reporter’s Note
(a) to § 7.01 specifically notes that the section “consolidates treatment of points
made by” the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY “in several sections, including §§
217, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 358 and 360.” Accord, Oriental
Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 945 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Nebraska law
and finding individual corporate officers personally liable for fraud and
misrepresentation even though working for corporate entity as principal); InterConnect, Inc. v. Gross, 644 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1994) (holding the president of
the company individually liable for wrongful actions taken in individual capacity);
T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 628 A.2d 53, 62 (Del. 1993)
(finding the corporate officer is not immune from an action seeking personal
liability for his role in corporate pollution).
257

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.02 (2006) (“agent is subject to tort
liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s conduct only when the agent’s
conduct breaches a duty that the agent woes to the third party”). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. d at 141 (2006):
Conduct by an agent that breaches a duty owed by the agent to the
principal does not subject the agent to liability to a third party who
suffers pure economic loss as a result unless the agent’s conduct also
breaches a duty owed by the agent to the third party. Most cases hold

700

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

Restatement is hardly one of automatic immunity for agent misconduct
simply because the agent and the third party have not entered into a
contract.
The differing strands of hornbook agency law can be reconciled by
appreciating that the disclosed principal immunity accorded agents
pursuant to § 320 is purely an immunity from being held liable under
contract. Section 320 (and its modern equivalent § 6.01 of the Third
Restatement) provide only that an agent for a disclosed principal “does not
become a party to the contract” because of agent status. By expanding this
presumptive contract claim immunity into a general immunity from suit by
third parties, courts immunizing claims adjusters have engaged in quite a
bit of judicial activism in favor of this class of defendants.
The absence of a contract and contract claim hardly ends the
inquiry. Actors such as claims intermediaries can still logically be liable in
tort. Traditional rule courts have either tended to ignore this or quickly
leap to the conclusion that the nature of the claims management process
does not create a tort duty of reasonable care toward the policyholder or
liability claimant.258
This view is wrongheaded for reasons already discussed. The
adjuster plays the role of an insurer. Insurers owe a fiduciary duty to
policyholders defending liability claims and a near-fiduciary duty to firstparty policyholders as well as having more limited duties to third party
claimants. By analogy, the claims intermediary ceded substantial authority
by the insurer logically owes similar duties.259
that an agent does not owe a duty to a third party when the agent’s
negligent conduct causes only pure economic loss to a third party.
258

See cases cited supra note 21; see also cases cited supra notes 101-121.
See, e.g., Badners v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 567 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Ala. 1999);
Gorab v. Equity Gen. Agents, Inc., 661 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Colo. App. 1983),
overruled by Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 462 (Colo. 2003).
259

At this point in the development of insurance law, insurers no longer
contest that they owe duties of good faith to policyholders; however, they often
argue against having a full-fledged fiduciary duty, even in liability insurance cases.
Although most insurers and counsel are likely to also argue that claims
intermediaries are mere agents and do not stand in the insurers’ shoes as alter egos,
at least one commentator appears to accept the proposition that where an
intermediary is sufficiently like an insurer or performing functions of an insurer,
liability should attach. See Federal Court Predicts Rhode Island Supreme Court
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Even without putting the intermediary in the shoes of the insurer,
the very nature of the relationship is one creating a duty of reasonable care
and basic honesty and competence. The intermediary is aware of the
policyholder or third party’s dependency upon the adjuster and it is
reasonable foreseeable that intermediary negligence or other misconduct
could cause significant injury.
Under these typical circumstances of claims intermediary activity
occurring every day in the field, the standard test for imposing tort liability
is clearly met. Section 320’s general prohibition on imposing a contract
relationship where the agent represents a disclosed principal hardly negates
this basis tort analysis.
Properly understood, then, traditional agency law does not foreclose
liability for claims intermediaries and certainly does not grant them broad
immunity for their negligence or greater misconduct toward policyholders
and third parties.
In addition, adverting again to contract law for a moment, the
traditional contract claim immunity and lack of privity defense made by
intermediaries arguably conflicts with the modern view of the rights of third
party beneficiaries. Historically, contract law was reluctant to recognize a
claim for breach by one who was not a party to the contract breached.
However, even in the 19th Century, third parties might have rights under a
contract if they were sufficiently within the contemplation of the
contracting parties or at least intended to benefit from the contract. By the
21st Century, this historical view has expanded somewhat, with courts more
often characterizing a contract claimant as an “intended” beneficiary with
rights rather than an “incidental” beneficiary with no rights.260
Will Permit Policyholder to Sue Independent Claims Administrators for Common
Law Bad Faith in Limited Circumstances, INS. LITIG. REP., Feb. 15, 2007, at 149150 (supporting general rule in cases of mere intermediary agency but conceding
that “[a]rguably, principles of joint venture provide a more theoretically sound
basis for imposing liability on a claims adjuster who shares economic risk with the
insurer and has significant control over the claims-handling process” and citing the
“joint venture” liability cases of Wohlers v. Bartgis and Farr v. Transamerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra notes 92-97). My proposed liability for claims
intermediaries is only a modest extension of this concept in that it dispenses with
the requirement that there be an economic risk partnership between insurer and
adjuster. Under my view, it should be sufficient if the intermediary has significant
control over the claims process.
260
See EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 126, at 917-18;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, §§ 10.2- 10.3; see generally Anthony Jon Waters,
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The insurance intermediary situation is one in which it clearly
appears that both insurer and TPA or adjuster are aware of the position and
rights of a policyholder or claimant and where the insurer’s contractual
retention of an independent contractor to process a claim is intended to
benefit the third party. If not, the insurer hiring the intermediary would
appear to be in at least technical bad faith in that it has failed to give the
policyholder’s interests (in getting a fair and swift adjustment of the claim)
as much consideration as it has given its own interests (in processing the
claim in a swift manner the minimized payouts by the insurer).
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE BENEFITS OF POTENTIAL
LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS INTERMEDIARIES
Because lack of contract privity and agency law do not compel
immunity for claims intermediaries, the question of intermediary liability is
best answered through a functional analysis of the relative net benefits of
permitting suits against such intermediaries. In contrast to majority rule
courts such as Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc.,261 my
application of instrumental, public policy concerns leads to a view that
immunity for claims intermediaries is clearly unwise and that at least in
some instances, these intermediaries should be subject to liability.
As outlined above in discussing Sanchez and similar cases, the
public policy arguments mustered in defense of the traditional rule are
weak. The claim that insurance intermediaries should be immune from tort
liability because they lack the protection of contractually set limits on
liability262 is particularly bizarre. By this reasoning, one might just as well
conclude that there should be no tort liability for negligent driving since the
unfortunate auto accident defendant never had the opportunity to negotiate
with his victim about perhaps agreeing to a lower limit on liability.
The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
261

84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (1999), see supra notes 122-149 and accompanying

text.
262

See supra notes 49-141 and accompanying text (discussing this rationale,
as most prominently advanced in Sanchez and Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co.,
892 A.2d 226 (Vt. 2005)). See also Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d
267, 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. 656 So. 2d
1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
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Similarly, if one accepts this rationale for tort immunity, one might even
prohibit a tort claim against a mugger, unless perhaps the mugger had an
adequate opportunity to negotiate a contractual limit on his liability for
assault and battery.
This simple illustration not only underscores the common sense
absurdity of this attempted justification for claims adjuster immunity but
also raise a question of legal doctrine. What on earth is the consideration
that would support a bargain in which a victim agrees to limit its right of
recovery against (in ascending order of blameworthiness) an errant driver, a
sloppy adjuster, or a mugger? None comes readily to mind, suggesting that
this attempt to turn lack of contract privity into not only a shield but a
sword fails as anything but alchemy via ipse dixit.
As discussed above, the notion that an insurer limits its tort liability
by contract is itself incorrect. The policy limits of an insurance policy are a
contract-based limitation on a particular type of contract damages, but they
hardly constitute the cap of an insurer’s potential liability. As a matter of
contract, most liability policies provide a “defense outside of limits” to the
policyholder, which means that the insurer is responsible for paying
reasonable counsel fees and other defense costs until policy limits are
exhausted. In a sufficiently involved case implicating a policy with high
limits, defense costs can be millions or even tens of millions of dollars for
which there is no documented cap. The insurer’s good faith duties bar it
from hurrying to exhaust policy limits simply as a means of lowering its
defense expenditures.263 Beyond this, an insurer that acts in bad faith is, in
most states, also subject to consequential contract damages that are not
confined to the policy limits as well as being subject to tort damages,
including noneconomic damages such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress and the possibility of punitive damages.
Similarly, the defense of the historical rule premised on a need to
tamp down the costs of claims adjustment and insurance premiums is
similarly flawed, both as to fact and public policy. We simply do not know
whether forcing adjusters to internalize at least some of the external costs
of their errors would inevitably lead to price increases. Economic theory
may predict this but countervailing theory predicts that the effect would be
minimal or even overshadowed altogether by market conditions and the
degree of competition for claims intermediary work or insurance sales.
A strong case can be made that imposing liability for misconduct is
not likely to have a great impact on insurance prices unless misconduct is
263

See STEMPEL, supra note 27, at § 10.03.
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rampant. If not, there will only be a few cases even brought, with fewer
cases still resulting in judgments against intermediaries. After judgment,
the amount may or may not be enough to prompt a recouping price
increase. In some instances, the intermediary may not be able to increase
prices and will simply need to absorb the loss and lower profits. In the
absence of compelling proof that making claims intermediaries subject to
the tort system would bring substantial economic net costs, the judicial
system would be wise to stick to doctrine rather than implicitly legislating
immunity on speculative grounds. Applying traditional doctrinal analysis,
a claims intermediary seems at least as likely a candidate for a negligence
action as does an errant driver, restaurant owner, or shopping center.
In addition, the “prices will rise” rationale for limiting intermediary
liability, whatever empirical truth it might have, lacks persuasive force as a
public policy proposition. It assumes without discussion that an aggregate
increase in adjusting costs or insurance costs is bad. That hardly follows.
Rather, the question is whether an increase in adjusting costs is outweighed
by the benefits of forcing adjusters to act with greater care, providing an
alternative source of recovery for victims of bad adjusting, and the moral
accomplishment of holding business and social actors responsible for
wrongful conduct.
Depending on the amount and magnitude of intermediary
misconduct, resulting liability, and aggregate price increases, reasonable
minds might differ over the cost-benefit analysis. But the majority rule
cases barely acknowledge this tension and fail to grapple with it. A better
approach would be to resolve doubts in favor of traditional tort law
principles – which argue strongly for permitting actions against errant
adjusters – and leave any construction of liability based on policy concerns
to legislative actors.
Commercial entities such as MGAs and independent adjusters
generally have significantly more clout with state legislatures than do
policyholders or consumers in general. If there is a good cost-benefit case
to be made against intermediary liability, it will be persuasively made by
the intermediaries and their political allies. Until that happens, the
judiciary would be more consistent with overarching principles of law
(primarily agency and tort law) by permitting liability rather than granting
immunity to entities that are well-equipped to seek it in the political
process.
Particularly in the context of insurance, a field in which both
judicial common law and executive/legislative regulation has identified a
need to protect vulnerable consumers, it seems most odd to deny to
consumers even the possibility of seeking recompense if they are injured by
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the wrongful activities of a claims intermediary. Many majority rule states
precluding actions against claims intermediaries justify this on the ground
that the plaintiff third party or policyholder can obtain satisfaction from the
insurer-principal of the offending intermediary.264 However, as well put by
the American Law Institute:
It is consistent with encouraging responsible
conduct by individuals to impose individual liability on an
agent for the agent’s torts although the agent’s conduct
may also subject the principal to liability. Moreover, an
individual agent, when liable to a third party, may be
available as a source of recovery when the principal on
whose behalf the agent acted is not.265
The goals of accountability, fairness, and increase potential for full
compensation are served if the claims intermediary is subject to claims in
apt situations. Further, it appears to be the case that in operation, the
intermediary is effectively the insurer. It is discordant for the law to
impose substantial obligations and potential liability on insurers as
principals but then to simultaneously prohibit actions against their agents,
agents who often have independent, almost unsupervised authority over the
claims process.266
264

See Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226, 230-31 (“[I]n most
cases, imposing tort liability on independent adjusters would create a redundancy
unjustified by the inevitable costs that eventually would be passed on to insureds”);
see also Meineke v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 991 P.2d 267, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999)(“If the adjuster mishandles the claim, the insurer has the same liability to the
insured as if an employee of the insurer had mishandled the claim.”).
265
266

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. b (2006).

Some of the majority rule states shrink from imposing intermediary liability
on the ground that the applicable state law “only allows an insured to sue an
insurer for bad faith and not simple negligence.” King v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas.
Co., 656 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995). In my view, this misunderstands
the distinction between bad faith and “mere” negligence. Insurers do not act in bad
faith simply because they make mistakes. However, where an insurer intentionally
adopts a coverage position that is both mistaken and objectively unreasonable, bad
faith takes place. This type of bad faith is essentially a type of negligence that
differs from ordinary negligence not because it is done with evil intent per se but
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In addition, the relative immunity of claims agents seems
incongruous when contrasted to the relatively large exposure to third party
claims faced by sales agents, brokers, attorneys, accountants and attorneys.
The rationale for the majority rule for claims intermediaries – that adjusters
as agents have duties to the principal that are too inherently in conflict with
any purported duty to third parities267 – has not prevented actions against
other entities with substantial duties of loyalty toward a principal.
In these other professional or semi-professional relationships, there
often is no formal written contract between the third party and the
intermediary (as is the case with the insurance policy, insurer, and
policyholder) but courts have recognized a duty to the claimant because of
the nature of the activities of the agent-defendants. The sales agent has an
implied contract to provide services and has tort-based duties not to
mislead or disserve the applicant or policyholder. The broker often has not
only contract obligations but also obligations implied by statute or common
law. Accountants as agents do work for their principals that they know will
be relied upon by others and for that reason are usually held liable if their
negligence misleads those relying on their work. Other actors without
contracts may be responsible to others as a matter of tort law.268
because the negligence (in the form of unreasonable policy interpretation or
conduct) takes place over an extended period of time. It is not like the split-second
of driving negligence that can create tort liability but it is a type of negligence
nonetheless, even though the legal system has given it the much more sinistersounding name of bad faith.
267

See, e.g., Meineke, 991 P.2d at 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); King, 656 So. 2d
at 1339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995); Velastequi v. Exch. Ins. Co., 505 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986).
268

See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1922). In this case,
Judge Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals found that a merchant could be
liable for injury caused by inaccurate weighing of goods sold. Later, in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 449-50 (N.Y. 1931), Cardozo and the court were
unwilling to extend the same analysis to public accountant auditors, a result that
has been significantly criticized and ultimately was rejected by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See also Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
247 N.Y. 160, 168 (N.Y. 1928) (finding no liability for service interruption that
adversely affected the general public but not persons who were intended third party
beneficiaries of a contract). Cardozo became fonder of constricted tort liability as
he aged. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), another result
that has netted criticism and not been universally followed in other states. See
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In nearly all states, a policyholder victimized by poor attorney
defense of a claim subject to liability insurance has a right to sue for
damages even though there may not be a formal written contract between
these entities and the policyholder. Rather, a contract is implied in many of
these relationships, particularly the attorney-client relationship that results
from liability insurer defense of a third party’s claim against the
policyholder. In many states, the insurer may sue the attorney for
malpractice even though the primary attorney-client relationship is between
lawyer and policyholder (although there is clearly a contract between
insurer and defense attorney).269 Even where counsel is adverse and where
sensitive information is acquired through the representation of a client, an
attorney is sometimes permitted to disclose it (over the client’s objection)
to the opponent270 and may arguably have an obligation to do so.
generally JOHN T. NOONAN, SR., The Passengers of Palsgraf in PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).
269

See generally STEMPEL, supra note 27, at § 9.03[A]. See, e.g., Paradigm
Ins. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d. 593, 601-02 (Ariz. 2001) (finding that an
insurer may bring a malpractice suit against an attorney it retained to represent a
policyholder in an underlying tort litigation even though the attorney’s primary
client is the policyholder); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d
625, 628-29 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a policyholder may not hold an insurer
vicariously liable for an attorney’s alleged malpractice because the attorney
represented the policyholder and was obligated to exercise independent
professional judgment rather than robotically follow insurer’s direction).
270

See Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (attorney
who learns through adverse medical exam that plaintiff suing attorney’s client has
brain aneurysm not prohibited by lawyer confidentiality rules from disclosing
condition to plaintiff so that plaintiff may get necessary medical attention).
Presumably, the examining physician would also be permitted to make this
disclosure.
I would even argue that both the lawyer and the doctor were required to make
the disclosures in order to protect the health and life of the plaintiff. Even though
the plaintiff was not a client or patient, the circumstances gave rise to a duty to at
least tell plaintiff if they learned anything important about his medical condition
that was relevant to future treatment.
Whether the doctor or an insurer retaining the doctors can be held responsible
for failing to detect an aneurysm like that in Spaulding v. Zimmerman is a different
and more difficult question. See, e.g., Basil v. Wolf, 935 A.2d 1154 (N.J. 2007).
The court held that Ms. Basil, widow of a decedent worker examined by a doctor
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for an independent medical examination as part of workers compensation claim
adjustment, did not have claim against the insurer for the doctor’s failure to make
timely diagnosis of decedent’s spindle cell tumor that eventually became Stage IV
Sarcoma that killed decedent some 30 months later. Id. at 1172. Neither did Ms.
Basil have a negligence claim against Dr. Wolf as medical intermediary working
for the insurer. Id. at 1176. The court viewed the doctor was retained by insurer
only for limited evaluative purposes and that the insurer was not providing medical
treatment to Mr. Basil. Id. at 1172. A separate medical malpractice claim against
Dr. Wolf individually was settled.
Basil v. Wolf is a problematic opinion. On one hand, Dr. Wolf was not exactly
Dr. House (the brilliant but irascible character in the television series of the same
name). Dr. Wolf initially diagnosed Mr. Basil as having a “probable hematoma”
that should be treated by physical therapy. Basil sought an MRI or x-ray prior to
beginning any regime of physical therapy, presumably because he wanted to make
sure there was not a more serious problem or something that would counsel against
therapy. On the other hand, Dr. Wolf did in a subsequent visit recognize that the
condition was getting worse and that an x-ray was the “logical” next step. The xray was negative and an MRI recommended. But the x-ray did not take place for
months and Dr. Wolf did not authorize an MRI until months after that. Although
Dr. Wolf, a retired orthopedic surgeon who had canceled his malpractice coverage
upon becoming an evaluator/consultant (which suggests the Ms. Basil did not get a
big medical malpractice settlement), can be said to have had only a limited
assignment as an agent of the insurer, it is a little hard to square this
characterization of his and the insurer’s role with what seems to be Dr. Wolf’s
practical power as a gatekeeper for the insurer and the insurer’s practical power
over the treatment Ms. Basil received.
The slow pace of diagnosis and treatment, seemingly spurred by Ms. Basil’s
retention of legal counsel, hardly makes a strong case for immunizing either Dr.
Wolf or the insurer. The case was decided on summary judgment, with the New
Jersey courts taking the view that there were no material contested facts requiring
trial. This is pretty broad immunity to give an insurer or an agent of Dr. Wolf’s
type as a matter of law in view of their important role in examining the health of a
person in connection with a claim of this sort. Even if this was in the context of a
contested workers compensation claim, it still seems overly forgiving to excuse the
insurer or the doctor as a matter of law and find that Mr. Basil was not really
enough of a “patient” to have the protections of medical malpractice law.
Although permitting an independent action for malpractice against the doctor may
be enough of a correction in most cases, Basil v. Wolf appears to provide too little
incentive for intermediaries or insurers to take seriously their reasonable
obligations to claimants.

2009]

THE “OTHER” INTERMEDIARIES

709

Courts have divided as to whether insurers are vicariously liable
for the conduct of defense counsel retained and directed by an insurer271
and have also divided as to whether a third party other than the client or
insurer may sue insurer-provided defense counsel. Where attorneys have
escaped liability to third parties, this has generally been based upon the
rationale that the attorney’s duty of fiduciary loyalty and zealous
representation on behalf of a client (even a misguided or unreasonable
client) makes it inappropriate to dilute this loyalty or create a
countervailing loyalty by permitting tort actions against counsel by third
parties.272 Although this may be a reasonable if problematic assessment
271

See Rose v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 599 S.E.2d 673, 682-86 (W.
Va. Ct. App. 2004) (collecting cases finding vicarious liability and cases rejecting
it) (also noting that some states permitting vicarious liability may require actual
insurer knowledge of attorney misconduct while others will permit liability
through imputed or constructive knowledge of attorney misconduct by insurer).
See also Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 287 (Ill. 2004) (noting
same split in jurisdictions)
After careful consideration of this conflicting authority, we conclude that
when, as here, an attorney acts pursuant to the exercise of independent professional
judgment, he or she acts presumptively as an independent contractor whose
intentional misconduct may generally not be imputed to the client, subject to
factual exceptions. Id. at 278.
In reaching its holding, the Horwitz Court noted that its view conflicted with
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 253, which provides in Comment a that
“[t]he fact that the attorney is subject to discipline by the court does not prevent the
client from being liable for his [tortuous] conduct.” See id. at 280. The Court
further noted that it disagreed
with the Restatement’s discounting that attorneys are constrained by certain
court-imposed ethical considerations that serve to distance their behavior from
their clients. Attorneys cannot blindly follow their clients’ directions, even if
those directions are particular and express, if doing so would require them to
violate their ethical obligations.
See id. at 280.
272

See, e.g., Horwitz, 816 N.E.2d at 277, 284. The Horwitz Court itself was
divided in that three judges dissented. See id. at 284 (McMorrow, J., dissenting,
joined by Garman, J.) (finding sufficient agency relationship to support vicarious
liability even though attorney was independent contractor); Id. at 297 (Freeman, J.
dissenting) (favoring application of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 253 to
situations such as instant case). Id.

710

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

where attorneys are involved, it is not an apt approach for viewing the
relation of insurer and claims intermediaries. The claims intermediary has
duties to the insurer as principal but they are not of the same degree and
magnitude as those of the attorney to a client.
More important, these divided cases focus on the issue of vicarious
liability of the principal for the agent’s acts. All states appear to recognize
that the attorney can be individually liable for misconduct when
representing the policyholder’s interests notwithstanding the attorney’s
fiduciary responsibilities to the insurer as either client or as agent to
principal.
Ironically, in at least one state (Washington), a claims adjuster that
engages in conduct too tinged with legal analysis and activity (e.g.,
document drafting) may be liable for de facto malpractice and unauthorized
practice of law273 – but if the adjuster is merely negligent, the protections of
the traditional lack-of-privity/disclosed principal approach would appear to
apply.274 In other states, claims intermediaries, particularly public adjusters
(nonlawyers who represent policyholders in advancing first party property
claims against with insurers) are sometimes held to be engaged in
unauthorized practice of law.275
273

See Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1079 (Wash. 2002). In Jones,
however, the adjuster found to have engaged in unauthorized legal practice appears
to have been an Allstate employee. Presumably, however, the court’s analysis
would be equally applied to independent contractor adjusters.
In addition, Jones introduces an interesting complexity to Washington law.
Adjusters practice law if they give legal consultation or prepare legally operative
documents such as the release at issue in Jones. However, the court (in a 5-4
decision) ruled that insurance companies using adjusters in this way could continue
but that they would be liable to third parties interacting with the adjuster-cumlawyer if the adjusters’ activities fell below the standard of care for a lawyer in
similar circumstances. The adjuster in question Jones was found to have fallen
beneath this standard. Id. at 1079.
274

See Kim v. O’Sullivan, 137 P.3d 61, 64-5 (Wash. App. Ct. 2006)
(policyholder defended by insurer-selected attorney could not assign malpractice
claim to third party bringing suit nor could anti-assignment rule be circumvented
by third party’s prosecution of malpractice claim; insurer-retained attorney could
not be sued for bad faith like insurer). Id.
275

See, e.g., Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 872
(Utah 1995); Prof’l Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Ind. 1982).
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But unlike actual lawyers, adjusters who avoid this pitfall,
particularly adjusters working as insurance company employees rather than
independent contractors, are considerably better protected from liability
than real lawyers or adjusters drafting releases. Further, real lawyers have
very strong fiduciary duties to clients, sometimes multiple clients, and play
an inherently more adversarial, judgment-laden role in the dispute
resolution system. Logically, attorneys should have more protection from
liability to third parties (but not from their client-principals) than do TPAs
and independent adjusters. But in majority rule states, they have less.
Something is wrong with this picture.
Recognizing the relationship of insurance intermediaries to
policyholders as one supporting tort liability for harm inflicted would put
intermediary exposure on a par with that of other actors who conduct
activities upon which a reasonably discreet and identifiable number of third
parties are known to rely and likely to suffer injury if those activities are
negligently performed.276 Similar results could be supported by a
276

For example, in the significant, now venerable case Biakanja v. Irving, 320
P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958), the court concluded that a notary public could be held
liable to an intended beneficiary for negligent attestation of a will. In reaching this
result, the court considered several factors in order to determine whether the notary
should owe a duty to parties with whom he did not contract: (1) the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the claimant; (2) the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury (from
the defendant’s errors); (4) the closeness of the connection between defendant’s
conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame reasonably attached to defendant’s
conduct; and (6) public policy considerations regarding incentives for preventing
future harm. Id. at 19. See also Bus to Bus. Mkts, Inc. v. Zurich Specialties
London, Ltd., 135 Cal. App. 4th 165, 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (reaffirming state’s use of Biakanja factors for determining actor’s liability
to third parties).
This is not a bad set of criteria for determining the existence of duty to third
parties in the absence of a contract. As discussed above (see supra text
accompanying notes 198-204), it often results in liability for accountants,
attorneys, engineers, and others who conduct activity that they know will impact
others in a non-attenuated way or where third parties are expected to rely on the
activity of the professional or intermediary.
Applied to claims intermediaries, the Biakanja factors would tend to support
liability because (1) the entire adjusting transaction is intended to benefit the
policyholder at least as much as the insurer (because the insurer has a nondelegable duty to give equal consideration to the policyholder’s interests) and also
to benefit, at least to a degree, third party claimants and society; (2) harm from
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reasonably broad approach to the question of intended third party
beneficiaries of contract.277
C. A WORKABLE STANDARD OF INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
One valid concern underlying the traditional approach protecting
claims intermediaries from liability is the view that it is unfair to hold
agents accountable for errors commanded by the principal. For example,
the adjuster denying a claim may itself have recommended payment and
merely been the bearer of bad news when it informed a policyholder or
claimant that coverage was denied by the insurer. In other situations, the
adjuster may have had only a limited investigatory role and no evaluative
role.
Although these are valid concerns, they do not logically support a
blanket rule of intermediary immunity. Rather, these cases suggest that
claims agents should not be strictly or vicariously liable for insurer
misconduct or error. Intermediaries should be liable not merely because of
an insurer’s bad conduct or decision but should instead be potentially liable

adjuster negligence is foreseeable; (3) harm is often certain where adjusters act
negligently or intentionally deny or recommend denial of a claim without proper
basis; (4) the adjuster’s conduct and an adverse outcome are often closely linked;
(5) many adjuster failures are morally blameworthy, particularly in light of their
status as agents for a principal that owes a fiduciary-like duty of good faith; and (6)
public policy favors holding negligent adjuster accountable in order to discourage
errors and their attendant harm.
277

The historical rule is that a “third party should not be permitted to enforce
covenants made not for his benefit, but rather for others [because the third party] is
not a contracting party [and] his right to performance is predicated on the
contracting parties’ intent to benefit him.” See Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). Although this may
logically prohibit a policyholder landlord’s tenant from claiming benefits under the
landlord’s property insurance policy, the rule should not bar a policyholder from
being able to obtain compensation when injured by the actions of a claims adjuster
that was retained by the insurer to vindicate the interests of the policyholder under
the insurer’s policy. Unlike many third parties, the policyholder clearly was
intended to benefit from an important contract with the principal and retains rights
under that contract even if the principal has outsourced the claims function to an
intermediary.
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only where a plaintiff has alleged negligence or some greater quantum of
wrongdoing by the intermediary.
Already, the majority rule has been relaxed enough that most states
permit actions against claims intermediaries where the intermediary and the
insurer can be said to have operated as something like a joint venture,
particularly where there is some sharing of financial risk.278 Several other
jurisdictions have moved toward permitting intermediary liability under
what might be termed a management theory, permitting claims where the
intermediary conducts the basic administrative functions of an insurer and
has discretion to determine claims outcomes even if the intermediary and
the insurer lack sufficient financial links to be deemed a joint venture.279
From these already reasonably well established extensions of
liability in derogation of the historical rule, it is only a relatively small step
toward simply making intermediaries liable under basic tort principles of
duty and negligent breach causing damages. Although only a few states
(perhaps only Alaska and New Hampshire) support this approach,280 it is
the most sensible means of consistently holding intermediaries accountable
and creating adequate incentives for intermediary care.
This proposed approach would not create undue burden on
downstream intermediaries or dramatically expand litigation and business
transaction costs. The likely additional cost of a negligence regime for
policing the actions of claims intermediaries will probably be modest in
relation to the gains of greater intermediary care resulting in fewer
problems and greater settlement of claims.
278

See supra text and accompanying notes 77, 87-92.

279

See supra text and accompanying notes 78-82, 81-93. Although it is not
often invoked, this principle is sufficiently established that it has in the past
appeared to me that this was in fact the general rule: adjusters sufficiently acting
as the “functional equivalent” of the insurer may be liable to at least insureds and
policyholders and perhaps to claimants under certain situations. See Stempel on
Insurance Contracts, supra note 27 at § 10.02[A] p. 10-17. Further examination
of the issue in this article suggests I might have been overbroad in that statement
because of the tendency of some courts not to recognize an exception to the privity
and disclosed agency defenses even where the administrator or adjuster has
assumed the functions of the insurer. In general, however, it appears most
jurisdictions will permit liability upon a sufficient showing of adjuster activity as
an insurer, particularly if there is financial intertwinement or risk sharing.
280

See supra text and accompanying notes 75-82.
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Consistent with the general rule of § 7.01 of the current
Restatement and its predecessors, an intermediary cannot avoid liability if
its conduct is tortuous simply because the conduct was committed in the
service of the insurer. However, where an intermediary can demonstrate
that it had no discretion in its conduct and that the conduct was completely
controlled by the insurer/principal, adherence to the traditional majority
rule remains appropriate.
In practical application, this means that many, perhaps most, cases
will result in claims against intermediaries surviving motions to dismiss as
a matter of law. In the modern real world of insurance law, insurers
delegate substantial authority to claims intermediaries as independent
contractors. Typically, the intermediary has control over the quality and
quantity of investigation conducted, evaluation of the claim, and
communication with claimants and policyholders. If the intermediary does
not conduct these activities in an objectively reasonable manner (as would
a hypothetically reasonable adjuster in that situation), a claim for
negligence should lie. But it hardly follows that adjusters who act
reasonably will be routinely sued. If they are, they can counterattack via
Rule 11 motions or similar measures designed to discourage frivolous
claims.281 At a minimum, adjusters acting reasonably, although perhaps
forced to defend more cases because of relatively liberal notice pleading
and Rule 12 motion practice standards,282 are unlikely to ever be
wrongfully held liable.283

281

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (imposing sanctions on litigants and counsel under
apt circumstances if claim is not factually supported or legally cognizable); 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (permitting imposition of sanctions against litigants or counsel that
unnecessarily prosecute unfounded claims). See also ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID
F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §§
3.5, 11.5 (7th ed. 2008).
282

Although pleading and motion to dismiss practice is still relatively proplaintiff, recent developments have shown that courts are perfectly capable of
dismissing claims that are inadequately pleaded or present a far-fetched legal
theory of relief. See HAYDOCK, HERR & STEMPEL, supra note 211, §§ 3.3, 4.1-4.4.
Arguably, the modern ethos, at least in federal court, is too nitpicking in its desire
to see the complaint plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable chance of
litigation success. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(dismissing complaint in antitrust action over dissent of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg).
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Naturally, if the intermediary has engaged in misrepresentation,
dishonestly, deceit, gross negligence, recklessness, or sharp practices, a
liability claim logically should be permitted. If the intermediary has
intentionally engaged in unreasonable conduct that deprives a policyholder
There has also been substantial academic criticism of Twombly. See, e.g.,
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1561, 1592 (Twombly “imposed a plausibility
test on pleadings, thereby discombobulating a basic area of law and managing to
generate 2200 citations in its first five months.”); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why the
Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008). But
see Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 S. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008)
(defending link between heightened review of disfavored antitrust claims at
summary judgment stage and seeing Twombly as logically extending approach to
pleading stage of litigation); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 61 (2007) (similar view approving Twombly as reflecting heightened
scrutiny given antitrust claims in summary judgment motion practice). Irrespective
of whether criticism of Twombly is well-taken, is seems incorrect to say that
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are toothless, particularly if the
plaintiff is pursuing a relatively recently accepted cause of action such as a claim
of insurance intermediary negligence. In addition, where the allegations of
intermediary error are particularly weak, the case should logically be amendable to
reasonably inexpensive disposition via summary judgment. See HAYDOCK, HERR
& STEMPEL, supra note 211, § 12.3.
283

Because claims by third parties against claims intermediaries have
historically not been permitted, even those jurisdictions that have relaxed or
overturned the general rule have rendered decisions very protective of
intermediaries in light of the facts of the disputes.
See supra text and
accompanying note 79 and see infra text and accompanying notes 221-223
(discussing Oklahoma’s Wathor case and Mississippi’s Jeffcoat case). It is only
logical that courts will at least subconsciously expect to see relatively substantial
error or wrongdoing before holding a previously immune entity to account during
the early decades of recognition of a “new” tort of intermediary negligence. At a
minimum, adjusters are unlikely to lose weak cases both at trial and on appeal. For
example, in Jeffcoat, the claimant was stripped of a jury verdict even thought he
adjuster’s conduct was horrendous. See infra text and accompanying notes 221223. There is simply no good reason to expect that allowing tort claims against
administrators and adjusters will produce an avalanche of judgments against these
intermediaries.
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of the benefit of the insurance bargain or that fails to give equal
consideration to the interests of the policyholder, the adjuster should be
subject to a bad faith claim.
In response to such claims, claims intermediaries should be
required to defend on the merits if they are to avoid liability. One available
defense for the intermediary – at least as respects only the decision to deny
a claim -- would be that it acted solely upon the instruction of the principal
and had no discretion to disobey. Although this is more forgiving standard
than that applicable to most agents in tort cases, it would respond
adequately to whatever core kernel of value might remain in the traditional
approach. However, even if the adjuster was merely a conduit for the
insurer’s decision on coverage or payment, the adjuster should be subject to
liability where it has been negligent (or worse) in its processing of the
claim.
In addition, intermediaries might in some cases successfully defend
on the slightly different ground that although the insurer did not exercise
iron-fisted control or micromanagement of adjuster activity the nature and
circumstances of the retention were sufficiently limited that the adjuster’s
conduct cannot be considered negligent or wrongful in context. This is
similar to one majority rule court’s sentiment that “[t]he independent
adjuster’s obligation is measured by the contract between the adjuster and
the insurer. The adjuster that contracts to perform a $200 investigation is
not obligated to expend the same effort that might be reasonable for a fee
of $2000, nor is it obligated to continue when the insurer advises it to
stop.”284
This sensible case-specific view would prevent small, relatively
blameless adjusters (who logically would have done little significant harm)
from being saddled with potentially company-closing liability. Such a
context-based defense is a permissible means of softening the edges of tort
liability but does not support blanket immunity for claims intermediaries.
Rather, it supports a general rule permitting third party actions against
intermediaries under the well-established principles of tort law and
adjudicating them with sensitivity to the overall facts of the adjuster’s
assignment and performance.
Independent contractor adjusters and insurers should not be
permitted to institutionalize negligent or bad faith performance by
knowingly or routinely contracting for adjuster activity and compensation
284

See Meineke, 991 P.2d at 271.
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that is so low as to encourage insufficient care in the claims management
process. Neither should an adjuster be insulated from liability where it
stops investigating under circumstances where this is unreasonable under
the circumstances or reflects a failure to give adequate attention to the
interests of a policyholder.
Moving to wide recognition that insurance administrators and
claims intermediaries can be liable for negligent infliction of injury to
policyholders and other reasonably foreseeable claimants would also be a
healthy step away from the current caselaw’s excessive focus on bad faith
liability and recognize that an intermediary may do considerable harm even
if not acting as an insurer and that even where bad faith liability is
inappropriate, the intermediary should not be completely immune from the
consequences of its actions.285
In addition, cases in some jurisdictions, although permitting claims
against intermediaries under the heightened standards of management
theory or joint venture, have exhibited perhaps an undue tendency to shrink
from finding sufficient insurer-like conduct by the intermediary, effectively
keeping the historical rule of adjuster immunity in place even in cases
where the intermediary is doing insurer-like adjusting and should be held
accountable for injury inflicted on foreseeable parties, particularly
policyholders.286
285

This has been recognized over the years in cases rejecting bad faith liability
for claims intermediaries but noting that other causes of action, such as a simple
tort action sounding in negligence, may under apt circumstances be available to
those injured by the intermediary. See, e.g., Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 264
A.2d 668, 672 n. 3 (Pa. 1970) (plaintiffs’ “allegations as to the adjusters and their
agents might establish a cause of action in tort” but because instant action framed
in contract, plaintiffs cannot recover due to lack of privity); Stone v. New Eng. Ins.
Co., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (inability to maintain claim
under insurance contract or unfair claims practices statute may not foreclose other
claims sounding in tort or based on other statutes).
286

For example, in Wathor v. Mut. Assur. Admin, 87 P.3d 559 (Okla. 2004),
discussed supra text and accompanying notes 79, 84-86, the court found – as a
matter of law – that the administrator in question had not acted sufficiently like an
insurer to permit the insured to bring a claim against the administrator even though
the facts as set forth in the case report would appear to permit a reasonable
inference that the administrator had been delegated the bulk of the entire claims
function by the insurer. See id. at 563 (“[administrator] unquestionably performed
some of the tasks of an insurance company in its claims handling process”).
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The problem with requiring a financial pooling of risk as a
prerequisite to administer or adjuster liability is that it fails to appreciate
the degree to which claims intermediaries have plenty of incentive to
mistreat policyholders and other claimants under straight fee-for-service
contracts. Like any vendor, an independent contractor claims intermediary
wants to please the party that hired it in order to gain continued future
employment and to continue to charge adequate prices. Even without
formal risk sharing or economic partnership per se, the independent claims
intermediary has substantial incentive to resist claims, knowing that this
will save the insurer money (at least in the short run) and result in favorable
reviews of the adjuster’s work (and future business).
Although
substandard, overly stingy administration and adjusting may result in
successful litigation against the insurer, this does not provide sufficient
incentive for optimal adjuster care, certainly not adjuster behavior that
gives equal consideration to the interests of policyholders.
First, any litigation consequences of adjuster misconduct are likely
to come years after the misconduct. By this point, the adjuster will have
already attained financial reward from taking a hard line against claims and
the relationships between the intermediary and insurer personnel are often
sufficiently close that the insurer is unlikely to hold the adjuster
accountable and to replace the adjuster. In addition, by this point, insurer
and adjuster may be in a “trench warfare mentality” where even after an
Although the court majority put great stock in the insurer’s apparent final say
as to claims payment, the dissent correctly noted that the rule of Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 343 was that an agent committing a tort is not relieved of
liability simply because the agent’s tortuous action was commanded by the
principal or “on account of the principal.” See id. at 565 (Opala, J. and Watt, J.,
dissenting).
The majority was unmoved, however, finding liability inappropriate because
the administrator did not have its compensation package expressly tied to the
approval or denial of claims and “did not share the risk of loss with the [insurer,
here an employer’s health plan]. As discussed in text, the requirement of financial
risk sharing and entrepreneurial partnership as a prerequisite for administrator
liability is unnecessarily demanding.
Equally disturbing is that the court never addressed Brown v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217 (Okla Ct. App. 2002), which recognized that independent
investigators and adjusters could be liable under simple tort and negligence
principles based on duty created by their relation to policyholders and the
foreseeability that inadequate claims processing could injure the policyholder.
Brown was not even cited in passing by the Wathor Court. See generally id.
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adverse judgment they continue to fail to see what was done wrong in
dealing with the policyholder or claimant.287
Second, and perhaps more troubling but more difficult to ascertain
is the prospect that the insurer, which profits from delay in claims
resolution and the time value of money, silently is happy to have adjusters
take an overly hard line. As previously discussed,288 this permits the
insurer to “have it’s cake” (funds that do not have to be paid until after an
adverse court decision) and “eat it, too” through minimizing its potential
bad faith exposure by pointing the finger at the claims intermediary as the
actual active agent of misconduct or the purveyor of bad investigation or
evaluation that led the insurer astray. In return for continuing to receive
business from the insurer, the claims intermediary can, under the current
regime, act as the insurer’s foil because it is unlikely to be held accountable
under the law unless it has sufficiently supplanted the insurer, perhaps even
rising to a level of a joint venturer.
For these reasons, subjecting independent adjusters and
administrators to the same tort regime that largely governs everyone else
and their activity seems both modest and justified. A compromise position
of sorts would be like that of Mississippi, which immunizes intermediaries
from claims sounding only in negligence but may find liability where there
was been gross negligence, recklessness, or some misconduct greater than
negligence. Although this would be an improvement over the traditional
approach, it still permits too much avoidance of responsibility and too little
incentive for claims intermediaries. Cases decided under this heightened
standard of requiring “more than negligence’ can exhibit an alarming
tendency to characterize even outrageous behavior or missteps as only
mere negligence.
For example, in Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat,289 the
Mississippi Supreme Court held (albeit over a strong dissent) that there was
287

Perhaps most amazingly and notoriously, the insurer and its agents
involved in the famous Campbell v. State Farm litigation, despite having been held
to have acted in bad faith for egregious failure to settle a resolvable claim and
protect the policyholder, including a $145 million punitive damages award
(eventually reduced to $9 million) continued to maintain for more than 25 years
that nothing wrong had been done. See STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD, supra note
27, chs. 10, 14-23 (2008).
288

See supra text and accompanying notes 146-47.

289

Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777 (Miss. 2004).
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as a matter of law nothing worse than negligence in a situation where the
adjuster: misrepresented its activities to the claimant; withheld assessing
the amount of coverage until receipt of a legal opinion; never requested the
legal opinion; was not licensed in Mississippi; was not trained in
Mississippi insurance principles, in particular the question of “stacking” of
policy coverages that was at the core of the dispute; and failed for months
to take any concrete action to acquire necessary knowledge that it did not
have (including failing to insist that the insurer provide necessary
information).290 The evidence of gross negligence, reckless, or intentional
dereliction of duty by the adjuster was substantial albeit contested (both the
adjuster and the plaintiff presented dueling expert witnesses) but this did
not stop the Jeffcoat majority from overturning a jury verdict in Plaintiff
Jeffcoat’s favor. So much for the protection provided policyholder’s under
the “gross negligence” standard of care for claims intermediaries.291

290

See id. at 780-83.
In fairness to the Mississippi Supreme Court, at least the case was a close
one, essentially decided as a 4-3 opinion (a three-member majority opinion, one
concurring justice, and three dissenters). See id. at 789. The majority’s reluctance
to uphold a sizeable verdict against the adjuster may also have been fueled by
simple legal realism in that Plaintiff Jeffcoat had already received $1.8 million in
compensation from his injuries from the insurer. Just the same, even the majority’s
description of the adjuster’s performance seems to suggest something more than
mere negligence. For example:
Gallagher did not provide training or resources to support its adjusters’ work
on uninsured motorist claims. Gallagher failed to give its adjusters any resources
or training regarding stacking in Mississippi. Although she was generally familiar
with stacking, [Gallagher adjuster Juana] Love did not know that stacking was
available in Mississippi or how it works until Jeffcoat’s lawyer informed her that it
is and explained how it works. Love knew that she needed a legal opinion on this
issue, but she failed to request one. It escapes us why Love would wait until the
[policyholder’s truck] fleet schedule was discovered to request an opinion.
Clearly, Love could have obtained a legal opinion on whether and how stacking
applies in Mississippi without knowing the number of vehicles in the
[policyholder’s] fleet.
*
*
*
Gallagher’s adjustment of this claim evinces a complete breakdown of
communication and cooperation between two contractually obligated parties,
supervisors and subordinates within Gallagher, as well as between two
principals and their agent. Important documents related to this policy were not
shared with Gallagher either by accident or willfully. The [insurance] carrier’s
291
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CONCLUSION

Treating insurance intermediaries as mere agents for disclosed
principals without contract obligations to policyholders or claimants once
arguably made sense and still arguably makes sense to the limited degree
that it this approach prevents the intermediary from becoming liable in
contract to insurance policyholders and other third parties or vicariously
liable for the misconduct of insurers. Increasingly, however, the historical
approach of intermediary immunity has become an anachronism in view of
the substantial outsourcing of traditional insurer functions to independent
contractor intermediaries. In addition, the traditional contract immunity of
these intermediaries should never have been permitted to evolve into a de
facto immunity from tort liability in cases where intermediary negligence
or other misconduct foreseeably injures policyholders or other third parties
within the intermediary’s zone of duty.
Many courts have begun to recognize the problem and impose
liability upon intermediaries who in effect function as insurers themselves
rather than mere agents or that are in joint venture-like financial connection
with insurers. However, this continues to leave these important actors of
modern insurance under-policed to the detriment of policyholders,
consumers, and society. Widespread adoption of the tort law approach
advocated in this article would improve the incentive structure of
intermediary activity and align it with that of insurers and similarly situated
social actors, encouraging more consistently apt claims practices.

representatives were uncooperative with Gallagher, bringing the resolution of
Jeffcoat’s claims to a standstill or as Love described it, an “impasse.”
See id. at 784-85.
Not surprisingly, a jury of presumably rational persons viewed this situation as
something more than mere negligence. The state supreme court’s overturning of
this reasonable verdict as a matter of law suggests that Mississippi’s “more than
negligence” standard for imposing liability on adjusters is simply too malleable
and likely to result in courts straining to avoid adjuster liability. By contrast, a
negligence standard would be less susceptible to judicial manipulation.
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DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND THE
“RACE TO THE BOTTOM” IN
CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS
Daniel Schwarcz*
***
This contribution to a symposium on insurance intermediaries analyzes
insurers’ compensation of independent agents and brokers in consumer
markets. It focuses on various forms of “differential compensation,”
whereby an intermediary’s compensation differs depending on the insurer
with which the consumer ultimately purchases coverage. Such differential
compensation, the article argues, undermines competition among consumer
insurers with respect to non-price product attributes. This, in turn,
increases the risk of a “race to the bottom” in consumer insurance
markets, as insurers focus on selling the cheapest coverage possible that is
consistent with legal restrictions. To address these problems, this article
suggests that insurers who rely on independent agents to sell consumer
lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying different rates of
compensation to different agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.
***
In 2004, a series of lawsuits filed by the New York Attorney
General challenged insurers’ long-standing payments of year-end bonuses
to insurance brokers. The lawsuits alleged that these payments, known as
contingent commissions, created conflicts of interest that undermined
*

Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. For helpful
comments, I thank Hazel Beh, Tom Cotter, Sean Fitzpatrick, Kristin Hickman,
Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Francesco Parisi, Jeffrey Stempel, an anonymous
referee, attendees of the Insurance Intermediaries panel at the 2008 Annual
Association of Law Schools, and participants in a research seminar at the
Department of Risk Management and Insurance at Georgia State University. This
symposium piece builds off of my earlier article, Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond
Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 289 (2007).
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brokers’ professed loyalty to their clients.1 “If the practices identified in
our suit are as widespread as they appear to be,” the Attorney General
stated, “then the industry’s fundamental business model needs major
corrective action and reform.”2
Within months of these allegations, the commercial insurance
industry had indeed changed significantly. Each of the four largest
insurance brokers pledged to end their practice of accepting contingent
commission payments from insurers.3 Because of the concentration of the
insurance brokerage industry – the three largest brokers, Marsh, Aon, and
Willis enjoyed more than a 54% market share among the top 100 brokers in
20044 – this shift dramatically impacted the entire market. Meanwhile, the
prominence of these allegations led corporate risk managers and other
sophisticated insurance purchasers to demand from their brokers
previously-undisclosed details about contingent commission arrangements.5
Although many small brokers still accept contingent commissions, many
other brokers (including the four largest) now publicly tout their refusal to
accept such commissions in marketing themselves to their clients.6

1

See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the
Way to Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3047 (2006)
(reviewing the trajectory of Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation of contingent
commissions); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning
Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007).
2

Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney Gen., Investigation Reveals
Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html.
3

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 291-92.

4

See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 364 (2006).
5

See David Dwanka, Mid-Level Insurance Brokers Defend Contingent
Commissions Amid Growing Criticism, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2006.
6

Broker Compensation: Hearing Before the New York Ins. Comm’r (2008)
(testimony of Don Bailey, CEO of Willis) (testifying that Willis does not accept
contingent commissions because they pose a "clear and obvious conflict of
interest") available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br_cmp_indx.htm.
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For all of this reform in commercial insurance markets, virtually
nothing has changed about the way intermediaries in consumer insurance
markets are compensated. In both property/casualty and life/health
consumer insurance lines, most independent insurance agents continue to
receive increased compensation from insurers to whom they steer a
significant amount of business.7 And, unlike sophisticated insurance
purchasers, most consumers continue to have no real understanding of these
practices and the impact they may have on the advice that insurance agents
offer.
From a doctrinal perspective, this divergence in consumer and
commercial insurance markets may appear to be perfectly reasonable. The
insurance brokers that service commercial insurance markets are generally
considered to be legal agents of policyholders.8 By contrast, the
independent insurance agents that populate consumer insurance markets are
usually described primarily as legal agents of insurers, rather than
consumers, and therefore have more limited (if any) fiduciary obligations to
policyholders.9 Consequently, compensation structures that create conflicts
of interest appear to be more troubling doctrinally in commercial markets
than in consumer markets.
But from an economic perspective, the differential reform in
commercial and consumer insurance markets is bizarre.
Unlike
sophisticated commercial entities, ordinary consumers generally have
limited information about the relative quality of different carriers and a
bounded ability to translate the information they do have into effective
As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently
decision-making.10
observed, “the benefits from holding . . . insurance are delayed, the
7

See generally id.; see also Richard W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard Around
the World, J. OF INS. REG. 83, 100 (2007).
8

See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 56-57 (3d ed.
2000).
9

ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D: LAW OF
INSURANCE AGENTS § 47.5, at 326 (1998). See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY 66 (2003); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker
Liability: Crossing the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002).
10

See Part II, infra.
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probability of having a claim is hard to analyze, consumers do not get
useful feedback about whether they are getting a good return on their
insurance purchases, and mapping from what they are buying to what they
are getting can be ambiguous.”11 Consumers are therefore much more
susceptible than commercial purchasers to being steered to insurance
carriers they would not prefer under ideal market conditions.
Not only does such steering create mismatches between consumers
and their insurers, but it undermines the competitiveness of consumer
insurance markets as a whole. Although consumer insurance markets are
ultra-competitive with respect to price,12 they are remarkably noncompetitive with respect to claims handling quality.13 Indeed, many
consumer insurance markets appear to be characterized by insurer-side
adverse selection, wherein price competition creates a race to the bottom
among insurers with respect to claims handling quality.14 This Article
argues that differential compensation contributes to this insurer-side
adverse selection. By corrupting the objectivity of independent agents’
advice, differential compensation undermines the primary mechanism by
which consumers can ordinarily overcome informational and cognitive
limitations in assessing the quality of complicated financial products.
As such, this Article proposes that insurers who rely on
independent agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited
from paying different rates of compensation to different agents for the sale
of the same line of insurance. Such reform would be less radical than it
may initially appear. Federal regulators have long regulated commissions
11

CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 76-77 (2008).

12

See J. DAVID CUMMINS, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE
2-3 (2002); Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the PropertyLiability Insurance Industry, RAND J. ECON. 375 (1973).
13
14

See Section II. B., infra.

Legal scholarship has long recognized that such price competition can cause
firms to provide inefficiently poor quality when consumers cannot reliably evaluate
quality due to information deficits or systematic cognitive limitations. See
generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004);
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).
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for the sale of Medigap policies, and they recently announced their
intention to do the same for Medicare Advantage programs.15 By extending
these policies to the sale of all consumer insurance policies, lawmakers
could provide consumers with the same protections that sophisticated
commercial entities already enjoy. Even more importantly, they could
enhance the competitiveness of consumer insurance markets as a whole.
I.

INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS AND DIFFERENTIAL
COMPENSATION
A. INSURANCE AGENTS IN CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS

Consumers can purchase insurance coverage directly from an
insurer, or through either independent or captive agents. Captive agents are
employees of a single insurer and only offer coverage with that carrier.16
By contrast, independent agents can write business with multiple insurers
and consequently provide consumers with a choice of carriers.17 Such
choice can be valuable for consumers, as insurers differ in terms of their
reputations for claims handling, financial strength, risk management
services, and scope of coverage offered.18 In addition to these variations in
15

See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (limiting agent compensation so that first year
compensation may not be greater than twice renewal compensation, renewal
compensation must be paid for at least 5 years, and replacement commissions may
not be greater than renewal commissions for the product); Press Release, Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Proposes New Protections for Medicare
Beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage and prescription Programs (May 8, 2008)
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ (describing proposed regulation that would
“require Medicare Advantage organizations to establish commission structures for
sales agents and brokers that are level across all years and across all [Medicare
Advantage] plan product types”).
16
17
18

HOLMES, supra note 9, at 326.
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 375.

See id.; Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 296-97. Independent
insurance agents market themselves primarily on the basis of their capacity to help
consumers compare these variations in quality and pricing. As the website of their
main trade organization explains, independent agents “work with you to identify
the insurance . . . that [is] right for you… and use [their] access to multiple
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“quality,” insurers employ differing underwriting criteria and strategies,
resulting in price differentials even in highly price competitive
marketplaces.19
Consumers may prefer independent agents over captive agents for
other reasons as well. First, many insurers do not offer insurance directly
to consumers or distribute their products through captive agents, meaning
consumers who want to purchase policies from these insurers must go
through an independent agent.20 Second, because independent agents
“own” their customer lists, insurers cannot directly solicit the agent’s
clients or switch those clients to a different agent. Some have argued that
this ownership gives independent agents a comparatively strong incentive
to serve their clients, though empirical efforts have failed to confirm this
theory.21
Of course, there are offsetting costs associated with purchasing
coverage through an independent rather than captive agent. First, just as
some insurers only provide coverage through independent agents, many
popular insurers, such as State Farm and Allstate, only offer coverage
through captive agents.22 In general, these insurers tend to be more
companies to deliver those products.” Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of
America – Consumer Information, http://www.iiaa.org. A brochure designed by the
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents similarly explains that “by
shopping among various companies, your professional agent can find the best
combination of coverage, price and service -- the best value for your insurance
dollar.” National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Straight Talk
about
Choosing
a
Professional
Insurance
Agent,
http://www.pianet.com/Publications/ choosinganagentbrochure.htm.
19

See, e.g., Meg Green, Top of Their Game, BEST’S REVIEW 26 (Dec. 2006)
(describing how some of the most profitable property-casualty insurers focus on
underwriting only particularly safe risks, and pass off some of the resulting cost
savings to their insureds).
20

See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 639 (1996).
21

Helen Doerpinghaus, An Analysis of Complaint Data in the Automobile
Insurance Industry, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 120 (1991); J. David Cummins & Stephen
Weisbart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Agency
Performance (1977) (IMA Education and Research Foundation).
22

See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 638.
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publicly visible, as large insurers can more easily support a captive
distribution system and may also have greater advertising incentives.23
Second, other things being equal, coverage purchased through captive
agents will tend to be cheaper than coverage purchased through
independent agents.24 Because captive agents only work with one carrier,
they spend less time on each sale, meaning that they receive lower
commissions than independent agents.25 These lower commission rates
may result in lower premium rates for customers, as studies suggest that
insurers pass through to consumers most of the cost of agent
compensation.26
B. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENTS
Independent agents are compensated through standard commissions
on the premiums consumers pay for their coverage.27 These “ordinary”
commission rates have always varied based on the underlying line of
insurance sold, as different lines of insurance require different levels of
effort by insurance agents.28 But, historically, these commission rates were
relatively standard within specific insurance lines, as individual insurers
offered a single commission rate to all agents. Although new insurers

23

Id.

24

Itzhak Venezia et. al., Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating
Equilibrium Approach, 40 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 443, 444 (1999).
25

See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 648-49.

26

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 380-83. Competing factors, such as
the improved quality of an insurer’s underwriting criteria which is caused by
increased premiums, may offset this effect.
27

See id. at 374. In property/casualty insurance markets, these commissions
are generally the same each year that a consumer renews a policy, whereas
commission rates tend to decrease over time for life insurance sales personnel.
This creates its own conflicts of interest, which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
28

See id. at 374-75.
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occasionally offered above-market rates to break into markets, competition
ultimately ensured relatively uniform commissions within product lines.29
In the last few years, the premium commissions that different
insurers pay independent agents have begun to vary more significantly than
in the past. Some insurers now negotiate their commission rates on an
individual basis with agents, offering higher rates to agents that have
historically directed a large volume of profitable business to the insurer.30
As a result, many independent agents receive higher commission rates for
selling policies from one insurer than another, despite competitive forces.
Even insurance agents who receive the same premium commissions
from different insurers may nonetheless receive different contingent
commissions from those insurers.
Unlike differential premium
commissions, insurers have long paid contingent commissions to
independent agents.31 Contingent commissions are year-end bonuses that
some insurers pay to independent agents based on the performance of the
agent’s book of business with that insurer.32 Most contingent commission
contracts link this bonus to certain volume or profitability benchmarks for
the agent’s book of business. If the specified benchmarks are met, then the
insurer pays the agent a contingent commission that usually is calculated
based on the profitability and/or volume of the agent’s book of business
with that insurer.33 In life and health markets, agents often receive these
29

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 301.

30

See, e.g., http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubb7450.html; MetLife,
Supplemental Compensation Plan, http://www.whymetlife.com; Rupal Parekh,
Hartford the Latest to Offer Supplementals as Replacements for Contingent
Commissions, BUS. INS., 33 (July 2007).
31

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3056 (“Contingent commissions have been
used by insurers as an incentive mechanism for their agents for a century or
more.”).
32
33

Id.

In general, the size of an intermediary’s contingent commission is based on
two variables: (1) the amount of insurance business that a particular intermediary
refers to the insurer, as measured in total premiums; and (2) the profitability of that
business, which is usually measured by the insurer’s loss ratio on that business. In
most cases, intermediaries are only entitled to contingent commissions if they meet
threshold levels of both sales volume and profitability. See Jeffrey Wilder,
Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial
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contingent commissions in the form of in-kind benefits, such as vacation
trips, rather than monetary compensation.34
However it is structured, differential compensation undermines
independent agents’ incentives to objectively present consumers with
information about competing insurance options.35 The reason is simple:
they incentivize independent insurance agents to steer consumers to carriers
based on considerations other than those customers’ insurance needs and
risk preferences. Most obviously, differential commissions encourage
insurance agents to steer consumers to insurers who pay the highest
commissions. But bec ause differential commissions are almost always tied
in some way to the volume and/or profitability of the agent’s book of
Insurance 5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group Working
Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061. The loss
ratio is the “ratio between premiums paid and losses incurred during a given
period.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed. 1999). Premiums on both new
policies and policy renewals are generally treated similarly in these calculations,
which are almost always made on a yearly basis. Wilder, supra, at 5. In some
cases, contingent commission arrangements may be based only on volume, not
profitability. However, “the great majority of the arrangements covering the
smaller intermediaries is based on the profitability of the business written or
profitability and volume.” Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 379. Once
intermediaries reach these qualifying levels, their commissions typically increase
with better results along either dimension. See Wilder, supra, at 5.
34

See, e.g., Broker Compensation, supra note 6, at 103-113 (testimony of F.
James Ginnane) (describing various cruises to the Baltics, Sweden, Montreal and
elsewhere that MassMutual paid based on annual production, and noting that “all
of the carriers” he was familiar with offer similar trips), available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br-cmp-tran-buf.pdf.
35

Consumers who purchase insurance via a captive agent have already made a
decision that they want to purchase their coverage with a particular carrier. This
means they will often have already priced out several different carriers and,
perhaps, asked neighbors or friends about their experiences with those carriers. By
contrast, consumers who seek out coverage via an independent agent have typically
not made any decisions about which carrier best suits their needs. Although they
may have had a particular agent recommended to them, they generally do not even
know which carriers the agent offers, much less the relative characteristics of those
carriers. Rather, independent agents offer themselves to consumers as an
alternative to comparison shopping among different insurers. They purport to do
the comparative shopping for the consumer.
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business with an insurer, they may also create more subtle steering
incentives for agents.36 For instance, they may lead agents to steer
customers to an insurer that has a minimum-volume requirement on the
cusp of being satisfied.37 Alternatively, they may cause an agent who
believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to steer that consumer to an insurer
with whom the agent does not have a differential commission arrangement
tied to profitability.38 Differential commissions may also increase premium
costs for consumers.39
II.

THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEGAL RESPONSE TO
DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION FOR INDEPENDENT
AGENTS

Differential compensation of sales agents is common, and often
understood to be relatively benign in many industries and market contexts.
For instance, salespeople in retail stores may often receive special bonuses
or in-kind benefits if they reach sales targets for particular products or
brands. Like independent insurance agencies, such stores often carry
multiple brands and consumers may rely on the advice of salespeople in
making their decisions. Given that few suggest lawmakers regulate the
compensation of sales personnel in these contexts, why would a different
result be warranted in insurance markets?
Part of the answer is that consumer insurance markets are often
regulated in ways that would be unthinkable in other markets. For instance,
state insurance departments regulate product prices and designs and license
salespeople and insurers.40 Although the desirability of specific regulations
36

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 297-301.

37

See Wilder, supra note 33, at 19.

38

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89. For this reason, agents who
steer “high-risk” consumers to certain insurers may theoretically undermine their
client’s interest by signaling to the insurer that particular consumers are relatively
“high risk” and should thus be charged increased premiums. See Schwarcz,
Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 324-35.
39

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 383.

40

(1995).

See generally ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 103
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is often contentious, the notion that insurance requires robust market
conduct oversight is generally accepted. The reasons are two-fold. First,
consumer insurance markets are uniquely susceptible to market failure for a
variety of reasons, including the complexity of the underlying product, the
cognitive limitations of consumers, the prevalence of information
asymmetries, and various other external forces that distort the market by,
for instance, mandating the purchase of coverage.
Second, the
consequences of such market failure are significant. Consumers who have
inadequate coverage typically do not discover that fact until after they have
suffered a loss, at which point they no longer have the ability to mitigate
their damages.41
This Part applies these general rationales for insurance regulation to
differential compensation arrangements in consumer insurance markets. It
concludes the market forces that ordinarily limit the pernicious effects of
differential commissions are unreliable in consumer insurance contexts.
Similarly, it suggests that the consequences of the resulting market failure
are significant, contributing to a race to the bottom over claims-handling
practices in many consumer insurance lines.
A. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND MARKET FAILURE
In ordinary product markets, an intermediary’s temptation to push
expensive or high-margin products is counter-balanced by the potential for
market backlash.42 At least some consumers are likely to arrive at a store
with some knowledge about competing product options, especially given
the wealth of such information available on the internet. This is
particularly true with big-ticket items – like high definition televisions or
cars – about which consumers will often invest time in researching.
Attempts to steer such consumers to inferior or overpriced products may
backfire, resulting in those consumers shopping elsewhere and sharing their

41

Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505, 583-84 (1998).
42

Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS
PROGRAMS (Lusardi, Annamaria ed., forthcoming 2009); Howell E. Jackson &
Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread
Premiums, 12 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007).
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negative impressions with friends and family.43 Although sales personnel
may attempt to target uninformed consumers, such an approach can be
risky as it may be hard to distinguish between informed and uninformed
consumers. And even consumers that do end up purchasing inferior or
over-priced products will often fail to discover this in the course of using
their product.44 Such consumers will not only hesitate before returning to
the store, but they too may talk to family and friends about their negative
experience.
To be sure, these market forces hardly eliminate sales contests and
inducements that lead to slanted advice – there will always remain sleezy
car salesmen, stores that sell over-priced and useless gadgets, and chains
that push consumers to purchase over-priced accessories that add little to
the overarching product. But the prospect that routine government
intervention in these contexts could efficiently improve matters is slim. As
this Section shows, these market forces that ordinarily protect consumers
from excessive steering work poorly in consumer insurance markets.
i.

Information in Consumer Insurance Markets

Unlike consumers in most markets, insurance consumers have
access to few, if any, accurate measures of an insurer’s reliability in paying
claims fairly and efficiently.45 It is, for instance, impossible for consumers
to find out how often individual insurers pay claims within 30, 60, 90, or
120 days of a claim being reported; how frequently they deny claims; how
frequently they are sued for payment or found guilty of bad faith; and how

43

For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers’
behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981).
44

In economic parlance, insurance policies are thus “credence goods” because
most consumers cannot evaluate their quality even after they purchase the policy.
See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657,
720-21 (1985) (explaining the differences between search goods, experience goods,
and credence goods in economic and legal literature).
45

“Information about the reliability of different insurers is hard to come by
[and] the quality of insurance coverage is almost impossible to assess without an
expert.” KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 176 (1986).
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frequently policies are cancelled or non-renewed.46 While consumers can
look up how often complaints against specific insurers are lodged with state
regulators, this data is notoriously unreliable and inconsistent.47 Even the
data published by Consumer Reports is highly limited, as it does not take
into account the size and type of each consumer’s claim and it is based on
each consumer’s subjective experience with the claims process.48
Although consumers can, and do, carefully scrutinize premium
differentials from different carriers, the significance of price differentials is
almost impossible to assess without a corresponding understanding of the

46

One recent proposal to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) would empower regulators to publicly disclose most of
these data elements about the relative quality of insurers’ claims handling, which
they already collect. See PROPOSAL FOR CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (Market Regulation
Committee Proposal). Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal
under the guise of confidentiality and trade secrets. See Jim Connolly, NAIC
Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 25,
2008,
available
at
http://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews.
com/cms/nupc/Breaking%20News/2008/09/25-CONDUCTRULE-jc;
Chad
Hemenway, NCOIL Committee Votes Against NAIC Market Conduct Data
Proposal, BESTWIRE, Jul., 11 2008; Sean Carr, NAIC Sets September Vote for
Market Conduct Plan, BESTWIRE, Jul. 28, 2008; Letter from Am. Health Ins.
Plans, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Am. Ins. Ass’n, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., and Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. to
Sandy Praeger, President of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008)
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_d_data_collection_
comments_namic0527.pdf.
47

See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: The
American and British Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV.
735 (2009). Currently the Market Analysis and Priorities Working Group of the
NAIC is working to develop better codes for the entire complaint data collection
effort. See http://www.naic.org/committees_d_mapwg.htm (last visited February
8, 2009).
48

Consumer Reports surveys thousands of consumers who filed claims and
asks them to assess their satisfaction with the claims process. See Consumer
Reports Investigates, Surviving the Hard Market in Homeowners Insurance Vol.
69, Issue 9, Consumer Reports. 36 (Sept. 2004); Homeowners Insurance Report,
The New Protection Game Vol. 64, Issue 1, Consumer Reports, 16 (Jan. 1999).
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differences in the underlying products.49 A high-priced insurer may offer
good coverage for a fair price, while a low-priced insurer may offer
coverage that is poor, even relative to its seemingly low premiums. In fact,
it is precisely for these reasons that independent agents choose to market
themselves to consumers by focusing on their capacity to offer advice about
competing carriers.
This lack of concrete information about the relative quality of
different insurers undermines a key protection against aggressive steering
in ordinary consumer markets. As described above, the fact that consumers
ordinarily have the capacity to independently research and assess different
product options limits the capacity of ordinary retail establishments to steer
consumers to unfavorable deals. Moreover, it increases the prospect that
attempting to do so will create market backlash, leading consumers who
realize they are receiving poor advice to spread the word to others. But
because most consumers simply do not have concrete information with
which to assess the advice about the relative quality of carriers that
insurance agents dispense, these protections are less robust in consumer
insurance markets. This is particularly true given that insurance advice is
hardly formulaic. The best insurance options for a customer may depend
on numerous considerations, including the customer’s risk tolerance, cash
flow, preexisting relationships with carriers, and numerous other factors.
This means self-serving advice can often be justified on some basis, and
will rarely be obviously identifiable, even to experts.
Not only do consumers have a limited capacity to assess ex ante the
quality of different carriers’ coverage, but they also have a limited capacity
to do so ex post. Unlike almost any other product, only a very small
percentage of consumers end up using the insurance they purchase.50 When
they do, it is almost always for relatively small claims, even though the
most important element of that insurance is the coverage it provides in
cases of large losses.51 Finally, consumers that do submit claims to their
insurers are typically ill-equipped to judge the extent to which their insurer

49

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 315.

50

See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1413-15 (2007).
51

See id. at 1415.
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lived up to its legal obligations.52 Consumers may therefore be susceptible
to insurers’ capacity to “tell a story” that appears to justify the refusal to
pay a claim or a relatively low settlement of that claim.53
This limitation in the capacity of consumers to assess insurance
quality ex post further limits the power of market forces to address the
steering that may result from differential compensation. Ordinarily,
consumers who are successfully directed to inferior or overpriced products
may discover this fact over time. Consumers who feel they were so
victimized can not only choose to shop elsewhere in the future, but can talk
to family and friends about their experience. Because most consumers who
are steered to inferior insurance will never realize this fact, they will not
exact these market penalties on agents who succumb to the temptation to
maximize their compensation by directing consumers to inferior
arrangements.
ii. Consumer Decision-Making about Insurance
In ordinary markets, consumers assess the desirability of different
product options using a roughly rational process, at least in the aggregate.
Especially when purchases involve big-ticket items, consumers are often
willing to invest a significant amount of cognitive energy into making sure
that they have thought through their options and selected a product that
meets their needs and desires. As a result, salespeople can often exert only
a minimal amount of pressure on shaping consumers’ preferences. When
salespeople push inferior or overpriced products, consumers may not only
resist such practices, but may choose to avoid the establishment in the
future and tell their friends and families of their experiences.
Two features of insurance markets substantially undermine this
reasoned purchasing behavior, and the disciplining impact it has on agents’
sales efforts. First, consumers typically purchase insurance as part of a
larger event or transaction, such as taking a job, moving, or buying a home
or automobile. Unlike with televisions, cars, or refrigerators, consumers do
not typically decide that they can finally afford a new insurance policy, or

52

See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1407-13
(1994).
53

See id.
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that their old policy is out of style, obsolete, or run down.54 But the
bundled decision-making that typifies such insurance purchases is both
difficult and complicated, resulting in consumers “tend[ing] to adopt
simpler choice strategies to cope with that complexity.”55 Such simplistic
strategies obviously enhance the capacity of sales agents to steer consumer
decisions.
Second, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that
consumers’ preferences concerning insurance are remarkably malleable.56
Experimental research has established that framing effects can have
important implications for consumers’ purchases of insurance policies. For
instance, one study found that subjects were willing to pay more than twice
as much for flight insurance covering “terrorism” and “mechanical failure”
than they were willing to pay for flight insurance that would pay for losses
for “any reason.”57 Similarly, consumers tend to have bimodal responses to
low-probability, high-cost risks, either dismissing them entirely or
significantly overweighing their significance.58 Which of these outcomes
54

Evidence suggests that consumers rarely change carriers after they initially
purchase a policy, especially outside of the auto insurance context. INSURANCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 5, fig. 2-3
(reporting that only 7% of homeowners or renters changed insurers in the last five
years, but 23% of auto insurers did). When consumers do change insurers, they
overwhelmingly cite price as the reason. See id. at 6, fig. 2-4.
55

See Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1223-34 (2003) (reviewing literature
displaying this consumer tendancy to choose simple choice strategies).
56

Consumers’ decision-making processes about insurance are a complicated
mix of intuitive, emotional, and rational responses that are susceptible to
manipulation. See Horward Kunruether & Mark Pauly, Insurance DecisionMaking and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS
63 (April 2005); David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to
Meet the Practice in Insurance, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services
(2004); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 76-77 (2000).
57

Eric J. Johnson, et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993).
58

Gary H. McClelland, et al., Insurance for Low Probability Hazards: A
Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104, 108-09
(1993).

2009]

DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION

739

obtains often depends on the availability of the underlying risk. Thus,
Californians’ purchases of earthquake insurance generally increase
significantly immediately after an earthquake occurs and then gradually
decrease (until the next earthquake).59 Finally, consumers’ insurance
decisions are significantly impacted by their affection for the item to be
insured. In general, people prefer to insure against losses that involve high
affect, even when holding constant the expected value of the insurance and
the insured’s level of wealth.60 It is for precisely these reasons that insurers
are among the heaviest advertisers of any industry.61
Given this malleability of consumers’ insurance preferences,
experienced or well-trained sales agents are likely to have a substantial
capacity to steer consumers to insurers by helping to shape those
consumers’ preferences. This form of steering is unlikely to generate any
market backlash, because it involves altering consumers’ preferences.
Often, this manipulation unambiguously impedes efficient market outcomes
by skewing consumer assessments of objective information. This occurs,
for instance, with the framing of a risk to increase a consumer’s assessment
of its likelihood. At the same time, other types of manipulation may
admittedly operate on consumer insurance preferences in ways that are
normatively ambiguous.62 Consider an agent who focuses on a consumer’s
affection for an item in order to increase her desire to insure against loss to
that item. Evaluating the desirability of this result within a consequentialist

59

See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small
Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 249, 252, 254-55 (1977);
HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS 26-27, 36-41 (1978).
60

Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 142-43, 148 (2000). Entire
markets for insurance have flourished based on this principle: consider life
insurance for children, which in most cases is irrational based on standard
insurance theory.
61
62

See Baker, supra note 52, at 1404.

See Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations,
5-6, 9-12 (Oct. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933089.
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framework is difficult (if not impossible), because there is no exogenouslydefined preference to serve as a benchmark for that evaluation.63
iii. Insurance
Agents’
Discrimination
Between
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Purchasers
In any consumer market, plenty of consumers will be relatively
uninformed and therefore susceptible to inefficient steering. But these
uninformed consumers are typically protected by their more informed
counterparts. Because aggressive or misleading sales efforts that are
directed at informed and engaged consumers can have negative effects on a
business’s reputation, uninformed or rationally ignorant consumers often
benefit from the presence of their more informed counterparts when sales
people cannot distinguish between the two.64
Once again, though, this market protection against inefficient
steering is less robust in insurance markets. Unlike most salespeople,
insurance agents must discuss clients’ personal situations in order to assess
their coverage needs and facilitate insurer underwriting.65 This process
enhances agents’ capacity to assess the relative sophistication of their
consumers, and to offer advice accordingly. In fact, one of the earliest
studies of contingent commission payments found just such a pattern of
discrimination in a large independent insurance agency in Arizona:
relatively engaged customers were less frequently directed to insurers that
paid contingent commissions than customers who were less engaged with
their insurance purchases.66 Such consumer segmentation undermines one
63

See id. at 12, 18.

64

Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
636-38 (1979).
65
66

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 318.

Id. at 317-18; see Wilder, supra note 33, at 2-3, 5, 7. The agency, which
remained unidentified, employed eight agents with no ownership stake in the
company and three “equity agents” who received a portion of the agency’s profits.
Because the contingent commissions that the company received were paid directly
to the company, the three equity agents stood to gain more from maximizing
contingent commissions than the non-equity agents. Additionally, only the equity
agents handled “house” accounts, which (1) either originated in another agency that

2009]

DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION

741

of the core protections against undue steering in ordinary markets: the
capacity of an informed minority to protect the interests of other
consumers.67
B. THE COST OF MARKET FAILURE FOR DIFFERENTIAL
COMMISSIONS
Market failures, of course, are ubiquitous. And many of these
market failures are better left alone than subjected to the expensive, and
often ineffective (or worse), forces of government regulation. But that is
not the case here. This Section argues that insurers’ payments of
differential compensation to independent agents facilitate a “race to the
bottom” in consumer insurance markets through insurer-side adverse
selection.68 They do so by undermining the willingness of independent
agents to inform consumers about insurers’ claims handling practices or to
counteract consumers’ tendency to discount the value of quality claims
handling.

the company subsequently acquired or were originally handled by an agent who
retired, and (2) did not fit the portfolio or expertise of any non-equity agent. The
defining characteristics of these house accounts strongly suggest that they were less
sensitive than other agency customers to the level of service they received from
their agent. This hypothesis was corroborated by the fact that house accounts were
three times more likely than other accounts to pay their premiums directly to their
insurer, rather than to pay them through the agency, indicating disengagement with
their insurance agent. The study concluded contingent commissions significantly
impacted the recommendations that the equity agents gave to their less responsive
consumers, finding that “the prospect of contingency fees [led] equity agents to
increase the frequency with which they place house accounts with insurers offering
contingent commissions by more than 50%.” Id.
67

See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1406-08; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck,
Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 672, 674-75 (1996).
68

BAKER, supra note 9, at 7. Just as insurer’s lack of information about
consumers can lead to adverse selection, consumers’ lack of information about
insurers can lead to the “insurer-side” adverse selection described above.

742

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
i.

[Vol. 15:2

Insurer-side Adverse Selection

Part A described how insurance consumers’ limited information on
the relative quality of different insurance options and suspect decisionmaking about insurance can lead ostensibly independent agents to steer
consumers to inferior insurers. But these two market conditions can also
have the more general impact of undermining competition among insurers
with respect to claims handling.
If a sufficiently large percentage of consumers are ill-informed
about insurers’ claims handling, insurers that pursue aggressive claims
handling strategies (lemons) will profit more than other insurers. These
insurers can pass on some of these profits to consumers in the form of
lower premiums. In the long run, this will force other insurers to either
drop out of consumer markets or, more likely, adopt low quality claims
handling practices themselves.69 By contrast, if a sizable number of
consumers are cognizant of differences in insurers’ claims handling, then
some insurers will seek to appeal to these consumers by adopting a high
price, high quality brand. That, in turn, could force other market players to
compete over their own claims handling quality. Of course, insurers’
quality/price mix would still vary, with different insurers appealing to
consumers with different risk preferences. As a result, the market as a
whole would compete along both of the two primary dimensions that define
the insurance-policyholder relationship.
Through similar mechanisms, insurer-side adverse selection can
occur if insurance consumers’ decision-making causes them to under-value,
or under-appreciate, differences in insurers’ claims handling practices.
There are strong reasons to suspect consumer decision-making about
insurance generally has this character.70 The relative value to consumers of
high quality insurance depends on two considerations: (i) the likelihood
they will suffer a potentially insurable loss, and (ii) the likelihood a lowquality insurer will poorly handle any such claim relative to a high-quality
insurer. With respect to the former, research has consistently found that
most people judge their own likelihood of suffering a loss to be lower than
69

See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 14, at 630, 722, 724-25, 746-47
(exploring how consumers’ under-estimation of risks can compel a similar race to
the bottom with respect to those risks).
70

Indeed, research has consistently found that there is a “systematic tendency
for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.” Cutler & Zeckhauser,
supra note 56, at 3.
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the average such risk, so long as they retain even a minimal amount of
control over the event.71 Thus, people in general are overly optimistic
about their risk of being injured in an earthquake,72 being involved in a car
accident,73 suffering health problems,74 and dying young.75 For these
reasons, they also generally buy less insurance against these risks than they
should, especially when no outside force – such as legal mandates or loan
terms – artificially increases demand.76
Although less evidence exists as to how consumers evaluate the
likelihood that a low-quality insurer will poorly handle a claim relative to a
high-quality insurer, there are theoretical reasons to believe people will also
tend to under-estimate this risk differential. In part, that is because
consumers’ choice of insurers involves precisely the minimal amount of
control over an ultimate risk (the risk of a low-quality choice having
negative consequences) that leads people in other contexts to believe their
71

A separate relevant strand of research has found that, when facing lowprobability risks, people tend to either dismiss those risks entirely or overweigh the
value of insurance against those risks. See SLOVIC, supra note 56, at 75, 77;
McClelland, supra note 58, at 95, 108-109. This conclusion, however, has
ambiguous implications for the extent to which consumers believe they will suffer
an insurable loss, depending on the side of the bimodal distribution on which an
insured risk falls.
72

Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 401 (1992).
73

David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self Evaluation: The Role of
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2002); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59, at 240.
74

Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).
75

See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 4, 23 (2001-2002).
76

See id. (noting the vast majority of Americans are under-insured against the
risk of dying young); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59 (suggesting most Californians
do not purchase earthquake insurance).
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risk is lower than the average such risk.77 Additionally, however, the actual
difference between low and high quality insurers is ambiguous, in that it
involves numerous considerations that are hard to definitively compare
across insurers, even with all relevant information.78 Research suggests
people tend to interpret such ambiguous information in self-serving ways.79
Given that high quality insurance unambiguously costs more than low
quality insurance, this bias may theoretically manifest itself in consumers
dismissing potential differences in claims handling quality.
Of course, the mere fact that economic conditions in insurance
markets could theoretically lead to insurer-side adverse selection does not
make it so. But many consumer insurance markets do appear to be
characterized by some degree of insurer-side adverse selection, with few
insurers pursuing high-quality, high-price strategies. Aside from the
common (though often anecdotal) observations of commentators
acknowledging this equilibrium,80 significant evidence suggests prominent
national insurers such as Unum/Provident, State Farm, and Allstate have
each recently engaged in systematic, national efforts to cut claims payments

77

See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.

78

See supra text accompanying notes 45-53.

79

Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997).
80

See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291, 1296
(10th Cir. 2000) (observing Blue Cross had "a financial interest in denying claims
in order to remain economically viable as well as competitive within the insurance
industry"); BAKER, supra note 9, at 128 (collecting specific examples of seeming
insurer opportunism); Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1401-26; John Langbein, Trust
Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of
Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2007) (“Even when
insurance is experience rated, the insurer still has an incentive to deny claims,
because the market for insurance services is intensely competitive. Low-cost
providers prevail over high-cost providers.”). But see Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith”
Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 405, 418 (1996)
(arguing that “any insurer who frequently refused to pay covered claims would
likely soon develop a reputation for behaving in this fashion and lose customers,”
but acknowledging that “it is plausible that insurers might occasionally behave
opportunistically without suffering a prohibitive reputational penalty”).
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to policyholders.81 Additionally, the insurance industry plays a significant
role in limiting public access to information about different insurers’ claims
handling quality. For instance, insurers have collectively devoted immense
energy and resources to ensuring that data about their claims handling
quality, which is already collected by state insurance regulators, is not
made publicly available.82 Similarly, studies of insurer marketing and
advertising suggest that individual insurers do not publicly advertise any
concrete information about the quality of their claims handling, preferring
instead vague and unverifiable promises about trust (as well as concrete
promises about price, of course).83 In a market where insurers sought to
compete over the quality of their claims-handling, one would expect that
some insurers would prominently resist these trends.
ii. The Role of Differential Compensation in Explaining
Insurers’ Race to the Bottom
As described above, the two economic conditions that make insurer
side adverse selection a plausible, and seemingly accurate, description of
consumer insurance markets are (i) consumer ignorance about claims
handling quality and (ii) under-appreciation of the significance of this
variable.
This Section suggests that differential compensation of
independent insurance intermediaries is a key contributor to this
equilibrium.
Consumer markets are ordinarily able to overcome informational
problems through the evolution of a network of independent intermediaries
that digest complicated data and objectively present consumers with
advice.84 This process allows consumers to make informed choices that
81

See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE
FARM (2008) (displaying State Farm’s practices); Langbein, supra note 80, at 1318-21
(displaying Unum/Provident’s practices); Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Advocates
Call for Refunds, Rate Reductions, For Allstate Policyholders After Company Releases
Internal Documents Revealing Intentionally Underpaid Customers, REUTERS, Apr. 7,
2008 (displaying Allstate’s practices), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS187467+ 07-Apr-2008+PRN20080407.
82

See documents cited supra note 46.

83

See generally Baker, supra note 52.

84

See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of
Middlemen, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (2006) (describing several economic
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reflect their risk preferences despite their relative lack of understanding
about the underlying market. Just as importantly, it improves the decisionmaking of less sophisticated consumers, by influencing insurers’
reputations through word-of-mouth among consumers.85
In the insurance context, objective and independent market
intermediaries could accomplish these ends by digesting data on claims
handling quality, along with repeated first-hand observation of insurers’
practices, to accurately communicate information about insurers’ claims
handling practices. Such information gathering services are particularly
significant in consumer insurance markets, not simply because of the dearth
of public information on insurers’ claims handling practices,86 but also
because few consumers could independently assess such information, even
if it were publicly available. The quality of an insurer’s claims handling is
not a monolithic concept, and could be constructed in multiple ways, with
differences in metrics appearing significant when they were not, or vice
versa. For instance, data suggesting an insurer denied a relatively high
percentage of claims, or a relatively high number of its consumers sue for
coverage or complain to state regulators, might simply reflect the insurer’s
pool of policyholders, rather than its claims handling practices.87

roles for middlemen, including assisting “consumers by reducing the cost of
product search and evaluation, helping consumers to find the products that best fit
their needs, and helping consumers to manage risk.”).
85

This role of market intermediaries in filtering and processing information for
less sophisticated parties has been extensively discussed in debates on the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, which is often imagined to achieve efficiency through a
similar market intermediation mechanism. See generally Susanna Kim Ripken,
Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in
Corporate Forward Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929 (2005)
(discussing the role of market intermediaries in the efficient capital markets
hypothesis).
86
87

See supra Part II.A.

Insurers have themselves seized on these difficulties in assessing claims
handling data as one of their primary arguments against public disclosure. See
Letter from Wiley Rein to Sandy Praeger, Pres. of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
6 (April 16,2008), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees
_d_data_collection_comments_namic0416.pdf (resisting the public release of
market conduct regulation, because “release of the information in raw form without
the benefit of evaluation and interpretation would be unfair and potentially
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Just as independent and objective sales agents can improve
consumer information, they can also improve consumers’ capacity to
rationally and thoughtfully assess the trade-offs associated with purchasing
relatively high quality insurance. By employing “debiasing” strategies,
intermediaries may be able to counteract the tendency of consumers to
under-appreciate the value of high quality coverage.88 For instance,
research suggests that people who are convinced that a potential loss is
truly random generally no longer perceive they are relatively less likely
than average to suffer from those losses.89 By pointing out just how little
control people have over the financial losses that are the subject of
insurance, independent intermediaries could convince consumers to pay
more for more reliable coverage. Similarly, independent agents might be
able to concretize information about insurers’ relative claims handling,
thereby limiting the ambiguity of risk differentials that can trigger a selfserving interpretation of information. Even if independent intermediaries
could not neutralize these biases, they might be able to counteract them.90
For instance, independent agents could attempt to enhance consumers’
evaluations of the risks attendant to low quality coverage by vividly
describing these risks. Increasing the availability of risks can counteract
consumers’ tendency to underestimate them.91
Differential compensation undermines these market intermediation
mechanisms by distorting the objectivity of the advice independent
damaging to insurers, and misleading to policyholders, investors, and the public at
large.”).
88

See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204-05 (2006).
89

Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 307 (1999); David Dunning,
Chip Heath & Jerry M. Suls, Flawed Self-Assessments: Implications for Health,
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 80 (2004) (“One
of the strongest moderators of unrealistic optimism is perceived control. The
greater a person’s perceived control over an event or its outcome, the stronger the
person’s optimistic bias.”).
90

See Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 48. (“[C]onsumers’ decisions about
insurance can be affected by distortions in their perceptions of risk and by
alternative framing of premium and benefits.”).
91

Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 88.
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insurance agents offer to consumers.92 Agents’ capacity to mitigate
consumer ignorance about insurance and debias consumers in ways that
promote thoughtful consideration of insurance quality depends on agents
prioritizing the interests of those clients. When intermediaries are
incentivized to steer consumers to insurers in order to maximize their
compensation, they are also encouraged to manipulate consumer
preferences and impressions to achieve this outcome. This short-circuits
the ordinary market solutions to informational and decision making
problems in complex consumer markets. As a result, even insurers that are
interested in cultivating a high-price, high-quality market strategy have
limited vehicles for effectively communicating this strategy to potentially
interested consumers. This creates circumstances under which insurer-side
adverse selection with respect to claims handling can (and seemingly does)
flourish.
III.

CRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO DIFFERENTIAL
COMPENSATION

Given the need for reform described in Part II, this Part briefly
concludes by considering a simple legal intervention in insurance markets
that resembles measures adopted in the federally-regulated markets that
relate to Medicare.93 That reform would limit insurer compensation of
independent agents selling consumer lines of coverage to premium-based
commissions, and would require insurers to pay a single, flat commission
rate to all independent agents in their distribution networks. It would not
mandate any particular commission rate, allowing insurers to choose the
rate they wanted to offer to their independent agents. Insurers could set
different premium commission rates for different lines of insurance,
reflecting the fact that different product lines require different levels of
effort for agents. Additionally, insurers could pay different commission
rates to independent agents in different states to account for premium and
cost of living differences across states.
Such reform would largely eliminate the distorting potential of
differential compensation, leaving independent intermediaries without
significant financial reasons to promote the policies of one insurer over
another. Although some insurers might offer slightly higher commission
rates than others, competition would ensure that these differentials would
92

See Section II.A, supra.

93

See Press Release, supra note 15.

2009]

DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION

749

generally be quite small.94 To the extent that differentials in commission
rates persisted, they would be much less problematic than current
commission differentials. Rather than rewarding individual preferred
agents who steered consumers to a particular insurer, they would reflect an
insurer’s decision to offer above market commissions to all independent
agents who sell a particular product line. As noted earlier, such a strategy
might be justifiable for new entrants in a market seeking to establish a
customer base.95 Moreover, a high commission strategy might also be
sensible for insurers offering high-price, high-quality products if the sale of
such products requires comparatively more effort. Indeed, some economics
literature suggests that sales agents in the consumer electronics industry
may receive higher commission rates, on a per-dollar basis, for the sale of
high quality products than low quality products for this reason.96
Not only would a flat compensation rate for an insurer’s
independent agents help to solve the problems identified in Part II, but it
would do so while imposing few administrative costs. A ban on contingent
commissions or other specific compensation arrangements, standing alone,
only invites insurers to design compensation structures that retain the same
basic incentivizing function, but technically comply with the ban. Insurers’
switch from contingent commissions to “supplemental compensation”
arrangements, which retain the same performance-based contingency
structure, is illustrative.97 Because of its simplicity, a mandatory flat rate of
94

Tacit collusion among insurers in setting commission rates would be
unlikely, given the number of insurers who rely on independent agents to distribute
their products.
95

See supra text accompanying note 29 (noting that this was one reason
historically that insurers offered higher premium commission rates).
96

See Ajay Kalra, Mengze Shi, Kannan Srinivasan, Salesforce Compensation
Scheme and Consumer Inference, 655 Management Science (2003).
97

See Sally Roberts, Compensation Shake-Up Continues; Chubb Pays $17M,
Ends All Contingents, BUS. INS., Dec. 25, 2006 (noting that the Chubb agreement
states that “a fixed commission paid to a producer, set prior to the sale of a
particular insurance product, and that may be based on, among other things, the
prior year’s performance of the producer’ is not considered contingent”).
Although some have suggested that these newly-emerging arrangements avoid the
conflicts of interest associated with contingent commissions because they are
“retrospective rather than prospective,” this argument is unpersuasive. The fact
that supplemental compensation arrangements are retrospective merely shifts
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compensation for all intermediaries avoids this inefficient gaming.
Moreover, it would be easy to enforce because it would operate on insurers
rather than intermediaries. There are obviously fewer insurers than
intermediaries (making market conduct observation easier) and insurers are
less likely to engage in outright fraud than individual intermediaries who
have less to lose from doing so.
Of course, mandating that insurers pay their independent agents a
single commission rate is significantly more intrusive than a disclosurebased response to the problem. Not only would it be more costly to employ
than disclosure, but it might distort consumer insurance markets in ways
that may be hard to measure, or even predict. Nonetheless, such an
aggressive intervention is prudent.
First, merely enhancing the disclosure requirements of independent
agents is unlikely to mitigate the risk of steering, and the attendant risks of
insurer-side adverse selection. Although I develop the limits of a
disclosure-based regulatory response elsewhere,98 the basic argument is
simple: as described above, the reason that market forces do not prevent
inefficient steering is that consumers generally have a limited ability to
independently assess their insurance options. Merely informing consumers
that their intermediaries may have a conflict of interest does nothing to
address this fact. Of course, such disclosure could facilitate an agent’s
capacity to eschew differential compensation as a marketing technique.99
But such efforts would be unlikely to prove profitable because consumers
would have little sense of the value of such neutrality.
It is for precisely these reasons that compensation practices in
consumer insurance markets have not, in fact, changed since 2004, despite
the very public revelation of agents’ conflicts of interest at that time and the
adoption of mandatory disclosure laws in a number of states since.100 This
is particularly noteworthy given that numerous intermediaries in
commercial insurance markets have voluntarily disclaimed differential

forward the potential pay-off to intermediaries of steering customers to sub-optimal
insurance. See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 292.
98

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1.

99

As noted above, this is precisely what has happened in commercial
insurance markets.
100

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3064; Cooper, supra note 8, at 100.
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compensation to recruit and retain new clients.101 Simply put, if potential
clients are not attuned to the importance of unbiased advice or the ways in
which advice can be distorted by incentive structures, they will not be
swayed to change their behavior by competitors’ promises of neutrality.
In fact, regulations of structurally similar conflicts of interest in
other industries have often gone beyond disclosure-based strategies for
precisely these reasons.
Differential compensation of insurance
intermediaries is one form of a common type of regulatory problem, coined
a “trilateral dilemma.”102 In a trilateral dilemma, an end-service provider
compensates a market intermediary in order to induce the intermediary to
steer consumers’ business to the end-service provider.103 Regulations of
such side payments often do more than merely require disclosure, for the
precise reasons developed above. Examples include prohibitions against
certain side payments to real estate settlement providers,104 limitations on
side payments that brokerage firms can pay to investment managers,105 and
limitations on attorneys’ receipts of side-payments for referrals to other
attorneys.106
Second, none of the proposed economic rationales for differential
compensation appreciably enhance the efficiency of consumer insurance
markets.107 The most significant such potential benefit of differential
101

See supra text accompanying note 3.

102

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 312-19; Jackson, supra
note 42.
103

Jackson, supra note 42..

104

See 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).

105

See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency
Costs to Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 82-83 (1994); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78b (2008).
106
107

See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(b) (2009).

Aside from the enhanced underwriting theory addressed in the text,
contingent commissions have also been defended because they: (i) may expand
coverage for non-verifiable losses, Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann,
Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 18 (Ctr. for
Fin. Studies, Working Paper Nov. 24, 2005) available at http://www.ifkcfs.de/papers/05 24.pdf.; (ii) protect small agencies, Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at
3042; and (iii) facilitate economies of scale by encouraging intermediaries to work
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compensation is that it can improve the “front-line underwriting” of
independent agents by giving them a stake in insurers’ profitability.108
According to this theory, agents often possess information about the
riskiness of customers that insurers cannot directly observe, as they interact
directly with their customers and may have long standing relationships with
them. Differential compensation that is linked to insurer profitability gives
agents an economic reason to convey truthful information to the insurer.
Alternatively, such compensation may facilitate improved underwriting
simply by causing an agent who believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to
steer that consumer to a different insurer that does not pay differential
commissions.
Whatever purchase this theory may have in commercial insurance
markets, it is simply implausible in the context of consumer insurance lines.
The theory assumes agents do indeed have important underwriting
information about their clients that insurers cannot observe directly. But
insurer underwriting in consumer insurance markets is generally
standardized and based on simple and easily administrable algorithms.109
Even if independent agents did possess information that could not be
captured in an insurance application, it is unlikely that insurers would find

with fewer insurers, Cummins & Doherty, supra, note 4, at 386-89. For reasons
developed in Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 305-11, these
justifications are not persuasive. A final defense of contingent commissions – that
they help small insurers to break into the market – is not in conflict with the
proposal suggested herein, which would permit insurers to offer above-market
premium commission rates.
108

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89; see also Regan & Tennyson,
supra note 20, at 639 (“The agent is the first contact the insurer has with a potential
policyholder and may be able to obtain information about the customer which
would be difficult or costly for the firm to verify. It is widely acknowledged that
agents often employ subjective criteria in evaluating insurance applicants.”).
109

See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 45, at 78 (“[A]n efficient
classification system does not strive to make its premiums equal expected costs
beyond the point where that goal is worth achieving.”). RICHARD V. ERICKSON,
AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 241 (2003)
(“Individual companies are increasingly less likely to undertake their own home
inspection or direct field investigations of an applicant. Instead, more risk
assessment is centralizing into data system operated by information service
companies that supply the insurance industry.”).
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incorporating that information into their underwriting to be cost efficient.110
This is especially true given the lack of adverse selection in most consumer
insurance markets.111
Of course insurance markets, like all markets, change over time.
Thus, rationales for differential compensation that may not be compelling
now may prove significant later. Consequently, any market intervention
should be accompanied with continued monitoring and supervision. But
the need for continuous re-assessment does not absolve lawmakers from
ignoring conflicts of interest in consumer insurance markets that have been
addressed in commercial and federally-regulated insurance markets. The
failure of state lawmakers to act not only undermines the efficiency of
consumer insurance markets, but it blunts the claim that consumer
protection is best secured through the continuation of state-based insurance
regulation.112

110

See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 135 (1970) (explaining how insurers must
adopt easily administrable rules of thumb to operate effectively).
111

See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224-5 (2004).
112

See, e.g., Press Release, NAIC Still in Opposition to Federal Regulation
(Jan. 20, 2009) (On file with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners).
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